Leavening society: the role of religious organisations in integration processes in Norway by Trotter, Stephen Richard
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trotter, Stephen Richard (2019) Leavening society: the role of religious 
organisations in integration processes in Norway. PhD thesis.  
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/75116/ 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge  
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author  
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses  
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
Leavening Society – The Role of Religious Organisations in Integration Processes in 
Norway 
Stephen Richard Trotter 
Master of Art (Social Sciences) , Master of Research 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
School of Social and Political Sciences, College of Social Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
March 2019 
1 
Abstract 
This thesis explores how religious organisations can influence integration 
processes in Norway through a case study of the Catholic Church, a Catholic 
charity, and a Catholic youth association. In order to fully understand the role of 
religious organisations, this thesis also examined secular 
identities/identifications/organisations and how, if at all, they diverge in 
influencing integration processes. I provide an extensive literature review that 
sets up a discursive framework, which allows me to draw together a range of 
concepts and understandings, and to critically analyse the findings in their 
appropriate context. The framework suggests a continuum of understanding 
integration processes, marked by three ideal types: a Redistributie Discourse of 
Exclusion (RED/Redintegration), a Social Integrationist Discourse (SID), and a 
Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD). Rather than imposing a view of integration 
processes on the participants and research, the discursive framework allows them 
to express nuanced understandings of how integration processes operate and how 
they may be shaped. 
Integration processes are processes of societal reconstitution, and require an in-
depth exploration of the contexts in which they occur.  With the religious/secular 
emphasis of the thesis, this entails exploring both constructions of the nation and 
the development of Catholicism in Norway.  Utilising a range of qualitative 
methods, centred on ethnography, I gathered data from multiple organisations, 
religious and secular, and across multiple locations, over the course of fourteen 
months. This continuous, in-depth, qualitative research is essential to capturing 
the processual and contested nature of integration processes. What I discovered 
was that the perception of the end goal of integration processes was fundamental 
to how different organisations influenced integration processes. Similarly, what 
stood out was how the Social Integrationist Discourse was prevalent in both the 
secular and religious organisations. The functional emphasis of SID renders 
perspectives susceptible to Moral Underclass Discourses. The Church and its youth 
organisation, on the other hand, had a more open-ended perspective on 
integration processes, which was also expressed by the migrant research 
participants; exhibiting a Redintegrationist discourse.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 – Leavening understandings of integration processes 
In January 2008, the Norwegian minister for Labour and Social Inclusion met with 
Bp. Eidsvig of the Catholic Diocese of Oslo in order to discuss the positive role of 
the Catholic Church on the integration processes of Polish labour migrants in 
Norway (Katolsk.no, 2008a; 2008b). 2008 was the year migrants from Poland 
became the largest group of migrants in Norway, after nearly 40 years of 
Scandinavian migrants holding the title. Six years later, the Church was accused 
of membership fraud, related to the same migration of Poles, after Polands EU 
accession, to Norway. This forces us to question how the Church influences 
integration processes. For years, the Catholic Church in Norway has claimed to be 
a positive influence on integration processes, but the claim has not been 
thoroughly investigated. It is only the last few years there has been any extensive 
research on the Church’s influence on integration processes in Norway (Erdal, 
2016b; Hovdelien, 2016; Mæland, 2016; Aschim, et al., 2016). Much of this is 
exploratory, as opposed to a full analysis of integration processes. 
 
The title of this thesis draws on a recurring theme and image in Pope Francis’ 
papacy — leaven (Scalfari, 2013; Pope Francis, 2015; 2017; 2018a). Both the 
culinary and intellectual understanding of the term imply raising something, 
improving a combination of ingredients that will result in something greater than 
the sum of its parts. Yet, as anyone familiar with baking can attest to, success is 
never guaranteed, and a myriad of factors might cause something to go awry. 
Importantly, religion is not the only leaven; or as one interviewee, Gunnar from 
Caritas Bergen1, put it ‘what we have tried to do, is to not bake the same cake’. 
There is more than one route to integration, and there is no universal answer as 
to what the end goal is. What shapes integration processes at a local level may 
differ from the regional, national, transnational, global, and individual levels. 
Which does not suggest people, and organisations, do not have ideas of what an 
integrated society is, how it can be achieved, and how they differ.  
 
                                         
1 One of the religious organisations explored in the thesis. 
12 
 
This thesis participates in and contributes to debates on integration processes and 
secularisation. These concepts are explored in depth in chapter 2. As this thesis 
will argue, integration processes are processes of societal reconstitution, and 
therefore are continuous, relational, and contextual. The thesis contributes to the 
secularisation debates, which questions the role of religion in society. This has 
resulted in the decision to explore not only the role of the Church, but to situate 
it in a wider context that extends beyond the religious sphere. It stems from a 
perspective that society should be considered holistically. In other words, we 
cannot consider the role of religion without also considering the role of the non-
religious and everything in between. Furthermore, this thesis builds on previous 
research I have done on the Catholic Church in Norway (Trotter, 2013; Trotter, 
2014).  
 
The thesis utilises statistical data, historical data, policy reports, geographical 
data, participant observation, interviews, and documentary analysis. Therefore, 
the theoretical framework has to be able draw together all these forms of data 
and demonstrate the interrelationship between them. The approach in this thesis 
is reminiscent of Fredrik Barth’s dictum that sociologists and anthropologists ‘be 
like the magpie and steal all that glitters’ (Barth, et al., 1990, p. 215). Although 
referring to the development of theory, the ethnographic approach of this thesis 
draws on the same idea methodologically. Despite an extensive review of 
literature on migration and integration processes, the discursive framework, that 
this thesis is built around, derives from analyses of political language and social 
exclusion (Levitas, 2005). This decision stems from the fieldwork data. The data 
required stepping beyond the concepts and theories developed by migration and 
integration scholars that appeared to offer only a partial analysis.  
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1.2 – Aims and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the nascent field of research on the 
intersections of Catholicism and immigration in Norway. Despite previous studies 
and research, such as by Mæland (2016), Hovdelien (2016), and Aschim et al. 
(2016), none have explicitly included non-religious organisations and individuals. 
This is necessary in order to more fully explore the potential, or lack of, influence 
of religious organisations. The addition of an analysis of secular aspects and the 
intersections with the religious is one of the innovative contributions of this thesis. 
Rather than privileging religion, religious organisations, and religious identities, 
this thesis aims to shed new light on the religious-secular relationship by drawing 
attention to how they can reflect and/or refract each other. This challenges the 
idea that the religious and secular operate in distinct spheres of influence, but 
examines the relationship between them. In response to the stated aim of this 
thesis, I formulated the following research questions: 
 
1. To what extent, and in what ways, do religious and secular identities and 
identifications influence integration processes? 
2. What is the role of the Catholic Church (in Norway) and related institutions 
in integration processes? 
a. How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to 
and perception of integration processes? 
i. How do the responses and perceptions of integration 
processes mirror or diverge from other organisations or 
institutions, such as the state? 
b. How does the relationship between different Catholic organisations 
influence integration processes? 
3. How do secular organisations and activities in Norway impact integration 
processes? 
a. How do secular organisations and institutions, and their members, 
mirror or diverge from each other, and the state, in their 
understanding of integration processes? 
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1.3 – Thesis outline 
In Chapter 2, I delve into the literature pertinent to the thesis. Building up to an 
exploration of theoretical underpinnings of integration processes, I first examine 
processes of migrant identification and categorisation. This stems from the 
perspective that identities are the fundamental components of integration 
processes. The next step is to present and discuss the discursive framework that 
allows us to understand how identities, categorisations, and integration processes 
interact. The discursive framework presents a continuum which allows us to sort 
a vast array of concepts in the integration and migration literature. Applied to the 
data in the substantive chapters, it deepens our understanding of how integration 
processes are viewed and influenced by organisations, migrants, and non-
migrants. Finally, I offer a brief foray into how the discursive framework can help 
us understand how religion and religious organisations can be seen and understood 
in integration processes. 
 
In Chapter 3 I discuss the methods used in pursuit of answers to the research 
questions. As mentioned above, this includes ethnography, interviews, and 
document analysis. Special attention is given to ethnography, as it was the 
principle method used during the data collection process. As ethnography is a 
holistic method, much of what is covered in those sections formulate the 
underlying methodology, where participant observation, interviews, and 
document analysis are tools available to the ethnographer. Subsequently, I 
consider some analytical issues related to the choice of methods, fieldwork sites, 
and data analysis. Following this, I explore issues around reflexivity and the impact 
researcher identities have on the research. Finally, I discuss ethical considerations 
in the research, such as participant anonymity, participant awareness of research 
and consent, and risks in social research. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth look at some of the key factors that shape 
integration processes and establish the context under which those processes 
occur. Beginning with a detailed and extensive breakdown of statistics germane 
to the analyses. This entails an appreciation of historical developments in 
migration patterns, both international and domestic. The next step is to present 
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statistical data in ways that allows us to understand and appreciate the complexity 
and heterogeneity of migrants. Subsequently, I track the development of 
Norwegian policy in the migration and integration field over the last half century, 
and explore how understandings of integration processes have shifted in terms of 
policy. Following this, I devote some space to discussing the particular details 
concerning Bodø and Nordland, the county in which Bodø lies. 
 
As religion is a particular focus of this thesis, Chapter 5 is devoted to exploring 
the particularities of the religious context in Norway. By initially looking at 
religion in Norway generally, it sets the stage for understanding how the Catholic 
Church fits into the overall landscape. In order to appreciate the full value of the 
findings, it is necessary to closely examine the Catholic Church in Norway in detail. 
Bearing in mind the details from the preceding chapter, exploring the 
interconnections between the Catholic Church and immigration in Norway 
provides a background that contributes to dispelling certain notions, such as its 
status as an “immigrant Church”. Rather, as the chapter shows through a close 
scrutiny of demographic and documentary details, the emphasis should be on the 
Church as managing, or attempting to manage, a ‘unity within complex diversity’ 
(Erdal, 2016b, p. 264) while simultaneously negotiating its own place in Norway. 
 
This sets the scene for Chapter 6, exploring how integration processes are 
influenced at Diocesan and Parochial levels. In particular, we see how the rapid 
growth over a relatively short period of time can affect parishes, such as St. 
Eystein in Bodø, and activities in NUK and Caritas. This is also where we see the 
utility of the discursive framework, as it helps distinguish the different influences 
religious organisations can exert on integration processes. The chapter also 
demonstrates how awareness of integration processes can cause shifts in activities 
and goals for the different organisations. 
 
In the following chapter, I explore how a framework developed primarily for the 
analysis of religious organisations by Hirschmann (2004), can benefit from an 
expansion into the secular. In Chapter 7, I explore the pursuit and provision of 
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Hirschmann’s three Rs: resources, refuge, and respectability. Based on my 
findings, focusing on interviews with migrants, I suggest adding a fourth R: 
reciprocity. Examining the interrelation of these concepts, I again draw on the 
discursive framework to demonstrate how the, now four, Rs can influence 
integration processes. 
 
In the third, and final, substantive chapter, I explore how non-migrants in various 
positions of responsibility in Bodø frame activities within their respective 
organisations. By exploring how they perceive their activities, volunteers, and 
migrants, I critically examine the underlying perspectives on integration 
processes. Chapter 8 highlights how understandings of integration processes shift 
based on the context and situations being questioned. Thus, we find that despite 
using the same word, integration, the interviewees demonstrate vastly different 
discursive traits when focusing on influencing integration processes emphasising 
non-migrants’ experiences of shifting demographics or migrants’ arrival and 
needs. 
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1.4 – Thesis contributions 
Finally, in the conclusion I draw attention to the key contributions of this thesis. 
The application of the discursive framework throughout the chapters, 
demonstrates how integration processes are perceived, understood, and 
influenced. It also shows how an emphasis on discourse can allow us to go beyond 
the religious-secular continuum and understanding, and demonstrates the 
similarities between two supposedly contrary spheres of influence. The scope of 
this thesis offers a significant contribution to the understanding of how religion 
can influence integration processes. Through the synthesis of previous literature 
on integration processes, a critical understanding of Norwegian nation-building 
and Catholic doctrine and structures, and findings, I have adapted a discursive 
framework that allows us to see how multiple actors, organisational and 
individual, religious and secular, influence integration processes based on their 
conceptualisations of integration and their discourses around it. 
   
18 
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical framework 
2.1 – Introduction 
This chapter will outline and discuss the various concepts and theoretical 
underpinnings of this thesis. Constructing a theoretical framework is crucial to 
satisfactorily answering the questions this thesis asks. Here, I explore and discuss 
key concepts, such as identities and identification, and integration. In order to 
analyse the research material, and thereby provide some answers to the research 
questions, I propose a discursive framework. This framework allows us to 
distinguish the nuances contained in the language around migration and 
integration processes, and to point to the potential impact of the different 
discourses. The research questions are as follows: 
 
1. To what extent, and in what ways, do religious and secular identities and 
identifications influence integration processes? 
2. What is the role of the Catholic Church (in Norway) and related institutions 
in integration processes? 
a. How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to 
and perception of integration processes? 
i. How do the responses and perceptions of integration 
processes mirror or diverge from other organisations or 
institutions, such as the state? 
b. How does the relationship between different Catholic organisations 
influence integration processes? 
3. How do secular organisations and activities in Norway impact integration 
processes? 
a. How do secular organisations and institutions, and their members, 
mirror or diverge from each other, and the state, in their 
understanding of integration processes? 
 
This chapter will focus on notions of identity and identification, as these notions 
inherently underpin all theoretical understandings of integration processes, which 
are discussed in section 2.4. Emphasising the most relevant markers of identity 
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relevant to migration, integration, and the questions of this thesis, I will first 
explore the triumvirate of identities: religious, ethnic, and national (REN). These 
three were chosen due to their interconnectedness (Baumann, 1999), and to a 
certain extent for their prevalence. REN identities are susceptible to criticisms of 
rigidity and encouraging a static understanding of identities, justifiably so, but 
this renders them, at a glance, easy to spot. To turn an axiom on its head: 
sometimes you have to see the forest before you can investigate the tress. 
 
This is not to suggest that gender, sexuality, and age are not relevant, nor is this 
list exhaustive. Transnational, diasporic, or cosmopolitan identities are often 
offered as modifications to our understandings of the above identities (Vertovec, 
2001), and are occasionally pertinent to the analysis, but was not a specific focus 
of this thesis due to limitations of space, resources, and scope. Regional identities, 
at both supranational (such as a Nordic identity) and sub-state levels (Northern v 
Southern Norwegian, urban v rural), are also relevant in certain contexts, and 
discussed as they become relevant in this thesis. Intrinsic to this discussion is the 
contextual nature of identities and identification processes, contexts that are 
explored and discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
The research questions also necessitate a discussion of another identity, that of 
“migrant”. Breaking down migrant identities is essential in order to demonstrate 
relationships of power, and critically examining organisations that engage with 
migrants. Labelling and categorisation of migrants is an essential component of 
differentiating and legitimizing experiences of migration and responses to 
migration by both state apparatuses and other organisations, such as those 
discussed in this thesis (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Despite their permeation of 
processes of categorisation, the understanding of migrant identities through 
processes of identity formation and identification is rarely highlighted.  
 
From there, we can have a fruitful discussion of the nature of integration and the 
concomitant field. The emphasis here is not on individuals (or places) in need of 
integration, i.e. migrants and their environs, but on the various aspects of 
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integration that underpin preconceptions of “successful” versus “failed” 
integration. This area is fraught with concepts and terminology in need of 
clarification. The discussion will attempt to carve a path through the jungle of 
competing understandings and highlight this thesis’ base premise when referring 
to integration, a concept Robinson (1998, p. 118) characterised as ‘chaotic’. The 
contestation of keywords is neatly summarised by Salazar (2017, p. 7): 
 
[Keywords] never acquire a closed or final meaning (not even within 
one domain or discipline). The meaning of a keyword is never settled 
until it truly disappears from common use or its scholarly paradigm 
goes into decline. As keywords acquire new meanings, they do not 
shed old ones. Historically, keywords accumulate meanings, 
sometimes contradictory ones, and even when one is dominant, 
others remain available and can be reaffirmed. Moreover, keywords 
rarely shift their meaning in isolation but rather in conjunction with 
others. 
 
The clarification of keywords and concepts will result in a discursive framework, 
which I will subsequently apply to the role of religion and religious organisations 
impact on integration processes. This serves as an example of how the framework 
will be applied throughout this thesis, where the full depth and breadth of the 
context can provide a clear picture. This chapter, therefore, attempts to distil 
the relevant literature and strengthen our understanding of these contested 
keywords that are at the heart of the discussion. That is not to suggest they will 
cease to be contested, but that this thesis attempts to facilitate a clear, coherent 
answer to the research questions. 
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2.2 – Identification and categorisation – From individuals to groups 
Identities are to Sociology what elements are to Chemistry. Two related questions 
need exploring in order to understand Identities: firstly, what are they and how 
are they formed? Secondly, how do they work? Pursuing these questions derives 
from the question of why they matter, which is, for now, explained by the view 
that ‘identity tends to promote social cohesion’,  what Holtug calls ‘the “Identity 
Thesis”’ (Holtug, 2017, p. 1084). He makes a distinction between two forms of 
identity, a social identity and personal identity; although he fails to critically 
examine these categories.  
 
They bear a resemblance to Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000, p. 15) ‘relational and 
categorical modes of identification’, respectively. According to Holtug (2017, p. 
1086), the social identity derives from the knowledge of being a member of a 
social group, thus it is an identity contingent upon a relationship, imagined or 
real, to others. This is comparable to one of Brubaker and Cooper’s “key uses” of 
identity, referring to identity as a ‘collective phenomenon’ (2000, pp. 7, 15)2, 
which they prefer to analyse as relational identification. Hall (2015, p. 394) refers 
to identities in this sense as ‘the names we give to the different ways we are 
positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past’. 
 
The personal identity stems from an individual’s unique characteristics and traits 
(Holtug, 2017), which Brubaker and Cooper (2000, pp. 7,15) understand as 
pointing to ‘something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational’, the 
categorical identification. These distinctions do not imply clear, bounded types of 
identities, merely ways of understanding how they are used, bearing in mind 
FitzGerald’s (2012) admonition to not construct boundaries, categories, and 
identities out of force of habit but to be critically aware of the processes of 
construction, interaction, and prioritisation. This processual perspective is neatly 
captured by Hall (2015, p. 395) wherein identities are ‘not an essence but a 
positioning’. I will return to this below. 
                                         
2 Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 7) also suggest a relationship between social cohesion and the 
collective phenomenon – ‘This sameness is expected to manifest itself in solidarity, in shared 
dispositions or consciousness, or in collective action’ 
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A fundamental premise of the onward discussion is that an individual has multiple, 
intersecting, and overlapping identities (Amelina & Faist, 2012), hence an aversion 
to utilising the singular form “identity”. This approach incorporates the argument 
from Brubaker and Cooper (2000) that, analytically, the concept of identification 
is more fruitful. Identification emphasises the internally oriented (Jenkins, 2000), 
processual, and relational nature of identities, hence if we seek to understand a 
singular identity it needs to be seen in relation to other identities, be they one’s 
own or someone else’s.  
 
This is contrasted with “categorisation”, which is an external form of 
identification (Jenkins, 2000). The key detail is how categories are not self-
ascribed, but the result of the use of ‘material and symbolic resources to impose 
[categories], classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting 
[…]’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 16)3. Although the state is a prime example of 
the use of categorisation, states are not alone in imposing categories: processes 
of categorisation also take place through public narratives and in everyday life 
(Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). These two points hint at relationships of power 
(Jenkins, 2000), whereby an individual may not choose which identity is relevant 
in a situation or context, or that it may be contested, and an individual may be 
denied an identity4. This is fundamental to understanding integration processes, 
as discussed below. 
 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) describe identities as characterised by three 
elements: (1) categorical commonality, the sharing of an attribute; (2) relational 
connectedness, having a network sharing the relevant identity; and (3) a feeling 
of belonging. They function both as identifications and as categorisations. As 
categorisations, for example by the state, they are used to define, differentiate, 
demarcate, and isolate groups, and to subsequently apply a policy to them 
(Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). As Jenkins (2000), and Bartram, et al. (2014), argue 
                                         
3 See also Jenkins (2000, p. 19) 
4 For example, claiming two national identities or religious identities may be contested, and the 
individual forced to choose one over the other. 
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categorisation is essential for the management of complexity of the social world, 
to the point where these concepts appear natural.  
 
Furthermore, categorisation can offer a false sense of the timelessness of 
identities, and rarely display an appreciation of the history and trajectories of 
how identities are socially constructed and made relevant (Polzer, 2008)5. As 
Brubaker and Cooper remark, categorisation does not imply anything ‘about the 
depth, resonance, or power of such categories in the lived experience of the 
persons so categorized’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, pp. 26-27). Yet, 
categorisations can be internalized (Jenkins, 2000), and give categorisations a 
sense of legitimacy. Similarly, categorisations can provoke resistance. These 
processes are integral to later discussions. 
 
2.2.1 – Religious identities, identifications, and categorisations 
The first research question this thesis seeks to answer pertains to the role of 
identities and identifications in integration processes. Having discussed general 
ideas around identities and identification, as well as categorisation, above, I turn 
to the three identities I have identified as most pertinent to this thesis. 
 
Exploring each of the REN identities in turn6, I will begin with Religious Identities, 
as it forms a significant part of this thesis. To reiterate Brubaker and Cooper’s 
point above, religious identifications or categorisations do not imply depth, 
resonance, or the power of these identities. That is to a certain extent captured 
by the concept religiosity. Putnam (2007) argues that religious identities are 
uniquely situated to cut across ethnic or national identities, which is not to suggest 
they are alone in that. It can be argued that religious and national identities are 
both privileged in part due to the notion that these identities can “be done 
something about”, through conversion and naturalisation7, thereby mitigating or 
                                         
5 See, for example, Umut Özkirimli (2000) on ‘Primordialism’ as a paradigm within studies of 
nationalism 
6 Note, this does not suggest they exist and operate independently of each other. Rather the 
opposite, they often overlap. 
7 The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, for example, specifically refers to an individual’s 
right to change their nationality (article 15) or religion (article 18), whereas ethnicity is not 
mentioned in the same way (United Nations, 2018) 
24 
 
limiting an imposition of a religious or national identity. That is not to suggest 
religious identities, or national identities, have an unmitigated positive effect on 
integration processes, as that is context-dependent.  
 
Looking more closely of what religious identities are, I refer back to Holtug’s 
(2017) argument that the Identity Thesis is premised on social cohesion consisting 
of shared values. Religious identities involve sharing values characterised by 
reference to a religion and the construction of something sacred (Hall, 1995). For 
brevity, I will provide Knott’s definition of religion: ‘social relations given meaning 
by a certain type of ideology, set of traditions, values, and ritual practices’ (Knott, 
2005, p. 134). Religious identities also involve relationships to places constructed 
as important, such as places of worship8 or sites of pilgrimage9 (Rose, 1995). 
Religion, and religious identities, can therefore be seen as a ‘system of organizing 
meaning, based upon identification with a chain or line of belief’ (Hervieu-Léger, 
2000).  
 
Religion, and religious identities, are often contrasted with secularism and ideas 
of secularity. As in the research questions of this thesis, it is assumed that the 
secular operates differently or separately from the religious, a distinction which 
is not fruitful. Rather than seeing it as a binary relationship of religious-secular, 
the relationship between the two concepts is highly complex (Asad, 2003). I return 
to secularism and secularisation processes in section 2.4.3. Contrasting secular 
and religious identities, as in the research questions, merely recognises that there 
a range of identities and identification processes that exist and operate with 
varying degrees of reference to religion, religious authority, organisations, 
communities, groups, and institutions. 
 
                                         
8 Churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, etc.  
9 Such as Mecca for Muslims, Rome for Catholics, or Jerusalem for Jews, Christians, and Muslims. 
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2.2.2 – Ethnic identities, identifications, and categorisations 
Moving on to Ethnicity, identities shaped around this concept are highly elusive. 
Whereas religious identities attempt to reference some sacred truth contained 
within a religion, ethnic identities are more malleable. As Fredrik Barth posited 
in one of his most significant pieces: ‘The features that are taken into account [in 
ethnic identities] are not the sum of “objective” differences, but only those which 
the actors themselves regard as significant’ (Barth, 1998[1969], p. 14). Add to the 
mix that ethnic identities are not homogeneous (Macdonald, 1993) and can be 
layered10, it is essential to underline the need for a critical understanding of how, 
as categorisations, ethnic identities are constructed (Polzer, 2008) and 
determined by context (Rothschild, 1981). This thesis sees ethnicity from a 
Constructivist perspective, as opposed to the defined, fixed, and timeless 
perspective of Primordialists. 
 
Khosravi (2012) demonstrates how even names can be imbued with an ‘ethnic tag’, 
which points to the pervasive nature of categorisations and how identities can be 
imposed or assumed. These ethnic categorisations are then taken to imply 
something about an individual or a group (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2018). It becomes 
even more complex as culture is often tied to ethnic identities, necessitating a 
clarification of what is meant by culture. As with religion above, there is a vast 
plethora of material discussing and defining culture, most of which it is infeasible 
to cover here. As a starting point, I offer Bauböck’s (1996a) summary: 
 
[Culture] refers, on the one hand, to complex systems of symbols and ideas 
that human beings use in their communication; and on the other hand, to 
comprehensive ways of life or to societal communities whose members 
share a system of symbols and ideas. In a shorthand manner, we may speak 
about culture as language and culture as community. 
       Bauböck (1996a, p. 89) 
 
This rudimentary understanding of culture allows us to attempt some clarification, 
if only by virtue of establishing ethnic identities as a means of ‘rendering cultural 
differences comparable’ (Eriksen, 2014, p. 170), or ‘dialectical cultural 
                                         
10 Such as Scottish to British to Anglo-Saxon, or Norwegian to Scandinavian to Germanic. 
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differentiation’ (Jenkins, 1997, p. 13). By seeing ethnic identities in relation to 
culture, we simultaneously harken back to Holtug’s social identity and Brubaker 
and Cooper’s relational identification: culture, as ethnicity, should not be 
understood as categorical identification. This implies, and to a certain degree 
necessitates, an understanding that forces groupness. 
 
Bloch and McKay (2015) refer repeatedly to the role of language in the 
construction of ethnic identities amongst employers within ethnic enclaves. 
Similarly, Phinney, et al. (2006), make repeated connections between language 
and ethnic identities. Additionally, as will be shown in the empirical chapters, 
language is often presented as one of the key factors influencing integration 
processes, echoing Phinney, et al. (2006, p. 78), argument that language 
proficiency is seen as a key indicator of acculturation by drawing a distinction 
between ‘ethnic and national language’.  
 
Ethnic identities and its attributes, in this case language, serves as a point of 
comparison to another group defined by another language. It is important to keep 
in mind that a language can function as both an ethnic language and national 
language, depending on the context. People being capable of speaking, and 
mastering, multiple languages complicate this, thus rendering dialects and 
accents pertinent to our understanding11. Language, therefore, is a highly 
problematic foundation for the construction of ethnic identities, reminding us 
again that ethnic identities are not about objective differences, but perceived 
differences between an “us” and “them”. 
 
Secondly, an important element of ethnic groups is a ‘belief shared by its members 
that, however distantly, they are of common descent’ (Jenkins, 1997, pp. 9-10). 
This common descent has a reciprocal relationship with culture as a way of life as 
it becomes tied to a relationship with, and adaptation to, an imagined place, 
which can be either a region or country and leads us perilously close to 
                                         
11 I return to this in the next chapter, when discussing my own processes of identification and 
researcher reflexivity. 
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conceptions of nationalism (Rothschild, 1981; Weber, 1978; Anderson, 2006). This 
ecological perspective is also found in Fredrik Barth’s work (Barth, 2007).  
 
The relationship to place and ecology brings ethnicity close to the concept of race 
and can draw on appearance as an element of commonality/difference. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of Norway, where negotiations of belonging are 
tied to notions of “looking or acting Norwegian” (Lynnebakke & Fangen, 2011; 
Erdal & Strømsø, 2016; Erdal, et al., 2017; Alghasi, et al., 2006a). Guðjónsdóttir 
and Loftsdóttir (2017) offer an interesting case of racialisation in a Norwegian 
context, in that the term “immigrant” is racialized and applied to ‘people who 
are or have “Third World” origin, different values from the majority, “dark skin” 
[and] the privilege of Western migrants: to be referred to by their nationality […]’ 
(pp. 799-800). A similar pattern is found by Friberg and Midtbøen (2018) in their 
exploration of ethnic hierarchies in low-wage labour markets in Norway. 
 
As mentioned above, ethnic identities function as an identity based on 
differentiation of “us vs them”, at the same time as they are ‘not conditioned 
either by political or economic or religious factors [but] come into existence by 
way of migration […]’ (Weber, 1978, p. 392)12. In other words, although ethnic 
identities can draw on political, economic, or religious factors, ethnic identities 
do not arise from them but rather from contact with elements dissimilar to their 
own (Brubaker, 2004; Baumann, 1999; Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994) and cannot be 
seen independent of those factors (Rothschild, 1981). Importantly, this 
emphasises how ethnic identities is something possessed by both majorities and 
minorities, not only by the “Other”. 
 
Ironically, ethnic identities can be fiercely mobilised (Rothschild, 1981) and are 
‘readily accessible’ (Brubaker, 2004, p. 17), but simultaneously ‘unsuitable for a 
really rigorous analysis’ (Weber, 1978, p. 395). As far as the analysis of this thesis 
is concerned, there has to be an awareness of how the malleability of ethnic 
identities can lead to a ‘“coding bias”’ (Brubaker, 2004, p. 92). In the discussions 
                                         
12 See also Barth (1998[1969]) 
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surrounding integration processes, ethnic identities become important because 
they can be constructed as identities ‘that defines and accepts them for what they 
are, rather than by what they do’ (Rothschild, 1981, pp. 5-6), rendering them 
susceptible to calcification and hardening based on perceptions of security and 
safety (Barth, 1998[1969]). Ethnic identities, therefore, relate to power structures 
and processes of securitisation in society and are at risk of becoming rigid and 
constrictive (Rothschild, 1981; Fenton, 2003). In order to ensure fluidity, and 
challenge these power structures, there are a range of theoretical approaches and 
measures that are explored later in the chapter when discussing integration 
processes.  
 
Before concluding this section, I need to address the concept and understanding 
of race in this thesis, as it has hitherto been absent. This is partly due to a relative 
absence of a critical exploration of race and racialisation in Norway13, an absence 
noted by Gullestad in 2004. In particular, I seek to draw from perspectives of 
critical whiteness and focus on an astute theorisation by Owen (2007): 
 
[A] functional property of whiteness is that its borders are 
continuously being redefined, entailing that analyses of whiteness’s 
functioning must always be grounded in specific contexts of its 
manifestation 
Owen, 2007, p. 206 
 
Critical whiteness problematises and focuses on the role of power and privilege, 
challenging the normalisation of it as belonging to those deemed white. Rather 
than exploring where power is not, critical whiteness draws our attention to where 
power is situated and why. In the case of Norway, I argue, as Gullestad (2002), 
that race, and whiteness, has been redefined in terms of ethnicity and nationality. 
This is seen, for example, in Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) findings that 
Icelanders are positioned ‘highly desirable compared to other migrant groups due 
to the intersection of perceived racial belonging and nationality’ (pp. 803-804). 
Another argument in support of this is the similarity between Owen’s argument 
that whiteness can be used as ‘a form of property that defines identities, is a 
                                         
13 For a critical exploration of race and racialisation in Norway, see Gullestad (2002; 2004; 2005) 
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resource to be used at will, and has systematic consequences […]’ (2007, p. 211) 
and Friberg and Midtbøen’s findings that, in Norway, ‘ethnicity has become a 
signifier of suitability for particular jobs, or even as a skill in itself’ (2018, p. 
1476). In this sense, ethnicity can communicate a degree of whiteness (Gullestad, 
2004). I return to this in depth in section 4.4.2, in exploring policy developments 
and the shifts in understandings of “likhet”, Norwegianness, and whiteness. 
 
Whiteness, according to Bonnett (1998), does not operate uniformly: rather, it 
can expand and contract, and shapes, and is shaped by, gender and class. This 
argument is also made by Levine-Rasky (2011), who argues from an 
Intersectionality perspective, that ‘class and ethnicity will reinforce each other in 
some circumstances and they will contradict each other in different 
circumstances’ (p. 248). The key element to keep in mind is that whiteness can 
function insidiously to shape ‘the cultural stock of knowledge [and] background 
presumptions we unavoidably draw upon in everyday communicative interactions’ 
(Owen, 2007, p. 212). In other words, although the language of race and whiteness 
is conspicuously absent in Norway, its effects are not. Rather, it is masked by the 
language around ethnicity, nationality, and categorisations of migrant identities 
such as refugee, asylum-seeker, and migrant labour. 
 
2.2.3 – National identities, identifications, and categorisations 
National identities are framed around ideas of a national culture that embodies 
values and beliefs (Rose, 1995; Castles & Miller, 2009; Jenkins, 1997), and are 
produced discursively through ‘[…] education, literature, painting, the media, 
popular culture, the historical heritage, the leisure industry, advertising, 
marketing, etc.’ (Hall, 1995, p. 184). The risk, when discussing national identities, 
is that it presents the nation/state as a natural entity; this fallacy is known as 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Chernilo, 2006).  
 
National identities are often constructed as highly exclusive, where ‘nothing was 
inherited from “others”’ (Berggren, 1993, p. 51), and in opposition to an “Other”. 
National identities are further complicated by their relationship to nationality and 
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citizenship, where the concepts are often used interchangeably. Marshall, for 
example, argues ‘citizenship […] is, by definition, national’ (Marshall, 1950, p. 
12). All of this combined leads to a complex relationship between the processes 
of identification and categorisation. Hence, the next paragraphs will attempt to 
disentangle these concepts. 
 
Beginning with citizenship, an influential, but not without its flaws, theory by T. 
H. Marshall (1950), provides us with a starting point for a discussion. Marshall 
characterised citizenship as comprising of three parts: civil, political, and social. 
The civil component is comprised of rights pertaining to justice and freedom. The 
political element relates to the right to participate ‘in the exercise of political 
power’ (Marshall, 1950, p. 11). Finally, the social portion concerns the most 
malleable parts of citizenship, namely ‘from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society’ 
(Marshall, 1950, p. 11).  
 
Other scholars offer a similar breakdown: firstly, citizenship is a legal status; 
secondly, citizenship can be practiced (the notion of active citizenship); finally, 
citizenship can be an identity defined by its relationship to rights and obligations 
(Damsholt, 2012; Bartram, et al., 2014; Joppke, 2008). Emotions can also feature 
prominently when discussing citizenship either as practice or identification 
(Askins, 2016; Birkvad, 2017), adding yet another layer to our understanding of 
the processes and reminding us to not be blinded by the ‘rational-legal mask [of] 
the modern state’ (Asad, 2003, p. 22). 
 
Marshall (1950, p. 28) expressed this as a shift from a ‘status bestowed on those 
who are full members of a community’ to understanding citizenship as practicing 
and identifying with that identity, in effect internalising it. This is not to suggest 
Marshall had an entirely individualistic, and passive, understanding of citizenship, 
as he also argued that citizenship requires, rather than incites a ‘direct sense of 
community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common 
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possession’ (emphasis added) (Marshall, 1950, pp. 40-41). The distinction is thus 
whether citizenship precedes internalisation of an identity or if citizenship should 
be the proof of that internalisation (Jurado, 2008), as will be discussed below in 
terms of whether a state emphasises rights or duties in the process of constructing 
and defining citizenship and the concomitant hierarchies of belonging, rights, and 
claims-making. 
 
What citizenship, according to Marshall, offers, is a replacement for ‘differential 
status associated with class, function and family’ (Marshall, 1950, p. 34). In other 
words, citizenship, and by extension national identities, seek to override other 
identities (Jenkins, 1997; Østerud, 1984), which is challenged by de-territorialized 
identities such as diasporic or transnational identies. This desire to override other 
identities can be seen in the introduction of citizenship ceremonies, where the 
goal is often to ‘make [citizenship] not only a formality and legal contract, but fill 
it with moral and emotional content’ (Aagedal, 2012a, p. 10; Aagedal, 2012b). 
There is a tension between the political, legalistic nature of citizenship (the 
categorisation aspect) and the emotional, communal ideal of national identities 
(the identification aspect) (Erdal & Strømsø, 2016).  
 
This is further complicated where denizenship can be contrasted with citizenship: 
when limited rights are afforded those living and working within the political unit 
of the nation without having full membership (Brochmann, 2012; Damsholt, 2012). 
In denizenship, there is access to the civil and social elements of citizenship, as 
they are premised on ideas such as a universal right to justice and that access to 
welfare is contingent upon contribution, but access to the political sphere is 
limited and stratified14.  
 
In understanding national identities, it is important to briefly explore the notion 
of nationalism. It is nationalism that forces a bifurcation of denizenship and 
citizenship, as it ties citizenship inextricably to engagement with a political 
system and emotions (Leith & Soule, 2011; Østerud, 1984). Yet, nationalism also 
                                         
14 Naturally, this varies between states 
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seeks to evoke passion and emotions regarding a place15. This understanding puts 
national identities close to ethnic identities, blurring the boundaries between the 
two (Østerud, 1984), establishing an ethnic nationalism. This blurring is clearly 
demonstrated by Bechhofer and McCrone (in Leith & Soule, 2011), in the case of 
Scotland: 
 
National identity in Scotland is an unquestioned fact of birth and 
upbringing in the main, and most people carry it around with them 
in a taken-for-granted way. They articulate certain common features 
of being Scottish. They possess and mobilise shared identity markers 
such as: birth and upbringing, ancestry and parentage, residence, 
accent, a sense of commitment and belonging, as well as a set of 
cultural symbols – sport, humour, landscape and languages. 
 Bechhofer and McCrone, in Leith and Soule, 2011, p.99 
 
This sets up criteria for inclusion and exclusion, echoing Brubaker (2004). National 
identities become something that have to be performed and asserted, as opposed 
to merely ascribed (Hall, 1995). This applies unevenly, where some have to prove 
their national identities whereas others take it for granted. The expression of this 
comes in the rhetoric and notion of “active citizenship”, where duties and 
responsibilities take primacy over rights. A highly political concept, it draws on 
the notion of ‘an imagined community created through relationships with each 
other’ (Erdal & Strømsø, 2016, p. 3) and can be manipulated to create notions of 
“good/active” and “bad/passive” citizens. This form of nationalism finds it 
expression in civic nationalism. The tension between the rights and duties of 
citizenship and national identities is neatly illustrated by Borevi (2010). 
 
 Rights-line Duty-line 
1. Main responsibility Society Individual 
2. Main instrument for 
governance 
Resources Incentives 
3. Source of legitimacy Universal system 
[inclusive] 
Selective system 
[exclusive] 
                                         
15 I use “place”, as opposed to nation/state/political unit as nationalism is not premised on the 
existence of a political unit, but can also express the desire for one, see also Rose (1995) 
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Table 1 - Ideal-typical notions of integration concerning the relation between rights and duties (reproduced 
from Borevi, 2010: p.28) 
 
An emphasis on either rights or duties indicates an approach to integration and 
citizenship (Jurado, 2008). By accentuating the duties of a citizen, or someone 
claiming the national identity, integration/inclusion is contingent upon the 
individual, where rights are seen as an incentive to performing the duties, and the 
identity is legitimised through its exclusivity. Jurado (2008) identifies this as an 
assimilationist approach. Likewise, a rights-orientation implies that society is 
ultimately responsible for integration/inclusion, rights are seen as resources in 
facilitating that process, and national identities are legitimised through its 
inclusiveness: an approach characterised as civic nationalism or multiculturalism 
(Leith & Soule, 2011; Jurado, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, the idea of a nation can also attach itself to religious identities 
(Weber, 1978), readily evidenced by constitutional declarations of ‘Christian and 
humanist heritage’16 or such as ‘The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the Danish 
People’s Church […]’17, ‘Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the 
Book of God’18, or ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost 
place […]’ (Lovdata, 2018a; grundloven.dk, 2018; WIPO, 1992; Constitute, 2018d). 
Even the EU resolved to add a reference to ‘the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe’ in the Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2007).  
 
On the other hand, you have constitutions that proclaim ‘France shall be an 
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic’ (emphasis added); ‘This 
charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and 
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians’ (emphasis added); and 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof […]’19 (Constitute, 2018a; Constitute, 2018b; Constitute, 
2018c). 
                                         
16 The Norwegian Constitution as of 2018, earlier versions referred only to Christian heritage 
17 The Danish Constitution as of 2018, “People’s Church” is a translation of “folkekirke” 
18 Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia 
19 1st Amendment of the US Constitution 
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This relationship is not static, and changes over time, as well as not being as 
simple or straightforward as a constitutional clause or amendments would imply. 
Drawn to its extreme, national identities can assimilate most other identities and 
metamorphose into ideas of distinct, hierarchised civilisations20 or present 
themselves as ‘supreme moral [communities]’ (Baumann, 2010, p. 48)21 
emphasising exclusive, inclusive, pluralist, republican, secular, religious, 
democratic, monarchical, or socialist traits.  
 
Drawing this section to an end, it has sought to describe the nature of three forms 
of identities that regularly feature in discussions of migration and integration. 
Discussing these identities separately does not imply they exist or manifest in 
isolation, rather the opposite. It is because they are so thoroughly interwoven it 
is necessary to explore them separately, and by understanding the parts we can 
endeavour to see the whole picture. The important understanding to take from 
this section is the relationship between identification and categorisation, and how 
identities are manipulated. In other words, although I have attempted to 
differentiate between the three in terms of content, there is no firm rule on the 
separation: religious identities can be seen as expressions of ethnic or national 
identities, and vice versa.   
                                         
20 This is stance is best exemplified by Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilisations (Huntington, 
1993) 
21 For more on this, see for example Fox (2012), Haynes (2010), and Norris and Inglehart (2011) 
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2.3 – Migration and identity 
Identities relating to the processes of migration are integral to later discussions. 
With the above identities, there are processes of identity formation: religious 
identities usually involve a ritual or process of initiation or conversion; national 
identity can be apotheosized through citizenship ceremonies (for new citizens), 
or notions of sacrifice22; and ethnic identities are often seen as innate. A question 
that needs to be asked is what heralds migrant identities? On a general level, 
migrant identities can readily be identified as resulting from migration. Bearing in 
mind, as above, both processes of identification and categorisation, migration 
processes can result in a variety of identities, as encounters activate and situate 
a number of identities. Some which are rendered invisible, others that are 
considered problematic. These processes tie into issues of colonialism, racism, 
nationalism. 
 
What this section seeks to do, is to provide a framework for understanding the 
process of identity-formation relating to migrant identities. By questioning the 
process of identity-formation, we can critically examine the range of identities 
associated with migration processes. At its most fundamental, migration is a 
process of exclusion (King, 1995): a juxtaposition of sedentary versus mobile. 
Because of the dominance of nation-states, migration is usually understood to be 
either internal, within the territorial borders of a nation-state, or international, 
outwith the borders of a nation-state.  
 
This can lead to processes of categorisation establishing different identities with 
similar underlying characteristics that are only distinguished by the crossing of a 
border, such as internally displaced persons versus refugee. Aspects of temporality 
are also significant, as they lead to categorisations of tourists versus immigrants. 
Despite processes of categorisation seeming commonsensical, processes of 
identification are, in this context, more elusive. For the purpose of this thesis, 
migration will refer to international migration, and internal migration will only be 
                                         
22 Encapsulated by the expression ‘Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’ – ‘What joy, for 
Fatherland to die’ 
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touched upon as necessary. I also define a migrant as anyone who has crossed an 
international border.  
 
The justification for such a broad definition lies in the need to see “migrant” as a 
keyword, with a multitude of connotations. The separation of one form of 
population movement from another derives in part from distinctions of time, 
distance, intention, and circumstance. These are components in the 
categorisation of migrants: labelling some as tourists, refugees, pilgrims, student, 
labourers, etc. A broad definition presupposes only a starting point, whereas the 
categorisations ascribe a range of assumptions and connotations which are 
contextual. This definition allows us to draw on Rothchild’s (1981) point from 
section 2.2.2: should migrants be defined by what they are or what they have 
done? As researchers, we can only establish, with some degree of certainty, when 
an international border has been crossed, and even that can be contested23. 
 
The above definition risks re-affirming issues of methodological nationalism and 
perpetuating notions of the sanctity of a territory (Van Gennep, 1960) and the 
importance of boundaries (Massey, 1995). It privileges processes of categorisation, 
which forces us to tread carefully. Migrant identities, as results of processes of 
categorisation and identification, should be scrutinised. Particularly in relation to 
this thesis, due to its organisational focus, it is important to note how there are 
multiple processes of categorisation. Processes of identification are similarly 
varied and context-dependent and allows us to question the importance of migrant 
identities and whether they are meaningful.  
 
There are a range of factors impacting migration processes. Leaving aside mental 
and emotional aspects for now, the physical aspect of migration can be divided 
into three phases: leaving, journeying, and arriving (or, in some cases, returning). 
The problems arise when assumptions are made about what this does to the 
migrant: how, if at all, does leaving, journeying, and arriving/returning change 
                                         
23 For example, Australia’s Pacific Solution, which detains migrants to Australia outwith Australia’s 
border. 
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the migrant. What are the mental and emotional aspects? Migration is both an 
assertion of difference and similarity. In order to understand migration’s potential 
to influence identity formation, we can draw on Turner’s concept of Communitas: 
‘[it] emerges where social structure is not’ and emphasises notions of liminality 
and change that ‘[transgress] or [dissolve] the norms that govern structured or 
institutionalised relationships and is accompanied by experiences of 
unprecedented potency’ (Turner, 1969, pp. 126, 128). 
 
Let us start at the beginning: the process of leaving. There are, at least, two 
elements to take into account: ‘structural elements that enable and constrain the 
exercise of agency by social actors’, hereafter known as drivers (Van Hear, et al., 
2018), and the migrant and concomitant relationships. The relationship between 
the two influences the transformative process of migration, shaping how it is 
understood and the impact we believe it to have upon the individual: is it forced 
or voluntary? Permanent or temporary? Answers to those questions are fluid and 
complex. Drivers and reasons behind migration are always multi-layered, and they 
have implications for the latter part of the migration process (Erdal & Oeppen, 
2018). With regards to the migrant, there are also micro- and meso-factors to 
consider, such as family or networks (Van Hear, et al., 2018). Adding to this, there 
are also aspects of cumulative causation, whereby each act of migration feeds 
back into the plexus of macro-, meso-, and micro-factors (Bartram, et al., 2014; 
Castles & Miller, 2009; Massey, et al., 1993). Push and pull theories of migration 
is one possible approach to ‘decomposing an enormously complex subject into 
analytically manageable parts’ (Massey, et al., 1993, p. 433). While not providing 
all the answers, they provoke questions of “why” people migrate or do not 
migrate. 
 
The second phase, the one often considered transformative, imbuing the 
individual with a special identity24, is the migration. A useful supplement to 
understanding how this part can differ for people is the concept of mobility. As a 
concept, mobility has a range of meanings related to the circumstances, but 
                                         
24 See for example the special issue of Social Anthropology on ‘Key Figures of Mobility’ (2017, vol. 
25, no. 1)  
38 
 
importantly demonstrates how people have different experiences of migration 
(Salazar, 2017).  Mobility posits a relational understanding of migration and 
integration processes that allows us to move beyond a focus on nation-states. As 
Van Hear, et al., (2018) emphasise, structural factors are important in shaping 
factors related to mobility.  From geography to infrastructure, and war and peace, 
the migrant’s experiences within the liminal phase are what is assumed to have 
a, if any, transformative impact. It is vital to emphasise that the result of this 
transformative process is not necessarily positive (Salazar, 2017), despite 
assumptions that migration results in improved outcomes for the migrant (Erdal & 
Oeppen, 2018; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017).  
 
Assumptions around the migration process contribute to shaping bureaucratic 
distinctions and labels that affect the final phase of a migration, which in turn can 
result in reshaping the migratory experiences after the migration event (Erdal & 
Oeppen, 2018).The obverse of mobility is immobility, which shapes migration 
processes in equal measure. The notion of voluntary or involuntary immobility is 
significant for the final phase of the process. The immobility can be forced upon 
the migrant, such as those held in detention centres or stuck in refugee camps, or 
it can be voluntarily through arriving at one’s destination. The experiences of 
migration, mobility, and immobility, in the liminal phase are important to our 
understanding of processes of categorisation and identification of migrant 
identities. While in the liminal phase, ‘the characteristics of [the migrant] are 
ambiguous’ (Turner, 1969, p. 94). Rituals are usually contained within one social 
system or culture, which governs the full process of segregation, liminality, and 
aggregation. Migration goes beyond this, in that each phase is governed by 
multiple, potentially competing, social systems and cultures. 
 
Throughout the migration process, we have to be mindful of the migrant’s 
identification process, and simultaneously processes of categorisation. The 
migration can pass unnoticed and uncontested, e.g. tourists, or it can be 
discussed, debated, challenged, or rejected, e.g. asylum-seekers and refugees. 
Turner (1967, p. 97) emphasises the nature of this in his description of the liminal 
personae as ‘polluting to those who have never been, so to speak, “inoculated” 
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against them, through having been themselves initiated into the same state’ 
(emphasis added). Those attempting to ascribe an identity upon the migrant will 
be shaped by their own experiences, or lack thereof, of migration and their own 
sense of mobility/immobility (Døving, 2009). Bordering and categorisation 
operates ‘as much for the perceptions and feelings of natives’ (Bartram, et al., 
2014, p. 20) as for migrants.  
 
The final phase attempts to negotiate a transition to a non-liminal, non-migrant 
identity.  The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the strategies by 
which this done or attempted. There can be an emphasis of other identities 
(religious, ethnic, national, diasporic, transnational, etc.), or there might be an 
attempt at assimilation and erasure of other identities. This is where labelling and 
categorisation, in the pursuit of managing the migrant, can conflict with the 
migrant’s processes of self-identification. As categorisations are external 
impositions, their validity, applicability, and purpose should be questioned and 
challenged. Polzer (2008, p. 480) presents us with five questions, whose answers 
allows us to do that: 
 
1. Partiality – Who is defining the category? 
2. Functionality and Immutability – What is the purpose of defining the 
category at a particular point in time? 
3. Conflation – What characteristics of the category are emphasised over 
others? 
4. Self-confirmation – What sources of information are used to create or 
confirm the existence of the category? 
5. Negotiability – How can the categorisation be challenged? 
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2.4 – Integration processes – A conceptual forest 
2.4.1 – Conceptual clarification 
Leading on from the previous section, I will begin by outlining a range of migrant 
labels, some of which are assumed to imbue the migrant with special 
characteristics, before moving on to a discussion of strategies for managing 
identities, difference, and diversity (segregation, integration, inclusion, 
assimilation, etc.). Finally, I will briefly survey how religious organisations and 
religion can be understood to influence these processes and strategies. 
 
Continuing the phased approach (departure, journey, aggregation) from the 
previous section, I isolate two components of the final phase: an internal 
component and an external component (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a; 
Christensen, et al., 2006). The external component attempts to control who is 
able to transition into the final phase, in other words, immigration control. This 
bounding/bordering does not only happen at territorial borders and at nexuses 
such as airports, but is shifted and moved based on political considerations, such 
as documentation checks by universities, employers or landlords25. In other words, 
it is an exclusionary process.  
 
The internal component concerns what to do with those who have been permitted 
to transition into this phase, namely integration policy26. These policies can be 
either inclusive or exclusionary, where certain practices, values, traditions, or 
identities are constructed as acceptable or unacceptable. Integration, and related 
policies, raise the question of “integration into what?”. I strongly advocate a 
processual perspective; therefore, the directionality of integration takes 
precedence over an imagined end result. Nonetheless, the imagined end result is 
significant, hence the development of a discursive framework which critically 
explores alternative result-oriented perspectives. The discursive framework I 
present allows for critical analyses of integration processes and multiple 
directionalities and layers. I will be referring to a Norwegian context and 
                                         
25 See also Mulvey (2010) on the relationship between policy developments and 
integration/immigration control or Guentner, et al., (2016) on bordering practices in the UK 
welfare state. 
26 Understood here in its widest possible sense. 
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approach, which is covered in further detail in Chapter 4. A salient detail, which 
will become clearer later in this chapter and expanded upon in later chapters, is 
the dominance, on several levels, of a Social Integrationist Discourse that 
emphasises employment. Thus, integration, in Norway, is often seen as 
integration into the labour market, and failure to do so implies a lack of 
integration or failure on the part of the migrant. The discursive framework allows 
me to draw on the qualitative data in this thesis and challenge this perspective. 
Through multi-sited research, I compare and contrast discursive tendencies across 
locations, institutions, and across a range of migrant experiences. This discursive 
approach demonstrates the hydra-headed and multi-layered nature of 
integration. 
 
An important reminder is that the preceding phases of departure and journey 
strongly influence this part of migration. The receiving society interprets 
predisposing (contextual), proximate, precipitating, and mediating drivers, 
evaluating them according to dimensions of locality, scale, selectivity, duration, 
and tractability27 (Van Hear, et al., 2018; Bartram, et al., 2014).  Another vital 
reminder is how, in talking about integration, we need to be critical of the 
concept, as it produces and reproduces ideas around society, the state, the 
nation, and the relationship between majorities and minorities. As Rytter (2018, 
p. 2) colourfully notes: ‘the concept of integration is not innocent but [reflects] 
and promotes specific constructions [and] an asymmetrical relationship between 
majorities and minorities’.  
 
In particular, it constructs migrants as reference points for defining belonging and 
individualises societal inequalities by obscuring structural issues within the nation-
state (Korteweg, 2017). Due to the relationship between research and nation-
states28, whereby the latter often funds the former, migration and integration 
research risks, amongst other things, reproducing and strengthening state 
perspectives and political rhetoric, encouraging methodological nationalism 
                                         
27 Factors that are more or less susceptible to change 
28 Alternatively, supra national bodies such as the EU or UN. 
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(Dahinden, 2016; Bartram, et al., 2014). Keeping these issues in mind, we can 
explore the topic further. 
 
In order to examine the two issues of internal and external control, we can return 
to the notion of citizenship. As discussed above, citizenship seeks to override other 
identities, including, theoretically, a migrant identity (Bertossi, 2007). Legal 
citizenship implies a cessation of the liminal identity, and allows for ease of 
controlling access to the nation-state and the basis for limiting rights for non-
citizens (Bertossi, 2007), as demonstrated in, for example, Utlendingsloven29 (The 
Immigration Act): ‘§5 […] by foreigner it is understood, in this act, to be anyone 
who is not a Norwegian citizen’ (Lovdata, 2018b).  
 
That is not to say citizenship is not differentiated, as Balibar (2004, p. 76) notes 
‘it tends to divide humanity into unequal species’. It not only marks inclusion 
versus exclusion but is also differentiated by the active versus passive citizen, or 
the citizen versus the national (Castles, 2007)30. Furthermore, not all citizenships 
are created equal, as citizenship provides perhaps the simplest categorisation and 
process of granting and denying rights, as demonstrated by differentiated rules 
for visa requirements31 and access to material and symbolic resources. The 
presence of dual-nationality further complicates the understanding of citizenship 
as erasing or devaluing competing identities, as it de facto opens up for multiple 
identities (Castles, 2007) and opens the doors for discussions of the post-national 
and transnational.  
 
This permits us to distinguish between a few migrant identities. Firstly, a migrant 
clearly defined by their citizenship requires a specific form of integration 
approach dependent upon a few supplementary factors such as duration and 
                                         
29 The shorthand term for ‘The Act relating to the admission of foreign nationals into the realm 
and their stay here’  
30 See also Balibar (2004), in particular ch. 4, for an extensive discussion on citizenship as 
differentiated. 
31 See, for example, the Passport Index (2018), which ranks the “power” of different passports, or 
Hagelund, et al., (2012) arguing for the benefit of visa-free travel with a Norwegian citizenship as 
an incentive to naturalize. 
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selectivity. Thus, a tourist does not necessitate the same response as a foreign 
citizen arriving as a student. Both of these categories can be governed by visa 
regulations, and due to the assumption of duration (short-term) they do not 
necessarily warrant an integration-oriented response.  
 
Secondly, by distinguishing migrant identities by citizenship, it enables a nation-
state to perform its own ritual of incorporation: citizenship ceremonies. As 
discussed above, citizenship ceremonies transfer the migrant from their liminal 
identities into non-liminal citizenship (Pittaway, 2013). It might become apparent, 
at this point, that this sounds like assimilation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), which 
is evidenced by referring to citizenship acquisition as a ‘naturalisation process’ 
(Brochmann, 2012, p. 48). This attempt at rendering the migrant 
‘indistinguishable […] in the ways relevant to cohesion’ (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114), 
becomes apparent in citizenship ceremonies such as the one reported by Aagedal 
(2012b, p. 131): ‘The County Governor makes a point of the fact that country of 
origin is not listed [in the presentation of participants], “because now they belong 
here”’. As has been emphasised by other scholars, despite citizenship’s stated 
goal of representing full membership, this is often undermined by discourses of 
difference and discrimination32 (Brochmann, 2012; Damsholt, 2012; Eriksen, 2012; 
Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017). From a migrant perspective, citizenship can 
also be seen in an instrumental light, whereby acquiring citizenship is a method 
of accessing status, resources, and security, as suggested by Ong’s (1999) concept 
of ‘flexible citizenship’33. 
 
Nor does citizenship necessarily operate uniformly, as it means something 
different for a naturalized citizen34 than it does for their descendants who will 
rarely undergo the same ceremony and will have an entirely different relationship 
to their citizenship. I am avoiding the use of “2nd” or “3rd generation” because I 
find it establishes an artificial and analytically weak category. It raises questions 
                                         
32 A recent example of this is the Windrush affair, see for example Wardle and Obermuller (2018) 
brief editorial in Anthropology Today for a very brief exploration.  
33 On a reflexive note, this was one of the reasons I acquired a UK passport, as it guaranteed a 
more favourable fee status when applying for studies in the UK. 
34 It can also mean different things to different people, and there can be a range of motivations 
behind naturalization (see Aagedal, 2012) 
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of where a generation begins and another ends, and results in notions such as the 
“1.5 generation”35 or comparisons of “old” and “new” 2nd generations (Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou & Bankston III, 2016). Although there is some research on 
the effect of the descendants right to citizenship on parental integration 
(Avitabile, et al., 2013), and the transmission of citizen-identities from parents to 
children (Trovão, 2017), there is, to my knowledge, no research on the impact of 
parental naturalisation on processes of identification amongst descendants36. As 
such, when the focus is on descendants of migrants, it requires its own approach, 
and we cannot blindly apply the same understanding to that category. 
 
If citizenship is not the desired panacea, what, through processes of identification 
or categorisation, are the migrant identities that are continuously attributed 
importance? Sticking to Norway, Alghasi, et al., (2006b, pp. 16-17), emphasise the 
racialisation of migrants, pointing to ‘skin colour, dress, language, ethnicity, and 
religion’. Migrant identities entail a struggle, either for the ability to define 
yourself (Alghasi, 2006) or to be recognised as equal to the non-migrant Norwegian 
(Carli, 2006). Despite numerous definitions of integration relating to economic, 
political, civil, and social factors (Rytter, 2018), we ultimately return to notions 
of identity and social cohesion. In particular, integration is directed at ‘immigrant 
groups that are cast as especially problematic’ (Rytter, 2018, p. 8)37. As argued 
by Korteweg (2017), there is a need to emphasise that problems typecast as 
“immigrant problems” are in fact societal issues that cross-cut multiple groups.  
 
What migrant identities warrant responses, and why those identities and not 
others? I am critical of the fact that answering this question requires 
categorisation and emphasise that these categories are not homogeneous or 
timeless: migrants arrive at the identities through different trajectories and move 
beyond them (Polzer, 2008; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Using Brochmann and 
Hagelund (2012b) as a starting point, we can identify migrant categorisations that 
                                         
35 Foreign-born but migrated at a young age (Harker, 2001). 
36 For extensive research on young migrants from Eastern Europe now living in the UK, see the 
Here to Stay? (2018) Project, and for a critique of adult-centric migration research see White, et 
al. (2011) 
37 The Brochmann II-commission, for example, explicitly targets asylum seekers for integration 
policies 
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invoke different responses. These responses are contingent upon a range of drivers 
and factors, as discussed above with reference to Van Hear, et al., (2018). It is 
also important to keep in mind the contentious dichotomy of forced and voluntary 
migration (Bartram, et al., 2014; Erdal & Oeppen, 2018), and how those 
distinctions serve to justify differing responses (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Again, 
this discussion is with reference to a Norwegian case, and will invariably differ 
between contexts. Nor does it say anything about local responses or approaches, 
which will be explored in later chapters. 
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Table 2 - Migrant categorisation 
Migrant 
categorisation 
Duration of stay Policy activated by categorisation 
Nordic citizen Irrelevant38 None/limited 
Aspiring citizen39 Minimum stay required, 
future residence assumed 
indefinitely 
Comprehensive – Governed by Statsborgerloven (Citizenship Act) (Lovdata, 2006). Criteria 
include: established identity; aged 12 or above; is and will continue to reside in the realm; 
fulfil the requirements for permanent residency; have at least 7 years residency over the last 
10 years40; completed 300hours of Norwegian language and social studies; not serving a 
criminal sentence; rescind former citizenship. 
Refugee Has shifted from 
conceptions of ‘permanent 
exile’ to exclusion or 
eventual repatriation 
(Castles & Miller, 2009) 
Comprehensive – Access: Immigration Act; subject to Introduksjonsloven (Introductory Act) 
(Lovdata, 2018b; 2016); technically shaped by the Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951/1967), 
but interpreted and applied at national level resulting in high levels of variation (Crawley & 
Skleparis, 2018); refugees dispersed throughout the country, subject to agreement with 
municipal administrations. 
EEA citizen Dependent upon 
circumstances 
Access regulated by EØS-loven Part 3, ch. 1, Art. 28(The EEA Act) (Lovdata, 1994) and the 
Immigration Act, but exempt from the Introductory Act 
Non-EEA citizen Dependent upon 
circumstances 
Moderate – Generally governed by the Immigration Act, and may be subject to the 
Introductory Act 
Asylum seeker41 Subject to processing time Comprehensive – Access regulated by the Immigration Act and subject to Introduksjonsloven 
(Introductory Act) (Lovdata, 2018c; 2016); housed in asylum centres, limited access to work 
and education. 
Tourist Temporary Limited 
Student Temporary Limited 
Rejected asylum 
seeker 
From a state perspective, 
ideally short, but variable 
Detention and deportation 
Undocumented 
migrant 
From a state perspective, 
ideally short, but variable 
Detention and deportation 
                                         
38 Citizens of Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland) are exempt from a number of immigration rules (Lovdata, 2018b) 
39 This category refers to migrants seeking Norwegian citizenship and represents a more liminal category than some of the others. 
40 Reduced for persons married to a Norwegian citizen and Nordic citizens  
41 As with “Aspiring citizen”, asylum seeker is a highly liminal category (James & McNevin, 2013; Andrews, et al., 2014) 
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It might be notable that the above table does not include the category “economic 
migrant”, which is often used as a contrast to the refugee category, but is merely 
a shorthand for assumptions made about the migrant and used to justify a policy 
of exclusion (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Bartram, et al., 2014). For this reason, I 
choose to exclude it. One can ask the question what separates an EU/EEA citizen 
migrating for work from those usually categorised as “economic migrants”, why 
are the former not considered “economic migrants” but are somehow legitimised?  
 
The distinction, obviously, derives from where they originate from and how they 
journey. As suggested by Crawley and Skleparis (2018, p. 60), there should be an 
emphasis on the boundaries and trajectories between categories and the values 
and rights attributed to the different categories. Jenkins (2000, p. 13) reminds us 
that ‘categorisations are not necessarily re-appropriated as self- or group 
identifications. History, context and, not least, the content and the consequences 
of the categorisation all matter.’ The categories are not natural or innate, they 
are bureaucratic devices and should be seen as such, hence the inclusion of “Policy 
activated by categorisation” in order to emphasise that these categories play a 
part in the relationships between migrants and the state. Bureaucratic categories 
should be problematised and deconstructed, as is shown through the data and 
analysis in this thesis.  
 
Where immigration control and categorisation form part of the external 
component of the final phase of migration processes, integration is the internal 
aspect. I have previously used “integration” as a broad, catch-all term, but it is 
due a closer inspection. The concept of integration42 is highly contested, and by 
no means straightforward. Rytter (2018), situating the concept in a Danish 
context, emphasises how the concept ‘carries a wealth of meanings and is 
constitutive and confirmative of social imaginaries among majority populations 
that need to be critically studied and analysed rather than simply being 
reproduced […]’. It is necessary to be mindful of how discussions of integration 
                                         
42 As Rytter (2018) does, I am italicising integration when I am referring to the concept, rather 
than the process. 
48 
 
contribute to reification, objectification, and exclusion (Rytter, 2018)43, 
perpetrated even by academics, as in Eriksen and Sørheim (1994, p. 278): 
 
It is possible to say it as strongly that the degree of success for 
immigrants’ integration process hinges on their loyalty to the state. 
For them to consider themselves, and to be considered, integrated, 
the immigrants have to feel at home in Norway. For them to feel at 
home, they have to be active participants in society’s shared 
institutions. 
 
 
Integration, according to Eriksen and Sørheim, is inextricably tied to loyalty, a 
sense of belonging, and active participation, yet they do not address thresholds 
or barriers to participation. This mistake is repeated by Bergh and Bjørklund 
(2010) in their discussion of political integration of minorities in Norway: they fail 
to address barriers to participation, draw conclusions based on voting44, and ignore 
other forms of political participation.  
 
This is in contrast to Papademetriou and Kober (2012), who emphasise that 
immigrants should be considered “successfully integrated” when they have equal 
opportunities and participate in society on an equal basis as non-migrants. I 
strongly agree with the latter conception, but it needs to be seen as an ideal to 
be pursued. Equal opportunities requires overcoming differences in status, 
wealth, privilege, as well as the lack thereof. Equal opportunities and 
participation in society is not only an issue for migrants, but also disenfranchised 
and marginalised groups that are not migrants, such as indigenous populations or 
other groups (disabled, LGBTQ+, women, etc.) (Castles, 2007). As has been 
repeated numerous times, these groups, and concomitant identities and 
categories, overlap, intersect, and are contingent upon context. 
 
                                         
43 A similar and relevant comparison is Miles and Brown (2003) discussion on racism 
44 In local elections, rather than general elections. They do not address the fact that turnout is 
often lower for local elections, but nonetheless make sweeping generalisations based on their 
limited data. 
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Echoing Rytter’s point that there is a wealth of meanings embedded in the concept 
integration, we can identify a short list that includes terms such as (but not 
limited to): assimilation (segmented, selective), accommodation, segregation, 
inclusion, adaptation, acculturation (dissonant, consonant, or selective), 
transculturation, incorporation, multiculturalism (cosmopolitanism, fragmented 
pluralism, interactive, critical, protective, offensive), interculturalism, 
marginalisation, “balkanisation”, and exclusion (Bauböck, 1996a; Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2001; Hall, 1995; Castles & Miller, 2009; Bartram, et al., 2014; Turner, 
2010; Heller, 1996).  
 
Regardless of terminology, there is a fundamental question that needs to be kept 
in mind: ‘who has the power and legitimacy to demand integration of others?’ 
(Rytter, 2018, p. 13) A useful question is whether we can agree on what, 
ultimately, an integrated, socially cohesive society will look like. This will 
invariably depend on context, and I will hazard to claim there is no “perfect” end-
point that will suit every society. Rather, integration processes are constant and 
variegated and will develop differently not only in different countries but also 
within a country. 
 
Ultimately, the above list of terms are discursive and political choices. I 
understand this as each term attempting to present a way of acting and offering 
its own description and understanding of society. As such, each term involves 
opening up and closing down potential understandings and approaches (Levitas, 
2005), they can function both descriptively and normatively. Whereas much of the 
literature and policy focuses on integration as pertaining to migrants, we should 
keep in mind the multiplicity and contextuality of identities that might be 
interwoven with migrant identities. 
 
Therefore, as mentioned above, the idea of managing a diversity of identities 
needs to be conducted within a framework where the diversity is seen as the 
whole, rather than the particular. Echoing the Durkheimian (Greenwald, 1973, p. 
159) notion that ‘society is not constituted simply by the mass of individuals who 
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comprise it […] but, above all, by the idea which it forms of itself’, it is useful to 
distinguish the above concepts by how, who, and what they seek to externalise as 
unwanted characteristics (Levitas, 2005). It is not discrete categories and static 
individuals who, when lumped together, morph into a greater unit, but their 
understandings of themselves and others45 that shapes the continually, 
dynamically, shifting notion of society. A useful concept in this regard is Beaman’s 
deep equality, which emphasises this subtle process:  
 
[deep equality is] a process, enacted and owned by so-called 
ordinary people in everyday life […] It recognizes equality as an 
achievement of day-to-day interaction […] It circulates through 
micro-processes of individual action and inaction and through group 
demonstrations of caring […] Paradoxically, deep equality is fragile. 
     Beaman (2017, p. 16) 
 
In Table 3, I present a discursive framework, developed by Levitas (2005), that 
attempts to distinguish how inclusion/exclusion is constructed and justified. 
Although not developed specifically for discussions around migration and 
integration, Levitas (2005) argues for a holistic conception of society where 
inequality has to be seen as endemic rather than externalised. The three 
discourses are ideal types, and should be seen as a continuum rather than discrete 
categories. Therefore, you can find examples of each ideal type within any 
situation that involves communication and discourse. The three types are (a) the 
Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion (RED), (b) the Social Integrationist Discourse 
(SID), and (c) the Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD). Levitas succinctly simplified 
the differences: ‘in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD 
they have no morals’ (2005, p. 27). This framework provides us with a template 
for evaluating and grouping the concepts mentioned above.
                                         
45 Moreover, their understanding of The Other, those perceived or constructed as external to 
themselves and the internal others. 
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Table 3 - Discursive framework (Levitas, 2005, p. 14, 21, 26-27) 
 
Redistributive 
Discourse of 
Exclusion  
(RED) 
• Emphasises inequality as a prime cause of social exclusion 
• Addresses social, political, and cultural factors in addition 
to economic as constitutive of inequality 
• Focuses on processes which produce inequality 
• Implies a reduction of inequality through a multifactorial 
approach and redistribution of resources and power 
• Potentially able to valorise diversity of identities 
• Identities considered equal 
• Posits citizenship as the obverse of exclusion 
• Society constituted holistically 
 
Social 
Integrationist 
Discourse  
(SID) 
• Narrows the definition of exclusion/inclusion to 
participation in paid work 
• Obscures inequalities due to different categorisations 
(gender, ethnic identities, national identities, etc.) 
• Conceals the upper strata of society 
• De-emphasizes identity 
• Society constituted as fragmented but functional  
Moral 
Underclass 
Discourse 
(MUD) 
• Presents the unwanted characteristics as culturally distinct 
from the “mainstream” 
• Focuses on behaviour of the excluded/marginalised rather 
than on the structure of society 
• Implies benefits have negative consequences - encourage 
“dependency” 
• Inequalities among the rest of society are ignored  
• Strong homogenisation of the “native” population 
• Highly gendered discourse vilifying men and rendering 
women passive 
• Hierarchical understanding of identities 
• Reified and exclusive conceptions of identity 
• Society constituted as fragmented 
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Utilising this framework allows for a range of methods and sources, which will be 
explored in the next chapter. It also forces us to see how the data is embedded in 
a specific context that is the result of a host of intersecting factors such as history, 
geography, current events, language, politics, and processes of identification and 
categorisation. For example, Buxrud and Fangen (2017) — despite not relying on 
Levitas framework — analyse national day oratory in Norway and demonstrate how 
there is a range of sentiments reminiscent of both RED and SID. Similarly, it is easy 
to recognise the use of MUD, which is not to say there are not more insidious and 
hidden forms of it. 
 
In Table 4, I assign the different integration strategies to the category I consider 
most appropriate. Adapting Levitas’ framework is one of the key contributions of 
this thesis and will feature throughout the thesis. The framework allows me to 
reconcile the polysemic nature of many of the concepts. By seeing my participants 
and data in context, I can refrain from splitting hairs over which concept is most 
appropriate, as participants often had competing understandings of the same 
concept and related their understandings back to the context we were in at the 
time. Instead, their words reflected deeper discursive elements. The framework 
offers a degree of flexibility, which mirrors the conceptual stretching and 
contestation that often takes place in fields that are highly politicised.  It allows 
me to evaluate and situate the data clearly by continuously reflecting on what is 
implied in addition to explicit remarks. 
Table 4 - Categorisation of related concepts 
Redistributive Discourse 
of Exclusion (RED) 
Social Integrationist 
Discourse (SID) 
Moral Underclass 
Discourse (MUD) 
Multiculturalism 
Accommodation 
Inclusion 
Interculturalism 
Selective acculturation  
Deep equality  
Integration 
Enclaves 
Segregation  
Segmented Assimilation  
Dissonant acculturation  
Consonant acculturation  
Incorporation 
Denizens 
Integration 
Multiculturalism 
Racism 
Assimilation 
Group Threat Theory  
Reactive ethnicity  
Welfare Chauvinism  
Passing 
Integration 
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I assigned concepts to a category based on an extensive literature review. The 
sources (and quotes) used to match them to the framework can be found in 
Appendix A. In most cases, the concepts derive from specific definitions by the 
author(s) who developed them, and as such only appear once. That integration 
makes an appearance in each column is a testament to the malleability of the 
term. Rather than employing one concept over another, I choose to emphasise the 
similarity between the concepts, which allows us to make broader, more 
meaningful distinctions. The above categorisation also goes some way in enabling 
us to distinguish between emic and etic usages of the different concepts (Rytter, 
2018). As most concepts only make one appearance, they require little 
modification, but we have to qualify two concepts to reflect their plurality of 
usage: integration and multiculturalism.  
 
Multiculturalism has been categorised in two columns due to its prevalence as 
both a theoretical concept (the etic usage) and how it is used to describe a society 
or normative position (the emic usage). Therefore, it straddles two discursive 
categories. As for integration, I sympathise strongly with Rytter’s (2018, p. 15) 
admonition to ‘take responsibility for the concept of integration’, and in order to 
demonstrate the prerequisite critical awareness of the concept I suggest taking a 
step back from it. Hence, instead of merely using integration in an 
undifferentiated form, where possible, I will prefix it with the appropriate 
discursive categorisation. In other words, as will become apparent throughout 
later chapters, there is MUD-Integration, SID-Integration, and redintegration. By 
linguistic providence, redintegration is an archaic term for restoring something to 
a state of wholeness, and therefore fits the precepts of the RED discursive 
category and obviates the need to use the style applied to the two other concepts. 
By probing their usage of the term, these distinctions allow us to identify what 
different actors may be referring to when they use integration. Integration can, 
therefore, signify the breadth of the discursive framework and function 
generically rather than specifically. With this in mind, we can finally turn to how 
religion and religious organisations, in theory, can influence integration processes. 
This will help us answer the research questions more clearly in the later, 
substantive chapters. 
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2.4.2 – Religion and integration processes 
The discussion here is predominantly theoretical and abstract, and it needs to be 
stated that the relationship between religion, religious institutions, and 
integration processes (whether it is MUD-, SID-Integration, or redintegration) 
operates at numerous levels and in a multitude of ways: Structurally, historically, 
discursively at micro-, meso-, macro-levels, and is continuously and dynamically 
shifting even within a specific context. We need to keep in mind three, related, 
components: religiosity, dogma, and praxis. Dogma and praxis are closely related, 
as they refer to the organised aspects of religion. Dogma being the doctrine or 
teachings, and praxis being the practice those teachings lead to. An example can 
be how an orthodox/heterodox stance on liturgy can result in a specific 
performance of liturgy. Religiosity, on the other hand, emphasises the importance 
religion has for the individual. 
 
Seen in light of the discursive framework, we can generate a set of ideas of how 
religion might influence integration processes. Distinguishing dogma, praxis, and 
religiosity allows us to question what about religion impacts integration processes 
and how. The table below presents a way of seeing religion and integration. 
Consistent with the discursive framework above, I have organised it in a matrix 
that allows us to separate the three components potential usages. The matrix 
considers religion generally, but different religions will manifest differently based 
on context.  I look more closely at how Catholicism functions in Norway in Chapter 
5.  
 
One significant issue is the notion of native/non-native religion, i.e. whether there 
is a conception of a dominant, “natural” religion. As discussed in the section on 
identities, ethnic and national identities can seek to absorb religious traits, 
thereby privileging some religions over others. The matrix is not able to 
demonstrate this, which is why it is necessary to understand how contextual these 
concepts are. Furthermore, secularism plays a large part in understanding how 
religion can operate within a context (Casanova, 2009). Secularism is not merely 
religious indifference or political toleration of religion, but points to a dynamic 
relationship between ‘legal reasoning, moral practice, and political authority’ 
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(Asad, 2003, p. 255) and religious organisations as ‘normative organisations’ 
(Hornsby-Smith, 1991, p. 203). Casanova (2009, p. 1051) differentiates between 
three understandings of secularism, all of which need to be contextualised in order 
to facilitate analysis: as a ‘taken-for-granted normal structure of modern reality’; 
as a principle of statecraft advocating the separation of religious and political 
authority; and as an ideology ‘entails a theory of what “religion” is or does’. 
 
Table 5 does not make the role of secularism explicit, as the three components 
will have different relationships to secularism and will shape the resultant 
discourse concerning dogma, praxis, and religiosity. For example, understandings 
framed by MUD can come from anti-religious attitudes, or from intolerant religious 
attitudes. Context will allow us to distinguish which it might be. Furthermore, 
despite it being presented as a 3x3 matrix, it would be imprudent to understand 
it as clearly bounded categories. It should, and has to, be seen as a continuum. 
Much in the same way the colours red, green, and blue can be combined to create 
any colour in the visible spectrum, our three components can be combined in 
innumerable ways to describe different contexts. 
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Table 5 - Religious components by discourse 
 RED SID MUD 
Dogma 
• Flexible and can be 
adapted to local 
circumstances to 
promote contact (e.g., 
inter-faith work) 
• Reified and used 
instrumentally to 
inform processes (for 
example, as part of 
funding policies for 
religious institutions) 
• Reified and seen as 
conflicting with host 
society (for example, 
debates on gender 
equality) 
Praxis 
• Permitted in public 
spaces, and 
uncontested (for 
example, public 
processions) 
• Subject to some 
regulation (for 
example, juxtaposing 
animal rights/welfare 
and religious practices 
(halal, kosher, etc.)) 
• Withheld from public 
space or strongly 
contested (e.g. 
limitations on religious 
architecture (minarets, 
steeples, etc.) 
Religiosity 
• Protected and treated 
equally (e.g., given 
equal time off for 
religious holidays) 
• Only considered 
relevant insofar it 
relates to work or 
education (for 
example, sitting exams 
while fasting) 
• Strongly contested or 
subject to hostility (for 
example, bans on 
religious garment or 
visible symbols of 
religiosity) 
57 
 
The above table echoes Hirschmann’s (2004, p. 1207) assertion that ‘there is not 
one monolithic interpretation of the role of religion’ in integration processes. Seen 
in light of the different discourses, it is possible to understand how religion 
influences integration processes. Firstly, from a structural level, we can speak of 
religion, in the form of organisations and institutions, as impacting integration 
processes. Levitt (2004) and Kivisto (2014) argue that religious institutions and 
organisations allow for the negotiations of a common vocabulary and expectations 
about rights and duties.  
 
In the case of the Catholic Church, at the macro-level we can point to Pope Francis 
(2018b; 2013), through his speeches, encyclicals, and similar46, as engaging in a 
discourse strongly aligned with a redintegrationist discourse. Campese (2016, p. 
28) points to how migrants ‘have a central metaphorical relevance in [Pope] 
Francis’ vision of the [Church]’. For example, in the Pope’s emphasis on a ‘culture 
of encounter, the only culture capable of building a better, more just and 
fraternal world’ which cannot be achieved through ‘economic growth alone [but] 
taking account of every dimension of the person’ (Pope Francis, 2013). At the 
meso-level, we can examine how Bishops’ Conferences and individual Bishops 
engage in public discussions of the shape and direction of society. 
Contemporaneously, we can point to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB)47, and historically we can look to Bishop Fallize of Oslo consciously 
adapting to political currents in Norway at the turn of the 20th Century48. By virtue 
of position and power, the Pope and Bishops can legitimise forms of Dogma, Praxis, 
and Religiosity from a Catholic perspective. Naturally, not all religions operate 
the same way49, and need to be seen in context. This is explored further in Chapter 
5, with specific reference to Catholicism and Norway. 
                                         
46 See Zalonski (2013) for a breakdown of the different levels of papal teaching and their 
importance (in a structural sense, there is debate about how it translates to individual religiosity, 
see for example some of the work by Hornsby-Smith). 
47 See in particular USCCB (2003) Strangers No Longer, Together on the Journey of Hope  
48 In the build-up to the dissolution of the union with Sweden, Bp. Fallize banned, within the 
Catholic Church in Norway, the use of foreign flags and eventually restricted the use of the union 
flag (Eidsvig, 1993). 
49 See Shavit and Spengler (2017) for a discussion of the authority and reach of the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research 
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If the religious institution has an extensive transnational connection, it can tap 
into networks that allow them to offer a degree of representation and protection 
for migrants where that may be necessary (Levitt, 2004; Huynh & Yiu, 2015). In 
other cases, religious organisations become facilitators for the reproduction of 
ethnic identities that have a strong religious component (Connor, 2008; Garcia-
Muñoz & Neuman, 2012; Trzebiatowska, 2010). These are mere possibilities and 
are not inherently positive or negative. The process of evaluating those situations 
is shaped by the discursive landscape that serves ‘to frame how religion [is] to be 
recognised and what sort of interreligious relations are to be encouraged and 
which discouraged’ (Kivisto, 2014, p. 83).  
 
At the micro-level, a congregational level, we can identify different reasons 
behind religion’s impact on integration processes. De Guzman and Brazal (2015) 
point to a distinction between congregations that are monocultural or 
multicultural50, where in the former a contestation of identities or praxis can be 
disruptive. Village, et. al, (2017) point to how congregations can contribute to 
developing networks that help migrants develop social capital. Keeping in mind 
the discussion of identities at the beginning of this chapter, Village, et. al, (2017) 
point to bonding capital, fostering cohesion within the group, and bridging capital, 
facilitating relationships outwith the religious identity, as a potential outcome of 
multicultural congregations.  
 
Whereas Snyder (2016, p. 8) argues migrants potentially draw attention to ‘social, 
ethnic, and economic rifts and lacunae’, and through that force a re-negotiation 
of religious identities. This may result in a re-examination of theological 
foundations and established praxis, and a reorganisation of the congregation 
(Kivisto, 2014; Heyer, 2016). Ralston (2016), on the other hand, argues 
congregations can mirror, and thereby perpetuate, divisions in society. 
                                         
50 Village, et. al, (2017, p. 1948)  define a multicultural congregation as having 20 per cent or more 
of its members of a ‘cultural background that is different from the dominant cultural group’. 
Whereas Kivisto (2014, p. 87), emphasising racialized divisions, approaches it from the other end 
and defines it as ‘one in which no more than 80 per cent of its members are from one racial group’. 
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Finally, at an individual level, religious identities also work in different ways. As 
with the two preceding levels, religious identities can overlap and reinforce other 
identities, and at an individual level this can result in intergenerational 
maintenance of not only religious identities, but also national or ethnic identities 
(Huynh & Yiu, 2015). According to Kivisto (2014), religion competes for time 
against other spaces where integration processes take place, highlighting that the 
significance of religion is predicated on levels of religiosity. Connor (2012) finds 
that religious participation is conducive to emotional well-being for migrants, 
strengthening the argument of religion contributing to social bonding and social 
cohesion.  
 
Hirschmann (2004) suggests religion serves three functions for migrants: 
resources, refuge, and respectability. Although his emphasis is on religion, I argue 
in Chapter 7 that this can be applied to non-religious settings, and that there is 
an element missing from his list — reciprocity. Hirschmann (2004, pp. 1207-1208) 
defines resources as ‘social and economic assistance’ and ‘a means of collective 
and individual socioeconomic mobility’. Refuge is presented as ‘physical safety as 
well as […] psychological comfort’ and a means of mitigating the ‘trauma of 
migration’ (Hirschmann, 2004, pp. 1210, 1229). Finally, respectability derives 
from ‘[…] opportunities for status recognition and social mobility’ (Hirschmann, 
2004, p. 1229).  
 
Hirschmann’s three Rs can be tied into the discursive framework of this thesis. 
RED, SID, and MUD imply views on the use of resources, the role of respectability, 
and the provision of refuge. Under RED, resources is only seen as one of many 
factors in resolving inequalities, whereas SID emphasises the economic aspect of 
resources, and MUD argues ‘social and economic assistance’ leads to dependency. 
Respectability is de-emphasised in SID and juxtaposed in MUD and RED. MUD 
perpetuates socially constructed hierarchies, externalises “unwanted” 
characteristics and imposes them on those it seeks to exclude, whereas RED 
emphasises the need to address multiple factors in order to ensure social mobility. 
Refuge is similarly de-emphasised in SID, while MUD and RED are again on opposite 
ends: in MUD, provision of refuge results in dependency, while in RED it is an 
important aspect of addressing processes of inequality. 
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Yet, the social bonding within religious identities and groups can be antithetical 
to integration processes, as Putnam (2007, p. 161) points out that combined with 
racial segregation the religious practices in the US exacerbated that segregation: 
‘it was proverbial among sociologists of religion that “11:00 am Sunday is the most 
segregated hour in the week”’. As emphasised above, context is key.  
 
An example of this can be found in contrasting the development of 
conceptualisations of religiosity in Norway with similar conceptualisations from a 
different context. Leirvik (2007) argues for a distinction between a Popular 
Religiosity (folkereligiøsitet) and a Normative Religiosity, where those oriented 
towards a Normative Religiosity seek to disentangle their religion from national 
and cultural markers and influences. Ironically, he argues, in the case of Islam, 
that this would facilitate the creation of a ‘Norwegian Muslim’ (Leirvik, 2007; 
Døving, 2009). Muslims of a Popular Religiosity character would, in contrast, be 
culturally introspective and focus on preservation of their ‘homeland identity’ 
(Leirvik, 2007, p. 31). Giving Leirvik the benefit of the doubt, we can see 
Normative Religiosity as a means of adapting to local circumstances and shifting 
the discourse to a Redistributive Discourse, in part attempting to render different 
religious identities as equal.  
 
A significant issue is that Leirvik situates the concepts in a power relationship 
without exploring the implications of that relationship: Popular Religiosity as a 
grassroots religiosity as opposed to the elite nature of Normative Religiosity. 
Leirvik’s Popular Religiosity overlaps indiscriminately with nationalism, politics, 
and culture, whereas the Normative Religiosity becomes a sanitized, curated 
expression of religiosity that conforms to elite manipulation. Furthermore, the 
concepts do not allow us to address all aspects of religious identities: dogma, 
praxis, and religiosity. 
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This is somewhat addressed in Hornsby-Smith’s notion of customary religion: 
which is beliefs and practices produced by and derived from formal religious 
socialisation, but outwith the purview of continued control of religious authorities 
and subsequently subjected to ‘trivialisation, conventionality, apathy, 
convenience and self-interest’ (Hornsby-Smith, 1991, pp. 90, 92). Here, dogma 
and praxis (formal religious socialisation), as well as religiosity (trivialisation, 
conventionality, etc.) are expressed components. Customary religion, therefore, 
allows us to draw more fully on the discursive framework, and to distinguish the 
necessary components. It also opens up to situating religious institutions, 
identities, and religiosity within different contexts. 
 
2.4.3 – Secularisation processes 
Early conceptualisations of secularism and secularisation processes emphasised 
the diminishment of the role of religion in the public sphere and predicted its 
eventual disappearance. As this has yet to occur, alternative perspectives have 
evolved. Casanova (2009) characterises secularism as either an ideology, with 
assumptions on what a religion is or does, or as a principle of statecraft that seeks 
to separate, or define, two forms of authority, the political and the religious. 
Taylor (2007) characterises secularisation as a pattern of ‘identifying with […] 
while professing widespread scepticism about’ religion (p. 514).  Davie (1994) 
referred to this as ‘believing without belonging’. Hervieu-Léger (2000) offers a 
clear analysis of this phenomenon: 
 
The dominant religions can still supply individuals with a unifying 
ferment from their own experience, yet they have all but lost the 
power to inform the organisation of social life. 
     Hervieu-Léger, 2000, p, 90 
 
 
Secularisation processes relate to ‘how religion becomes public’ (Asad, 2003, p. 
182). With the expansion of religious freedoms, the opportunity to be non-religious 
simultaneously opens up. This points to secularism acting as a principle of 
statecraft (Casanova, 2009), whereby the state attempts to act equitably towards 
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all religions. Simultaneously, this results in a process whereby religious identities 
are side-lined as a ‘political medium’ (Asad, 2003, p. 5). 
 
Yet, behind its ‘rational-legal mask’ (Asad, 2003, pp. 22-23), the state can be far 
from secular or neutral in regard to religion and religious identities. Establishment 
Churches, such as the Church of Norway, are seen as representative institutions, 
privileging them in the ‘complex arrangement of legal reasoning, moral practice, 
and political authority’ (Asad, 2003). This complexity is readily seen in Norway’s 
funding policies concerning religious societies, explored in section 5.2.  
 
Secularisation processes set constraints for the role religion can play in the public 
sphere. Subsequently, the impact these processes have on national and local 
contexts will contribute to shaping integration processes.  
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2.5 – Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to equip us with the theoretical framework that will allow 
us to explore the data of this thesis. Key to this has been the discursive framework 
presented in Table 3. In order to answer the questions this thesis asks, we have 
had to clarify and discuss the terminology and concepts pertinent to understanding 
the answers. Without engaging with the national and specific context of the thesis, 
the main focus of this chapter has been to explore the question of how identities 
and integration processes are related and, on a theoretical level, interact. 
 
This has involved exploring, first, the idea of identity. Arguing that identities are 
plural and contextual, the relevance of identities is premised on the notion that 
they are fundamental components in the formation of social cohesion. From there, 
I explored three identities that are regularly highlighted and privileged in 
discussions of migration and integration: religious, ethnic, and national. Through 
understanding the malleable bases of these identities, we can appreciate how 
they are often interdependent. Following that, it is necessary to understand how 
the migration process is construed as formative. This allows us to distinguish not 
between only migrants and non-migrants, but also between different forms of 
migrant identities. From there, we can critically analyse how processes of 
categorisation are developed and used to inform different integration strategies, 
as well as the role of processes of identification. 
 
Finally, the discussion can focus on integration processes. By first problematizing 
the concept of integration and pointing to the risk of privileging the nation-state 
and citizenship, we could examine categorisations of migrants from a critical 
perspective. These categorisations also point to potential integration strategies 
undertaken by the state, and what can be constituted as “successful integration”. 
Rather than listing and defining all the theoretical perspectives, I applied a 
framework based on discursive elements. From there, it is possible to group 
theoretical concepts based on their shared premises and goals, although they 
might disagree on the exact strategy.  
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As the thesis seeks to draw attention to the role of religion, I subsequently focused 
on how religion can be understood within this framework. It involved clarifying 
the underlying premises for why religion should be devoted time and attention in 
the pursuit of understanding integration processes. Keeping in mind that context 
shapes how the influence of religion affects integration processes, I pointed to 
several nodes of influence: institutional at the macro-, meso-, and micro-level51, 
congregational, dogma, praxis, religiosity, and, ultimately, the individual. The 
emphasis on the role of religion necessitates a discussion of secularisation, which, 
like religion, operates in multiple ways. Fundamentally, secularism/secularisation 
processes question the importance/relevance of religion and religious 
organisations. 
 
This is where the contribution of this thesis is directed: by exploring, in depth, 
the context and nature of integration processes in a case study, to deepen our 
understanding of integration processes. Subsequent chapters will provide 
historical, political, and religious context (Chapter 4 & Chapter 5) that will allow 
us to examine critically the research material and explore the research questions 
(Chapter 6-8). In the next section on methodology, I turn to how I sought to answer 
the research questions.  
  
  
                                         
51 Alternatively, this distinction can be constructed along a centre-periphery line, where the 
Vatican and concomitant bodies and offices (in this thesis) constitute the centre of the Catholic 
Church and the congregational is constituted as peripheral. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology and methods 
3.1 – Introduction 
Building on the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter, the 
emphasis on discourses led me to employ qualitative methods in order to embed 
the answers within their relevant contexts. Through long-term ethnographic 
fieldwork, supplemented by semi-structured interviews and documentary 
analysis, I was able to explore multiple sites and explore their interconnections. 
Through prolonged fieldwork, I could explore the fluid nature of discourses and 
how they shift, or do not shift, in response to events and different contexts. 
Changes, or lack thereof, can be both obvious and subtle, and in order to explore 
the subtlety, qualitative methods were more suitable. 
 
In this chapter, I introduce and explore the methods I utilised. Through outlining 
the background and development of the ethnographic method, I demonstrate why 
I find it to be the best suited to answer the research questions. As a holistic 
method, it stretches beyond merely performing participant observation, but 
emphasises the need to understand the surrounding context and factors that 
influence the fieldwork sites. In order to supplement the ethnographic data, I 
performed semi-structured interviews with figures of particular interest to the 
different sites. Qualitative methods rely on the researcher becoming the 
instrument of research, and therefore necessitates a discussion of the researcher’s 
roles and identities. This reflexive exercise facilitates a critical scrutiny of the 
data gathered and the data collection process. Reflection on the researcher and 
research methods is vital to the integrity of the research (Charmaz & Mitchell, 
2001). 
 
Following this, I discuss the choice of organisations and locations presented in this 
thesis. I also briefly introduce the participants from the semi-structured 
interviews and the motivation to pursuing those interviews. This leads to a 
discussion of ethical aspects: how to manage consent, treading the line between 
overt and covert research, how to ensure participant anonymity, and risks 
incurred by both the participants and the researcher in the course of fieldwork.   
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3.2 – Ethnography and the Manchester School 
Ethnography as a methodology can briefly be described as ‘veni, vidi, scripsi’ – I 
came, I saw, I wrote (Macdonald, 2001, p. 64). It relies on long-term participant 
observation, during which the ethnographer may employ a host of methods and 
techniques for soliciting information (Atkinson, et al., 2001). As this research 
explores dynamic processes, I concluded that ethnography was the most viable 
methodology. Ethnography offers the possibility of sustained critical research that 
can respond to changing circumstances, while also recognising the subjectivity of 
qualitative research methods.  In this section, I outline the nature of ethnographic 
research, approaching it from a chronological perspective (entering the field, in 
the field, and leaving/writing). The initial sections bear the mark of a literature 
review, according to Atkinson, et al. (2001, p. 1), the least life-enhancing genre 
of scholarly writing, but it is necessary in order to understand the nature of the 
data-collection process.  
 
3.2.1 – Veni – I came 
Despite changes and developments in what fieldworkers bring to the field in terms 
of theory or dispositions, ethnographic methods have remained relatively 
unchanged. Malinowski is commonly considered the founding father of 
ethnographic research: he conducted long-term fieldwork in the language of his 
research subjects at a time where anthropological knowledge was largely based 
on travellers’ accounts and analysed by “armchair-anthropologists” (Gluckman, 
2006, p. 13). In Malinowski’s iconic Argonauts of the Western Pacific, he sets the 
standard for ethnographic work: 
 
[Ethnographic work] should deal with the totality of all social, 
cultural and psychological aspects of the community, for they are so 
interwoven that not one can be understood without taking into 
consideration all the others. 
      Malinowski, 1922, p. xii 
 
The means by which this totality could be achieved was through prolonged, 
personal, and constant fieldwork in the native language; rendering the 
ethnographer open to observing and participating in all facets of daily life, from 
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village brawls to ceremonial events (Malinowski, 1922). The foreword and 
acknowledgements in Argonauts of the Western Pacific offer some interesting 
insight into how Malinowski was able to conduct his research, but what is 
interesting from a contemporary perspective is the invisibility of his research 
objects. Acknowledgements are made to government officials, professors, 
traders, librarians, and the publishers, but the Trobrianders themselves are not 
mentioned (Malinowski, 1922, pp. xiv-xv). Contrast this with Rabinow’s 
Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (1977), which demonstrates the importance 
of different key informers in obtaining access to the field and accumulating data. 
Whereas Malinowski privileges the role of the ethnographer, referring to other 
non-native residents as ‘untrained minds’ (Malinowski, 1922, p. 4), Rabinow (1977) 
recognises how different informants granted him equally valid insight into issues. 
 
There is a distinct difference in tone between Malinowski and Rabinow. Malinowski 
employs a positivist language, attributing success to ‘a patient and systematic 
application of a number of rules of common sense and well-known scientific 
principles’ (Malinowski, 1922, p. 5). Contrast this with Rabinow’s (1977, p. 151) 
belief that ‘anthropology is an interpretive science […] Both the anthropologist 
and his informant live in culturally mediated worlds […]’. Whereas Malinowski 
(1922, p. 5) speaks of ‘manipulating and fixing [the ethnographer’s] evidence’, 
Rabinow (1977, p. 119) emphasises that anthropological data is ‘mediated by 
history and culture’. Perhaps rather amusingly, Malinowski (1922, p. 7) argues that 
‘ethnology has introduced law and order into what seemed chaotic and freakish’, 
but Rabinow, fifty years later, describes fieldwork as intersubjective and ‘neither 
quite here nor quite there’ (Rabinow, 1977, p. 155). These differences represent 
different epistemic positions of objectivity versus subjectivity, and I would argue 
that Rabinow’s subjective epistemology is the most suited for exploring highly 
complex social processes.  
 
Malinowski’s objectivist approach resonates with the criticisms of social 
anthropologists being tools of colonial authorities, whereas Rabinow seems intent 
on addressing these criticisms. Despite this epistemic development in Social 
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Anthropology, the nature of ethnography has remained the same: first-hand 
experience, diversity of research techniques, fluency in the native language, long-
term fieldwork which grants the researcher an air of normalcy, and a grounded 
and symbiotic relationship between the data collection process and theory 
(Atkinson, et al., 2001; Faubion, 2001; Miller, 1997; Gluckman, 2006; Kempny, 
2006). Put simply: ‘[…] now that I was in the field, everything was fieldwork’ 
(Rabinow, 1977, p. 11). Where recent ethnography differs from Malinowski’s 
approach is in its shift from a naturalist perspective wherein the ethnographer is 
in the field but not part of it, to seeing fieldwork as highly personalized and 
contingent upon the researcher (Atkinson, et al., 2001; Frankenberg, 2006).  
 
In spite of a lot of formalized argot, Marcus and Fischer (1986, p. 22) argue that 
fieldwork is, in the end, a ‘messy, qualitative experience’. I do not wish to suggest 
that Malinowski was blind to the unruly nature of the field, but there is a distinct 
difference in what Malinowski and early fieldworkers brought to the field when 
compared to post-war anthropology. Though Malinowski (1922) believed that the 
more ‘problems’ an ethnographer brought with him into the field, the more open 
he would be to developing theory, ethnographers now tend to recognise the 
ethnographer as a problem in and of him/herself. Or, as Marcus (1998, p. 246) put 
it: ‘Identity questions (and politics) have thus entered, for better or worse, into 
the way ethnography is shaped.’ 
 
Accepting that identity and subjectivity are cemented features of ethnography, it 
necessitates critical discussions of the methods chosen and an exploration of the 
researcher’s impact on the ethnography. I will return to the notion of reflexivity 
later, for now I will simply reiterate Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, pp. 14-15): 
‘the reflexive character of social research […] is not a matter of methodological 
commitment, it is an existential fact.’ 
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3.2.2 – Vidi – I saw 
The ethnographer brings an extensive toolkit into the field, and a frame of mind. 
It is not simply a question of what one sees, but the full range of sensory input. 
Whether it is ‘following one’s nose’ (Handelman, 2006, p. 95) or performing and 
interacting (Faubion, 2001), ethnography turns the ethnographer into the research 
instrument or as Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue: the ethnographer is the 
penultimate research instrument. In this section, I wish to explore what the 
ethnographer does once he or she is in the field. Smith (2001, pp. 220, 224) 
emphasises how the ethnographer should be ‘learning by labouring’ and endeavour 
to share in experiences of the research participants in order to generate the 
highest quality data. Although ‘insightful industriousness’ is seen a key trait in 
ethnographers, there are dangers in ‘seeing data everywhere’ (Charmaz & 
Mitchell, 2001, p. 161).  
 
What does the penultimate research instrument do? Miller (1997) and Rabinow 
(1977) both admit that much of their time in the field was spent hanging around, 
wandering idly, or simply drinking tea and engaging in small talk. In my case, it 
involved drinking copious amounts of coffee with Red Cross volunteers, asylum-
seekers, youth workers, parishioners, and polishing glasses and pouring pints in a 
bar. Participant-observation, the key method of ethnography, defines the 
research space as falling between the two poles of participation and observation 
(Rabinow, 1977). Navigating this space can present ethical issues or hazards, as 
participation and observation is often done on the informants’ terms. The 
ethnographer is dependent upon establishing rapport with informants, and making 
his/her presence natural or unobtrusive. Establishing rapport and gaining insight 
involves sharing experiences, but where does the ethnographer draw the line on 
what to share or what to ask about? I will return to the issue of ethics in 
ethnographic research below.  
 
The initial shock of entering the field can give an overwhelming sense that 
‘everything [is] fieldwork’ (Rabinow, 1977, p. 11), but through constant reflection 
and repetition the fieldworker explores ideas and concepts of interest.  There is 
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a measure of serendipity in ethnographic fieldwork, and this shapes the research 
and prods it in different directions (Marcus & Fischer, 1986). Rather than 
haphazardly meandering about a research field, the ethnographer will pursue 
ideas and pull at threads incessantly. Occasionally this leads to dead ends, but as 
the fieldwork extends over a longer period, the researcher simply shifts focus.  
 
3.2.3 – The Manchester School 
One particularly renowned approach to fieldwork is that of the extended-case 
method, as promulgated by Max Gluckman and other scholars at the University of 
Manchester. The extended-case method involves tracing events and situations, 
and observing how they spill over into one another, thereby also challenging 
previous notions of cultural stability and insulation: the social becomes a matter 
of practice and process (Evens & Handelman, 2006a; Mitchell, 2006; Kapferer, 
2006). In Gluckman’s own words: 
 
I am arguing that if we are going to penetrate more deeply into the 
actual process by which persons and groups live together with a social 
system, under a culture, we have to employ a series of connected cases 
occurring within the same area of social life. 
       Gluckman, 2006, p. 17 
 
Up until the 1950s, the pre-dominant idea in British Social Anthropology was that 
of Structural-Functionalism, represented commonly by Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-
Pritchard. Within this paradigm, social systems were envisioned as existing in 
states of equilibrium (Evens & Handelman, 2006a; Leach, 1964). After WWII, there 
is a distinct shift away from this paradigm, with prominent anthropologists such 
as Edmund Leach (1964, p. xiii) vociferously distancing himself from the 
structural-functionalists: ‘[…] society is not an organism, nor even a machine.’  
 
The Manchester School and the extended case method represent a step away from 
the grand, holistic theories that sought to account for all aspects of a society. In 
large part, this is due to the open and explorative nature of the extended case 
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method. As Glaeser (2006, p. 65) argues: ‘[…] Gluckman’s work is neither a 
worked-out body of theory nor a bounded methodology, but rather […] an “open 
platform”.’ Ultimately, the Manchester School signifies one of the significant 
breaks away from the objectivist ideals embodied by Malinowski and contributed 
to shaping much of British Social Anthropology and the ethnographic methodology. 
 
The extended case method attempts to focus on wider contexts (Mitchell, 2006). 
Key to seeing the wider context is following a case over a longer period. This 
extension in time led to an appropriation of history into ethnography, seen in, for 
example, Bourgois (2003, p. 48): ‘the intimate details of the lives […] revealed in 
this book cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.’ In addition to extending 
the purview of the case in time, the extended case method prompted a closer 
look at the actors in the case. Rather than focusing exclusively on the objects of 
study, the ethnographer becomes a feature of the social field and needs to explore 
his or her impact on it (Evens, 2006; Glaeser, 2006). Finally, the extended case 
method also prompts an extension into space, providing a foundation for multi-
sited ethnography (Glaeser, 2006). The extended case method still begins with 
scrutiny of the practices of a set of actors (Handelman, 2006). Ethnography, 
drawing on the extended case method, begins with a focus on events, and zooms 
out to explore the web of connections that tie in to that event.  
 
The Manchester School, and the extended case method, provide a solid theoretical 
foundation for ethnographic research on migration and integration. Rather than 
approaching a fieldwork site, a city, an organisation, or religious group, as isolated 
units of analyses, the extended case method demands a widening of perspectives. 
It is untenable to research migration and integration without extending the 
research in time and space; understanding where the migrant has come from, both 
geographically and emotionally, requires moving beyond isolated fieldwork sites 
unconnected to a greater whole. Exploring how different organisations and 
institutions interact with migration and integration processes requires an 
understanding of the different levels and units of analyses, from the global to the 
local, from the public to the private. The next sections will focus on these 
different units of analyses by exploring multi-sited research and reflexivity.  
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3.3 – Multi-sited research 
Ethnography builds on a fundamental assumption that space is socially 
constructed, and that the ethnographer inhabits a liminal position alongside 
participants in the construction of the social space (Boccagni, 2016; Falzon, 2009). 
Where multi-sited research differs from single-sited research is the focus on 
expansion as opposed to containment of the researched space (Falzon, 2009). In 
multi-sited research, it is not the bounded site that is important, but the meaning 
of that site to the actors (Xiang, 2013). The question then becomes what guides, 
defines, and limits the research, if not a territorially bounded space? Marcus 
(1995) identifies several strategies for conducting multi-sited research: following 
the people, the object, the metaphor, the plot, the life, or the conflict. 
 
What then is the strategy for my research? It is driven by the research questions: 
where and how integration processes develop. Reflecting the literature review, I 
have a particular focus on the role of religion and its relationship to secular 
processes. This leads to an emphasis on the Catholic Church and its connected 
elements, but an underlying premise was that the research should be defined by 
being ‘substantially continuous but spatially non-contiguous’ (Falzon, 2009, pp. 1-
2). In a sense, I am following the people, but also the conflict: my focus is on what 
lies ‘in-between’ (Boccagni, 2016, p. 2). Seeking to explore the discourses of 
integration presented in the literature review, the research benefits from 
broadening its parameters beyond a geographically or socially bounded area. This 
derives from an attempt to counter issues of methodological nationalism. 
Migration and integration are often framed by a nation-state context, but non-
national contexts might be more significant (FitzGerald, 2012; Amelina & Faist, 
2012; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Chernilo, 2006). This necessitates 
emphasising that participants, and the researcher, possess multiple and 
overlapping identities that are not defined by the nation-state (Amelina & Faist, 
2012). Similarly, the research explores different levels within state and Catholic 
Church, rendering the research not only multi-sited but also multi-scalar (Xiang, 
2013).  
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Despite offering several advantages, multi-sited research is not without its 
weaknesses. It invariably involves splitting attention and effort, giving the data a 
variation in both intensity and qualities. One common criticism is that an 
ethnographer focusing on multiple sites will suffer a loss of depth in the data 
(Marcus, 1998; Nadai & Maeder, 2009). A moot criticism, as it is also recognised 
that fieldwork, despite its length and depth, will not erase differences between 
the researcher and the participant. Rather, what should be strived for is a ‘limited 
fusion of horizons’ (Faubion, 2001, p. 49). To understand the actors and concepts, 
you have to be where the actors are and the concepts manifest (Marcus, 1998), 
hence the researcher will invariably achieve different depths depending on the 
site and space (Nadai & Maeder, 2009). 
 
Multi-sited research can also reinforce the legitimacy of the ethnographer in the 
primary site and the overall ecological validity of the research (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1983). My own fieldwork, for example, necessitated large amounts of 
travel throughout Norway. It impinged on my time spent in Bodø, but my travelling 
was seen as a necessary and natural part of my activities. My identities and social 
memberships fit into a web of translocal relationships that rendered my activities 
socially continuous despite their spatial dispersion (Gallo, 2009). For example, my 
involvement and work with the national Catholic youth organisation was both local 
and national. Parishioners in Bodø viewed moving between different, Catholic 
sites positively. Familiarity and experience with national events and structures 
were seen as contributing to local activities. Multi-sited research should not be 
understood as performing the same controlled experiment in different locations, 
but pulling at threads (Marcus, 1995).  
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3.4 – Interviews and document analysis 
3.4.1 – Interviews 
There are many kinds of interviews used in qualitative research, from oral history 
interviews to ethnographic interviews. They range from unstructured to fully 
structured. The interviews in this thesis are best characterised as semi-structured 
interviews, where I utilised open-ended questions and followed up answers 
(Davies, 2011; Ayres, 2012). In some of the cases, interviews are the result of long-
term contact and establishing rapport with the informant. As a result of the 
overarching ethnographic approach of the thesis, the interviews with Dmitri, 
Thomas, and Vanessa are shaped by this process and bear hallmarks of 
ethnographic interviews (Fielding, 2011). In other cases, such as with Msgr. Olsen, 
Siv, Ali, Larsen, and Hasvoll, the interviews can also be seen as elite interviews 
(Moyser, 2011). In the case of Msgr. Olsen, Siv, Larsen, and the interviews with 
figures in Caritas, they served as experts, whereas Hasvoll also served as a 
gatekeeper. Ali, on the other hand, was an elite interview in the sense that it 
offered the opportunity to ask a relatively prominent local politician about 
personal background, outlook, and motivation. 
 
3.4.2 – Document analysis 
Document analysis is a useful method of providing additional context and when 
used in conjunction with ethnography and interviews can help minimise bias 
(Bowen, 2009). As a part of a qualitative approach, document analysis can draw 
on a wide array of sources and used to supplement findings (Bowen, 2009), such 
as in section 5.2, where a participant’s contemporaneous reflection on why Norges 
Unge Katolikker (NUK)52 was investigated was validated by a report published the 
following year. Drawing on documents can also ‘provide a means of tracking 
change and development’ (Bowen, 2009, p. 30), such as in Chapter 4, where I use 
policy documents to track changes in integration policy in Norway. Naturally, 
there are questions of documents’ authenticity, credibility, representativeness, 
and meaning, as interpretations of documentations may not match the producer’s 
intentions (Wharton, 2011). In disentangling contentious cases such as the 
                                         
52 Catholic Youth of Norway 
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membership fraud case, explored in depth in Chapter 5, documents put forward 
by the Catholic Dioceses of Oslo (OKB) can be compared with official filings and 
records. 
 
Documents collected and analysed in this thesis range from newspaper articles 
and opinion pieces, to annual reports and minutes from meetings. I recognise that 
‘not all social facts have been documented’ and that ‘not all documents are 
available to research’ (Wharton, 2011, pp. 80-81). As mentioned initially, 
document analysis was used to supplement the ethnographic research and 
interviews.  
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3.5 – Analytical considerations 
3.5.1 – Methods 
This thesis draws on data collected over the course of fourteen months, June 2015 
– August 2016. Ethnography was the primary method of data collection, and was 
supplemented by thirteen semi-structured interviews53 and document analysis of 
associational documents, newsletters, newspaper articles, and other sundries that 
pertained to either the organisations or migration and integration generally in 
Bodø and nationally. The research was conducted primarily within five 
organisations, as well as within the cityscape of Bodø, my main base during the 
fieldwork. The five organisations were NUK (the national catholic youth 
organisation), Caritas Norway (the Catholic charity), Red Cross Bodø, St. Eystein 
(the Catholic parish, and school, in Bodø), and The Borealis54 (a bar). These 
organisations offered a range of avenues for exploring integration processes, 
concerning religious/secular, local/national, and volunteer/paid organisations. 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with members/volunteers of the 
organisations, as well as persons involved in municipal and county politics and 
administration. Casting a wide net allowed me to cross-reference topics with 
participants from the whole range of research sites. 
 
Through participation in the above organisations, I established rapport with a 
range of potential interview subjects. The semi-structured interviews were 
primarily conducted with the intention of filling in gaps, when information could 
not be solicited through normal conversation or it was necessary to record the 
conversation. This process of conducting semi-structured interviews necessitated 
tailored questions, utilising the full flexibility offered by the semi-structured 
interview. All the interviews were conducted in Norwegian, and all but one 
interview subject gave answers in Norwegian: the non-Norwegian interviewee 
spoke Swedish. Due to the similarities of Norwegian and Swedish, this did not 
present any issues. 
 
                                         
53 A list of participants can be found in appendix B 
54 The name of the bar has been anonymised 
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Ethnography relies on being able to recall encounters, and there are different 
methods of documenting encounters. Visually, through video and photo, aurally, 
through recording, or in writing, taking notes during or following situations and 
conversations. I focused on note taking and photography as primary modes of 
documenting and aiding recall. Field notes are used differently by different 
ethnographers, and adapt to the ethnographer’s style and preference. From 
minute jottings on napkins, to fully formed notes written at the end of the day. 
Regardless of how one makes field notes, they primarily function as ways to recall 
colourful encounters and complex situations, something which is difficult to 
render in field notes (Emerson, et al., 2001, pp. 354-357, 365). Personally, I relied 
less on written notes, preferring to avoid, if possible, taking notes in “live” 
situations and wrote notes when I returned to my flat. In situations where taking 
notes was unobtrusive, I chose to do so. On the other hand, I utilised photography 
as a means of documenting situations and facilitating recall. With the prevalence 
of mobile phone usage and photography, I found it to be a more unobtrusive 
method. 
 
3.5.2 – Fieldwork sites 
3.5.2.1 – Bodø 
Several factors influenced the choice of the dominant fieldwork site. Firstly, Bodø 
was chosen for its location and size. Bodø is introduced in depth in Chapter 4, and 
I will only briefly focus on my selection criteria. It is a regional centre within 
Northern Norway, and offered the opportunity to conduct the research in a 
peripheral context (Barth, 1963b, p. 16), while offering a basis for comparison to 
other cities and urban centres. Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, and Trondheim, though 
interesting cases, arguably offer little in terms of comparison. In orders of 
magnitude, their circumstances are different from most municipalities. Hence, in 
order to provide a basis for comparison in later studies Bodø was chosen. Although 
this study is not comparative, the research touches on other locations in order to 
elucidate elements in Bodø or concerning integration processes. Bodø serves as a 
territorial anchor in the research, framing large parts of the research. 
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Another factor in choosing Bodø was the presence of a Catholic community and a 
Catholic school. There are only five Catholic schools in Norway, four 
primary/lower secondary schools (grades 1-10) and one upper secondary school 
(grades 11-13). The schools are located in Bodø (years 1-10), Arendal (years 1-10, 
plus a kindergarten), Bergen (years 1-13), and Oslo (years 1-10). As I sought to 
establish a sense of anthropological strangeness, I excluded Bergen and Oslo due 
to my familiarity with the cities and the Catholic communities. Arendal was 
excluded as I previously participated in activities in St. Hallvard in Oslo, where a 
Polish congregation of Franciscans55 were responsible for the administration of the 
parish, and they moved to Arendal in 2008: thus, I concluded that Bodø offered 
the greatest possibilities for new experiences that I could approach from an 
anthropological perspective. Bodø also has the youngest Catholic parish of the 
four cities, which would enable me to find informants who could give me insight 
into how the Catholic community grew and developed within the city. 
 
3.5.2.2 – Catholicism 
The choice of Catholic as a common religious identifier between the religious 
organisations examined in depth in this thesis derives from my experience with 
the Catholic Church. As outlined in section 3.6 on reflexivity, I am a practicing 
Catholic, and have extensive experience with the Catholic youth community in 
Norway. As such, I had much more extensive access to informants and participants 
than if I had chosen another religious community, such as an Islamic community. 
My intimate knowledge of the Catholic Church in Norway allowed me to explore 
the connections between the dioceses, parishes, NUK, and Caritas Norway: seeing 
how the different organisations, groups, and people are interwoven. 
 
                                         
55 Monastic orders in Norway are subsidiaries of monasteries in other countries, such as the 
Dominican monastery in Bodø having first been a subsidiary of a monastery based in Staffordshire, 
England, and subsequently responsibility was transferred to a monastery in the Philippines. I do 
not explore this relationship in detail, but it is worth noting that it tends to shift the weight of 
religious sisters or brothers in favour of the “home” country (though exceptions do exist). Though 
an interesting topic to explore with regards to the relationship between religion and integration 
processes, it fell beyond the remit of this thesis and will only be tangentially referred to as it 
becomes relevant to other discussions. 
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The Catholic Church in Norway consists of people from roughly 200 countries and 
territories (Tande, 2016), and represents as such one of the most internationalised 
organisations in Norway. This leads Mæland (2016),  Hovdelien (2016), and Synnes 
(2012) to refer to the Catholic Church in Norway as a migrant church, due to the 
heterogeneity it derives from members of the Church having migration histories. 
I find the descriptive use of the term migrant church to be both misleading and 
ahistorical56, as it implies the Catholic Church in Norway on several levels deviates 
from a norm defined by hegemonic views of society (Snyder, 2016).  
 
It also carries the implicit assumption that the members retain their migrant 
identities, regardless of their life histories and will continually be defined in terms 
of their migrant identity. Furthermore, it downplays the presence of the Catholic 
Church in Norwegian society since its return to Norway in 1843. Identifying the 
Catholic Church in Norway as a migrant church carries the implicit assumption that 
the Catholic Church in Norway has remained unaffected by Norwegian society over 
the course of its recent history. This is reminiscent of Davie’s (1994, p. 92) 
observation that the British addition of “Roman” to “Catholicism” accentuates 
‘the foreignness of Catholicism’. Thus, the use of “migrant church” is a de facto 
Othering that will inhibit a fruitful analysis of integration processes. 
 
As one of the cases in this thesis, the Catholic Church in Norway offers both 
historical and current material for analysis. It has also been the origin of two of 
the organisations investigated, NUK and Caritas Norway. The Catholic Church in 
Norway has also attracted attention from researchers in Norway, with researchers 
in Stavanger, Bergen, Volda (outside Ålesund), and Oslo conducting research on 
their local Catholic parishes (Loga, 2011; Vedøy, 2016; Busengdal, 2015; 
Hovdelien, 2016; Mæland, 2016). 
 
                                         
56 Describing the Catholic Church as a “migrant church” in a theological sense is a different 
discussion, one not addressed here. 
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3.5.2.3 – NUK 
NUK is the national organisation for Catholic youth in Norway. In 2017, it 
celebrated its 70th anniversary, and tallies 90 local groups and almost 3000 
members. The organisation is organised along three levels: the local parish level, 
seven regions, and the national. NUK, centrally, organises roughly 20 activities 
annually, from leadership training activities to fundraising for Caritas Norway. 
More activities are organised at the local level, from supporting catechesis in 
parishes to choirs and youth groups (NUK, 2016). I explore how NUK fits into the 
Catholic landscape in Norway in Chapter 5, for now I will only mention the 
activities that formed part of my fieldwork. Over the course of the fourteen 
months, I participated in events at local, regional, and national levels. These 
included 3-4 meetings in the local youth group, a regional weeklong camp for 15-
16 year olds, two training weekends for aspiring leaders, and three national, week 
long camps, one for each age group (children 7-11, junior 11-14, youth 15-18). 
The regional and national camps also included a planning weekend for each.  
 
I also took part in a two-week international pilgrimage to the World Youth Day in 
Kraków, as well as the planning weekend ahead of the pilgrimage and four-five 
meetings with the organising group. I also took part in the Annual General Meeting 
and three meetings in the national council of the organisation. My use of the 
organisation and its activities as a fieldwork site was clarified and approved by 
the national council, and I was in regular communication with members of the 
secretariat or executive council. In the interest of maintaining participant 
anonymity, I have categorised data from the activities into three categories: local, 
national, and international. This means I will avoid specific details that could lead 
to identifying either participants or the specific activity. 
 
Related to the discussion on reflexivity, I have to mention that I have held 
positions of responsibility within NUK over the years. This brings into question the 
issue of impartiality and bias, which I address throughout the thesis. I will 
therefore clarify my role in the activities I participated in during my fieldwork. 
Firstly, I was the regional representative for the northern region, which provided 
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me with access to the national council, but also required me to support and 
develop activities at the parish level within the region. Secondly, I am a member 
in the leadership-training group, which is responsible for organising two training 
weekends a year for youths interested in becoming leaders, at any level or event, 
in the organisation. Thirdly, I was the deputy national coordinator for the 
pilgrimage to Kraków, which took place in the summer of 2016. Fourthly, I was an 
active part of several leadership teams at national camps. I discuss ethical 
considerations in detail below. Methodologically, this limited me from assuming a 
novice role, but forced me to critically rethink my familiarity. On the other hand, 
my experience and familiarity did not disrupt discussions and activities, and the 
base level of rapport with many participants allowed me to observe discussions 
that might not have taken place in front of a less familiar or trusted person. 
 
3.5.2.4 – Caritas Norway 
Caritas Norway is the official charity organisation for the Catholic Church in 
Norway, established in 1964 with the mission to promote the welfare of migrants 
and marginalised groups in Norway, as well as contribute to international aid work. 
It sprang from the Norwegian Catholic Refugees Aid, established in 1952, and its 
evolution into an independent organisation was prompted by a flow of Hungarian 
refugees to Norway following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 (Caritas Norge, 
2014)57. It is a member of the Caritas Internationalis and Caritas Europe networks 
(Caritas Norge, 2010). Caritas Norway works with both international and domestic 
issues, but the focus of this thesis is on the domestic aspects of their work. Caritas 
Norway is inextricably tied to the Norwegian Catholic Bishops Conference, and 
every Catholic parish in Norway may send a representative to Caritas Norway’s 
AGM. Caritas Norway functions as an umbrella-organisation for local, parish-based 
Caritas groups, providing advice, information, and assistance (Caritas Norge, 
2013). Although I focus on the larger centres in Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, and 
Drammen below, there are smaller, local, parish-based groups as well. 
 
                                         
57 See Mæland (2016) for a closer examination of historical material on Caritas Norway 
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Of particular interest is Caritas Norway’s work in the areas of migration and 
integration, topics that accounted for twelve per cent of their expenses in 2016 
(Caritas Norge, 2017b). Their high-profile domestic work consists of Information 
and Counselling Centres in Oslo, Drammen, Bergen, and Stavanger. The 
Information and Counselling Centre in Oslo is, by far, the most robust and offers 
the broadest services: guidance in fourteen languages58, legal advice twice a 
week, health care advice twice a week, job application course, Norwegian 
language courses, and a mentorship program (Caritas Norge, 2017a). All services, 
barring the language courses, are free of charge. The centres in Bergen, Drammen, 
and Stavanger offer scaled down versions of these activities, dependent upon local 
resources. In addition to this, in 2016 Caritas Norway started working with asylum 
centres and providing basic language tuition and introductions to public services 
and offices in Norway. The vast majority of activities are volunteer-led. 
 
My research activities in Caritas Norway, and its local groups, were confined 
primarily to semi-structured interviews, in addition to participant observation at 
Caritas Norway’s AGM in 2016. I interviewed the activity coordinators in 
Stavanger, Bergen, and Drammen, as well as the leader of Caritas Norway’s 
domestic section. I chose to examine Caritas Norway in part due to its activities, 
but also due to the overlap with the Catholic Church in Norway and NUK. Focusing 
on Caritas Norway is a result of seeking to answer the research question on how 
religious organisations influence integration processes. 
 
3.5.2.5 – Red Cross Bodø (RCB) 
The Red Cross is one of the other main organisations under the microscope. Though 
there are a plethora of secular organisations to choose from, the Red Cross is one 
of the few with a pervasive presence in Norway. The Norwegian Red Cross has 116 
local groups throughout Norway, and approximately 43 000 volunteers (Norwegian 
Red Cross, 2016a; 2016b). The Red Cross is, arguably, one of the most recognisable 
charitable organisations in the world: for example, the International Committee 
                                         
58 Permanently: Norwegian, English, Spanish, Polish, Romanian, and Russian. On an “as needed”-
basis: Arabic, French, German, Dutch, Lithuanian, Portuguese, Swahili, and Urdu. 
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of the Red Cross has received the Nobel Peace Prize on four separate occasions 
(Norwegian Red Cross, 2016b). The Red Cross also has a clearly defined set of 
guiding principles, and enjoys a close relationship with several municipalities, 
counties, and the state. Due to time constraints, it was impossible to explore the 
full range of activities offered by the Norwegian Red Cross. After conferring with 
one of the coordinators at RCB, we decided that my time would be best spent 
participating in their recently started after-school homework program. In addition 
to this regular activity, I took part in workshops on multicultural social work, town 
hall-style meetings to discuss integration activities in RCB, and the Annual General 
Meeting. 
 
I took part in the recently established weekly after-school program, which aimed 
to help pupils with homework. Although targeting children in primary and 
secondary education, adults attending the adult education program run by the 
municipality often visited the activity. The activity consisted of three-five 
volunteers assisting pupils with homework. On a busy week, there might be a 
dozen visitors, but large parts of the time was spent conversing with other 
volunteers. The activity was held at Stormen, the library and cultural centre in 
Bodø. 
 
In addition to this program, I got involved with the social work organised for the 
asylum seekers that arrived in Bodø in the early winter of 2015. Volunteers from 
RCB coordinated daily two-hour social events at the reception centre, and I took 
part about twice a week in November and December. The work involved talking 
to the asylum seekers, making tea, coffee, and waffles, and generally interacting 
with the asylum seekers. This could be talking to, and getting to know, the asylum 
seekers, playing cards, answering questions about Norway (both about culture and 
language), or playing games with the children. There would be between 15-30 
asylum seekers, and two-three Red Cross volunteers.  
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3.5.2.6 – The Borealis 
The Borealis is a pub in central Bodø, and my research there consisted of 
participant observation and a semi-structured interview with one of the 
bartenders. My reason for conducting research at a pub are two-fold. Firstly, 
approximately two-fifths of the workforce in the service industry are migrants 
(SSB, 2016a), making it an interesting area for observing integration processes in 
a workplace. Secondly, it is a profession with few requirements as to education or 
formal qualifications, and was therefore available to me in a way other migrant-
heavy industries, such as the construction industry, are not. I submitted open 
applications to several hotels and bars, but was only invited to an interview for a 
position at The Borealis. I worked shifts at the bar from October 2015 until I left 
Bodø in June 2016. To begin with, I was given the occasional shift, but following 
the holiday season, I worked more regularly, often covering shifts for colleagues.  
 
My primary focus was observing my colleagues, their interactions with each other 
and customers. There was considerable variation in pace in the bar, where certain 
evenings were slow and allowed for longer conversations amongst the staff and 
with customers. Other evenings were busy, with the bar filled to capacity and 
leaving little time for idleness. My engagement with The Borealis and its staff was 
not limited to a strict working relationship, I also went to the bar outwith my 
working hours, sometimes because I was passing by, other times because I had 
time to spare before or after other activities. This mirrored the patterns of other 
staff, who would socialise with each other in the bar. Writing field notes while 
working was not very problematic, as I could withdraw to the back of the bar 
under the guise of re-stocking the fridges or shelves, and could make minor 
jottings.  
 
3.5.3 – Data analysis 
The process of analysing ethnographic material is an exercise in structuring and 
framing chaotic situations and encounters. Attempting to observe everything, 
while focusing on one’s participation, can lead to overwhelming amounts of data 
(Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001). The question remains how, and when, to analyse the 
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data. After the fieldwork has been conducted and the ethnographer has returned 
from the field, one method of analysis is what Emerson, et al. (2001), refer to as 
the integrative strategy. Here the ethnographer attempts to conduct an analysis 
through a reflective narrative, writing in the first person to offer a more fluid 
transition between data from the field and the analysis. The integrative strategy 
is an inductive process, whereby the ethnographer ‘generates as many ideas, 
issues, topics and themes as possible’ (Emerson, et al., 1995, p. 166) This process 
starts with a close reading of field notes, which involves line-by-line open coding 
looking for themes and connections. The open coding process attempts to avoid 
pre-established categories, and encourages the ethnographer to use a multitude 
of codes. Following this coding, data is sorted and subjected to a critical 
examination. Naturally, the coding process is strongly influenced by disciplinary 
background, in the same way disciplinary background and training shape the 
fieldwork (Emerson, et al., 1995). 
 
The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed and coded using Nvivo. Nvivo 
offers certain advantages in coding interviews as it can be done alongside 
transcribing, and interviews can readily be compared to each other. I personally 
transcribed and coded the interviews, which allowed me to situate the interviews 
in the wider fieldwork and in relation to my field notes. This was essential, as the 
interviews need to be seen in the context of the fieldwork, as the chronology of 
events was rather significant. As with the ethnographic data, I utilised a close 
reading of the transcripts to generate codes for each interview, and later 
extended my scope to include the ethnographic data. Combining the interviews 
and the field notes facilitated writing integrative memos that form the basis of 
the later analyses.  
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3.6 – Reflexivity 
As the ethnographer is the research instrument, the data gathered is shaped by 
the ethnographer’s ability to observe and collect information. Ethnography 
involves the exploitation of the innate capacities of social actors: the ability to 
engage in conversation, to draw attention to issues, and to manage impressions 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Evens, 2006). The integrity of ethnographic 
research, therefore, is contingent upon the researcher’s awareness and openness 
concerning his or her identities, values, beliefs, and influence upon the material. 
Reflexivity implies that ethnographic research does contain limitations and these 
limitations derive from the ethnographer’s access to different data (Kapferer, 
2006) 
 
Neutrality in the field is a myth, but the research can be reconciled to scientific 
principles through balancing overtness and covertness in the field (Murphy & 
Dingwall, 2001). This balancing act is complicated by participants being less 
concerned with what the research is about than the kind of person the researcher 
is (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). Age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, religiosity, 
and a host of other possible identities, shape relationships with informants 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Mitchell, 2006; Glaeser, 2006; Frankenberg, 
2006). Furthermore, the informant does not suspend his or her life for the benefit 
of the ethnographer, but incorporates the researcher’s presence into their daily 
life (Rabinow, 1977). In some situations, this incorporation also denies the 
researcher some identities, such as that of the academic researcher (Macdonald, 
1993). Reflexive research considers these factors, and critically assesses their 
impact on the research. 
 
My research was situated in locations and contexts with which I am intimately 
familiar, adding an element of autoethnography (Reed-Danahay, 2011) to the 
overall research. To Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, p. 92), this presents a 
problem as it might prohibit a ‘novice role’, where the researcher is permitted to 
pry and break social conventions under the guise of ignorance. Anthropology 
usually requires an attitude of seeing a culture as “anthropologically strange” in 
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order to expose underlying assumptions. In other words, the ethnographer should 
sometimes ask seemingly simple and obvious questions, and this method is less 
accessible to someone with intimate knowledge of the culture, group, or social 
space in question (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).  
 
Accepting the premise that ‘identity questions (and politics) have thus entered 
[…] into the way ethnography is shaped’ (Marcus, 1998, p. 246), there is a need 
to outline what identities were activated and made relevant during the fieldwork. 
Firstly, as a dual-national UK/Norwegian citizen having grown up in Norway, 
completing all primary and secondary schooling there, I am intimately familiar 
with a range of Norwegian cultural nuances. I am fluent in Norwegian, and easily 
pass as a Norwegian due to language and appearance. Despite this, I would 
emphasise a Scottish identity, such as by wearing a kilt on special occasions. When 
speaking English to people I encountered during the fieldwork, I would also be 
identified as non-Norwegian (usually Scottish), or would be compelled to explain 
how I mastered both languages and/or ended up living in Northern Norway. This 
tension between being Scottish/British and Norwegian, I would argue, has allowed 
me to establish the required distance necessary to view my fieldwork as 
anthropologically strange, but simultaneously achieve a depth that stems from 
autobiographical details. Moreover, I hope to highlight the complexities and 
diversity of identities that are often subsumed under broad categories. 
 
Fluency in the language and awareness of cultural nuances alone do not mean I 
effortlessly entered into the field, as my background is from Oslo. For the purpose 
of reflexivity it is sufficient to say that being a “southerner” did shape some 
interactions. In interactions with some locals, being a southerner meant having to 
weather some abuse, though this was mostly kind-hearted. On the other hand, 
meeting other southerners usually afforded an easy conversation topic about what 
brought them to the North. The “northern” versus “southern” distinction is not 
necessarily analytical, but a distinction based on broad sweeping generalisations 
and stereotypes that go back as far as the 1960s (Hellstad, 2010). My generic South 
Eastern dialect meant participants could not easily identify my origins, hence 
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resorting to stereotypes. The distinction quickly ceased to be relevant, perhaps 
partly due to my disparagement of the capitol and praise of Bodø and Northern 
Norway, thereby beating them to the punch. 
 
On an even more detailed level, meeting people from Oslo, or the surrounding 
area, created an extra similarity (or dissimilarity) based on where in Oslo one grew 
up. In my case, I was raised on the East side of Oslo, but attended a primary school 
in the city centre, and a secondary school on the West side. Growing up on the 
East side allowed me to distance myself from certain stereotypes associated with 
the West side of Oslo59. There are advantages to being familiar with aspects of 
Norwegian culture and language, but I was able to establish the methodologically 
required distance (Marcus, 1998, p. 252) by virtue of having lived in the UK since 
2009, and by moving to a part of Norway which I was largely unfamiliar with. The 
relationship between the “Norwegian” and “Scottish” identities was shaped by my 
adolescence and has resulted in roots migration60, as Wessendorf remarks in her 
work:  
 
Adolescence as a period of liminality during which young people 
“anchor themselves in style” in order to overcome feelings of 
marginalisation from the wider social environment. 
      Wessendorf, 2013, p. 11 
 
 
As a result of my adolescence, I rarely self-identify as Norwegian (ethnically or 
nationally), subordinating it to other identities. I might have attended primary 
and secondary schools in Oslo, but they were not “typical”: my primary school was 
a private Catholic school, run initially by nuns and later taken over by the Catholic 
Dioceses of Oslo, and my secondary school, though state-run, offered the 
International Baccalaureate program. In many ways, my schooling kept me 
partially removed from ‘The Norwegian Unitary school’ and its ‘hidden curriculum’ 
                                         
59 Without going into excessive detail on the social construction of Oslo, the general idea is based 
on class distinctions where the West side is (upper)middle class and the East side is working class 
60 ‘the “roots-migrant”, those members of the second generation who relocate to their parents’ 
country of origin’ (Wessendorf, 2013, p. viii) 
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of values and expectations, the idea that Norwegian state schools enforce national 
identity constructions (Lidén, 2001; Snyder, 1971). Another factor is that I was 
classified as a minority language pupil, as I spoke English at home rather than 
Norwegian. This does not mean I was seen as a minority pupil, as that label is more 
often attributed to pupils that visibly stand out as “non-Norwegian” 
(Hofslundsengen, 2011).  
 
One example of this is when, while I was an upper secondary student, a guidance 
counsellor came to hand out exemption forms for not being assessed in “nynorsk” 
(New Norwegian), one of the official written forms of Norwegian, and 
automatically handed forms out to pupils who were not white. As exemption is 
given on the basis of what language the pupil uses as a native language, I asked 
for a form, and then had to explain to the guidance counsellor why I should have 
one, something she did not require from the other pupils she gave exemption 
forms. This blatant display of racialisation of my peers contributed to a desire to 
distance myself from a “Norwegian” identity. For many reasons, not all of which 
relate to my schooling, I have developed an aversion to being identified as 
Norwegian, and have emphasised and preferred to be identified as Scottish (or in 
a pinch, British).  
 
Geographically contingent identities aside, another significant identity that needs 
to be reflected on is my religious identity. I am a practicing Catholic, and have 
been from a very young age. I have been an active member of NUK for over two 
decades. I was sent to summer camps as a child, and later went voluntarily as an 
adolescent. Several of my older siblings were also active in the organisation, and 
I have remained active throughout my adult life. I have had multiple positions of 
responsibility in the organisation over the years, and am intimately familiar with 
several aspects of the organisation and its activities. Though by no means a 
theologian, I take pride in being knowledgeable of multiple aspects of Catholic 
doctrine and practice. It is beyond any doubt that this research has been shaped 
by my religious identity. I highly doubt I would have had the unfettered access to 
research sites constructed around a Catholic identity had I not identified strongly 
with that identity.  
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This presents multiple issues with regards to ethics and bias, most (if not all) of 
which will be addressed throughout the thesis. I will argue that my ethnographic 
fieldwork amongst parts of the Catholic communities in Norway is not impugned 
by my Catholic identity, rather it places the onus squarely on the openness 
required from myself with regards to the inferences I draw from my data. As 
pointed out by Marcus (1998, pp. 246, 252), reflexive ethnography of groups one 
is intimately familiar with leads to much greater pressure on what is required of 
the ethnographer, both methodologically and personally. 
 
Gender and age were also important in shaping my data. In the local parish, I was 
one of very few people between the age of twenty and thirty, and my age certainly 
played a factor in the organisational aspects of my research. Men, particularly 
young men, were almost as a rule few and far between in several of the activities 
I participated in. That is not to say they were not involved in the voluntary 
organisations, but there were gendered aspects of volunteering. Nor would I have 
been able to achieve such depth in NUK had I been older, although with my 
background in the organisation my age undoubtedly played less of a part in access. 
 
A final aspect which also shaped my research is my mobility. This is naturally 
related to my age, occupation, class and perhaps even marital status. Hammersley 
and Atkinson (1983, p. 87) note a tendency for ethnography ‘to be the province of 
younger research workers’. They hypothesize that it might be due to time 
commitments, or the lack thereof, as a young researcher. Being a young, 
unmarried, PhD candidate has given me a freedom of movement that is rarely 
available to researchers with more settled lives. With nothing but research laying 
claim to my time, I was able to devote myself to following leads and participating 
in research activities that necessitated travelling. In many ways, this reinforced 
an impression of my presence in the primary fieldwork site as itinerant or 
temporary. This might lead to some limitations, but as argued above it was a 
necessary aspect of the research.  
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In terms of being able to relate to the experiences of migrants, being a highly 
mobile, and undoubtedly privileged, migrant has shaped both the research and 
the researcher. Investigating aspects of integration and inclusion whilst 
simultaneously going through those processes was an interesting experience. 
Migration and integration are systems shaped by inequality, and there is no doubt 
that a single, young, white, highly educated man has an easier time of it. In terms 
of my migration history, I find it easiest to describe myself as having, for most of 
the last decade, lived a transnational life, split between Norway and the UK. This 
transnational existence, along with my educational and religious background, has 
contributed to my understanding of migration and integration. Migration offers 
challenges at personal, private, public, local, regional, and national levels, and 
the ideal outcome of integration processes is that migrants, of any kind, enrich 
any of these levels. 
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3.7 – Ethics 
Any social research requires a discussion of ethical implications of both 
constructing and conducting research. Ethics is not confined to what, usually pre-
approved, questions are asked in interviews or focus groups, but occurs at all 
stages of the research. Ethnography, in particular, puts the onus on the 
researcher’s integrity. The Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the 
Commonwealth (ASA) provides extensive guidance on the ethical processes of 
ethnography and participant observation. The ASA (2011) identify two key pitfalls 
in ethical ethnographic research: participant awareness, and participant 
anonymity. In the following sections, I explore how I negotiated these two aspects 
of my fieldwork. Additionally, I reflect on the notions of risk and harm, which are 
important factors in ethical decision making in research processes. 
 
3.7.1 – Negotiating consent 
The process of negotiating consent, particularly informed consent, is rarely 
straight forward. In the case of interviews and surveys, the process usually entails 
the participant signing a consent form and being given a plain language statement 
that lays out the research. In the case of participant observation, the process of 
establishing consent is more diffuse.  
 
With regards to interviews, I provided a written statement outlining the nature of 
the research project and how the interview data would be recorded, used, stored, 
and disposed of. The interview subject was subsequently given a consent form 
where they were given the choice of consenting to participating in the research, 
and whether they would prefer anonymity or if they consented to being named in 
the research and subsequent publications. The participant was offered the 
possibility of not answering questions they did not feel comfortable answering, 
and their participation was entirely voluntary. Due to lack of resources, no 
remuneration or incentive was offered. Rather, their participation was the result 
of established rapport, trust, and an interest in contributing to the research 
project. 
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In situations which were entirely observational, such as public speeches and 
celebrations on the 17th May or the deportation protest, I did not find it necessary 
to acquire consent from people present, as their anonymity provides ample 
protection. In smaller, more intimate situations where I would engage in 
conversation with potential participants, I maintained an open and honest 
approach. If anyone asked why I moved to Bodø, or was present at an activity, I 
would always include a statement concerning my role as a researcher and my 
project. In certain situations, such as with activities organised by NUK and the Red 
Cross, I would note that I had informed the organisations, or local branches, of my 
research and acquired organisational consent. If I felt the participant was unable 
to make an informed decision regarding my research, as would occasionally 
happen during my research at the Borealis61, I did not pursue conversations 
relevant to the research. I return to this in the section below in terms of 
overt/covert research practices. 
 
3.7.2 – Participant awareness 
Issues surrounding participant’s awareness of the researcher and the research are 
to be expected: overt versus covert research, individual versus collective informed 
consent, and recording of data. Firstly, the issues overt and covert research are 
not black and white, participant observation exists on a continuum of being overt 
or covert (McKenzie, 2009; Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). McKenzie (2009) argues that 
participant observation will inevitably contain covert elements, despite a 
researcher’s best intentions of conducting overt research. An attempt can be 
made to pursue overt research through obtaining approval, access, and consent in 
advance from participants and organisations (ASA, 2011, p. 2). Yet, advance 
consent from gatekeepers does not guarantee consent from other participants 
(ASA, 2011; McKenzie, 2009; Calvey, 2008).  
 
                                         
61 I would exercise judgement as to the level of intoxication, and would avoid research topics if I 
considered them too inebriated to make an informed decision as to the nature of my research. If 
the participant nonetheless pursued topics pertinent to my research, I would make a note of it 
and used it to inform other aspects of my research. 
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Lugosi (in Calvey, 2008, p. 908) argues that the overt/covert nature of the 
research depends on the relationship between the researcher and the participant. 
In this sense, the overt/covert nature of the research is not as important as the 
researcher’s duty of care (European Science Foundation, 2011; ASA, 2011). 
Undeniably, aspects of my fieldwork were covert: observations at a rally against 
the deportation of asylum seekers, participating in 17th May celebrations, and 
similar situations where there is no possibility of, or anything to be gained by, 
informing the public or participants of my intentions. Ethnographic fieldwork 
requires a continual process of ethical reflexivity, and in the interest of openness 
and transparency, it is important to recognise that aspects of research are covert 
(Calvey, 2008). 
 
The process of obtaining and maintaining consent is, in practice, maintaining a 
relationship with the participant. In interviews and focus groups, this relationship 
is defined as one between the researcher and the participant, clarified by consent 
forms and plain language statements detailing the research. In ethnographic 
research, on the other hand, the relationship between researcher and participant 
is more complex. The European Science Foundation (ESF) place ‘questionable 
procedures for obtaining informed consent [and] insufficient respect and care for 
participants in the research’ under the category of poor and inappropriate 
research practices (European Science Foundation, 2011, p. 9). There are several 
problems with this view, as it is not made clear what are ‘questionable 
procedures’ or displaying ‘insufficient respect and care’. As criticisms, they rely 
on a value-judgement of the researcher’s conduct and awareness, and in the 
following paragraphs, I reflect on the processes whereby I established, obtained, 
and maintained consent. 
 
Both the issues of obtaining and maintaining consent can only be resolved in situ. 
One aspect of the resolution of these issues is recognising intrinsic power 
relationships between the researcher and the participants. Rabinow (1977) and 
the ASA (2011) argue that symbolic violence and unequal power relationships are 
inherent in ethnographic research. In this perspective, the relationship between 
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the researcher and the participant is a zero-sum game where the researcher 
inhabits the role of a superior and extracts information from participants 
(Dyrberg, 1997). The ethnographer defines the encounter, controls the 
conversation, and asks the questions, possibly to the detriment or 
disempowerment of the participant.  
 
The alternative perspective is one where the power relationship is viewed as a 
‘plus-sum’ game, and both the researcher and the participant define the 
interactions and gain from the relationship (Dyrberg, 1997). Power, in these two 
forms, is generated in significantly different fashions: the former relies on a 
derivative form of power, where power is inherited from position, whereas the 
latter is a self-constituting form of power, where it is constituted in the context 
— and interaction — taking place (Dyrberg, 1997). In the course of my fieldwork, 
I pursued the latter, symbiotic relationship as the preferred power-dynamic 
between researcher and participant. 
 
Aspiring to achieve a ‘plus-sum’ relationship can be done through understanding 
and pursuing four principles: non-maleficence (no harm should come to 
participants), beneficence (a positive outcome from the research for all parties), 
autonomy (respect for decisions made by participants), and justice (participants 
should be treated equally) (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001; ASA, 2011). These principles 
are tied to obtaining and maintaining consent and rapport. Rapport-building can 
be distinguished as ‘getting in’ and ‘getting on’ (McKenzie, 2009, p. 5.2). The 
initial effort goes towards negotiating access to participants, whereas the later 
effort goes towards maintaining access. Initially, a researcher might approach an 
organisation or institution and clear the research with decision makers within the 
organisations, but this does not mean that all the people involved with the 
organisation are willing to submit to that decision and allow themselves to be 
researched. 
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Ideally, consent should be established by both the gatekeepers and the individual 
subject (ASA, 2011). Establishing consent is synonymous with establishing trust 
and rapport, and involves openness and transparency about both the research 
project and the researcher. The notion of informed consent is near sacrosanct 
within sociology, but there is, arguably, no such thing as perfect informed 
consent. Only the researcher is aware of the full extent of the research he/she is 
conducting, and ensuring a participant is made fully aware of the researcher’s 
goals is unfeasible. Researchers will, inevitably, simplify their research when 
dealing with participants and the greater public (McKenzie, 2009). Although 
consent forms, plain language statements, participant information sheets, and 
sundries, generate a level of informed consent, they are essentially 
bureaucratically approved simplifications. Providing a participant with an 
information sheet and consent form does not guarantee their understanding 
(Murphy & Dingwall, 2001) For this reason, the onus should be on maintaining 
consent over time, avoiding inflicting any form of harm on participants, treating 
participants as equals, and respecting their decisions (ASA, 2011; Block, et al., 
2013; Gillam, 2013). 
 
In terms of my own fieldwork, treading the line of covert and overt research 
mirrors the experience of McKenzie (2009). Rather than pre-determining the 
overt/covert conduct of the researcher, it is up to the researcher to judge when 
it is appropriate to ‘cut the continuum’ (McKenzie, 2009, p. 5.14). In the vast 
majority of my interactions, it was easy to judge when to cut the continuum: one 
of the most frequent questions I received was “what brings you to Bodø?”, and to 
answer anything other than “I am here to perform ethnographic research” (or in 
that vein) would involve a degree of deception which is unjustifiable. That being 
said, I would not volunteer the information unless prompted. I do not find this 
problematic, as most meaningful interactions involved getting to know 
participants, which inevitably necessitates a give and take. Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1983) accurately stipulate that it is unrealistic, and perhaps unethical, 
to expect honesty from participants if the researcher does not reciprocate. This 
is in line with ASA ethical guidelines, which hold that participants should be made 
aware of the research ‘whenever reasonably practicable’ (ASA, 2011, p. 2). To the 
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best of my ability, I would answer questions participants had concerning my 
research and conduct. 
 
At this point, an example would be more illustrative of how I cut the continuum 
at different points. My work with RCB involved taking part in an after-school 
activity aimed at helping pupils in primary and secondary education. This was 
decided in conjunction with the Volunteer Coordinator following a lengthy 
conversation on the nature of my research: a clearly overt aspect of the research. 
This established organisational consent. Becoming involved in the activity put me 
in touch with a group of volunteers. As the activity ran on a weekly basis, I sought 
to establish rapport with the other volunteers over the course of several weeks: 
always answering honestly as to what my job was (researcher), what I was 
researching (all aspects of the activity), and my motivations. Here I had to 
negotiate when to cut the continuum: in a relatively large group of volunteers it 
takes time to get to know all the volunteers, especially when attendance is 
sporadic or irregular.  
 
A larger ethical grey area concerns the people utilising the service the Red Cross 
provided: children. There were also adults that made use of the activity, and this 
presented a separate set of ethical considerations. With regards to including the 
children in the scope of my research, it would be irresponsible of me as a 
researcher to ignore their participation. Children are equal interpreters of the 
social world (James, 2001).  
 
The problem arises in establishing consent: at no point was it feasible to acquire 
consent from parents or legal guardians. It is necessary for me to rely on the 
organisational consent, which involved a police background check, and my own 
judgement. As such, I deemed it most practicable to maintain a covert position 
vis-à-vis the children attending the activity. Unable to establish any meaningful 
consent, I restricted my actions to doing what the activity was there for: helping 
them with homework. I did not actively question the children with any research 
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themes in mind, only in pursuit of helping them with their work. I collected no 
information other than what was immediately relevant, nor did I keep individual 
records. In the absence of consent, my resolution is to maximise anonymity62. 
 
3.7.3 – Participant anonymity 
Participant anonymity forms the other side of the ethics coin. The right to 
anonymity should be afforded every participant, but needs to be balanced with 
research that requires a certain degree of selection and identification. 
Conversations and interactions with a researcher, in confidence, should be treated 
with respect. Denying a participant anonymity should only be done with their 
explicit consent, and if the researcher cannot guarantee their anonymity the 
participant should be made aware of this (ASA, 2011). There are reasonable steps 
the researcher may take in anonymising participants: providing pseudonyms, 
altering non-essential information, or concealing locations. Participant anonymity 
ties into the principle of non-maleficence (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001): to protect 
participants from potential harm and unforeseen consequences, their identities 
are protected. Fortuitously, multi-sited and mobile research practices make 
anonymity easier to maintain, as the potential pool of participants is greatly 
expanded. Despite this, it is still difficult to guarantee absolute anonymity.  
 
The ethnographic description of events and communities carries the risk that even 
if the wider readership might not know who the participants are, the participants 
themselves might recognise themselves or each other (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). 
Occasionally, there is little to be gained by anonymising people or locations. By 
virtue of one of the organisations I have included in my study, it narrows down the 
possible locations to an extent where I cannot realistically conceal where I 
performed my research. There are only five Catholic schools in all of Norway, and 
only one of them is in Northern Norway. Had I even anonymised the religion, it 
would not have made a difference as there are few religious schools in Norway 
overall. As with the Red Cross, I obtained organisational consent, in this case from 
                                         
62 The same issues presented themselves during my fieldwork with NUK, and I maintained that 
approach with them. 
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the principal of the school. I was also introduced to teachers and parents as a 
researcher, thereby maintaining an actively overt role. I avoided actively 
questioning children, relying more on observation or questioning parents and 
teachers. Though I can attempt to anonymise most participant data, it does not 
guarantee they do not recognise themselves or other from the same setting. 
 
3.7.4 – Risk in social research 
All sociological and anthropological research carries a certain amount of risk. 
Ideally, research should not compromise the health, safety, or welfare of both 
individuals and communities under study (European Science Foundation, 2011), 
but a salient question is when harm might occur. In some situations, distress may 
be caused by asking sensitive questions, or issues may arise after publication 
(Murphy & Dingwall, 2001). Appreciating the heterogeneity of risk comes from an 
understanding of vulnerability. Firstly, vulnerability is often related to the 
circumstances the participant is situated in, and is not necessarily innate (Block, 
et al., 2013). Secondly, we can identify three types of vulnerabilities: consent-
based, risk-based, and justice-based. I have already touched upon the two first in 
the above sections, so will confine myself to the latter in this section. 
 
Justice, in a research context, carries a vast array of connotations. For Murphy 
and Dingwall (2001), justice relates to ensuring that participants are treated fairly 
and equally. Under this condition, my research involving children and adolescents 
should be included, as to omit them would indicate a lack of respect for their 
experiences. Another aspect of just research is that those studied should benefit 
from the outcomes of the research (Block, et al., 2013). Social research should 
not be exploitative, but rather give ‘fair return for assistance’ (ASA, 2011, p. 6). 
Other than specifying that there should be no ‘economic exploitation’, the ASA do 
not actually specify what is meant by ‘fair return’. The research, and subsequent 
publications, are a part of the fair return, but one can also include forms of 
remuneration for participating in the research. In the case of my research, the 
fact that I actively participated in the after-school program was considered a fair 
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return for access by the coordinators at RCB. A second element of my “repayment” 
to the Red Cross was that I would give them an evaluation of the activity before 
my departure. There is no clear cut answer to what constitutes ‘fair return’: it is 
context-dependent and subjective. 
 
It is not only participants who are susceptible to harm in the course of fieldwork. 
The researcher can at times find him/herself in vulnerable positions. Rabinow 
(1977) found that his data was enriched by occasionally not dominating the terms 
of interaction between himself and the informants. There are, unfortunately, 
stark contrasts: one researcher suffered sexual assault while on fieldwork 
(Academics Anonymous, 2016). To ignore risks to the researcher would be an 
oversight, as a researcher’s sense of safety will influence how they conduct their 
research. It is perhaps slightly disappointing that the ASA’s ethical guidelines 
prefer problems and issues to be resolved ‘without harming either the research 
participants or the scholarly community’, omitting the responsibility the 
researcher has to secure their own safety (ASA, 2011, p. 1). The risks negotiated 
by researchers are varied, and depend on a host of factors. Calvey (2008), 
performing covert research on bouncers, faced a set of risks which were unique 
to his research. Nor are all risks physical, as Calvey (2008) focuses primarily on 
the emotional risks and demands the research incurred. 
 
Just as research which causes harm to participants is unethical, as is research 
which harms the researcher. As risks to participants needs to be evaluated and 
mitigated, so for the researcher. I was aware of certain risks going into my 
fieldwork, some environmental, others emotional. Though used to cold winters, I 
was not prepared for the impact of the dark, arctic winter. Combined with 
performing fieldwork, and therefore carefully managing social interactions, the 
overall effect was emotionally, and physically, taxing. Tending a bar as a part of 
the research also put me in situations that could be considered risky, as anyone 
who has refused service to a customer can attest to, and though it never evolved 
into physical altercations it could have.  
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An entirely different form of risk came with the work with children and youths. As 
stated above, the Red Cross require anyone working with minors to undergo a 
police background check, a practice also being taken up by NUK. This vetting goes 
both ways, to protect the children, and the organisation, in the event of 
misconduct, but also to confirm the propriety of the volunteer. If I had not had 
years of experience of youth work in Norway, I would probably have shied away 
from children and adolescents in my research. Though no significant harm befell 
me in the course of the research, I find it important to elucidate aspects of risk 
to researchers. Calvey (2008, p. 909) argues that covert practices are ‘glossed 
over’ and edited out of completed research. In the same vein, I believe it is 
necessary to be clear that the risk of harm extends further than what may happen 
to participants or the discipline. Risk, and ethics, are part and parcel of a reflexive 
research practice. 
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3.8 – Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to explore my choice and use of methods. My 
decision to use ethnography stems from the research questions. The ethnographic 
method is designed to provide a holistic rendition of the research field, drawing 
in all elements of life. The fundamental idea of long-term participant observation 
has persisted for a century, but what is brought in to the analyses has widened. 
Rather than seeing the ethnographer as extraneous, ethnographic research now 
recognises the influence the researcher will have on the field and participants. 
The Manchester School, and other scholars, widened the purview to include not 
only what was right in front of us, but to see historical connections and how 
relevant issues transcend academically constructed borders. 
 
This widening justifies performing research across multiple sites, and necessitates 
a recognition of how the processes I wish to explore shape me. Capitalising on the 
reflexive turn in ethnographic fieldwork, I have attempted to be transparent about 
my identities. My identities and experiences have shaped the research process: 
from choice of location to selection of organisations. Ethnographic data provides 
ample scope for building theory, and I have opted to rely on concepts and 
terminology developed by others63, and to build on those. 
 
Ethnographic research necessitates lengthy reflection on ethical issues. I have 
explored how overt and covert research exist on a continuum and the ethical 
reflection concerns when that continuum is cut. To the extent it is possible, 
anonymity should be ensured, but as explored above: it is not always possible to 
guarantee. The ethical decision relates to when the participant should be made 
aware of the potential loss of anonymity. Decisions concerning ethical conduct 
also need to be weighed up against risk of harm, and the severity of harm. Rather 
than simply seeing risk as something concerning participants, or the discipline and 
wider research community, I also explore how risk towards the researcher has the 
potential to shape the research. 
                                         
63 Explored in Chapter 2. 
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Having addressed both theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this 
thesis, I now move on to exploring the contexts in which I conducted the research. 
Theory, methods, and context have a reciprocal relationship, and inform each 
other. Context and theory can result in a particular choice of method and 
methodology, in this case ethnography, while the chosen approach will further 
inform the understandings of context and theory. Having argued in the previous 
chapter about the need for seeing identities and integration processes in context, 
and keeping in mind a holistic perspective, this chapter has explored how I pursued 
that. The long-term ethnographic approach allows for exploring issues and 
concepts in a variety of contexts and immersing oneself fully into the research.  
 
The following two chapters present the contexts in which I conducted the 
research, and serve to ground the later analyses. Although ethnography situates 
the research in local contexts, the multi-sited approach necessitates extending 
our understanding of contexts to multiple levels. The interconnectivity of the 
world today also means that events or contexts of sufficient importance become 
relevant to even local contexts. As such, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explore both 
international, national, regional, and local contexts and issues. 
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Chapter 4 – Contexts of mobility and integration 
4.1 – Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapters have outlined the contours of this thesis, by 
exploring the literature, methodology, and methods underpinning it, this chapter 
provides some context. The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct statistical 
categorisations and understandings of migration and integration. This process has 
been essential to subsequent qualitative analysis in later chapters in terms of 
understanding and contextualising perspectives on integration processes. Bringing 
forth the complexity of immigration statistics and categorisations reflects the 
real-life experiences and understandings of my participants and findings from my 
fieldwork. While the data chapters reflect bottom-up understandings of 
integration, this chapter challenges top-down understandings, represented by 
official statistics and commissioned reports, of immigration and integration. 
 
I primarily focus on three aspects. Firstly, the demographic aspects of immigration 
to Norway64. Seeing demographic changes over time helps frame my later 
analyses, as participants draw on their and others recent histories in their 
understandings of migration and integration and how it has changed over their 
lifetime. Secondly, the political and bureaucratic context. As was pointed to in 
Chapter 2, we have to understand both processes of categorisation and 
identification. In order to answer the research questions, we need to explore the 
policy environment that helps shape processes of categorisation and may impact 
processes of identification. Thirdly, I explore the significance of certain key events 
on my fieldwork, such as the increase in asylum seekers in the winter of 2015-
2016 and compare the response to that with similar increases in other categories 
of migration65. 
 
This chapter will move between different units of analysis as required. For 
sections, such as policy environment, it is fruitful to compare Norway to its 
neighbours in order to emphasise the transnational nature of migration and 
                                         
64 It is beyond the remit of this thesis to explore emigration. 
65 Naturally, the statistical measurement of “reasons for migration” is highly problematic, and will 
be critiqued later in the chapter. 
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integration policy and processes. For demographic changes it is more relevant to 
emphasise the changes at the national level and locations that were explored 
during the fieldwork. Finally, I return to the discursive framework presented in 
Chapter 2 and demonstrate how it can be used to problematize different migrant 
categories and critically examine different constructions of “integration”. The 
chapter addresses the question of what are the contexts that shape integration 
processes and understandings of these processes in Norway.  
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4.2 – Demographics and (inter)national migration 
Castles and Miller (2009) argue that the starting point for understanding 
integration processes should be the historical experiences of nation-state 
formation. In other words, understanding how we got to where we are. What is 
equally important is understanding current experiences and processes of nation-
state formation. As argued in Chapter 2, a processual understanding of integration 
necessitates an acceptance that either: a) there is no end-point; or b) the end-
point is continuously shifting and renegotiated. The benefit of exploring the 
historical contexts and processes of nation-state formation is that it will 
contribute to our understanding of contemporary features. That being said, there 
are necessarily limitations to the extent of historical detail that can be covered, 
or is relevant, in this thesis.  
 
Although we can use historical data to inform analyses in later chapters, we cannot 
assume this knowledge is commonly held in the wider population. Similarly, as 
Hopkins, et al., (2018, p. 1) find with regards to information about demographics: 
‘accurate information [about the size of the immigrant population] does little to 
affect attitudes toward immigration’. Therefore, we should be mindful that there 
is a disconnect between perceptions of immigration, historical contexts, and the 
reality. This is related to attitudes towards immigration although the causal 
nature of the relationship is complicated and the question of whether perception 
shapes attitude or vice versa remains open (Hopkins, et al., 2018).  
 
One demonstration of how the relationship between perceptions, attitudes, and 
reality is influenced lies in how migration is registered, categorised, and 
presented. Here we look to both official statistics, but also research on 
immigration. Several scholars in Norway (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b; Eide & 
Simonsen, 2009; Gjerstad, et al., 2015; Hovdelien, 2016; Maagerø & Simonsen, 
2008; Ugland, 2018; Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994) uncritically emphasise the 
“recency” of immigration to Norway. By de-historicizing migration, we lose an 
important aspect of the processual nature of migration. In particular, we risk 
phenomenalising one form of migration while privileging and rendering invisible 
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other forms. Immigration to Norway is not recent, it is the method of measuring 
and registering immigration that is recent.  
 
Apart from government commissioned reports, academic literature concerning 
international migration and immigrants mostly appears from the 2000s onwards, 
with one of the earlier academic works specifically focusing on diversity and 
migration being Eriksen and Sørheim (1994). This does not mean immigration, and 
integration processes, have not been topics of discussion, but much of it has been 
done in politics and media. Much of this falls beyond the purview of this thesis66. 
This slowness in exploring and researching migration and integration processes 
may be related to the relatively recent diversification of the immigrant 
population, which is explored in section 4.3.1. 
 
In terms of statistics, we are limited by what is available from Statistics Norway 
(SSB); hence, the following sections will explore this data with a critical eye. The 
framing of research and statistics can give superficial insight into how the nation 
is socially constructed through statistical categories, which are in and of 
themselves socially constructed. Critically exploring the statistics and research 
can give us insight into the underlying factors and realities. This is done through 
challenging the categorisations, but also in expanding our view to include non-
immigrant specific data, such as internal migration, settlement patterns, and 
urbanisation. 
 
At its most rudimentary level, there has been a growth in the immigrant 
population as registered by SSB (Figure 1), both in terms of sheer numbers, but 
also as a share of the population. Yet, we have to recognise that SSB are counting 
individuals whose parents and grandparents were not born in Norway (SSB, 2014). 
Thereby giving rise to the category of “Norwegian-born with immigrant parents” 
and facilitates the idea of “2nd” or “3rd generation immigrants”. This statistical 
                                         
66 For an exploration of the media and immigration, see Eide and Simonsen (2007); for an account 
of the development of immigration and integration policy, see Christensen, et al., (2006) 
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simplification, by definition, precludes dual identities, and establishes 
international migrants as a population that will be considered apart (at least 
statistically) for three generations. This engenders a lasting impression of 
immigrants as “Other”.  
 
Figure 1 - Immigrant and descendants, 1970-2018 (SSB, 2017a), and immigrants pre-1970 (SSB, 2011) 
 
It also hides groups with more complex backgrounds, which SSB have recently 
come to recognise and therefore started expanding the categories they report. In 
their 2018 statistics on the population in Norway, they have included six 
categories: “Born in Norway with two Norwegian parents”, “Immigrants”, 
“Norwegian-born with immigrant parents”, “foreign-born with one Norwegian-
born parent”, “Norwegian-born with one foreign-born parent”, and “foreign-born 
with two Norwegian-born parents”. The issue remains that this approach 
encourages an emphasis on descent and lineage, which, as discussed in Chapter 
2, risks leading to an ethnicisation of migration. 
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Additionally, by focusing on changes in migration post-1970, we run the risk of 
rendering the nearly 80 000 people living in Norway in 1970 and born in 138 
countries (SSB, 2018) other than Norway invisible67. They are as important a part 
of understanding migration and integration in Norway as those who immigrated to 
Norway post-1970. Two other factors are related to the “recency”-notion: changes 
in net international migration and policy changes limiting immigration. If one 
considers net international migration of foreign citizens68 to/from Norway, it 
supports the idea of immigration being a “recent” phenomenon (see Figure 2), as 
the net migration of foreign citizens to Norway steadily increases.  
Figure 2 - Net international migration of foreign citizens (1958-2017) (SSB, 2017c) 
 
On the other hand, if we look at changes in the net migration year on year, it 
paints a clearer picture of how mobility, rather than simply migration, changes 
over time. What Figure 3 demonstrates is how there is considerably more 
movement in and out of Norway from the mid-1980s onwards69. Yet, there is a risk 
of over-emphasising the impact of international migration. Of equal importance is 
the changing mobility of the population within Norway (Lange, 2017) that has led 
to an increased internal migration. Processes of urbanisation and centralisation 
are as much a part of the nation-formation process as immigration and integration 
processes and need to form part of our understanding and analyses. 
                                         
67  As well as their descendants. 
68 i.e. individuals in possession of a non-Norwegian citizenship at the time of immigration. 
69 The fluctuation indicates a lesser/greater net migration relative to the preceding year, in other 
words, the greater the values (positively or negatively) means more people are migrating. 
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Figure 3 - Change in net international migration of foreign citizens, year on year 1958-2017 (SSB, 2017c) 
 
If we consider Figures 4 and 5, we first see that the late-60s/early-70s saw much 
higher internal migration between municipalities than preceding and subsequent 
decades up until the consistent increase from the 1990s onwards. Equally 
important is where this movement is headed: Figure 5 points to increasing 
urbanisation. We see the change along the urban/rural divide and can note that 
the late 1960s saw a stark increase in urbanisation. This coincides with the 
variations in international migration seen in Figure 3. Divorcing the immigration 
of the 1970s from processes of internal migration results in limiting our 
understanding of the overall processes of nation formation, problematizing 
immigration, and homogenising the non-immigrant population. 
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Figure 4 - Internal migration between municipalities, 1957-2017 (SSB, 2017d) 
Figure 5 - Urban/Rural population, 1960-2017 (World Bank, 2018) 
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Exploring this more closely, Figure 6 paints a picture of sparsely populated areas 
within municipalities becoming increasingly depopulated, whereas densely 
populated areas within municipalities grow (Figure 7 and Figure 8)70. Figure 9 
strengthens this by giving us an impression of just how far some of these internal 
migrants move, by showing movement between counties and regions. About half 
of all internal migrations involves crossing a county border, whereas roughly a 
quarter of the time it also involved a change of region.  
 
Whereas the least and less central municipalities have seen a decline in population 
or only a very modest increase, this contrasts with the more central 
municipalities, the immigrant population (at least as it is defined by SSB) has 
grown across all categories (Figures 10-13). Part of this can be attributed to a 
‘strong “district policy”’ (Grønseth, 2010, p. 22) by the Norwegian state. This can 
be seen in the emphasis on maintaining local industries, some of which attract 
and recruit considerable immigrant labour71, as well as an emphasis on settling 
refugees in as many municipalities as possible (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 
1986). 
 
 
                                         
70 SSB operate with four categories. “Central” is achieved when the physical centre of the 
population of a municipality is <75 minutes of travel from an urban settlement with a 
population >50 000 inhabitants. An additional requirement is that the urban settlement in question 
acts as a regional centre. “Somewhat” means travel of <60minutes to an urban settlement with 
>15 000 inhabitants. “Less” means travel of <45 minutes to an urban settlement with >5 000 
inhabitants. “Least central” municipalities do not fulfil any of these requirements. 
71 For example, on the north-west coast (Sunnmøre) (Busengdal, 2015; Halvorsen & Aschim, 2016) 
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Figure 6 - Decreasing population in sparsely 
populated areas of non-central municipalities, 
1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e) 
 
 
Figure 7 - Increasing population in densely 
populated areas of non-central 
municipalities, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e) 
 
Figure 8 - Increasing population in central 
municipalities, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e) 
 
Figure 9 - Movement between counties as 
percentage of total internal migration and 
between regions as percentage of total 
internal migration, 1957-2017 (SSB, 2017d) 
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Figure 10 - Total population and Immigrant 
population in "Least central municipalities", 
1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a) 
  
 
Figure 11 - Total population and Immigrant 
population in "Less central municipalities", 
1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a) 
  
 
Figure 12 - Total population and Immigrant 
population in "Somewhat central 
municipalities", 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a) 
 
Figure 13 - Total population and Immigrant 
population in central municipalities, 1990-
2017 (SSB, 2017e; 2017a) 
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What we have in the post-WWII period is not simply an increase in international 
migration, but a general increase in mobility and migration towards population 
centres. This is important to keep in mind because it reminds us that Norway is 
not a static, homogeneous country of sedentary individuals, and we should be 
careful not to attribute too much weight to international migration when 
discussing changes to Norwegian society. It is not only international migrants 
attempting to find their place, but also those migrating internally. 
 
This relates back to an observation by Eckstein (1966): there was significant 
division between urban and rural populations, and a strong sense of regional 
identities. In other words, municipalities with increasing populations are not 
simply encountering a plethora of identities that international migrants possess 
and continue shaping in a new context, but also internal migrants bringing with 
them their regional, local, and particular sets of identities. Furthermore, this adds 
to the complexity of the question of “integration into what?” as we can appreciate 
the diversity of the non-migrant population. Adding to this, we can point to a 
substantial body of scholarly research on Norway, such as Barth’s edited volume 
on Northern Norway (Barth, 1963a) and a further 88 Masters’ and PhD theses from 
the University of Oslo between 1957-1994 alone (Nielsen, 1996). We can add to 
this a host of articles, books72, and radio and television programmes73 of both 
academic and popular science varieties. The important detail is not what has been 
written or said, but the fact that there is a tradition of pursuing definitions and 
characterisations of Norway and Norwegians, which subsequently informs 
understandings of Norwegianness. 
 
  
                                         
72 Examples include work by Marianne Gullestad (1984; 1989; 1996) and numerous edited volumes 
(Alghasi, et al., 2012; Alghasi, et al., 2006a; Brox & Gullestad, 1990; Eriksen & Næss, 2011; Lien, 
et al., 2001; Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994) to name a few. 
73 NRK, the national broadcaster, even produced, in 2018, a five-minute clip called “Typisk norsk” 
[Typical Norwegian], named after a three-season program from the mid-2000s by the same name, 
where regional identities, dialects, and the urban/rural divide was given, by Professor Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen, as central elements of a Norwegian self-understanding and collective identity 
(NRK, 2018). See also Venås and Skjekkeland (2016) on dialects in Norway. 
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4.3 – Who, what, where, when, and why? Interrogating migration 
Having covered the most general aspects of population mobility, I will 
disaggregate the international migrants. There are multiple ways of going about 
this, and I will first address the common question of “where are they from?” 
(alternatively, “who are they?”). Bearing in mind that we are limited to answering 
this in terms of nation-state, and unfortunately this results in a loss of complexity 
and nuance when describing, statistically speaking, people who have immigrated 
to Norway74. The second question usually refers to “why are they here?” or “what 
made them come?” Despite offering clear categories such as “education”, 
“labour”, “refuge”, and “family reunification”, life is never as neat as simple 
categories. Add to that the fact that reasons change: someone might come for one 
reason, but they choose to stay for another, such as one of my participants, Dmitri. 
Finally, there is the question of “what are they doing here?” Here I will glean what 
information I can from statistics and available research and highlight where there 
are shortcomings. 
 
Including a temporal aspect, points to how events impact migration and 
integration processes over time. This helps highlight patterns and differences, for 
example pointing to the impact of gender on migration processes. As seen in the 
next section, there are distinct differences over time that become apparent when 
factoring in gender. After I have covered all this, it is time to turn to policy 
changes that have targeted immigrants75. This helps tie together the demographic, 
statistical, and previous research into a cohesive whole that will provide sufficient 
context for understanding and critically analysing some of the data. 
 
4.3.1 – “Where are they from?” 
This section relies on statistical data to give an outline of the immigrant 
population in Norway. Using statistical data, we are limited by issues of 
categorisation and ascription: statistical categories tell us little about 
                                         
74 For now, I will omit the generations of people born in Norway with various degrees of 
relationships to previous generations’ country of origin 
75 Although broadly referred to as “integration policy”, Norway’s Universalist welfare approach 
means broader policy changes relating to the welfare state and labour market are sometimes 
relevant. 
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identification and they are often overly general. For example, SSB often aggregate 
their data into either the nation-state level or group nation-states together into 
continental regions. This level of generalisation does not account for regional 
identifications, which might be more significant at the level of the individual or 
group, such as with Ali, who highlighted a Kurdish identity, rather than an Iraqi 
(nation-state) category, in addition to his Norwegian. This becomes especially 
problematic when considering groups in relation to their attributed reason for 
immigration, such as when asylum-seekers are granted asylum due to persecution 
at the hands of the state which they are then identified with. Grønseth (2010), 
for example, researched immigrants who identified as Tamil, whereas they will 
be identified as Sri Lankan in statistics, thus over-simplifying immigration from Sri 
Lanka. 
 
Furthermore, speaking of the size of different categories gives a false sense of 
stability and homogeneity. As was mentioned above, there is a high degree of 
mobility: the categories might increase/decrease in size, but it does not tell us 
about the composition of the category. This can be somewhat mitigated by 
considering temporal aspects. Firstly, we can consider both emigration and 
immigration over time, giving us a sense of the mobility of certain groups. 
Secondly, we can explore the length of their residency76. Despite this, we are still 
limited to categorisation, and aspects of identification have to be gleaned from 
other research.  
 
Firstly, Norway has immigrants from 211 countries and territories77, constituting, 
as of 2017, a population of 724 988 persons, almost 14 per cent of Norway’s total 
population (SSB, 2017f). Of these, two-thirds of immigrants come from only 
twenty countries. Nonetheless, compared to 1970, when 56 854 immigrants came 
from 122 countries and territories, and five countries comprised two-thirds, there 
has been a considerable diversification of the immigrant population. This is as 
expected, considering the overall increase in mobility pointed out previously. 
Figure 14 visualizes this changing composition. 
                                         
76 At a national level, which does not consider the processes and dynamics of internal migration 
following immigration. 
77 SSB counts certain territories such as Macau, Falklands, Puerto Rico, separately. 
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Certain features stand out and are related to policy developments (explored later 
in the chapter). Firstly, we see the prevalence of Scandinavian immigrant. This 
may be due to geographical factors (as neighbouring countries), as well as 
accessibility in terms of language and culture for immigrants from Sweden and 
Denmark78. This has also been supported by a favourable policy environment which 
has privileged Nordic immigrants.  
 
Secondly, we see how large-scale arrival of immigrants from certain countries map 
onto global events. Such as immigrants from Sri Lanka arriving as the civil war and 
conflicts intensify. Thirdly, by breaking the figure down by gender, it hints at how 
and why certain groups immigrate to Norway. For example, for many groups, 
women arrive later than men, which is consistent with women more often 
registered as arriving due to family reunification.  
 
Finally, certain developments relate directly to policy decisions concerning 
immigration and issues that impact immigration, such as EU expansion and 
Norway’s relationship to the EU (through EEA and Schengen membership), or the 
immigration ban that shifted immigration patterns towards refugees and family 
reunification. These changes are most easily seen over an extended period of 
time, while we have to recognise that migration extends much further back than 
presented here.
                                         
78 Which may, in part, explain the relative absence of immigrants from Finland, as Finnish is 
linguistically far removed from the Scandinavian languages, although Finland has historically had 
close ties to Sweden. 
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Figure 14 - Countries of origin for two-thirds of immigrant population, 1970-2017 (SSB, 2017f)79 
 
                                         
79 Countries are ranked in terms of size of population (from largest to smallest). The number of countries included corresponds as closely as possible to a population 
constituting two-thirds of the immigrant population for each respective year. 
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Seeing Figure 14 in relation to Figure 1 and Figure 2 at the beginning of this 
chapter, both the increase and diversification of the immigrant population 
becomes apparent. Adding a further layer of detail, we can break the above figure 
down by gender (Figure 15 and Figure 16). Firstly, the immigrant population as a 
whole is evenly split between the genders, but the composition of the two groups 
by country of origin differs slightly. Women from certain countries, such as 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Russia, are not matched by a corresponding male 
population. As mentioned previously, men have preceded women, such as from 
India, Sri Lanka, and Iran, which has implications for the perceptions of these 
groups. 
 
Nonetheless, there are several consistencies. Danish and Swedish are consistently 
prevalent in the immigrant population but diverge in the mid-2000s when Danes 
constitute a smaller portion of the immigrant population. Immigrants from the US 
are also a large portion of the immigrant population until the 90s, whereupon they 
shrink as proportion of the immigrant population. Furthermore, the “arrival” of 
certain populations within the ranking is closely related to policy decisions and 
external events. I explore this in detail below, with regards to “reason for 
migration”. This is perhaps most evident with immigrants from countries ravaged 
by conflict, such as ex-Yugoslav countries, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Syria, but also following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, where we shortly 
after seeing a significant increase in immigrants from Poland and Lithuania, and 
again following the accession of Romania. 
 
It should be noted that changes in ranking occurs not only if a population increases 
or decreases, but even if a population remains stable. The ranking is relative to 
the immigrant population for that year. 
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Figure 15 - Countries of origin for two-thirds of male immigrant population, 1970-2017 (SSB, 2017f) 
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Figure 16 - Countries of origin for two-thirds of female immigrant population, 1970-2017 (SSB, 2017f) 
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What the above rankings fail to illustrate is the size of these populations. The 
below figures (Figures 17-19)80 are cross-sections for the given years and give some 
insight into the changing composition of the greater share of the immigrant 
population. We have already established that the overall populations has both 
increased and diversified, with some differences between men and women, but 
one significant change is how the largest group, at times, is significantly larger 
than the rest. This is noticeable in the overall numbers but becomes more 
pronounced when looking at genders separately. What we see at the beginning of 
the period, is how Swedes and Danes constitute up to 40 per cent of the immigrant 
population regardless of gender, but throughout the 80s and 90s, the relative 
dominance of the two largest groups (which up until mid-2000s are Swedes and 
Danes) decreases as the immigrant population diversifies. From 2008 onwards, 
Poles constitute the largest group (2008 for men, 2010 for women), and it is around 
this time and onwards a range of research on migration is conducted or starts 
appearing81.
                                         
80 The figures are colour coded to match figures 14-16. 
81 See, for example, Alghasi, et al., (2009; 2012; 2006a), Aagedal (2012a), Eriksen and Næss (2011), 
Eide and Simonsen (2007), Gjerstad, et al., (2015), Aschim, et al., (2016), Erdal (2016b), 
Bendixsen, et al., (2015), to name some. 
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Figure 17 - Share of total immigrant population (SSB, 2017f) 
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Figure 18 - Share of male immigrant population (SSB, 2017f) 
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Figure 19 - Share of female immigrant population (SSB, 2017f)
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
1970 1980 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
127 
 
 
In order to combat an overly static understanding of migration, we need to explore 
the mobility/sedentary aspect. This is essential because it points to systemic 
factors. One way to challenge such assumptions is by exploring statistics 
pertaining to duration of residency (SSB, 2017g). Unfortunately, this statistic is 
not available broken down by gender. Figure 20 presents the average duration (in 
years82) of immigrants from the countries in Figure 14, as of 2017. The countries 
are listed in the same ranked order83 as in Figure 14, which facilitates comparison.  
 
The higher the average, the more stable that population has been over the 
measured period. Seen alongside Figure 14, Denmark, Vietnam, and Pakistan’s 
descent in the ranking can be seen as a result of stable populations (average 
residency of 20+ years) relative to the growth of more recent groups. Immigrants 
from Poland, for example, although present in the rankings throughout the period, 
rises to the top from 2008 onwards, which is reflected in the average residency of 
seven years. Similarly, immigrants from Syria have an average residency of two 
years yet is the seventh largest group. These averages should not encourage 
homogenisation of the immigrant population, as there is a massive diversity in 
length of residency: only two countries (Lithuania and Afghanistan) exhibited 
multiple gaps in the range of 0-40 years’ residency, and then only of immigrants 
with 30+ years’ residency in Norway. 
                                         
82 The values given are rounded to the nearest whole, which is why the bars do not match perfectly 
with the given value. Duration ranged from “<1 year” to “40+ years” 
83 As of 2017. 
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Figure 20 - Average duration of residency for two-thirds of immigrant population as of 2017 (SSB, 2017g)
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4.3.2 – “Why are they here?” and “What are they doing here?” 
The above figures, in particular Figure 20, offer us a transition into the question 
of “why” immigrants migrate to Norway, and offer a partial insight into the 
question of “what” they are doing there. Most importantly, it forces us to 
recognise that the registered reason for immigrating to Norway is not the same as 
the question of what keeps immigrants in Norway. There is also the question of to 
what extent the registered reason for immigration is significant beyond 
descriptive statistics. At a minimum, we can keep in mind that reasons for 
immigration and statistics feed back into policy development. For example, the 
Brochmann (I and II) 84-, Kramer85-, Haagensen86-, and Danielsen87-commissions  
directly addressed changes in immigration patterns (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 2011a; 2017; 1986; 1985; 1973). Changes in mobility patterns are not 
only discussed at a national level, but also seen and discussed in a regional context 
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2013). 
 
The first detail we can explore to gives us a better understanding of these issues, 
is age. The age of the immigrant, whether the individual is an adult or minor, is 
significant due to the policies and rules it activates88, as well as for the discourses 
around immigration and integration processes89. Unfortunately, the available data 
is not as granular as above. Furthermore, SSB omit immigrants from Nordic 
countries, hence we have no data on two of the largest immigrant groups for the 
last 40 years. For the period 1990-2017, the majority of non-Nordic immigrants to 
Norway were in the age group 18-29 years old with under-18s constituting one-
fifth (see figure 21). Three-fifths were below the age of 30. As will be explored in 
Chapter 5, this has skewed the demographics of the Catholic Church in Norway 
towards younger cohorts. 
                                         
84 For Brochmann-I the focus was labour migration, whereas for Brochmann-II the focus was asylum-
seekers and refugees 
85 The Kramer-commission looked at the “adaptation of refugees to Norwegian society”. 
86 The Haagensen-commission discussed “young immigrants in Norway” 
87 Exploring labour migration, and subsequently the commission that resulted in the “immigration 
ban” 
88 UDI (2018b), in their procedures for determining an asylum seeker’s age, directly refer to some 
asylum seekers not having proof of their age and misleading authorities in order to appear as a 
minor. 
89 In particular with respect to demonising discourses around young, male Muslims (Ezzati, 2011), 
discourses around immigrant women (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017), or in the press’ 
performance as an “ethnic gatekeeper” (Eide & Simonsen, 2007, p. 17) 
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Figure 21 - Age groups of non-Nordic immigrants between 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017h) 
 
This points to the majority of non-Nordic immigrants arriving in Norway with the 
possibility of spending a considerable part of their lifespan in Norway. Figure 20 
gives us an impression of how long some immigrants have stayed, but we have to 
expand it to the whole immigrant population. Figure 22 is a bell curve 
demonstrating average residency for the entire immigrant population as of 2017, 
which, ceteris paribus, indicates that two-thirds of immigrants will spend 
somewhere in the range of 6-19 years in Norway90. This should not be taken as a 
prediction, as context matters. How long someone remains in Norway is an open 
question, for both the immigrant and non-immigrant population. After all, as 
Figure 23 shows, the emigration of Norwegian citizens has increased over time as 
well. It speaks to a degree of bias when the duration of an immigrant’s residency 
in Norway is measured, but there are no statistics on Norwegian citizens living 
outwith Norway, and a general dearth of information about this category91. It 
reinforces a notion that Norwegian citizens are sedentary, whereas immigrants 
are mobile92.  
                                         
90 Skjerpen, et al., (Skjerpen, et al., 2015) and Pettersen (2013) provide a detailed look at 
emigration patterns (from Norway) for immigrants. Note, the data did not count above 40 years of 
residency; hence the right-hand tail in reality will taper more gradually than in the figure.  
91 I struggled to find any data on Norwegians abroad at all. Apart from a Conservative party 
manifesto promise to strengthen government services for Norwegians living abroad, I only found a 
Wikipedia article suggesting almost 240 000 Norwegian citizens living abroad (supposedly based on 
numbers from embassies, consulates, and associations for Norwegians). 
92 I am aware that these two categories are not mutually exclusive, which again speaks to the 
limitations of the statistical data. 
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What this reinforces is the notion that large-scale immigration and mobility is a 
phenomenon that has developed over the last couple of decades. This is also 
apparent in the observation by both Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b) and Ugland 
(2018) that Norway is currently in a period of immigration and integration policy 
reappraisal, brought on by changing migration patterns. 
 
Figure 22 - Bell curve of average duration of residency for immigrant population (SSB, 2017g)93 
  
 
Figure 23 - Immigration, Emigration, and Net Migration of Norwegian citizens, 1958-2017 (SSB, 2017i) 
                                         
93 Average=12.7 years, Standard deviation=6.5 years 
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Having addressed origin, age, length of residency, and gender concerning the non-
immigrant population, we can move on to registered reasons. SSB reports six 
reasons for immigration: labour, family reunification, refuge94, education, 
“unknown”, and “other”95. As with some of the numbers above, we are limited to 
a period of 1990-2017. We are able to break down “reasons for immigration” by 
three variables: age categories, gender, and region96.  
 
Beginning with gender (Figure 24), we notice a considerable difference in the 
registered reason for immigration: men are three-quarters of immigrants arriving 
with “work” as reason for immigration, whereas women are two-thirds of all 
immigrating due to “family reunification”. Men constitute a larger share of those 
arriving with “refuge” as reason, whereas more women than men travel to Norway 
for “education”.  
Figure 24 - Reason for immigration for the period 1990-2017, by gender (SSB, 2017h) 
                                         
94 SSB use “flukt”, and the literal translation would be “flight”, but I have opted to use “refuge” 
as it is both a less loaded term and less ambiguous. The Norwegian word for “refugee” is 
“flyktning”, which can also be translated to “fugitive”. Hence, I am attempting to be explicit in 
my translation as to which interpretation I am using. 
95 “Unknown” and “other” constitute 0.6 per cent of registered reasons for the period 1990-2017; 
hence, I am choosing to omit them from subsequent figures and graphs. 
96 SSB operates with six continental-level regions, as well as two additional categories: Europe 
(excl. Turkey), Africa, Asia (Incl. Turkey), North America, Central and South America, Oceania, 
Stateless, and Unknown. 
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Whereas Figure 24 gives us the overall impression for the period 1990-2017, it is 
also necessary to see how these categories change over the course of the period 
(Figure 25). What becomes immediately apparent is how following a spike in 
“refuge” in 1993 and 199997, the subsequent years see an increase in immigrants 
arriving due to family reunification. The second notable detail is the expected 
increase in “work” as a reason for immigration following the expansion of the EU 
in 2004.  
 
Figure 25 - Reason for immigration over time, 1990-2017 (SSB, 2017i) 
 
Keeping in mind Figures 14-16, if we break the above table down by region and 
gender (Figures 26-29); we can add a layer of understanding to why the 
composition of the immigrant population has changed over time. Recalling 
significant historical events and conflicts, it gives us a basis for making assertions 
about the immigrant population and understanding the source of policy changes, 
discourses, and activities directed at integration processes.
                                         
97 There are concomitant with the arrival of large groups from ex-Yugoslav countries, see Figure 
14. 
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Figure 26 - "Work" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017 
 
Figure 27 - "Refuge" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017 
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Figure 28 - "Family reunification" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, 
annually 1990-2017 
 
Figure 29 - "Education" as reason for immigration, by gender and world region, annually 1990-2017 
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First, Figure 26 makes clear: immigrants from Europe dominate labour migration. 
Seen in relation to the above figures, we can determine that this is, in large part, 
due to immigration from Poland and Lithuania. This is supported by UDI98 (2017a), 
who report that immigrants from Poland who arrived with “work” as their primary 
reason are a third of all EU immigrants in Norway for work. Amongst immigrants 
from Asia, two-thirds of those arriving for work were from India (34 per cent) or 
Vietnam (27 per cent). In total, Poland, Lithuania, India, and Vietnam represented 
over ninety per cent of all labour migration in 2016. 
 
In 2016, half of all immigrants in Norway with “Refuge” as a primary reason were 
from Syria, with Eritrea and Afghanistan making up for the majority of the rest 
(UDI, 2017a). This is a fact that was particularly salient during the fieldwork 
period, and the considerable increase in asylum-seekers late 2015 – early 2016 
resulted in a drastic increase in integration-oriented activities. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Concerning family reunification, there is a significant anomaly with regards to our 
two sources of information (SSB and UDI): they provide vastly different numbers 
when disaggregated. There is no clear reason for this. Whereas SSB (2017k) reports 
5950 immigrants from Europe due to family reunification, UDI (2017a) reports only 
1585. Yet, their total sums do not diverge wildly, with SSB recording 16 732 
immigrants for family reunification and UDI reporting 15 580. UDI offer a more 
comprehensive breakdown; hence I will draw on their figures here99. When it 
comes to family reunification, seven countries make up half of the sample 
population: Thailand, Syria, Somalia, India, Philippines, Eritrea and Afghanistan. 
The remainder are divided amongst 91 remaining countries. Disaggregated 
further, apart from adult women (44 per cent), the largest groups are boys and 
girls aged 0-5 and adult men (each at 12 per cent).  
 
                                         
98 Utlendingsdirektoratet – The Norwegian Immigration Authorities 
99 Figure 28 still draws on the figures from SSB, as substituting for the figures from UDI is not 
possible for the full period and would therefore lead to considerable inconsistencies. 
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Most countries follow the same gender division illustrated in Figure 24, with 
women largely constituting two-thirds of the immigrants from family 
reunification. The exceptions here are Thailand (83 per cent women) and the 
Philippines (78 per cent women), which explains in part why they appear in Figure 
16, whereas men from Thailand and the Philippines do not appear in Figure 15. 
UDI also tells us that 60 per cent of the women who arrived from Thailand and the 
Philippines arrived following marriage to a Norwegian citizen. A pertinent reason 
for mentioning this specifically is that Philippine women are often very visible in 
Catholic parishes around the country. I return to this in Chapter 5. 
 
Philippine citizens also stand out in the final group, those arriving for “education”. 
A quarter of all non-EU immigrants who arrived for educational reasons were from 
the Philippines, and a full three-quarters of those came to Norway to work as au 
pairs100. Add to this that there is an overwhelming gender bias towards female au 
pairs, 98 per cent of au pairs between 2000-2008 were female, and it creates a 
noteworthy dynamic. Øien (2009) offers an in-depth evaluation of au pairs in 
Norway. For now, I wish to draw attention to one of her acknowledgements: 
‘Special thanks go to […] the Office for Migrant Chaplaincies of the Catholic 
Diocese of Oslo for helping me get in touch with respondents’ (Øien, 2009, p. 5). 
The relationship between Philippine women and the Catholic Church is recognised, 
which strengthens the justification of this thesis’ focus on the role of the Catholic 
Church and related organisations in integration processes. Another example 
pointing to this is how Caritas Norway (2018) offers a specialised help centre for 
au pairs, and is advertised on UDI’s web site (UDI, 2018a)101. This points to the 
relationship between government bodies and civil society, and will be explored in 
Chapter 6. 
 
                                         
100 Norway is a signatory to the Council of Europe treaty ‘European Agreement on “au pair” 
Placement and Protocol thereto’ (1969), which explicitly states ‘au pairs belong neither to the 
student category nor to the worker category but to a special category which has features of both 
[…]’. It is unclear why Norway categorises au pairs under education but may imply a perspective 
on the au pair system that emphasises the educational component as the work is domestic. 
Alternatively, the decision was political and allows au pairs to circumvent labour migration laws. 
101 Caritas specifically mentions that the au pair centre is run with support from UDI but is not a 
part of the Immigration Authorities. 
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Concluding this section, what becomes apparent is how certain countries 
dominate the statistics repeatedly. There has been considerable diversification of 
the immigrant population, as demonstrated through figures 14-19, but there are 
some consistencies. EU countries, in particular Poland and Lithuania, dominate 
migration with “work” as the primary reason. Immigrants with “refuge” as the 
primary reason are, logically, from areas and countries with violent conflict, which 
in the 90s included several European countries but is today skewed towards North 
Africa and the Middle East. Family reunification statistics are complicated by the 
nature of EU rules and registrations of immigration, but family reunification is 
skewed towards women, and the countries that dominate are related to countries 
that appear in the “refuge” statistics or married to Norwegian citizens (in the case 
of Thailand and the Philippines). Finally, the smallest group are those who arrive 
for “education”, which again is skewed towards Philippine women (predominantly 
working as au pairs), or Chinese and US students.  
 
One of the interesting details presented above has to do with average duration of 
residency. Seen in relation to annual migration statistics, we see how mobility has 
increased and populations have demonstrated sedentary tendencies. The length 
of time different countries have constituted a significant share of the immigrant 
population, matches closely to their average residency in Norway. The exceptions 
here are some European countries, such as Germany, the UK, Sweden, and 
Denmark, where there is a considerable difference in how long they have 
constituted a significant share of the immigrant population and their average 
residency. 
 
As will be explored below, the integration processes have shaped, and been 
shaped by, the changing composition of the immigrant population. Yet, as pointed 
out, we also need to see this in relation to the changing demographics of Norway 
as a whole, such as the increasing urbanisation.  
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4.4 – A policy of change and a change of policy 
4.4.1 – The Norwegian welfare state 
Understanding the role, behaviour, and perception of the Norwegian welfare state 
is an important element of understanding integration processes. The goal here is 
not provide a comprehensive exposition102, but to highlight relevant aspects of the 
Norwegian welfare state that contribute to the contextualisation of integration 
processes. It is important to bear in mind the multi-layered nature of the welfare 
state, where some services are offered at local, regional, or the national level103. 
Hence, integration processes are, per definition, contextual,multi-layered, and 
may even be conflicting, as was mentioned in section 2.4.1 and will be shown in 
chapter 8. Titmuss (1963) provides a succinct starting point:  
 
All collectively provided services are deliberately designed to meet 
certain socially recognized ‘needs’; they are manifestations, first, of 
society’s will to survive as an organic whole and, secondly, of the 
expressed wish of all the people to assist the survival of some people. 
      Titmuss, 1963, p. 39 
 
 
Integration, in its vaguest sense, becomes the ‘socially recognized need’, in 
pursuit of society’s ability to ‘survive as an organic whole’. I argue, through this 
thesis, that the ‘socially recognized need’ is discursively established, warranting 
a framework which emphasises discourses. The final element of the above quote 
provides ample space for discussion: what is the expressed wish, how is that wish 
to be fulfilled? Here we find the tensions between residual and institutional 
approaches to welfare: the former limiting the commitments of the welfare state 
to ‘marginal and deserving social groups […] only when the family or the market 
fails’, while the latter ‘addresses the entire population, is universalistic […]’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 20). Welfare chauvinism, referred to in Chapter 2, 
points to how some may find society’s ability to survive contingent upon expressly 
denying assistance to ‘some people’.  
                                         
102 For a historical perspective on the development of the Norwegian welfare state, see Bjørnson 
(2001). For a contemporary overview, see Sørvoll (2015) 
103 For example in education, where primary schooling is local (municipality), secondary schooling 
is regional (county), and tertiary education is national (state). 
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The relationship between the residual and institutional perspective is evident in 
Bendixsen’s (2018) description of a Norwegian humanitarian exceptionalism, 
although the residualist aspect is reversed: while the universal welfare state (the 
institutionalist approach) is the norm, any instance of state failure allows for a 
construction of humanitarian exceptionalism by non-state actors operating in lieu 
of the state. This development can be traced to the unequal — in the sense that 
they are often formulated relatively independently of each other —  development 
of general welfare policies and integration policies. As Titmuss observed in the 
1950s:  
 
‘As society grows in scale and complexity, new social needs are 
created; they overlap with and often accentuate the more classical 
forms of dependent needs […] In so far as a society fails to identify, 
by fact and not by inference, its contemporary and changing social 
problems it must expects its social conscience and its democratic 
values to languish’  
Titmuss, 1963, p. 226, p. 242 
 
In terms of migration and integration processes, the admonition to avoid inference 
and guesswork is particularly salient. This is what the below section explores: the 
development of immigration and integration policy and the attempt the 
Norwegian state made, through the commissioned reports104, to base policies on 
facts and research rather than inference. The above quote also draws attention 
to the impact of the diversification of the population, as was explored in the above 
sections. 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) offers another important insight into the nature and role 
of the welfare state:  
 
[it] is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, 
the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of 
stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations. 
     Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 23 
                                         
104 The commissions usually consist of a range of individuals, from academics, politicians, and 
public figures to private citizens with relevant experience. 
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This returns us to the points made in chapter 2 about the nature of categorisation, 
in particular Table 2, and citizenship. Welfare policy does not only relate to 
healthcare, employment, pensions, etc., but is inextricably tied to issues of 
migration and integration. Or, as argued by Arts and Gelissen (2002), the welfare 
state is ‘a complex of legal and organizational features that are systematically 
interwoven’ (p. 139). As is shown below, changes to general welfare policy are 
occasionally categorised as “liberalising” or restricting immigration and 
integration policy. The discursive framework of this thesis reminds us of the 
potential stratification embedded in welfare systems and how they are perceived.  
 
In Norway’s social democratic form of a welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
the essential component is the ‘fusion of welfare and work’ (p. 28), echoed in 
chapter 7 with the axiom: contribution before benefaction — ‘yte for å nyte’. As 
is shown throughout this thesis, work/labour/employment is a recurring theme in 
discussions of integration and migration processes, particularly in the case of 
Moral Underclass and Social Integrationist Discourses. Exploring, in depth, the 
interconnections of welfare and integration policy, for example how austerity-
rhetoric factors in, is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
 
4.4.2 – Immigration and integration policy changes 
The changes in migration patterns described in the previous section have led to, 
or been caused by, policy changes. The majority of these changes can be traced 
back to the commissioned reports referenced earlier. Whereas the actual 
legislative changes are brief and succinct, the reports provide the basis for 
understanding the changes. The vast majority of the policy changes are founded 
on functional conceptions of society, and thus overwhelmingly reflect SID and 
MUD. It is only the last couple of decades where RED appears, which may be in 
response to the increasing diversification of the immigrant population and 
experience garnered over the preceding decades. UDI (2017b) offer an overview 
of changes to immigration policy from the 19th Century up until 2016, and SSB 
(Cappelen, et al., 2011) provide a statistical analysis of the impact of policy 
changes on immigration to Norway 1969-2010. For the most part, the emphasis 
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will be on Norway, but as will be shown, there is also a need to explore aspects 
of policy borrowing and similarities between the Scandinavian countries, but also 
Canada. 
 
Some of these policies aim to restrict immigration, about 68 of the 204 rules, 
directives, and laws enacted since the 19th Century, whereas others aim to ease, 
or “liberalise”105, immigration, roughly 88 of the 204. This is according to UDI, and 
their method of classification is unexplained (UDI, 2017b). Furthermore, some 
policies target specific populations, groups, or phenomenon, such as a legislation 
in 2005 that assisted Vietnamese refugees106 in the Philippines in applying for 
work- and residency permits in Norway (Lovdata, 2005). On the other hand, UDI 
have also included general changes to welfare rules under their “liberalising” 
category, such as the expansion of benefits. 
 
On the other hand, these assistive policies also point to other tendencies, such as 
privileging specific groups. Legislative changes in 1950107, 1957, 1979, 1999 target 
Nordic immigrants, granting them rights and privileges that were subsequently 
afforded other immigrants. The 1979 legislative change granted voting rights in 
municipal and county elections to Nordic citizens with a minimum of three years 
residency, which was later expanded in 1983 to apply to all foreign citizens. This 
expansion of political rights for Nordic citizens occurred again in 1999, granting 
them the right to vote in municipal and county elections provided they had 
registered by the end of March during the election year. No similar expansion has 
been made for other foreign citizens. These changes contribute to privileging 
certain immigrants and lead to a hierarchisation wherein certain immigrants are 
more desirable and privileged, or as less of a threat and can therefore be given 
access to more rights. This relates back to the discussion in Chapter 2 on rights 
versus duties. 
                                         
105 I am aware of the politically charged nature of the term “liberalise”, as it is not only used to 
describe an easing of restrictions, but also used with moral and political connotations. I will instead 
refer to “assist”, as the policies often aim to ease restrictions, expand protections and rights, or 
make exceptions to rules. 
106 Specifically those with the status “Remaining Vietnamese National”. 
107 Relaxing requirements for citizenship for Nordic citizens 
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Then there are policies categorised as “liberalising” that are questionably so. Such 
as the 2005 temporary regulation granting temporary residency to Iraqi citizens, 
but simultaneously curtailing the right to family reunification, exemplifying what 
Joppke (2007, p. 19) describes as ‘repressive liberalism’. The curtailment 
attempts to be non-selective as it affects immigrants generally, but 
simultaneously is obviously related to a specific group. The 1957 immigration law 
included a requirement for having a work permit but is counted as “liberalising” 
as the work permit ‘does not have to be acquired prior to arriving in the realm’ 
(UDI, 2017b). This is categorised as “liberalising” because it eases a restriction 
from 1927 that made a pre-approved work permit mandatory. Policies change over 
time, and changes in response to circumstances and politics. Despite the 1957 
“liberalisation”, the 1970s saw significant restrictions placed on immigration to 
Norway (except for Nordic citizens). 1971 made it mandatory to apply for a work- 
or residency permit in country of origin (or the country where one had resided 
legally for at least six months), and 1975 saw a temporary ban on work permits 
(Stortinget, 1976; 1974). Subsequently, all “liberalisations” of immigration policy 
until the mid-90s related to students, family reunifications, and asylum seekers 
and refugees: the “temporary” ban on work permits has not been rescinded. 
Exceptions have been made due to EU/EEA regulations. 
 
This is significant, as it provides some explanation for the composition of the 
immigrant population in Norway. The question, nonetheless, is “why” these 
restrictions and “liberalisations” were made. For that, I choose to examine the 
commissioned policy reports discussing immigration and integration processes 
from the post-war period, as earlier policy has been superseded and replaced. 
These reports highlight the relationship between immigration and integration 
processes, as concerns around integration processes are used to justify 
immigration controls. Yet, as will be shown, the reports are limited by their scope, 
and lead to, at best, a partial understanding and discussion. 
 
Firstly, the Danielsen-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973) follows 
three restrictions on immigration made in 1971: work- and residency permits had 
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to be made prior to departure, and work permits would only granted upon proof 
of “suitable lodgings” (UDI, 2017b). These, in turn, were preceded by a 
government white paper (Stortinget, 1969) that, contrary to what the restrictions 
would imply, remarked on the low level of immigration to Norway relative to other 
European countries. The immigrant population in Norway increased from 
approximately 46 000 to 76 000 (see Figure 1 in section 4.2) between 1950 and 
1970, but the white paper emphasises the impact on the labour market, which it 
considers negligible. Furthermore, it was also dominated by Nordic labour 
migration due to a 1954 common labour market agreement between Finland, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The white paper asserts: 
 
The government is of the understanding that the immigration politics 
that Norway has pursued the last years has been correct and should 
be maintained. From the fundamental viewpoint that international 
cooperation and international contact and exchange should 
encounter the least possible restrictions and obstacles and that the 
individual employee and employer should have the greatest possible 
freedom to enter into contracts, the Government therefore believes 
that aliens that have secured work in this country should, as a rule, 
not be refused a work permit. […] We have to expect that more 
foreigners want to live and work in Norway, and that more 
Norwegians will want to live and work abroad. This development 
should be considered natural and desirable, and there should, from 
the Government’s side, be put the least possible obstacles in the way 
of this. 
      Stortinget, 1969, p. 63-64 
 
The only indication of restrictive sentiments is seen in expressions of a lack of 
interest in encouraging migration to Norway and an understanding that increased 
immigration might impact the housing market. Yet, a line merits highlighting: ‘[…] 
one must expect that certain problems with adaptation will occur’108 (Stortinget, 
1969, p. 63). 
 
This raises the question of “what happened?” Why suddenly introduce restrictions 
two years later? Firstly, it was argued as necessary due to restrictions introduced 
by other European nations: ‘The influx Norway now has of job seeking foreigners 
                                         
108 The original reads “tilpassingsproblemer”, which can be translated as either “adaptation” or 
“adjustment”.  
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from remote countries seems to be a result of stricter rules for granting of work 
permits that have gradually been introduced in other Western European countries’ 
(Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, pp. 142, 147). Again, special emphasis is 
given to the impact of Swedish and Danish policies’ knock-on effect due to Nordic 
agreements. Norway’s 1975 “temporary” ban on labour migration was preceded 
by a similar ban in 1970 in Denmark. 
 
It is difficult to separate these policy restrictions from racializing tendencies. 
Firstly, the Danielsen-commission recognises the nature of immigration to Norway 
over the preceding decades is predominantly Nordic or Western-European, but 
singles out “remote” countries and immigrants arriving ‘under the cover of visa 
freedoms and under the pretence of being tourists, have succeeded in avoiding 
refusal at the Nordic perimeter’ (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 146). 
They make specific mention of ‘the spontaneous wave of immigration of, amongst 
others, Pakistani job seekers’ in the first half of 1971 (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 1973, p. 15). Add to this the report’s observation that ‘Norwegian 
employers have largely been reluctant in recruiting foreign workers. The 
increasing immigration Norway has had the last few years, is in large part due to 
increasing external pressure from job seeking foreigners’ (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 1973, p. 61). In other words, immigration is already presented as an 
external, undesirable process, provided it is not Nordic. 
 
It is also revealing to repeat the conceptual definitions the Danielsen-commission 
relied on. Distinguishing between assimilation, integration, and adaptation, they 
echo SID and MUD (see Chapter 2) in their emphasis on functionalism and 
hierarchisation of identities. The tension between permanent and temporary 
residency, and sedentariness and mobility clearly contrasts assimilation and 
integration. Assimilation is preferable for permanence and sedentariness, 
integration for temporariness and mobility. 
 
By assimilation, the commission understands in this context that a 
foreigner becomes as alike a Norwegian as possible. An assimilated 
146 
 
 
foreigner will in most respects be as a Norwegian in body and soul109, 
he speaks and thinks as most Norwegians, he has a Norwegian, 
although not necessarily only Norwegian, social circle, he 
participates in the Norwegian civic life as a Norwegian, he harbours 
a desire to be considered Norwegian and is to a large extent so, and 
he considers Norway his new Fatherland. 
[…] 
Integration is a far weaker form of incorporation in society than 
assimilation. By integration, the commission understands it as a 
foreigner is a recognised and functional part of society without 
necessarily becoming like societal members in general. He can keep 
his national identity, his own language, his close connections in the 
homeland and to a certain extent his homelands customs and 
patterns of life. He can live in the country without wanting to settle 
here for good, and he can wish that his children return to the 
homeland. Nonetheless, he can be a functional part of society and 
find his place. 
[…] 
Those initiatives from society’s side that are implemented in order 
to help the foreign worker find their place in the country, the 
commission will refer to as adaptive measures. The foreign workers 
in Norway span a range of foreigners with different predispositions 
and, not least, different desires to adapt. The commission is of the 
opinion that the Government’s goal should be to facilitate offers that 
can be enjoyed by the individual foreign worker and his closest 
family in accordance with their needs. 
   Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 69 
 
As the first significant discussion of immigration and integration processes, the 
Danielsen-commission sets a tone and introduces policy and language that shapes 
these processes for the next couple of decades. Particularly in view of several 
scholars pointing to the 1970s as the period of policy establishment and the 80s 
and 90s as policy consolidation (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b; Ugland, 2018; 
Christensen, et al., 2006). A minority of members in the commission argued an 
alternative point that emphasises the responsibility of the nation-state: 
 
 
Countries have allowed mass immigration without building up the 
necessary infrastructure to receive the flows – i.e. housing, social 
institutions, schools, adult education, etc. One cannot correct 
discrepancies without resorting to public investment of such 
                                         
109 The Norwegian text reads “sinn og skinn”, which literally translates to “mind and skin”, and 
though I opted for “body and soul” in the translation I want to draw attention to the literal 
reference to skin. It might have been used as a simple turn of phrase, for its alliteration, but it 
stands out when seen in relation to other racializing tendencies. 
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dimension that it would be exceedingly difficult to achieve political 
unity on the initiatives.  
   Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 72 
 
 
In other words, the report demonstrates a tension between the three discursive 
types presented in the previous chapter. “Assimilation”, in the commissions 
understanding, strongly homogenises the groups/categories, focuses on the 
behaviour of the immigrant, and presents a hierarchical and reified understanding 
of identities. “Integration” is conceived as emphasising functionality and identity 
is seen as less important. The more holistic, redistributive discourse exemplified 
by a minority in the commission emphasises the multi-factorial underlying 
processes of inequality. That is not to say the latter is more positive to 
immigration, as the minority subsequently emphasise the need to utilise local 
labour resources, in this case increasing employment amongst women, to satisfy 
needs before resorting to importing labour from abroad. The minority also made 
the explicit recommendation of a temporary migration ban, à la the Danish. 
 
As mentioned previously, the minority believes the guidelines for 
Norwegian immigration policy should build on a holistic evaluation 
of social economics and social considerations. Should there be a 
conflict between personal finance110 and societal considerations, the 
former should yield. […] When one investigates conditions closely, 
one must admit there has arisen new social problems in our country 
because we so far have not really had an immigration policy. We 
have had open borders without considering the immigrants’ needs. 
[…] The minority suggests Norway follows the Danish example and 
takes a temporary break from immigration. The suggestion of a 
temporary immigration stop might seem drastic, and some, perhaps, 
would opine that such a decision would violate international 
conventions. However, as far as one knows, Denmark did not meet 
any severe reaction from the international community.  
   Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1973, p. 73 
 
We have already outlined what happened to the demographics of the immigrant 
population following this, so it remains to fill in the blanks. It is telling that the 
next commissions deal with refugees and young immigrants and descendants of 
                                         
110 Based on the preceding discussion in the report, I believe this refers to employers and business-
owners seeking to recruit immigrant labour and the gains that might yield, rather than individuals. 
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immigrants. Education-oriented immigration has rarely received attention, 
barring au pairs; hence, the two remaining categories are family and refuge.  
 
Prior to the next commission, the Hagensen-commission that finished in 1985, half 
the policy changes following the “temporary immigration ban” were aimed at 
family reunification. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Hagensen-commission 
focused on young immigrants and children born in Norway to immigrant parent(s). 
We can contrast their definition of “integration” with that of the Danielsen-
commission. This should provide some indication as to how the official 
understanding and discourses of integration has changed in the twelve years 
separating the two reports. The definition is as follows: 
 
Minority groups and/or individuals are given the opportunity to 
acquire the knowledge and opportunities that enables them to 
manage in majority society on equal footing with members of the 
majority. Integration simultaneously involves minority members 
being given genuine opportunities to keep and develop (or change) 
their own culture, including their own language, and that they 
themselves decide at what rate both processes occur. 
Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1985, p. 7 
 
 
Both definitions maintain a functionalist outlook, emphasising functioning in 
society without necessarily becoming part of it. They attempt to offer immigrants 
a degree of agency by emphasising integration processes occur at his chosen rate: 
the first commission, in every concept, refers to male immigrants, whereas the 
latter is gender neutral. A government white paper from 1980 heralded this 
difference in tone by emphasising the choice of the extent to which the immigrant 
associates with Norway ‘beyond what is necessary to function here’ (Stortinget, 
1980, p. 6). Alternatively, this is indicative of the onus and responsibility being 
placed on the individual, absolving the government. 
 
Where the two definitions differ points to some change in understanding. Firstly, 
the 1973-definition only refers to immigrants “keeping” their customs, national 
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identity, language, and patterns of life, whereas the 1985-definition opens up for 
keeping, developing, and changing these aspects – suggesting a more processual 
outlook. Secondly, the latter definition underlines that it needs to be on ‘equal 
footing’ and ‘genuine opportunities’, recognising the presence of inequalities. 
This was succinctly noted in the 1980 white paper: ‘Tolerance does not seem to 
be innate’ (Stortinget, 1980). 
 
The Kramer-commission, completed one year after the Hagensen-commission, 
provides some further clarification on perspectives and experiences of integration 
processes with a particular focus on refugees. Related to the above remark on 
tolerance, the Kramer-commission remarks on both the ‘lack of understanding for 
people’s ability to be multicultural’ and ‘lack of will amongst Norwegians to 
accept that it is possible to combine multiple ethnic identities’ (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 1986, pp. 20, 74). In this case being Jewish was constructed as much 
as an ethnic identity as religious identity, reminiscent of the identity processes 
discussed in the literature review. 
 
Where the Kramer-commission differs from the previous definitions of integration 
and assimilation, is in the observation that ‘many believe that the two processes 
are actually two stages to the same process’ (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1986, 
p. 22). Assimilation was still defined as loss of identity and becoming 
indistinguishable from the ‘host society’, whereas integration was again 
emphasised as becoming a ‘functional part of the host society’ (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 1986, p. 22). The Kramer-commission offers an interesting take on 
the dispersal policies surrounding refugee settlement in Norway, directly linking 
it to a means to encourage assimilation rather than integration. They also remark 
on the novelty of the emphasis on integration rather than assimilation. 
 
The greatest shift in understandings of integration processes and discourses in the 
realm of policy occurred in the 1995 Moen-commission (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 1995). A decade on from the previous commissions, Norway’s 
experience with a diversifying population has developed, as has the conceptual 
repertoire concerning integration processes. Apart from repeating the 
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functionalist conception of integration, the demographically multicultural idea of 
Norway is front and centre. Whereas the Kramer-commission suggested Norway 
was moving in the direction of a multicultural society, the Moen-commission 
considers it a reality. 
 
The Moen-commission makes a remarkable admission, which gives some insight 
into the perceived relationship between immigrants and non-immigrants:  
 
At the same time, we have had a strong tendency to want to overlook 
or conceal [local] cultural differences. We have rather wanted to 
portray ourselves as a distinctly homogeneous people, with common 
values and interest. We have wanted to see the cultural uniformity 
as an overarching value and employed the educational system as an 
active component in the homogenisation process. […] Uniformity has 
been woven into a complete set of symbols, disguises, and 
expressions that we have developed cultural competency in 
mastering.  
   Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 25 
 
Here we begin to see the contours of a recognition of the ambiguity of the concept 
“likhet”, explored in detail by Lien, et al., (2001) a few years later, and it is 
concomitant with broader discussions of racism in Norway111. The ambiguity 
becomes apparent in the possible translations: uniformity, sameness, or equality. 
Myhre (2018) draws attention to historical struggles ‘over the contents of the word 
equality, likhet’ (p. 69). Lien, et al., (2001, p. 12) classify “likhet” as a 
‘gatekeeper concept’, and its ambiguity therefore becomes important, 
particularly as the concept of equality and egalitarianism has a powerful position 
in the Norwegian ‘national myth’ (Abram, 2018, p. 88). Whether taken as equality 
or sameness, migrants are nonetheless judged in relation to the hegemonic ideal 
of white Norwegians. “Likhet” is used to identify and privilege both whiteness and 
values characterised as “Norwegian”. With the diversification of the population 
described above, “likhet” becomes increasingly challenged from multiple angles, 
necessitating a critical examination of how discourses relate to difference and 
diversity, as is done throughout this thesis. 
                                         
111 See in particular Gullestad’s (2004) discussion of academic writings on racism in Norway, 
utilising material by Inger-Lise Lien and Unni Wikan written in the mid-90s. 
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Gullestad (2002) points to how equality as sameness ‘underpins a growing 
ethnification of national identity’ (p. 45), bringing to mind aspects of race and 
racialisation discussed in chapter 2. Abram (2018) draws a direct line between 
equality-as-sameness and racist, assimilative, “Norwegianization” policies of the 
19th and 20th Century. If taken as “equality”, we still have to bear in mind that 
‘equality is a discourse’ (Stråth, 2018, p. 47) that is contingent upon constructions 
of inequality. These discursive productions, much like the discourses around 
integration, are a part of the greater construction and imagination of the nation. 
 
Notably, equality and inequality can become racialised: ‘being white has become 
a more pronounced dimension of being Norwegian’ (Gullestad, 2004, p. 193). This 
brings to mind the findings from Lynnebakke and Fangen (2011) about the three 
perceived criteria of “Norwegianness”: origin, cultural practice, and citizenship. 
The absence of race and inclusion of ‘cultural practice’ is symptomatic of the shift 
towards a culturalist rhetoric of racism (Gullestad, 2005). While ‘likhet’ can serve 
to obscure differences between those seen as Norwegian, it also draws attention 
to differences between “the Norwegian” and the Other (Gullestad, 2002). In 
effect, ‘likhet’, and its attempted definition along origin, cultural practice, and 
citizenship lines, can be seen as a shorthand for a ‘white public space’ that 
strengthens ‘racial control practices’ in society (Page & Thomas, 1994, p. 111)112. 
‘Likhet’ establishes a context and discourse where the non-migrant, white 
Norwegian is rendered invisible, while the migrant is racialised and marginalised. 
 
What these reports come to represent is the ‘complex mixtures of discourses 
within which racial boundaries are articulated and normalised’ (Gullestad, 2005, 
pp. 27-28). If, as the Moen-commission suggests, uniformity and likeness require 
cultural competency in order to decode or understand, it echoes the Kramer-
commission’s findings on the lack of acceptance for multiple identities and the 
marginalisation of immigrant populations. This marginalisation is not uniform 
                                         
112 See also Hill (1998) for a perceptive analysis on the role of language in the construction of race 
and white public space. 
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across all groups, as noted in chapter 2 on differential racializing tendencies and 
degrees of whiteness (Bonnett, 1998). 
 
This is in part recognised by the Moen-commissions expansion of conceptions of 
pluralism, and admission of assimilative tendencies despite a discourse of 
integration: ‘At the formal and intentional level, integration policy has opted for 
integration, but in practice it has often worked assimilative or even segregating’ 
(Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 24). As pointed out in Chapter 2, the 
concept of “integration” appears in all three discursive models, which points to a 
need to understand what is implied or meant when concepts are used. Perhaps 
more importantly is seeing what is then done. Table 6 presents their 
conceptualisations of pluralism.
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Table 6 - Moen-commission's models of pluralism (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 25) 
Apartheid-pluralism Underground-pluralism Individualist pluralism/Limited pluralism Group pluralism/ Full pluralism 
Segregation 
Suppression of 
minority cultures 
Differentiated rights 
for groups 
Individual and group 
rights linked to 
cultural belonging 
Intolerant/Hard assimilation 
Discrimination of minority 
cultures 
Formal equality at the 
individual level 
Strong pressure to conform 
Minority cultures endure, but 
as underground cultures 
Humanitarian/Soft assimilation 
Minority cultures are tolerated 
Full equality at individual level. At group 
level, differences are normalised based on 
the norms of the majority. 
A strong, dominating majority culture 
provides assimilation pressure. 
Integration/Incorporation 
Minority cultures are supported 
Full equality at both individual 
and group level. 
Cultural differences are actively 
maintained, but must comply 
with overarching community 
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Comparing the above forms of pluralism to the discursive model in Chapter 2, the 
Apartheid- and Underground-pluralism clearly match a Moral Underclass 
Discourse. Both imply a ranking of identities, where society is constituted as 
fragmented and unwanted characteristics are “Other”. The Limited pluralism 
reflects a Social Integrationist Discourse, in that it de-emphasizes identity and 
adopts a laissez-faire approach to the entire process: ‘The authorities have an 
indifferent attitude to minority cultures, provided it does not break strongly with 
majority culture and its rules and norms’ (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995, p. 
26). The Moen-commission argues integration policy has been so poorly defined 
and formulated at the national level that local authorities have usually continued 
assimilative practices or avoided the issue (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). 
This is reminiscent of Kymlicka’s (1995) argument that the state will promote 
certain identities and disadvantage others, whether intentionally or through 
‘benign neglect’ (p. 110). 
 
There are strong similarities between the Moen-commission’s model of Full 
Pluralism and treatise on Multiculturalism. There is an emphasis on the importance 
of protecting both individual and group rights, and the recognition of differences 
(Modood, 2013; Kymlicka, 1995; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). The Moen-
commission emphasise compliance with an overarching community, whereas 
Kymlicka warns against allowing groups to practice internal restrictions that limits 
individuals. Modood (2013) offers a slightly different view in that he expands the 
understanding of pluralism, or the “multi” part of Multiculturalism. (1) There are 
differences, (2) based on different social attributes (race, religion, etc.), (3) 
groups differ, (4) groups constitute themselves and behave differently, and (5) 
not all members of the same group are ‘members in the same way’ (Modood, 2013, 
p. 110). In this sense, it mirrors the Redistributive Discourse. 
 
As of 1995, the Moen-commission argues that despite the desire to pursue Full 
Pluralism at the political, rhetorical level, the reality has often leaned towards 
the Limited Pluralism and the other forms of pluralism. In 2011, the discourse 
shifts slightly, with two commissions, Brochmann-I and Kaldheim-commission, 
examining welfare and migration, and integration policy respectively. The 
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Brochmann-I commission posits a central premise: ‘In a world of finite resources, 
internal and external mechanisms [for managing migration] are mutually 
dependent’ (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011a, p. 22). Throughout the report, 
there is an emphasis on “activation” versus “pacification” of immigrants, 
underscoring the necessity of employment in both integrating immigrants and 
sustaining a welfare state. In other words, the discourse emphasises a hierarchical 
conception of identities, which plays out in the construction of categories and 
policy applied as discussed in the previous chapter. Repeatedly, the report 
emphasises the need to raise the level of qualifications and skills amongst 
immigrants, thereby also establishing a discourse of externalising unwanted 
characteristics and associating them with immigrants and implies welfare benefits 
encourage dependency.  
 
The Brochmann-I report demonstrates both SID and MUD characteristics. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, it is not one or the other; these discourses operate on a 
continuum. What we do see, is that the “Universalism” the Brochmann-I 
commission argue underpins the Norwegian welfare system, does not allow for a 
valorisation of multiple identities, as would be required for the Redistributive 
Discourse of Exclusion, but instead communicates uniformity. Returning us to the 
idea of “likhet”, with its ability to convey vastly different meanings and 
implications. It also externalises “unwanted” characteristics from the mainstream 
and emphasises an assimilationist perspective that focuses on the behaviour of the 
individual — clear signs of MUD. 
 
The emphasis on qualifications is also skewed towards the Moral Underclass 
Discourse: Maximova-Mentzoni, et al., (2016) find evidence of systematic 
devaluation of non-Norwegian education and qualifications within higher 
education in Norway. This is also emphasised in the Kaldheim-commission (Norges 
Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b) and Brochmann-II commission (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 2017). The emphasis on translation and recognition of qualifications 
is also demonstrated in Chapter 6, amongst extra-ecclesial organisations working 
with immigrants. This cannot be separated from the policy perspectives of limiting 
immigration to the extent permissible by international treaties and agreements. 
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The formulation of the “desirability/undesirability” of categories of immigrants 
does not stop at the point of immigration but remains relevant in integration 
processes and contributes to shaping these processes. 
 
The latter of the 2011 commissions directly addresses integration policy and 
processes: the Kaldheim-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b). In 
their own words, they are ‘the first commission that has undertaken a holistic 
assessment of integration policy and integration work in Norway. The suggestions 
are the first to entail a holistic and coherent integration policy’ (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 2011b, p. 11). Nearly four decades after imposing a “temporary 
immigration ban”, there is a concerted effort to address integration processes. 
This strengthens the argument that discourses around immigration and integration 
processes have largely been Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass Discourses: 
a patchwork discussion on how to mitigate the impact of immigration. Despite the 
presence of elements of the Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion, that appears 
merely because of the strong welfare state universalism. There has been little, if 
any, valorisation of multiple identities within a holistic understanding of society.  
 
Here we can draw on the Multiculturalism-Interculturalism debate113, as that 
debate highlights conceptions of integration processes at national and local levels. 
In particular, I draw attention to some questions posed by Kymlicka: 
 
Is it better to emphasise bottom-up, local, civil-society-based 
projects of cultural interaction, as interculturalists imply, and save 
state-centred projects of redefining multicultural nationhood for 
later? Or will local projects of intercultural interaction always be 
fragile in the absence of an explicit state commitment to redefine 
nationhood? 
      Kymlicka, 2016, p. 172 
 
Another way of posing those questions is if it is enough that discourses around 
immigration and integration processes are held at the national level or whether it 
is necessary to see them at local and particular levels. The crux of this thesis is 
                                         
113 For a detailed exploration of this debate, see Meer, Modood, and Zapata-Barrero (2016) 
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exploring how Catholicism influences integration processes nationally and locally, 
and how it compares to other influences: By understanding how groups constitute 
themselves, and how individuals draw on their identities and perspectives when 
they interact with different levels such as the local, regional, or national. 
 
The Kaldheim-commission offers an explicit formulation of what “integration” is 
and should achieve: 
 
Integration of immigrants is concretely about qualification, 
education, work, quality of life, and social mobility; influence in 
democratic processes, participation in civil society; and belonging, 
respect for differences, and loyalty for mutual values. It is results, 
i.e. what is accomplished along these dimensions that determines 
how successful integration is.  
   Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b, p. 11-12 
 
Where the Brochmann-I commission offers a contrast is in the ideal of universalism 
in the welfare state, and how that translates into a national integration. The issue 
for the welfare state becomes how to apply universalism to the particular, and we 
return to the ambiguity of equality and uniformity. The Kaldheim-commission, on 
the other hand, conceptualises integration as something to be achieved by or done 
to immigrants. The Moen-commission observed that despite desiring Full 
Pluralism, the reality often matches Limited Pluralism or worse. The above quote 
from the Kaldheim-commission demonstrates this: the conception of society is still 
functionalist and fragmented. 
 
The Kaldheim-commission aptly demonstrates some of the tensions of the 
Multiculturalist-Interculturalist debate. Despite emphasising “Better integration”, 
the title of their report, they present three concepts: integration, inclusion, and 
diversity. Their conceptualisation of “integration” precludes a Redistributive 
Discourse of Exclusion, as it is markedly Social Integrationist. “Inclusion” is slightly 
more Redistributive, whereas “Diversity” clearly echoes that discourse: 
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[Integration] is about how recently arrived immigrants, as fast as 
possible, can enter employment and civil society […]. [Inclusion] is 
about everyone living in Norway having equal opportunities and 
duties to contribute and participate in the collective […]. [Diversity] 
refers to all residents114 in society. The commission believes the goal 
has to be that all residents should experience belonging, 
togetherness, or community with Norwegian society. This has to 
build on loyalty to mutual values and acceptance for diversity and 
differences. Immigrants have to immerse themselves in and respect 
the foundation of Norwegian societal life. At the same time, society 
and the population have to include new residents and respect new 
differences. Through contact and experience, all residents have to 
become accustomed to handling differences in a natural manner. 
Descendants of immigrants can develop identities and ways of life 
that represent new ways of being Norwegian. 
   Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b, p.27, 29 
 
Compare this to Meer, et al., (2016) summary of the Multiculturalist and 
Interculturalist positions: 
 
[…] multiculturalism can simultaneously describe “the political 
accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority 
cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity 
[…]”. […] [Interculturalism] assumed diversity is itself a culture. 
     Meer, et al., 2016, p. 4, 9 
 
On the side of Interculturalists, Cantle (2016, p. 149) remarks: ‘The strength of 
national identity depends to some extent on the powers and responsibilities of the 
nation-state’. This points to a linkage between a strong, comprehensive welfare 
system and identity — a fundamental linkage for welfare chauvinism (Bartram, et 
al., 2014; Keskinen, et al., 2016). Thus, the two commissions highlight different 
aspects of integration processes in Norway. Whereas the Brochmann-I commission 
strengthens the link between a Norwegian identity and the welfare system, the 
Kaldheim-commission presents a move towards seeing diversity as a reality and 
culture in Norway. 
 
                                         
114 The Norwegian word “borger” is used, which I have chosen to translate as resident, but can be 
understood as citizen. The specific word for citizen is “statsborger”; hence, I opted for the broader 
interpretation of “borger”. I highlight this because they could easily have omitted “borger” and it 
would simply have read “everyone in society”. The implication is that these ideals only apply to 
legal residents. 
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Tensions between these aspects was recognised and summarised in the 
Brochmann-II commission: ‘The Norwegian welfare model is both a resource and 
a problem when it comes to integration of immigrants and descendants’ (Norges 
Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 11). Moving in the direction of a Moral Underclass 
Discourse, the commission strongly homogenises the “native” population: ‘Norway 
has historically been, ethnically and culturally, a relatively homogeneous country’ 
(Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 12). The degree to which the Brochmann-
II commission externalises unwanted characteristics, ignores societal inequalities, 
and draws on stereotypes to establish a hierarchy of identities, is blatant. Take 
for example the following statements. The first fails to separate between standard 
of living and quality of life. The second portrays a Norwegian identification and 
categorisation as the pinnacle. The final statement suggests a causal relationship 
between immigration and inequality: 
 
 
Those who probably have the clearest benefit from immigration are 
the immigrants themselves. Moving to Norway, for many, will 
increase their standard of living considerably and quickly. […] Many 
with immigrant background embrace an identity as Norwegian, but 
few seize it fully, and many experience their identity as Norwegian 
is challenged by others who do not see them that way. […] 
Immigration can therefore be expected to give a direct increase in 
inequality in Norway […]. 
  Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017, p. 26, 138, 151 
 
In conclusion, what this section shows is how despite the awareness of the 
diversification of the Norwegian population over the last forty years, official policy 
discourses has developed slowly. The mid-90s demonstrate a move towards a more 
complex conceptualisation of society and immigration, but despite the move 
towards a Redistributive Discourse, there is a significant and lasting functionalist 
approach to integration processes. This is to be expected, as they are policy 
papers intending to offer suggestions for future policy, but their conceptualisation 
of immigration and integration processes are significant for the national 
discourses. What appears to be a significant issue is how a functionalist outlook 
can strengthen a Moral Underclass Discourse.  
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4.5 – Nordland, Bodø, and immigration and integration processes 
If the discussions around immigration and integration processes at the national 
level developed slowly, regional ones were slower. Here we see the differential 
impact of immigration on Norwegian regions, and it becomes necessary to bear in 
mind the internal migration processes as well as international migration processes. 
There is a significant dearth of historical material on immigration and integration 
process discourses with a regional focus, which results in an overwhelmingly 
contemporary perspective. This section, therefore, will explore the specific 
demographic details of Nordland, and Bodø, and briefly discuss regional and local 
policy aspects of integration processes. This allows us to draw some contrasts to 
the national discourse and policy, and better appreciate the local variations. 
 
As of 2017, there were 242 866 people living in Nordland, the narrow, elongated 
county that joins mid-Norway to Northern Norway. The county boasts a full quarter 
of Norway’s coast line and is the second largest county by territory. Seventy per 
cent of Nordland’s population are considered to be living in “densely populated” 
areas115. Of the 44 municipalities that make up Nordland County, 24 of them are 
categorised as “least central”116, 11 are “less central”, eight are “somewhat 
central”, and Bodø just qualifies as “central” with its 51 000 inhabitants. Just over 
a fifth of the inhabitants in Nordland live in Bodø, the fieldwork site for this thesis, 
making it twice as large as the next largest municipality, Rana (NFK, 2016). In 
other words, Nordland, apart from Bodø, can be considered somewhat peripheral 
and rural, although not inaccessible. 
 
According to SSB (2017i), there were 21 295 immigrants, from 140 countries, living 
in Nordland in 2017, roughly 9 per cent of the population of the county117. Of 
these, 4384 (21 per cent) lived in Bodø. Table 7 compares the countries of origin 
                                         
115 SSB define a densely populated area as at least 200 people living in an area with a distance of 
less than 50metres between houses. Compared to other counties, Nordland is the 14th “densely 
populated” county. The average is 76 per cent of the population in “densely populated” areas. 
116 As previously stated: “Central” is achieved when the physical centre of the population of a 
municipality is <75 minutes of travel from an urban settlement with a population >50 000 
inhabitants. An additional requirement is that the urban settlement in question acts as a regional 
centre. “Somewhat” means travel of <60minutes to an urban settlement with >15 000 
inhabitants. “Less” means travel of <45 minutes to an urban settlement with >5 000 inhabitants. 
“Least central” municipalities do not fulfil any of these requirements 
117 I have been unable to source data on how many internal migrants there are in Nordland. 
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in ranked order for the respective geographic unit. I included the national ranking 
from Figure 14 for comparison. 
 
Bodø Nordland National 
Poland Poland (5) Poland (7) 
Somalia Lithuania (4) Lithuania (5) 
Sweden Syria (1) Sweden (14) 
Eritrea Somalia (5) Somalia (10) 
Lithuania Sweden (15) Germany (13) 
Thailand Eritrea (3.5) Iraq (13) 
Syria Thailand (8) Syria (2) 
Russia Germany (12) Philippines (10) 
Iraq Russia (9) Pakistan (22) 
Germany Afghanistan (4) Eritrea (5) 
Philippines Philippines (9) Denmark (22) 
Afghanistan Romania (4) Thailand (10) 
Denmark Iraq (10) Russia (10) 
Ethiopia Latvia (4) Iran (15) 
Latvia Denmark (19) Afghanistan (8) 
Romania Iran (6) Latvia (5) 
Pakistan Ethiopia (4) Ethiopia (9) 
Iran Pakistan (8) Romania (5) 
Table 7 - Countries of origin for immigrants, by share of immigrant population (SSB, 2017g)118 
 
There is some difference in terms of duration of residency in Norway: it is 
consistently shorter for immigrants in Nordland. There are two possible 
explanations: more recently arrived or increased re-migration internationally or 
nationally. In the former, it raises questions as to why immigrants would travel to 
Nordland at a slower rate than nationally. This could be related to Nordland’s 
peripheral position geographically and differences in the regional labour markets. 
This is explored in Chapter 8, in the interview with a county official working on 
increasing labour migration to Nordland.  
 
                                         
118 Average duration of residency in years in parentheses. There is no data for average duration of 
residency at the municipal level. Countries in italics are included because they appear in one of 
the other columns but are not a part of the sample constituting two-thirds in its respective column. 
162 
 
 
The latter suggests increased mobility, due to, for example, employment or 
wellbeing119. This is explored in Chapter 7, in analyses of interviews and 
ethnographic data. It is noticeable that immigrants in Nordland from Somalia, 
Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ethiopia, likely to be refugees, have markedly 
shorter residency than at the national level, which might indicate a tendency 
towards onwards migration120. Figure 30 gives a bell curve for duration of 
residency of all immigrants in Nordland, and it reinforces the argument that the 
immigrant population in Nordland is to a certain extent more recent than at the 
national level. 
 
 
Figure 30 - Duration of residency for immigrant population in Nordland (SSB, 2017g)121 
 
                                         
119 See Grønseth (2010) for a qualitative analysis of Tamil refugees in Northern Norway and internal 
migration following refugee settlement. 
120 Internal migration in Norway is relatively under-researched, with Rees, et al., (1999) offering 
the most in-depth analysis. They conclude internal migration dynamics strongly resemble other 
West European countries, hence we can look to, for example, Boman (2011) or Åslund (2005). 
121 Average: 8.96 years. Standard deviation: 6.29 years (nationally – 12.7 years (average) and 6.5 
years (standard deviation)). As with the previous bell curve, the data skews it towards a lower 
average and shortens the right-hand tail because it does not count above 40 years. 
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Comparing the municipal, county, and national figures (Table 8), three of the top 
five countries of origin are shared: Poland, Lithuania, and Somalia. There are 
variations in the share of immigrant population, but largely the same countries 
that comprise two-thirds of the immigrant population locally, regionally, and 
nationally. Certain details stand out, such as the lower share immigrants from 
Poland constitute in Nordland and Bodø, and the higher share of the immigrant 
population constituted by immigrants from Somalia.  
 
As immigration from Poland is largely, and primarily, due to labour, their reduced 
share of the immigrant population in Nordland and Bodø might be tied to the 
labour market and Nordland’s role in the Norwegian economy. The higher share 
of immigrants from Somalia might be related to Norway’s policy on refugee 
resettlement, which seeks to disperse refugees throughout the country. This is 
supported by the absence of a significant population of, for example, immigrants 
from Vietnam in Nordland, as they were more commonly settled in Southern 
Norway. 
 
Country Bodø Nordland National 
Poland 10.7% 10.0% 13.4% 
Lithuania 4.9% 6.5% 5.2% 
Sweden 5.1% 5.4% 5.0% 
Somalia 7.0% 5.9% 4.0% 
Germany 3.7% 3.9% 3.4% 
Iraq 4.0% 2.1% 3.1% 
Syria 4.4% 6.3% 2.9% 
Philippines 3.6% 3.4% 2.8% 
Pakistan 1.0% 0.5% 2.8% 
Eritrea 5.0% 5.4% 2.8% 
Denmark 2.1% 1.9% 2.7% 
Thailand 4.5% 5.2% 2.6% 
Russia 4.2% 3.7% 2.4% 
Iran 0.9% 1.2% 2.4% 
Afghanistan 3.1% 3.5% 2.2% 
Romania 1.5% 3.0% 3.0% 
Latvia 1.7% 2.1% 1.4% 
Ethiopia 2% 2% 1.1% 
Table 8 - Two-thirds of the immigrant population in Bodø, Nordland, and nationally as of 2017 (SSB, 2017f) 
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The relationship between immigration and the county and municipality 
administrations, and policy and actions pursued is complicated. Unlike at the 
national level, where there are commissions, reports, White Papers, and a 
national press to demonstrate and draw attention to this relationship, this is 
largely absent at the regional and local level. At the county level, Nordland county 
administration’s efforts have been directed at labour-based migration, whereas 
the local level has been largely silent. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
 
Interculturalism posits that contact at the local level can be conducive to breaking 
down ‘traditional and hardened boundaries’ (Cantle, 2016, p. 142), although this 
risks perceiving boundaries as naturally occurring. This is echoed by Steen (2008), 
writing for IMDi122, emphasising local factors affecting municipalities’ willingness 
to resettle refugees. He points to the role of the size of the municipality (no 
effect), unemployment (mixed effect), and scepticism towards “non-western 
migrants” (negative effect). Contact may contribute to breaking down boundaries, 
but without state intervention overriding municipalities’ unwillingness to resettle 
refugees, intercultural contact is effectively short-circuited. Furthermore, this 
perspective homogenises that which is “inside” the boundaries that contact is 
meant to expose “the other side” to. Kymlicka also warns that there is a risk that 
this perspective ‘consigns control over nationhood to conservative and populist 
forces’ (2016, p. 173). The absence of clear policy and emphasis on immigration 
and integration processes at the local and county level, I would argue, points to 
the anxiety about discussions on nationhood (Kymlicka, 2016). As has already been 
argued above, there has been a strong homogenising tendency at the national 
level, and, despite the prevalence of regional identities, this raises the bar for 
challenging national perspectives on integration processes. 
 
Combined with a tendency towards functionalist Social Integrationist Discourses 
and the laissez-faire tendencies, the local and regional approaches deserve to be 
scrutinised. Interculturalism emphasises repeatedly that ‘everyday engagements 
between citizens or groups’ (Loobuyck, 2016, p. 232) should be encouraged and is 
where integration processes are the most impacted. As has been pointed out 
                                         
122 IMDi – Integrering- og Mangfoldsdirektoratet – Directorate for Integration and Diversity 
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above, integration processes occur at multiple levels, and 
Multiculturalism/Interculturalism’s emphases on societal/individual factors and 
actions are not contradictory. What distinguishes the two approaches is that 
Multiculturalism entails clear, targeted, and intentional moves towards altering 
‘“operative public values”’ (Modood, 2017, p. 6), whereas Interculturalism’s 
emphasis on the local risks absolving the institutions and bodies that govern and 
embody a significant power, and reduces it to incidental contact. Loobuyck (2016, 
p. 237) puts it as clearly as ‘Multiculturalism should be implemented by the 
government(s), Interculturalism by the citizens.’ 
 
The question then becomes whether we see proof of either Multiculturalism or 
Interculturalism at the regional and local level. What we can point to, is that Bodø 
municipality is certainly aware of their increasingly diversified population. On 
their web page about living in Bodø, they offer information in English, French, 
Polish, Somali, Russian, Tigrinya, Persian, Arabic, and Spanish (Bodø Kommune, 
2017). The question is what led them to choose certain languages over others. 
Consider, for example, that immigrants from Germany, the Philippines, and 
Thailand outnumber immigrants from Russia, yet the information is not offered in 
German, Tagalog, or Thai. It could be related to the average duration of residency 
of immigrants from these countries and the primary reason for immigration. As 
shown above, immigration from Thailand and the Philippines is often family 
reunification following marriage to a Norwegian citizen. Alternatively, these 
immigrants find information from alternative sources, such as the two Philippine 
community organisations in Bodø (Filipino Community and Filipino Union). 
 
The local aspects will be analysed in depth in later chapters, but before concluding 
I have to draw attention to the arrival of a large number of asylum-seekers late 
2015 to early 2016, in the middle of the fieldwork and data collection for this 
thesis. Firstly, the sudden change in migration patterns caught many nation-states 
by surprise, and a rhetoric of “crisis” was prevalent throughout Europe. Many 
governments acted quickly to introduce policies to respond to this, and Norway 
was no exception.  
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The discourse and rhetoric in politics and media, local and national, during this 
period provides important insight into constructions of immigration and 
integration processes from a diversity of positions. Offering a comprehensive, 
discursive analysis of national political and media rhetoric is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but they informed the findings and analyses and will be drawn upon as 
they become relevant123. What this means for the thesis is that the research was 
conducted at a time of heightened awareness and increased salience of 
immigration and integration processes. As such, the interviews and ethnography, 
based on local contexts, offer a clear counter-narrative to the national policy-
based political debates. 
  
                                         
123 Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) offer an analysis of the framing of the “refugee crisis” in 
Austria, and their findings resonate with my fieldwork: ‘a predominance of stereotyped 
interpretations of refugee and asylum issues’ (p. 1749)  
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4.6 – Conclusion 
What this chapter has sought to do has been to explore and demonstrate some of 
the context in which integration processes occur. Leaving discussions of religious 
aspects to the next chapter, this chapter has focused on the demographic and 
policy changes in immigration and integration processes over the last few decades. 
I am not suggesting the last few decades are the only worth exploring, as historical 
analyses are very enlightening, but it has been beyond the ability of this thesis to 
extend the analysis further back. 
 
Seeing policy and demographic changes in tandem offers us insight into the 
relationship between the two. In particular, the discussions in the commissioned 
reports remind us of how domestic decisions such as immigration control are not 
independent of outside influences. From the earliest reports, there are direct 
references to international factors and policy decisions made by neighbouring 
countries, in particular the Nordic countries124. Subsequent reports reflect shifting 
discourses and are shaped by the realities of alternative migration patterns and 
demographic changes. 
 
Due to decisions made in the late 1960s and early 1970s with regards to acceptable 
causes for immigration, and preferred groups, combined with Norwegian welfare 
ideals125, the perceptions and construction of “the immigrant” became 
intrinsically “Other”. The policy systems and overarching discourses were only 
lightly modified the next couple of decades, and a full discussion of what a Plural 
or Multicultural Norway would entail does not occur until the 1990s. Despite an 
increasing awareness of integration processes and factors that shape them, 
policies and discourses do not shift considerably. The focus and goal remains 
employment.  
 
                                         
124 For a detailed analysis of the immigration and integration policy relationship between the 
Scandinavian countries and Canada, see Ugland (2018). 
125 Bendixsen (2018) offers an incisive analysis of the contemporary relationship between 
Norwegian humanitarian ideals and welfare discourses. 
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Discourses remain overwhelmingly Social Integrationist, with undercurrents of 
Moral Underclass elements. Bendixsen (2018) points to Norway’s understanding of 
itself as a champion for humanitarian ideals in how it copes with and relates to 
categorisation of immigrants. If there is a prideful position on humanitarian 
positions and behaviour, morality cannot be separated from the discussion. 
Despite laudable statements about the importance of equality and mutual respect 
in the Kaldheim-commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2011b), there is still 
an emphasis on the superiority of the Norwegian model. This is succinctly 
demonstrated by Carli (2006, pp. 101-102): 
 
Another typical thing about being foreign in Norway is the need to 
constantly underline how good we have it in Norway […] And those 
who express some criticism about something about Norwegian 
society, they are met with “this is what is like in Norway”. 
 
 
The context in which discussions of immigration and integration processes took 
place start shifting in the 2000s. Perhaps most significantly, there is a fundamental 
change in labour-oriented migration: the enlargement of the EU alters the 
mobility patterns over the course of a short period of time, and Norway’s 
population is subsequently further diversified. It is not that there were not Polish 
or Lithuanian immigrants in Norway prior to their accession to the EU, but their 
presence was considered inconsequential and the Norwegian system had coped 
with it.  
 
What occurs in the mid-late 2000s is, to not put too fine a point on it, a rude 
awakening and challenge to the laissez-faire approach of previous decades. This 
is evident in the creation of two commissions to look into different aspects of 
immigration and integration processes. The Brochmann-I commission, focusing on 
the impact of immigration on the welfare system, is repeated in 2016, following 
another change in mobility patterns resulting in an increase in asylum-seekers. 
The emphasis remains functional in character, with an insidious moral undertone 
which is only partially addressed by the Kaldheim-commission.  
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Narrowing the focus to the regional and local levels, we find that Nordland and 
Bodø do not differ greatly in terms of demographics. Yet, as a peripheral part of 
Norway, it captures the in-between position of long-term experience with 
migration and mobility patterns found in cities, and the lack of experience many 
local communities have. This is reflected in the absence of clear regional positions 
on immigration issues, and efforts are largely shaped by the national discourse 
and policy. Particularly concerning refugee-settlement, where the local 
administrations have a degree of decision-making freedom, it was not until the 
heightened awareness of late-2015-early 2016 that local practices were afforded 
much attention. Subsequently, there was a hunt for “best-practice”126. 
 
This has provided us with the overarching secular context in which the research 
was conducted. The next chapter explores how the religious context in Norway 
has shifted over time, and in particular how the Catholic Church has developed 
over the course of its recent history in Norway. What will become apparent is the 
close relationship between immigration and mobility processes and the Catholic 
Church in Norway. By understanding this, we can more readily analyse the 
relationship between the Catholic Church and integration processes, and how it 
plays out at different levels.
                                         
126 Understood here as a discursive process that challenges and reframes issues and seeks to create 
new knowledge about them (Bulkeley, 2006). 
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Chapter 5 – Separation of Church and State, but bringing people together? 
5.1 – Introduction 
This chapter seeks to introduce the religious and Catholic landscape in Norway. 
Initially, I will offer an overview of religion in Norway and religious policy, before 
moving on to an in-depth examination of Catholicism in Norway. As with my 
discussion on the general Norwegian context, I limit myself to the modern era, 
touching on the development of the Catholic Church in Norway127 since it returned 
to Norway in 1843. In order to fully understand the relationships between 
migration, transnationalism, and Catholicism, Cruz (2016, p. 25) argues for 
‘[taking] theology seriously’, but it is equally important to understand the 
ecclesiology of the Church. Where the theology helps us understand the “why”, 
ecclesiology can help us understand the “how”.  
 
Furthermore, it is essential to distinguish between the theoretical aspects of 
theology and ecclesiology, and the practical realities within the national, regional, 
and local settings of the Catholic Church and its concomitant extra-ecclesial 
organisations. The goal of this chapter is not to offer an exhaustive description of 
every aspect of the Church, but to offer a series of analyses that help us 
understand the complex realities of Catholicism, migration, and integration 
processes. This will allow us to provide a fuller answer to the research question 
asking how the nature of the Church affects its response to and perception of 
integration processes. 
  
                                         
127 Hereafter referred to as the Church. 
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5.2 – The issue of affiliation and disaffiliation 
In broad strokes, Christianity was introduced to Norway in the 11th Century. At the 
time of the Reformation, Norway was in union with Denmark, and the Danish 
monarch, Christian the III, declared that Norway and Denmark would become 
Protestant, Evangelical Lutheran countries. In 1569, Frederick the II of Denmark 
decreed that persons of non-Lutheran religious convictions were banned from 
entering Norway (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013, p. 37). These royal decrees 
laid the groundwork for a religiously homogeneous understanding of Norway.  
 
Modern legal governance of religion in Norway begins with the Constitution of 
1814, which reaffirmed Evangelical Lutheranism as the official religion of Norway. 
The Church of Norway remained the official state church, all persons in 
government office had to adhere to Evangelical Lutheranism (Lovdata, 1814, p. 
§93; Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013), and religious illiberalism was 
evidenced by denying Jesuits, monks, and Jews access to the realm (Lovdata, 
1814, p. §2).  
 
The religious monopoly of the Church of Norway became increasingly challenged, 
and concessions were gradually made to other Christian denominations. The 
passing of Dissenterloven128 in 1845 opened up Norwegian society to Christian 
denominations, although Jesuits, Jews, and monks were still banned (Rygnestad, 
1955). These bans were gradually removed, with Jews granted access to the 
country in 1851, monks in 1897, and Jesuits129 in 1956 (Elden, 2017; Hoelseth, 
2011; 2013). Full freedom of religion was guaranteed in the Norwegian 
Constitution in 1964 (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013, p. 19).  While not 
necessarily indicative of popular religiosity, the legal governance of religion in 
Norway gives us some insight into elite perceptions of religion and their 
understanding of religion’s place in Norwegian society. 
 
                                         
128 The Law of Dissenters 
129 There had been two attempts previously, in 1897 and 1925, to repeal the ban on Jesuits (Teres, 
2013) 
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Following further changes to the Constitution, the Church of Norway went from 
being a State Church to a Folk Church (Church of Norway, 2015). Repstad (2002) 
defines a Folk Church130 as encompassing a vast majority of the population. 
Officially, roughly 70 per cent of Norway’s population are members of the Church 
of Norway (SSB, 2017b), although Repstad (2002) posits that religion is only 
important for 5 to 10 per cent of the population.  
 
What we can glean from a range of sources is that, despite Repstad’s claim, 
Christian nominalism is prevalent (Davie, 1994). In 2008, 80.7 per cent of the 
population were members of the Norwegian Church (SSB, 2016b), but only 63 per 
cent of respondents in the World Value Survey (2014) identified as members. In 
2017, this had dropped to 71.5 per cent (SSB, 2017b) and 47 per cent (Pew 
Research Center, 2017). Comparing a governmental and non-governmental source 
provides some contrast and points to the complexity of secularisation processes. 
 
Norway adheres to an active support of religious societies and confessions, and 
religion is, at a policy level, seen as conducive to a positive societal development 
(Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2013), something which is perfectly compatible 
with political secularism (Casanova, 2009). An essential aspect of Norwegian 
religious policy is the principle of equal treatment and funding of religious 
societies (Lovdata, 2018a, p. §16): the Church of Norway is given a block grant, 
and other religious societies are given an equivalent amount per registered 
member131 (Lovdata, 2017a [1981]). The Church of Norway is seen as preserving 
cultural heritage as well as offering religious services. In this sense, being a Folk 
Church extends beyond the tenuous basis of encompassing a majority of the 
population, a notion which can be increasingly disputed.  
 
Despite fiscal equality, this funding method is principally unequal. Other religious 
societies receive an equivalent amount, but the symbolic value is different. The 
                                         
130  Bryan Turner (1991) similarly identifies the Church of Scotland as a Volkskirche (German for 
Folk Church), and argues against its capacity to act as a representative, societal voice. 
131 For example, in 2017 the Church of Norway was given a block grant of approximately 2 million 
Norwegian Kroner, which resulted in other religious societies receiving 536NOK per member 
(Ministry of Culture, 2017a) 
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Church of Norway is funded irrespective of its membership, rendering it relatively 
immune to membership fluctuation, unlike other religious societies. The 
privileged position of the Church of Norway is aptly exemplified by the Orwellian 
suggestion from the leader of the Conservative Youth party: atheists should 
register as members of the Church of Norway in order to defund other religious 
societies (Friestad, 2016). 
 
This funding policy has received more attention the last couple of years due, in 
part, to membership fraud perpetrated by the Church. This case, appropriately 
categorised as a scandal, dominated the media landscape for a while, and internal 
discussion in the Church the last few years, and has resurfaced as court cases have 
commenced, been appealed, or finished. As court cases, both civil and criminal, 
were ongoing at the time of the research, I have confined myself to official 
documents from the courts, prosecutors, appellants, and government offices. This 
is in the interest of objectivity, as I consider media reporting and statements from 
the Church overwhelmingly biased and not conducive to the analysis. As a result 
of my experience with the Church I am well acquainted with several persons 
involved in the court cases, none of whom are named in this research without 
their express consent or through their public statements. Due to the divisive 
nature of this case, internally in the Diocese, I have had to negotiate a narrow 
middle-ground in order to not alienate participants. As a result, the following 
analysis may be read as downplaying the scandalous nature of this case, which is 
entirely unintentional. The actions of the Church, registering individuals as 
members without their consent, violated norms of privacy, freedom of religion, 
and honest reporting to official bodies. 
 
At the crux of the disputed case are the vague formulations of the law concerning 
religious societies, rendering them susceptible to divergent interpretations. This 
case is a great example of the complexity of the role of religion in Norway. Funding 
is allocated per member who is either a Norwegian citizen or a resident of Norway 
with a valid national ID number, and ‘belongs to the religious society’ (Lovdata, 
2017a [1981], p. §2). Compounding this is the formulation of §9 of the law 
concerning religious societies (Lovdata, 2017b [1969]) which states that ‘The 
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religious society itself determines by what method enrolment is conducted’. Thus, 
all that was required in order to obtain funding was a person’s national ID number 
and being officially registered as a religious society.  
 
One of the key grievances from the Catholic Diocese of Oslo132 is that although 
roughly seventy per cent of the population are members of the Church of Norway, 
this does not accurately represent the number of active members. Whereas, the 
Diocese of Oslo contend, they are only able to register 42.7 per cent of all 
Catholics in Norway (District Court of Oslo, 2017, p. 27), due to the impact of 
migration on their numbers133. In order to acquire a national ID number, the person 
must be resident for more than 6 months, register at a tax office, have a valid 
lease or contract for a property longer than 6 months, an employment contract 
lasting longer than 6 months, or proof of study (The Norwegian Tax Administration, 
2017b). Due to temporary contracts and high mobility of migrants who might be 
Catholic, considerable effort is needed to maintain an updated registry. Where 
the Church of Norway negotiates members belonging without believing, the 
Church deals with members believing without belonging (according to the state). 
 
When Dagbladet, a national newspaper, published a series of stories of people 
being registered as members of the Church without their knowledge in the autumn 
of 2014 (Kristiansen & Sørenes, 2014), more attention was paid to how members 
were registered in religious societies. One can note, for example, the change in 
instructions from the Ministry of Culture regarding membership lists and funding 
applications for religious societies. Instructions from 2014 (Ministry of Culture, 
2014) make no mention of criteria for inclusion on the lists.  
 
All subsequent instructions on the same topic specify that ‘the concerned must 
personally, actively and expressly notify or confirm his/her membership of the 
religious society in Norway [emphasis added]’ and the registrar must issue a 
certificate of enrolment (Ministry of Culture, 2015; 2016b; 2017b). The 2017 
instruction goes even further in establishing a distinction between a member and 
                                         
132 Hereafter “The Diocese of Oslo”. 
133 See also Catholic Diocese of Oslo (2016b; 2017a) for their submissions to the lawsuit and appeal 
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a funding eligible member (Ministry of Culture, 2017b). This distinction ultimately 
becomes a discussion of religious affiliation versus legal affiliation, where the 
Ministry of Culture (2016a, pp. 4-7) argues that religious affiliation is largely 
irrelevant when considering eligibility for funding.  
 
This distinction and interpretation was upheld by the District Court of Oslo (2017, 
p. 14), when passing judgement on the lawsuit between the Diocese of Oslo134 and 
the Norwegian State. The County Governor of Oslo and Akershus (2015) declared, 
in June 2015, that the Diocese of Oslo should repay 40.5 million kroner. The 
decision was upheld by the Ministry of Culture (2016a), at which point the Diocese 
(2016b) filed a lawsuit in order to overturn the decision. The District Court ruled 
in favour of the Ministry of Culture, and the Diocese of Oslo (2017a) has appealed 
the ruling. 
 
In addition to the lawsuit, criminal charges were brought against the Diocese of 
Oslo, Bishop Eidsvig of Oslo, and the accountant working for the Diocese at the 
time. The Regional Public Prosecutions office in Oslo dropped the charges against 
the Bishop, fined the Diocese, and maintained their charges against the 
accountant in November 2016 (Regional Public Prosecution Office in Oslo, 2016). 
The Diocese of Oslo challenged the fine and faced the courts along with the 
accountant in 2017 (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2016a). The accountant was 
acquitted, and the charges against the Diocese reduced to gross oversight, but the 
implications of these cases on future legislation and policy is unknown. 
  
The above case points to the highly complex role of religion in Norwegian society. 
The changes in the Church of Norway described above, combined with the 
diversification of religious and non-religious worldviews in Norway is closely 
related to migration flows since the 1970s. The religious landscape in Norway has 
                                         
134 Three bodies, The Dioceses of Oslo, Prelature of Trondheim, and the Prelature of Tromsø 
represent the Church in Norway, and it is necessary to distinguish between them in this case. The 
Prelature of Tromsø has agreed to repay roughly 5.6 million kroner without challenging the decision 
(Katolsk.no, 2015; Katolsk.no, 2017b; Grgic, 2015). Bishop Eidsvig of Oslo is responsible for both 
the Dioceses of Oslo and the Prelature of Trondheim; thus they have conducted themselves 
similarly. 
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shifted: The Church of Norway has decreased in membership, perhaps influence 
as well; other religious societies have flourished (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 
2013). The religious landscape has become more complex, raising questions of 
secularism as an ideology, when ideas and preconceptions of what religion ‘is or 
does’ come to the fore (Casanova, 2009, p. 1051). Seeing secularism as an ideology 
is inextricably linked to the connections between migration and religion (Leirvik, 
2007; Døving, 2009), as the interconnections between different identities, 
religious, national, and ethnic, are involved. This brings us back to the Discursive 
framework presented in Chapter 2, where RED points to valorisation, SID to 
functionalism, and MUD to hierarchisation. 
 
Leirvik (2007) goes as far as labelling Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism as 
‘immigrant religions’ and linking it directly with immigration from the 1970s 
onwards. Furthermore, he argues that in order to understand the prevalence of 
these religions, one should not focus on registered members but also look at others 
with similar ethnic and cultural origins, thereby assuming a religious affiliation, in 
effect stereotyping (Leirvik, 2007, pp. 24-25). Døving (2009) similarly states that 
immigrant has been equated with Muslim, and that religious identification has 
surpassed national or ethnic categories in importance. This opens up to the 
homogenisation of the “native” population, disregarding the heterogeneity of 
Christian denominations, and simultaneously enables “Othering” and 
marginalisation along religious lines in addition to ethnic or national. These 
facets, taken together, point to a Moral Underclass Discourse, although the overall 
image is naturally much more nuanced. 
 
This section has attempted to chart the lie of the land in Norway’s religious 
landscape and some of the notable developments in recent years. The discussion 
and analysis above is far from exhaustive but has attempted to demonstrate how 
different religions fit in to the religious landscape and influence perceptions. The 
Church of Norway and non-affiliation form the basis of Norwegian secularism, in 
the sense of being the foundations of the unreflexive ‘epistemic knowledge 
regime’ and the ‘taken-for-granted normal structure’ (Casanova, 2009, p. 105) in 
Norway.  
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The diversity of the religious field in Norway has broadened beyond Protestant 
denominations due to migration, where both Catholicism and Islam are pivotal 
players. Catholicism, subsumed under the Christian term, gives rise to very 
different responses than Islam. Both challenge the status quo through their 
association with migration, the Church through the issue of membership and 
affiliation, and Islam through visibility and perceived distance from the status quo 
secularism. A more exhaustive comparative analysis would be welcome but falls 
outwith the scope of this thesis due to time and space constraints. The following 
section will instead explore Catholicism in Norway in depth and offer the 
foundation for analysing the data in later chapters. 
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5.3 – The Catholic Church in Norway – putting the Universal in the Local 
In this section, I wish to explore the return and growth of the Church since 1843. 
The goal is to establish an understanding of the institutional history of the Church 
in Norway, and how these structures relate to circumstances today. 
Fundamentally, I find it important to explore how the Church understands itself, 
and its presence in Norway. Key to this understanding is the notion of the Church 
being in the world, but not of the world (Lumen Gentium, 1964, p. 244; Hanvey, 
2013). In a subsidiary, and perhaps more worldly sense, the Church is in Norway, 
but not of Norway. Though cryptic, it is a useful reminder when investigating the 
nature of the Church in Norway: even after 174 years, the Catholic Church in 
Norway negotiates its identity and place in Norway.  
 
Davie (1994, p. 92) notes that the British use the term Roman Catholic to 
accentuate the ‘foreignness of Catholicism’, I would argue the term specifies 
which form of Catholicism is meant135. The Church is not as unitary as one would 
believe, and there are several Eastern rites in full communion with the Roman 
(Latin) Catholic rite, though I will, unless specified otherwise, only be referring to 
the Roman Catholic Church throughout this thesis. Unsurprisingly, once one looks 
closely at the Church, it becomes apparent that it is not as unitary as expected. 
This will be explored in a Norwegian context below, but has been done for 
Catholics in England by Hornsby-Smith (1984; 1991) and others (Hornsby-Smith, et 
al., 1982). 
 
  
                                         
135 Interestingly, there is a religious group referring to itself as the Nordic Catholic Church, which 
split from the Church of Norway. One of their priests, Erik Holth, left the Nordic Catholic Church, 
joined the Church, and currently serves as a chaplain in Bergen. 2nd September 2017 also saw the 
first ordination of a Ukrainian-Greek Catholic (part of the Oriental/Eastern Catholic rite) priest in 
Norway. There is also a Syro-Malabar mass celebrated once a month, the priest travels from Rome. 
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5.3.1 – The return of the Church 
Following the Reformation, the Catholic Church only covertly existed in Norway 
until a royal exemption was granted on the 6th March 1843 to establish a Catholic 
parish in Oslo (Eidsvig, 1993, p. 162). The parish intended to cater to the needs of 
foreign dignitaries in Oslo136. The nascent Catholic parish in Oslo was named in 
honour of St. Olav, Norway’s patron saint and “Eternal King”, a gesture that has 
since repeated itself in Trondheim and Tønsberg. A gesture which did not go 
unnoticed or unappreciated, as the poet Wergeland confirms the wisdom of the 
naming ‘“with consideration to our sense of nation”’ (Eidsvig, 1993, p. 164).  
 
The Catholic Church in Norway was greatly aided, through donations and support, 
by the Swedish Queen, Josephine of Leuchtenberg, who was a Catholic. As Norway 
was in a union with Sweden at the time, the endorsement of a monarch went a 
long way in establishing the Catholic Church as an institution, although Queen 
Josephine and King Oscar were never crowned in Norway, partly due to Queen 
Josephine being Catholic. 
 
Bishop Fallize (served from 1887-1922) is perhaps one of the most significant 
figures in Catholic Church history in Norway, and he left a solid mark (Eidsvig, 
2011). One of his goals was to naturalise the Catholic Church in Norway, and key 
to this was establishing its presence throughout the country. During his tenure, he 
established eight parishes: Harstad, St. Hallvard in Oslo, Porsgrunn, Kristiansand, 
Stavanger, Drammen, St. Olav in Trondheim, and Arendal. The most influential 
aspect of these establishments was the presence of religious sisters, who ran 
hospitals and schools (Eidsvig, 2011; Eidsvig, 1993; Hadland, 2007). Bishop Fallize 
also established St. Olav, a (still-running) publication that sought to inform 
Catholics in Norway on a range of issues, both religious and secular. Both priests 
and religious sisters were often “imported” from abroad, and gradually the 
Catholic Church in Norway grew. 
 
                                         
136 In Sweden, the Church was re-established in 1783, with Swedish-born being permitted to be 
Catholic in 1860. In Denmark, foreign-born Catholics were given permission to practice their faith 
in 1648, and Danish-born were given this freedom in 1849 (Gran, 1986). 
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The naturalisation of the Catholic Church in Norway was not a passive process. 
Most of the work was done by the grass roots, but historical posterity attributes 
more weight to individuals such as Bishop Fallize. Notable Catholic apologists in 
Norway, and conversions, in the first half of the 20th Century were Sigrid Undset, 
the Nobel Laureate author, Lars Eskeland, a prominent public figure (Eidsvig, 
1993, pp. 302-306), and Lars Roar Langslet, a politician and former government 
minister. In the latter half of the 20th Century, members of the congregation of 
Dominican monks in Oslo have stood on the parapets and promoted Catholicism 
(Skjeldal, 2014). On the national scene, these figures have gone a long way to put 
a face to the Church in Norway. Arguably, what is of more importance is the work 
laid down at the grass roots, or as reported in a periodical in 1899: 
 
It is indubitably, that if there is in our country a change in the views 
concerning Catholicism, this is not due to Catholic priests, but 
primarily due to the work of Catholic nurses. 
      Eidsvig 2011, p. 26 
 
 
The project of naturalising the Church was, and is, continuous. During WWII, for 
example, it was incumbent upon bishops and clergy to demonstrate loyalty to 
Norway rather than the occupying forces from their countries of birth (Eidsvig, 
1993). Unlike other occupied countries that had more native-born clergy, Catholic 
clergy in Norway at the time were overwhelmingly Dutch or German; the Germans, 
on the face of it, caught between conflicting loyalties. Eidsvig (1993, pp. 326-327) 
argues that the understanding of Catholics, in Norway, changed following WWII: 
Catholics were seen less as a cult, and more as members of a global church. This 
image of the Church as international and global is considerably reinforced as the 
demography of the Church changes from the 1970s and onwards, largely due to 
migration. 
 
The opening of the Church gained momentum with The Second Vatican Council, 
the incremental democratisation of the Church at parish and diocesan levels, and 
the growth of the Church in Norway from the 1970s and onwards. Due to the 
infrastructure of the Church at the time of Vatican II, three bishops represented 
181 
 
 
around 6000 Catholics, the ability to process and build on the works of Vatican II 
in the parishes is apparent in most parish histories. Unfortunately, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to explore the minutiae of Vatican IIs impact on Catholics in 
Norway, but it is fruitful to understand what Vatican II was and entailed for the 
Church. Suffice to say, there was a massive discursive shift, which at least on the 
surface moved towards a Redistributive Discourse. 
 
Vatican II was where the Church sought to reshape its image and portray ‘itself as 
a world Church and acted as such’ (Pesch, 2014, p. 325). Liturgies were translated 
into vernacular languages, the priest celebrates the Mass facing the 
congregation137, and active participation was encouraged (Pesch, 2014, pp. 100-
102; Menzes, 2013). These changes altered what the congregation understood, 
saw, and expressed. Understood, in the sense that the entirety of the liturgy would 
be celebrated in a language they spoke, though it took years to translate the 
Missal138. Saw, in the sense that the orientation of the priest not only moved the 
priest to the other side of the altar, but also occasionally necessitated rebuilding 
the choir139. Expressed, in the sense that the laity were recognised as active 
participants in the liturgy rather than consumers. 
 
It is difficult to estimate what effect these changes had on the laity in Norway, 
and it has so far not been explored, such as Hornsby-Smith did with English 
Catholics (1991). Hence, we cannot decisively establish whether the changes 
following Vatican II were seen in a positive or negative light, or even if they were 
paid much attention in Norway.  
 
  
                                         
137 The orientation of the celebrant is normally (following Vatican II) Versus Populum (facing the 
congregation), but masses are occasionally celebrated Ad Orientem (To the East, where the 
celebrant faces the same direction as the congregation). 
138 The first official Norwegian Missal was completed in 1982, based on the 1975 Editio Typica 
altera (Tande, 2002). In other words, thirteen years after the 1969 Missale Romanum, and seven 
years after the lightly revised Editio Typica altera. 
139 Choir, in the architecural sense, is where the clergy are seated, and the altar and tabernacle 
are placed. 
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5.3.2 – Growth of the Church – Shepherd’s delight or warning? 
Leaving aside broader strokes of history, it is worthwhile to explore some statistics 
concerning the Church. Firstly, Figure 31 shows us Catholics as a percentage of 
the population in Norway. Never a large part of the population in Norway, yet the 
growth over time is notable140, and appears to increase in line with migration 
patterns explored in the previous chapter. 
  
Comparatively speaking, the Catholics as a percentage of the population in Norway 
is roughly comparable to Muslims. Thus, the two religious groups offer fruitful 
bases for comparison and contrasting experiences of “Othering” and integration 
processes. Catholics stand out in their share of Christians outside the Church of 
Norway, where Catholics have gone from representing one in five to representing 
two in five of Christians outside the Church of Norway. The Church is four times 
larger than the next denomination, Pentecostals (SSB, 2016d).  
 
 
Figure 31 - Catholics as percentage of population (SSB, 2016c; Tande, 1993; SSB, 2016d)141 
                                         
140 The dip in 2015 is due to the registration-case discussed in section 5.2. 
141 SSBs registration of membership in religious organisations does not extend further back, hence 
the limited comparison in the figure. 
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As for the composition of the Catholic population, I find it most useful initially to 
first differentiate between laypersons, religious sisters, and clergy. 
Deconstructing the population by nationality, country of birth or ethnicity does 
not tell us a lot about the structures of the Church and who has the power to 
shape it. I return to specific demographic aspects later.  
 
Table 9 presents these figures, and what stands out is the change in religious 
sisters over time and how many priests administer to the Catholic population. The 
number of priests and religious sisters gives us an indication of the Catholic 
population that visibly and explicitly worked for Catholic ideals. For example, by 
the 1940s, there were 23 Catholic hospitals run by religious sisters (Hadland, 
2007). Considering these hospitals were spread throughout Norway, their impact 
on the local communities should not be underestimated. 
 
Table 9 - Catholics, Priests and Sisters in Norway over time (Tande, 1993; Katolsk.no, 2017a) 
Year Catholics Priests Sisters Catholics per Priest 
Sr. as % 
Catholics 
Number of 
parishes 
1845 100 1  100  1 
1850 100 2  50  1 
1860 200 6 2 33 1.0% 3 
1870 400 10 5 40 1.3% 4 
1880 480 14 17 34 3.5% 6 
1890 950 20 54 48 5.7% 9 
1900 1969 22 124 90 6.3% 12 
1910 2046 25 207 82 10.1% 13 
1920 2612 23 288 114 11.0% 14 
1930 2630 33 445 80 16.9% 21 
1940 3000 45 560 67 18.7% 23 
1950 4306 57 550 76 12.8% 23 
1960 6229 52 545 120 8.7% 27 
1970 9225 70 483 132 5.2% 28 
1980 13961 68 369 205 2.6% 28 
1990 28155 57 257 494 0.9% 30 
1992 31642 66 246 479 0.8% 31 
2016 147882 106 125 1395 0.1% 41 
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The above table only gives a cursory overview of Norway as a whole and does not 
capture the complexities of local communities and parishes. Per September 2017, 
there were three bishops142, 108 priests, eight deacons (six permanent and two 
transitional), and four lay brothers. Of the 108 priests, roughly, 85 are in “full 
active service”, i.e. have full parish responsibilities or significant chaplaincy 
duties or pastoral care for large groups143.  
 
With a registered membership of 155 332, this means there were approximately 
1800 Catholics per active priest (Tande, 2017c). To give an accurate impression 
of the pastoral care provided by the Church, the 85 active priests are the key 
group to analyse. As the two transitional deacons are due to be ordained in the 
next 12 months, and are currently on placement in parishes, I will include them 
in the subsequent analysis.  
 
The Church in the mid-20th Century was small and saturated with clergy and 
religious sisters. This laid a strong foundation for the Church to develop in 
subsequent decades. Bearing in mind the context explored in the previous 
chapter, it operated in a country with a strong sense of nationalism. Prior to WWII, 
and for a while after, there were noticeable anti-Catholic sentiments, as a 
Catholic and Norwegian identity were largely considered incompatible. Finally, 
the naturalisation of the Church benefitted from the changes brought by Vatican 
II, wherein the Church could develop a Norwegian vernacular expression. This 
allowed it to situate itself as less conflicting with other identities. 
 
Though the Church is often described as comprised of migrants, this ignores the 
institutional approach wherein the Church is keenly aware of its role in Norwegian 
society and its need to relate to a populace and state. The 1970s presents itself 
as a critical juncture for the Church as well as for broader Norwegian society, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Between 1972 and 1992, registered members of the 
                                         
142 Bishop Grgic of the prelature of Tromsø, Bishop Eidsvig of the diocese of Oslo, and Bishop 
Emeritus Schwenzer of the diocese of Oslo. 
143 I have excluded ordained priests with predominantly monastic responsibilities or are above the 
retirement age (70 years). There are some priests above the retirement age that continue to have 
full parish responsibility; they have been counted as “active”. 
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Catholic Church in Norway went from roughly ten thousand to over thirty thousand 
(see Table 9) (Eidsvig, 1993). Simultaneously, the Church is adjusting to the 
realities and fallout from Vatican-II. 
 
The mobility patterns explored in the previous chapter give rise to a significant 
growth, as immigrants with Catholic identities migrate to Norway, often as 
refugees from dictatorships144, conflicts and their aftermaths145.  For example, 
Vietnamese, Chilean, and Sri Lankan146 immigrants are well established 
communities in the Church in Norway. As the Norwegian state looks to its 
neighbours for input on immigration policy, the Church in the Nordic countries 
work together at the episcopal level. For more on the Nordic Bishops’ Conference, 
see Gran (1986). Unfortunately, there has been little examination of, or written 
about it, since. Furthermore, their website is only available in German, pointing 
to the potential lack of importance or relevance, similar to Shavit and Spengler’s 
(2017) remarks on the European Fatwa Council. 
 
One relevant decision agreed by the Nordic Bishops’ Conference, made in the late 
1970s, was to not create parishes based on ethnicities, and instead resolve to 
provide pastoral care for Catholic immigrants within existing structures (Gran, 
1986). This has had significant repercussions on how parishes have developed and 
underpinned the shared religious identity while attempting to downplay ethnic 
identities. The question then becomes what sort of relationship is encouraged 
between religious and ethnic/national identities: competition or 
complementarity? In later years, there has been an emphasis on valorising the 
diversity of ethnic identities rather than subduing them, but this is not without 
challenges, as explored below. 
 
The only formal foray into immigration and integration politics was a statement, 
in 1998, on irregular immigrants and their conditions in the Nordic countries 
(Conferentia Episcopalis Scandiae, 1998). The statement emphasised the 
                                         
144 Such as the Pinochet regime 
145 Such as the Vietnam war 
146 Predominantly Tamil 
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obligation Catholics have to help their neighbours, even irregular immigrants, and 
unless the state provided for the immigrants the result would be alternative 
systems that risk undermining current systems. The statement corresponds 
significantly to a Redistributive Discourse, emphasising multiple factors involved 
in facilitating inequality, and simultaneously emphasising the equality of 
identities and individual worth. This also fits neatly into Bendixsen’s (2018) 
analysis, mentioned in the previous chapter, of the relationship between the 
welfare state and humanitarian exceptionalism. 
 
The demographic factors have forced a certain degree of introspection for 
Norwegian-born Catholics. While Catholics in Norway have grappled with what is 
understood by “Norwegian Catholic” for years147, I argue that the idea of a 
“Norwegian Catholic” is seen in light of these changes wrought in the mid-20th 
Century. Furthermore, the idea of a “Norwegian Catholic” is more a symptom of 
internal affairs in the Catholic Church in Norway, most prominently the growth in 
the 1970s and onwards.  
 
Despite the decision to avoid ethnicity-based parishes, a Vietnamese Pastoral care 
centre was established in 1980 (Gran, 1986), drawing attention to the particular 
within the universality of the Church. As other equally valid expressions of 
Catholicism become more prevalent, it challenges the hegemony of the taken-for-
granted Norwegian expression. As demands for pastoral care diversify, it moves 
from a general to a specific form. Providing specialised pastoral care for 
Vietnamese-born begets the question of what, if any, specialised pastoral care 
Norwegian-born desire. As this distinction was not salient previously, the 
“Norwegian Catholic” was synonymous with a general form and therefore enjoyed 
a hegemonic position.  
 
                                         
147 I have encountered this discussion repeatedly, and no firm conclusion is ever reached. See 
Siarkiewicz-Bivand (2017), Bivand (2012), Erdal (2016a), and Helskog (2011) 
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The bishops, by virtue of their position, contribute to shaping this hegemony. 
Bishops are appointed through a complicated process that does not exclude 
nationality or ethnicity as a factor, but it is nigh impossible to ascertain to what 
extent it influenced the choice. What can be gauged is how Catholics in the 
country see the appointment. Bishop Gran (1964-1983) was Norwegian-born and 
can be seen as a further extension of the amalgamation of a Catholic and 
Norwegian identity, one which Grans predecessor, Bishop Mangers, expressed joy 
at (Eidsvig, 1993, p. 394). Bishop Gran also featured regularly in the media and 
wrote regularly about Vatican II and the Bishops Synods in the Diocesan magazine, 
St. Olav. Thus, the face of the Church communicated a Norwegian connection that 
strengthened the Norwegian pastoral care as the dominant, general form. This is 
subsequently used to justify arguments that the Church has become a migrant 
church (Hovdelien, 2016), implying it had become Norwegian. 
 
Gran’s successor, Bishop Schwenzer (1983-2005) oversaw the Diocese of Oslo as 
Catholics went from representing 0.34 per cent to 1 per cent of Norway’s 
population. In line with the larger demographic changes in Norwegian society, this 
also affected the composition of Church membership. The largest group continued 
to be the Norwegian-born Catholics, with 25 per cent of Catholics born in Norway 
in 1992. Other significant groups were the Polish-born, Vietnamese-born, Chilean-
born, and Philippine-born, each accounting for just under ten per cent of the 
Catholic population. In other words, the Church was already negotiating a plethora 
of potential national and ethnic identities, in addition to various religious 
expressions and pastoral care issues. 
 
It has been Bishop Eidsvig (2005-current) who has served as bishop as the Church 
has doubled in size and Norwegian-born no longer constitute a hegemonic group 
and has had the greatest challenges in terms of pastoral care. Not only have the 
Polish-born grown to become the single largest group, there have been significant 
changes to the previously straightforward classification of Norwegian-born: those 
born in Norway are automatically counted in this group. In other words, the 
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Norwegian-born group includes a generation of young Catholics negotiating a 
range of identities, subject to endogamous and exogamous marriage practices148. 
 
Bishops make decisions on pastoral care based on factors such as these, and the 
result is a population of clergy, who look to address those needs. A key aspect of 
understanding pastoral care is not assuming a pastoral carer, priest or religious 
brother/sister, as capable of providing pastoral care only for their group. Priests 
provide pastoral care for all Catholics within their parish or chaplaincy 
irrespective of country of birth. Hence, one can distinguish between a general 
form of pastoral care and a specific form: A Catholic might attend mass in 
Norwegian but go to confession in French. The specificity of pastoral care is 
contingent upon language, tradition, culture, or spirituality.  
 
In order to provide pastoral care, it therefore becomes necessary for a bishop to 
expand the pool of priests available: from priests capable of celebrating a 
Tridentine Mass149 to priests familiar with the Polish tradition of Święconka150. 
Pastoral care has to consider local contexts, and a priest is capable of 
accommodating a range of specific pastoral demands even though the priest is not 
familiar with either the language, tradition, culture, or spirituality. If the nearest 
Polish priest is thousands of miles away, a parishioner can attempt to explain to 
the local priest what Święconka is and what they want the priest to do. As such, 
the below analysis of the clergy only serves as an indication of the overall range 
of training, experience, and languages the Church is capable of providing pastoral 
care in through their priests. 
 
There are 17 different countries of birth for the 87 active clergy. Nearly two-fifths 
were born in Poland, a fifth born in Norway, and 15 per cent born in Vietnam. Of 
those ordained in Norway, 27 in all, two-fifths were born in Vietnam and three-
fifths born in Norway. This is notable, as although the Vietnamese-born 
                                         
148 Extending not only to ethnic or national identities, but also religious identities and mixed 
marriages between a Catholic and non-Catholic partner. 
149 Pre-Vatican II Mass in Latin celebrated from 1570-1962. Still celebrated, but not commonly. 
150 Blessing a basket of food at Easter 
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represented 7 per cent of Catholics in 1992 and had five priests capable of 
providing national pastoral care, this percentage has decreased to 3 per cent in 
2017 yet they have fifteen priests providing national pastoral care (Vietnamese 
Pastoral Care Centre, 2017). This reinforces Gran’s (1986) claims of the success of 
the pastoral care centre, but contrasts with the previous refusal to facilitate 
ethnic parishes. It raises interesting questions of “what if” the Church had done 
the opposite; how it would have changed the nature of the Church in Norway. 
 
This can be compared to Filipino-born priests, three per cent of the active clergy, 
while Filipino-born Catholics make up seven per cent of the Catholic population 
in 2017. Without a specific pastoral care plan, added to what we know about this 
population based on the demographics from the previous chapter, it raises 
questions of whether the primary cause/reason for immigration matters, in 
addition to forms of religiosity: does it matter that the Vietnamese-born were 
predominantly refugees, the Philippine-born came through family reunification, 
and the recent Polish-born arrivals are labour immigrants? 
 
The Polish clergy also demonstrate changing conditions in the Church151: two-
thirds of them arrived after Poland’s EU accession. With the growing demand from 
Lithuanian-born Catholics, there are now two Lithuanian-born priests. Another 
notable detail are clergy from the African continent152: all three have taken up 
positions in Norway the last two years. 
 
The provision of pastoral care for Catholics comes in many forms and responds to 
the demands of the parishioners. Hence, the changing composition of the clergy 
can be seen in connection with the changing make-up of the Catholic population 
in Norway. The increasing diversity of the clergy, not only in terms of country of 
birth but also in experience, training, and age, raises a slew of questions that all 
                                         
151 There is a lot of fluctuation in this group; therefore, the total number of active Polish-born 
priests in Norway is subject to a degree of uncertainty. These numbers represent Polish-born 
priests still active in Norway and who were active at the given point in time. 
152 One priest from DR Congo (arrived November 2016, responsible for French-speaking Catholics); 
one priest from Nigeria (arrived July 2015, responsible for English-speaking African Catholics); and 
a transitional deacon from Kenya but ordained in Norway. 
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point to a shift in the understanding of how one is Catholic in Norway today. Cruz 
(2016, p. 44) points to the intensification of ‘Catholicism as a global religion with 
transnational dimensions’, something which is clearly visible within the Church in 
Norway (Erdal, 2016b). 
 
An important caveat is that although the Church might offer specific forms of 
pastoral care, this is complicated by geography and access. Not all groups have 
access to specific pastoral care within their parish, and although priests travel 
around to mitigate this, there is no guarantee that Catholics will have access to a 
language-specific pastoral care. There is also the issue of the quality of the 
pastoral care, which is dependent upon the relationship between the clergy and 
the laity.  
 
Integration processes apply equally to new priests in a parish as it does new 
parishioners, albeit with different power dynamics. Priests in Norway, on average, 
serve a parish between 5-7 years, and will move between 3-5 times153. The 
dynamics of clergy allocation is an important, but it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to explore it in detail beyond its relevance to integration processes. 
 
Figure 32 is a map of all Catholic churches in the Nordic countries, demonstrating 
how the distribution of parishes can point to the possibility of the Church, as an 
institution, having an impact on local integration processes, and where they might 
have an impact. The map and attached statistics (Table 10), underline how 
important context is for answering the research questions. Despite historical and 
cultural similarities between the Nordic countries, they have vastly different 
premises for accessing parts of their respective populations. The distribution of 
parishes can also point to differences between the Nordic countries in terms of 
urbanisation or episcopal decisions of parish establishment. 
 
                                         
153 Subject to how long they serve in Norway, and if they are incardinated in a Norwegian diocese 
or prelature. 
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Sweden Norway Denmark Iceland Finland 
113 053 (1.12%) 155 332 (3.11%) 47 673 (0.82%) 12 901 (3.8%) 14 447 (0.26%) 
Table 10 - Catholic populations in the Nordic countries as of 2017 (percentage of total population) 
 
 
Figure 32 - Catholic Churches in the Nordic countries154 
  
                                         
154 Created by the author by adding markers on a base map, by going through the individual 
countries’ diocesan websites and finding addresses for each parish. 
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5.3.3 – ‘Unity within complex diversity’ 
Turning from the shepherds to the flock, the next paragraphs explore the 
composition of the registered Catholics along language, country of birth, and age. 
For nearly three decades, Fr. Claes Tande has presented estimates of the Catholics 
in Norway and the Diocese of Oslo155, by their country of birth and language 
group156, relying on internal numbers, statistics from the Norwegian Statistics 
Office (SSB), and the National Registry. After the digitalisation of the internal 
membership registries in 2005, the statistics report only known Catholics with a 
national ID number and for whom the Church receives funding.  
 
This leads to a certain discrepancy in the data as recently arrived migrants do not 
necessarily register for a national ID number, but use a temporary D-number 
instead157, as mentioned in the previous section. Table 11 and table 12 are a 
collation of these estimates. Due to the issues with registration in the period 2011-
2015, I have not included estimates from those years. Another issue is that it is 
difficult to track how the population changes. For example, between May 2018 
and October 2018, there were 2000 new registrations, but 1000 de-registrations 
due to emigration (Tande, 2018). In other words, it is essential to keep in mind 
the overarching demographic factors explored in the previous chapter with 
regards to duration of residency. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
155 The Prelature of Mid-Norway and the Prelature of Northern-Norway are not included in the 
statistics compiled by Tande for 2006, but the Diocese of Oslo accounts for 90 per cent of the 
Catholic population.  
156 For the Church in Norway, language group is occasionally more relevant due to pastoral care 
157 D-numbers are intended for migrants working six months or less in Norway (The Norwegian Tax 
Administration, 2017a) 
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Table 11 - Membership of the Church by language (Tande, 1993; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2017a) 
Language/ 
language group158 
1992 
(estimated) 
2006 
(Oslo) 2008 2010 2017 
% of Catholic 
population in 
2017 
Spanish-speaking 6700 4123 4976 5387 7590 5% 
English-speaking 3500 2220 2945 3254 3947 3% 
German-Speaking 3400 856 1187 1286 1381 1% 
French-Speaking 2650 741 943 1028 1414 1% 
Portuguese-
Speaking 1200 696 875 992 1583 
1% 
Other 9950 9232 11603 12858 20466 13% 
Norwegian 12000 19584 23862 26616 36188 23% 
Polish 4200 3247 7302 12024 60689 39% 
Lithuanian  126 226 340 18158 12% 
Vietnamese 3200 3226 3587 3674 3916 3% 
Total 46800 44051 57506 67459 155332  
Using country of birth as a proxy for primary language, Table 11 demonstrates how 
different groups have grown over time. A necessary caveat is that the table does 
not consider bilingualism and does not allow us to discern when people might be 
fluent in multiple languages. In other words, although there seems to be a 
discrepancy between 15 priests offering pastoral care for 3916 Vietnamese-
speakers, there is no way to identify Norwegian-born who have Vietnamese-born 
parents and have Vietnamese as a primary language for pastoral care needs. 
Furthermore, the languages above are not the only ones the Church offers pastoral 
care in; they also offer specific pastoral care for Burmese, Tamil, Hungarian, and 
Slovakian Catholics (subsumed under the Other category).  
 
Contrasting language group with country of birth minimises the risks overly 
homogenising those groups. In order to nuance the above discussion, Table 12 
presents the (as of 2017) largest groups by country of birth. The listed countries 
represent almost 90 per cent of Catholics in Norway, with the remainder contained 
in other. What stands out is the change between 1992 and 2017, where most of 
the groups have steadily decreased as a share of the Catholic population. Polish-
born have gone from 9 per cent in 1992 to 39 per cent in 2017. Lithuanian-born 
went from a negligible population in 1992, 2006, 2008, and 2010 to comprising 12 
                                         
158 Language-groups represent persons born where the language is the official (de jure) or de facto 
language. Where it is impossible to ascertain what language would be spoken, multiple languages 
are used, or the numbers are relatively small, it has been categorised as Other. 
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per cent of the population in 2017. Norwegian-born and Filipino-born have 
displayed a similar trend of growing in 2006 and 2008 to shrinking as an overall 
share in 2017. The other category has decreased considerably in its share of the 
Catholic population but represented 169 countries in 1992 (145 of which numbered 
less than 100 persons) and represents a range of 188 different countries in 2017 
(148 of which numbered less than 100 persons). 
Table 12 - Catholics by Country of Birth (Tande, 1993; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2017a) 
Country of 
birth 1992 
% in 
1992 2006 
% in 
2006 2008 
% in 
2008 2010 
% in 
2010 2017 
% in 
2017 
Poland 4200 9% 3247 7% 7302 13% 12024 18% 60689 39% 
Norway 12000 26% 19584 44% 23863 41% 26616 39% 36188 23% 
Lithuania  0% 126 0% 226 0% 340 1% 18158 12% 
Philippines 3200 7% 4066 9% 5474 10% 6141 9% 10881 7% 
Vietnam 3200 7% 3226 7% 3587 6% 3674 5% 3916 3% 
Chile 4400 9% 2394 5% 2744 5% 2868 4% 3181 2% 
Sri Lanka 1200 3% 1229 3% 1394 2% 1437 2% 1512 1% 
Eritrea   194 0% 260 0% 348 1% 1215 1% 
Germany 2700 6% 715 2% 1022 2% 1122 2% 1186 1% 
Spain 1000 2% 478 1% 543 1% 583 1% 1076 1% 
Other 14900 32% 8792 20% 11091 19% 12306 18% 17330 11% 
Total 46800   44051   57506   67459   155332   
The composition of the Catholic population in terms of age adds another layer to 
the above statistics. In 2016, almost a fifth of registered members in the Church 
were below the age of 15 (Ministry of Culture, 2017c, pp. 220-221), and the 
average age of Catholics is 35 (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017c).  If we contrast 
country of birth with age, we can make some pertinent observations. Firstly, 
Figure 33 shows how the Norwegian-born population ceases to be a dominant share 
of the Catholic population from age 10. By age 26, the Polish-born Catholics 
overtake the Norwegian-born until age 69. For Lithuanian-born, a more recent 
development in demographic changes, these intersections occur at age 29 and 53. 
 
If we contrast country of birth and age as a share of the total Catholic population 
(Figure 34), we get a different picture. Between the ages of 31 and 59, the 
Norwegian born represent less of each age category than the other four countries. 
In other words, it is inconceivable that the younger Norwegian-born population is 
homogeneous. This points to the importance of Catholic youth work in integration 
processes, which is explored in the next chapter. 
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Figure 33 – Country of birth as percentage of age (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2017e) 
 
Figure 34 - Country of birth and age as share of the total Catholic population (Catholic Diocese 
of Oslo, 2017c) 
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Without comprehensive data on factors such as endogenous and exogenous 
marriage, the true complexity of the Norwegian-born group will remain, from a 
statistical perspective, a mystery. Identity is more complicated than simply 
country of birth, and there is not enough data to statistically explore the 
Norwegian-born group. Catholic children (born outwith or within Norway) are 
likely to grow up bilingual (or trilingual in some cases) and with complex 
attachments to family, Church, school, extra-curricular activities, etc. More of 
this will be explored in the section on Catholic youth work. 
 
As explored in the previous chapters, there are distinct patterns to labour, refuge, 
family reunification, and education. With significant parts of the Catholic 
population immigrating from countries where labour forms a dominant reason for 
emigration, it makes sense that the Caritas heavily emphasises helping in areas 
relating to work. Similarly, the dominance of Philippine women amongst Au pairs 
and family reunification, and their presence in the Church, in part explains 
Caritas’ recent focus on a specialised Au Pair centre. In other words, there are 
compelling reasons to explore the influence of the Church and religion beyond the 
institution of the Church itself, and look to closely related organisations, as will 
be done in the next chapter. With regards to the Church itself, the assumption 
that specific pastoral care for different languages or groups will fade away as later 
generations are Norwegian-born is overly simplistic. It ignores the connections 
between culture, language, and religion that persist over time (Hervieu-Léger, 
2000). 
 
A caveat is that these figures only indicate national or diocesan level changes, and 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the impact of these changes at 
every parish. I will explore this in relation to Bodø and St. Eystein in the next 
chapter. Adding geographic factors and seeing them in context of wider societal 
factors such as labour markets, can offer more detailed analyses of the different 
groups.  It can also be argued that knowing cause of migration would facilitate 
further analyses, but this level of detail does not exist within Church records and 
attempting to aggregate the data from other material is indicative at best.  
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Furthermore, the above tables and analysis tells us of registered members, not 
the actual number of Catholics in Norway: not all registered members will be 
practicing Catholics, and there might be practicing Catholics who are not 
registered. It is fair to assume the discrepancies in current statistics are minor, 
due to the recent scrutiny of memberships, as pointed out earlier in this chapter. 
 
Whereas this thesis is concerned with how these structures fit into integration 
processes, the above discussion relates mostly to the provision of pastoral care. 
This is because it is important to understand what has shaped Catholic lives, 
migrant or not, and how these individuals have shaped the institutions and 
organisations in which they take part. Undoubtedly, the Church will continue to 
change in response to events the last decades, but this thesis is not concerned 
with what will change but with what was in place when these events occurred. 
How do we understand integration processes in light of the above discussion?  
 
Erdal (2016b) describes the nature of the Church in Norway as consisting of 
‘migrancy, transnationalism and diversity’ (p. 261) and looking for ‘unity within 
complex diversity’ (p. 264). As such, integration in the Church does not adhere to 
the notions of demographic superiority one might see in other settings (Erdal, 
2016b). Yet, the idea of a religious institution contributing to integration 
processes situates it in a wider societal context; hence, we can differentiate 
between tiers of the integration processes: that do not operate independently of 
each other, as will be demonstrated in later chapters. 
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5.4 – Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to outline the broader religious landscape in Norway 
and situating the Church in it. The Church of Norway enjoys a privileged position, 
as evidenced by the current funding policy, despite the process of disaffiliation 
where it is increasingly common for the public to not affiliate with any religion. I 
also briefly discussed how Christian denominations, such as Catholicism, are 
treated preferentially in the intersections of religion and migration, where for 
example Islam is seen as more alien.  
 
The Church has changed significantly over the last half century, both centrally and 
at its peripheries. By highlighting the institutional history of the Church and the 
privileging certain groups within the Church, we can understand some of the 
relationships of power. As the Church goes through significant changes from the 
1970s and onwards, our understanding of the Church is nuanced by exploring the 
shifts in demographics, amongst priests and clergy as well as the laity.  It allows 
us to create a framework for understanding the Church’s activities in terms of 
general and specific pastoral care.  
 
The general pastoral care used to be oriented towards Norwegian-born Catholics. 
As new groups have arrived and requested specific pastoral care, the 
understanding of general pastoral care has also had to change. Additionally, the 
increasing complexity of the Norwegian-born group blurs the lines of what might 
be specific pastoral care for Norwegian-born, as languages, cultures, spiritualties, 
and religiosities within this group diversify. Ultimately, the above analyses will 
allow us to better understand what context extra-ecclesial organisations operate 
in, as will be explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – Integration processes in faith-based settings 
6.1 – Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the question of what role faith-based organisations 
play in integration processes. Drawing on the fieldwork pertaining to the Catholic 
organisational field, with both Ecclesial structures and Faith-based organisations, 
I explore how integration processes are shaped and viewed by the different actors. 
In  addition to the discursive model presented in Chapter 2, some additional 
concepts that become relevant here are institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) and Hirschmann’s (2004) three Rs of migrant facilitation: Refuge, 
Resources, and Respectability. What this chapter will show is that the overall 
integration process is a multi-directional, bumpy, marbled process subject to a 
multitude of influences at both institutional, group, and individual levels. 
 
This chapter first examines the Church specifically, at the diocesan and 
parochial159 level. Offering insight into the relationship between national and local 
understandings of and approaches to integration processes. Secondly, I explore 
faith-based organisations such as Caritas Norway and NUK. The Catholic aspect of 
these organisations ties them to a hierarchical religious power structure that 
coexists with the, nominally democratic and egalitarian, secular power. The 
overlap in highly structured organisational fields that ‘provide a context in which 
individual […] deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) is a site of negotiation, where the Catholic and non-Catholic organisational 
fields are occasionally complementary or competing. The remit and mission of 
these faith-based organisations are slightly different, hence it becomes interesting 
to explore how changes to their target groups influences the organisation, and 
how they cope with changing patterns of mobility and diversity. 
 
Whereas the state apparatus comprise distinct levels such as central government, 
county administrations, local authorities, and citizens; the Catholic Church has its 
                                         
159 In this context, I am use parochial as referring to issues relating to the parish, rather than its 
alternative meaning of having a limited or narrow outlook or scope. 
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dioceses and bishops160, vicar generals161 and episcopal vicars162, parishes and 
their pastors163, and its members. Some of these tiers overlap, whereas others 
compete, and the relationship between the secular and religious, and within the 
faith-based organisations is an important element of understanding religious 
influences on integration processes. Cruz’ (2016) typology of Catholicism, 
Ecclesiological (institutional), Liturgical (ritual), and Missiological (pastoral), 
encapsulates not only the different tiers, but also indicates the multifaceted 
nature of the Catholic organisational field. Within each of these fields 
(ecclesiological, liturgical, and missiological), the different tiers and actors have 
varying levels of power and responsibility.  
 
With a clear, principal separation between the Catholic Church and Norwegian 
state, these two bodies have differing goals for integration processes: The Church 
seeks, first and foremost, integration into its theocratic, ecclesial structure and 
system, whereas the state is chiefly concerned with integration into its structures 
and values. This is not to say the two are mutually exclusive, but nor are they 
necessarily mutually inclusive. NUK and Caritas Norway, as Catholic faith-based 
organisations, inhabit an intermediary space between these two and a key 
question becomes where they cohere or compete with state secular or religious 
conceptions of diversity and integration processes.  
 
This ties into the discussion of whether religion is a bridge or barrier to integration 
into a more extensive society than that of the parochial. Religious participation 
can be a veneer for cultural reproduction of ‘ethnic values’ (Connor, 2008, pp. 
245-246) and a major fault within a society (Kivisto, 2014), or it can mitigate 
psychological trauma caused by migration events (Connor, 2012) and be ‘places 
where a common vocabulary and shared set of expectations about rights and 
responsibilities are worked out’ (Levitt, 2004, p. 15). Common to both views is 
                                         
160 Imbued with ‘all ordinary, proper, and immediate power which is required for the exercise of 
his pastoral function’ (Code of Canon Law 381 §1) and ‘represents his diocese in all its juridic 
affairs’ (Code of Canon Law 393) 
161 ‘who is to assist [the bishop] in the governance of the whole diocese’ (Code of Canon Law 475 
§1) 
162 ‘has [power] only offer [sic] the specific part of the territory or the type of affairs or the faithful 
of a specific rite for which he was appointed’ (Code of Canon Law 479 §2) 
163 ‘In all juridic affairs the pastor represents the parish […]’ (Code of Canon Law 532) 
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that religion has taken centre stage ‘in public discussion about difference, 
diversity and its “resolution” or management’ (Beaman, 2017). What becomes 
apparent through the data is that NUK and the Church are more oriented towards 
a Redintegrative discourse, whereas Caritas Norway leans towards a Social 
Integrationist discourse, which appears to be a result of its mission and goals and 
distance from the Church. 
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6.2 – Diocesan processes 
Underpinning this section is research question 2a: How does the nature of the 
Catholic Church affect its response to and perception of integration processes? 
Despite the transnational, supranational, international characteristics of the 
Church, it is primarily its relationship to a national context which is of interest 
here. The justification for this acquiescence to methodological nationalism is, in 
part, due to a recognition of relationships of power within both the Church and 
the state, one claiming a monopoly on salvation, the other a monopoly on 
legitimate use of force. Thus, both institutions wield a degree of power in defining 
the shape and goal of integration processes, but also the consequences of 
deviation from this: exclusion from a community164. Within each of these 
communities, there are a plurality of identities, which can either be seen as 
complementary or conflicting. Ultimately, the Church and the State attempt to 
manage identities, and this section focuses on how the Church manages these 
processes. 
 
As described in Chapter 5, the Norwegian state actively supports religious societies 
and confessions, creating a de facto relationship with the Church where there is 
an implied trade-off between state funding and the Church encouraging a positive 
relationship with the State, from an institutional and individual perspective. 
Within the centralized state, it then becomes essential to identify and categorise 
peoples’ religious affiliations, or non-affiliation, and the responsibility for 
reporting membership rests on the Church. This is a form of integration that can 
be understood as coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whereby the 
secular powers through formal, and informal means, pressure the Church to adapt 
to its systems. This relationship has been in place, at least, from the return of the 
Church in the 1840s, resulting in a mutual adaptation to certain parameters that 
have changed over time. Most importantly, the Church is, to a large extent, 
subject to the law and jurisdiction of the State. This contributes to establishing a 
Norwegian form of Catholicism, where the relationship to the State is different 
than in, for example, Poland, and therefore contributes to shaping its members. 
                                         
164 At least on a formal level, which is not to suggest exclusion does not take place in other tiers 
or aspects. 
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There are several ecclesial elements that demonstrate signs of institutional 
isomorphism, and that can be understood as a form of integration. Firstly, we have 
the membership fraud case, as presented in Chapter 5, wherein there is a 
negotiation on the interpretation of divergent rules of membership. The 
repercussions of this case are that the laws, regulations, and policy become 
updated, clarified, and applied across all religious institutions. Within 
Hirschmann’s (2004) framework, this relates to the aspects of both Resources and 
Respectability, as defined in Chapter 2.  
 
As diocesan access to funding allows them to offer services to their members, and 
by not “playing by the rules”, the dioceses impact on the respectability of the 
members and associated organisations. One informant165 mentioned how NUK, 
despite being a separate legal entity subject to controls and checks by a different 
government department, was explicitly selected for an extra check on its 
activities and membership registries for which it receives funding. This was later 
confirmed by the government body writing in its report: ‘NUK was this year [2015] 
selected for control for the fiscal year 2013 due to the media reporting on 
membership in the Catholic Church’ (Fordelingsutvalget, 2016, p. 99). Here we 
see a direct link between the Church and one of its associated organisations, and 
how the actions of one may influence the other. 
 
Hirschmann’s framework ties into the discursive framework, where a strong 
emphasis on resources at the expense of respectability, and vice versa, can be 
seen as indicative of the discursive models. Herein we find a question: what is 
more influential on integration processes where the Church plays a part, resources 
or respectability? Resources can contribute to strengthening services offered by 
the Church, and concomitantly strengthening the positive impact on migrants’ 
emotional well-being (Connor, 2012); thereby facilitating positive integration 
processes. Respectability, on the other hand, contains that crucial negotiation of 
shared values, rights, and responsibilities (Levitt, 2004). Whereas the former can 
                                         
165 Due to concerns of anonymity, I am unable to offer further details on the informant. 
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lead to a de-emphasis of identity and emphasis on functions, the latter is 
predicated on discussions of values and identities. 
 
One of the notable outcomes of the membership-case has been a 
professionalisation of the Diocese of Oslo, and an expansion of the role of the 
layperson within the administration of the diocese. Throughout my fieldwork, 
when talking about this case with participants and informants, this 
professionalisation was seen as both positive and negative. On the one hand, we 
have a clear instance of coercive isomorphism, causing the Diocese of Oslo to 
adopt a managerial structure more akin to what is culturally expected (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) in Norway. The culmination of this process is a revised 
organisational structure that ‘is adapted to the current situation for the diocese, 
the regulations and governmental requirements’ (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 2018). 
 
As an aspect of integration processes, it is arguable whether this shift is voluntary 
or if it should be seen as a form of assimilation wherein the Church is denied its 
institutional uniqueness as a transnational, religious institution. Furthermore, 
though this professionalisation requires new positions to be filled, the tendency 
towards privileging a Norwegian education and work experience, mentioned in 
Chapter 4, has also carried over into the diocese. Ultimately, issues around 
membership caused by increased migration prompted these shifts, but the 
involvement of migrants, or even lay Catholics in general, has been incredibly 
limited. The changing structure is likely to have an impact further down the line, 
and it is too early to tell what that impact will be. For now, this process, prompted 
by migration, has not been focused on integration of migrants, but rather on 
structural change.  
 
Another significant part of the ecclesial structure is the priest, who encapsulates 
the Ecclesial, Liturgical, and Missiological, who moves between the diocesan and 
pastoral level, and, arguably, is a linchpin for integration processes involving the 
Church. Their remit is to manage and care for a locally situated community, 
putting them in a position to shape local and individual integration processes. 
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Priests neatly encapsulate Hirschmann’s three Rs: they control parochial 
resources, provide refuge through their liturgical and pastoral work, and can 
legitimise groups, activities, and individuals and thereby provide respectability.  
 
The Diocese of Oslo’s professionalisation is a move to mitigate clerical 
shortcomings by establishing a safety net in matters pertaining to parochial 
administration. As discussed in Chapter 5, on the nature of clerical “stock” in 
Norway, with one-fifth of priests born in Norway, many priests will be, initially, 
unfamiliar with a Norwegian context. We can, keeping in mind the idea of coercive 
isomorphism, see this as a measure to integrate priests into a “Norwegian” way of 
doing things, at least as it pertains to administrative and bureaucratic practices.  
 
Yet, with the emphasis on providing pastoral care for specific language groups or 
nationalities, participants often voiced the concern of “parallel parishes”. By 
ensuring that parishes have access to pastoral care in their own language or form, 
through either chaplains or itinerant priests, it may undermine integrative efforts 
to build whole, cohesive communities. For example, with many voicing concerns 
about Polish priests and Polish parallel parishes, exemplified by conflicts in St. 
Svithun in Stavanger (Friestad, 2015)166.  
 
There is also the contrast between official assessments of the Vietnamese Pastoral 
Care Centre, as mentioned in the previous chapter Bishop Gran offered a positive 
assessment, whereas Thomas Sivertsen remarked that in the 1980s ‘Vietnamese 
had a reputation of keeping to themselves’. As is shown below, when discussing 
NUK, the Vietnamese are now often fundamental to parishes they belong to. What 
we can infer from this is that, given time, targeted pastoral care may appear 
fragmenting to begin with, but the autonomy and respect afforded identities and 
religiosities has an overall positive impact long-term as seen from an institutional 
perspective. In other words, taking components of the redintegrative discourse, 
                                         
166 The chaplain, who came to Norway following Poland’s EU accession (due to anonymity, I am 
omitting further details), was accused of embezzlement and avoiding customs payments on 
imported church equipment. The case is currently in the courts. The situation highlighted rifts 
between the parish as a whole and the Polish part of the parish. 
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equality of identities and valorisation of diversity, has had a positive result for the 
Church. 
 
An effective method of demonstrating one’s interest in respecting and caring for 
members, is by acquiring or training individuals to cater to their interests. In the 
case of the Church, this is most effectively done through the clergy. Through the 
mechanisms of clerical training, relocation, and acquisition, the bishop can use 
priests as resources, material and symbolic. Clerical training is a lengthy process, 
not just in terms of formal training, but also in a long-term formative process in 
encouraging vocation amongst potential priests. Out of the 124 clergy in Norway, 
45 were ordained in Norway. 12 of these are Vietnamese-born, and all bar one 
were ordained from the 1990s onwards. Despite the prevalence of other groups, 
the remainder of the priests ordained in Norway are Norwegian born, except for 
Fr. Kuspys (Ukrainian-born) who serves Catholics of the Eastern Rite and Fr. Opata 
(Kenyan-born). Encouraging and generating vocations is an informal measurement 
of the Church’s success in its reconstitution and integration processes, as Thomas 
remarks with regards to the lack of vocations in Bodø: 
 
[…] I don’t think we’ve had a single vocation to become a nun from 
Bodø, nor priestly vocations. In that sense, you can say [the 
monastery] has failed. 
 
 
Relocation allows the bishop to adjust to changing circumstances by 
decreasing/increasing the presence of clergy in a parish, or by moving priests with 
particular skills and qualifications around. Relocation can also occur either to 
resolve a conflict, by removing an ineffective priest, or to make better use of the 
priest in a different position. It can also be established as a standard practice in 
order to reduce speculation about causes of relocation when they occur, a popular 
criticism of the Church being that they conceal criminal activity by priests by 
relocating them. In many cases, there is only one priest in a parish, so relocation 
is often a big change for the parish, and for most parishes the addition of a second 
priest can have an immense impact. In other words, the Church is able to adapt 
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to relatively sudden changes in demographics faster, by relocating priests, then 
secular organisations that would have to utilise different methods of acquiring 
resources, such as through government (local, regional, or national) funding or 
through voluntary organisations. 
 
The final aspect, clerical acquisition, directly relates to migration. In order to 
provide pastoral care, the Church needs both a) enough priests and b) the right 
kind of priests. By the second point, I am referring to priests with the language 
skills to communicate with members of the laity. This plays into how the Church 
sees itself as influencing integration processes: 
 
The Catholic Church in Norway has members from more than 120 
nations, and we are effectively a large integration arena with 
considerable social value that extends beyond our religious 
functions. We offer, amongst other things, a not inconsiderable 
language and cultural training. 
    Catholic Diocese of Oslo (2017b, p. 5) 
 
The critical question here is how and for whom does the Church offer ‘language 
and cultural training’? From an organisational perspective, the Church can only 
compel clergy as resources, and if two-thirds of the clergy, the ones not educated 
and ordained in Norway, require language and cultural training themselves, who 
is providing the training? Finally, why are they providing it? Rather, where 
integration-oriented activities were established and developed, it was often under 
the auspices of Caritas, with Per Wenneberg, at Caritas Norway, emphasising that 
Caritas recruits volunteers predominantly from the parishes: ‘we have ads out on 
frivillig.no167 […] That’s one part, but most of it comes through the parishes.’ 
 
In other words, as far as integration processes are concerned, the explicit 
measures are dependent upon the relationship between the Church and Caritas. 
In some cases, there is a close, working relationship, but Per highlighted one of 
the difficulties for Caritas, clerical relocation: 
                                         
167 A website for individuals seeking to volunteer for activities and organisations requiring 
volunteers. 
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It’s a bit of both, some parishes are good, some are bad, not because 
they’re bad, but because priests are changed out, or they’re there 
a relatively short period of time and half a year later there’s a new 
priest who doesn’t know what I spoke to the previous one about. I’m 
not complaining about this personally, but it’s not the easiest group 
to deal with when you have to call a small parish up in Hammerfest, 
or whatever, and it’s half a year since the last call, it’s difficult to 
get a hold of the person, or there’s a new priest since last time. So 
that’s a bit challenging, I have to admit. 
 
Though the Church might be ‘a large integration arena’, the nature of integration 
processes within the different areas of that arena vary immensely. As argued 
above, the structural elements privilege non-migrants (clergy or laypersons), and 
integration is rarely a conscious goal in and of itself. At the structural level, the 
focus is consistently on the continuity of Catholicism and its position in Norway, 
rather than shaping integration processes into a wider Norwegian society. Instead, 
the Church draws on its relationship to Caritas to effectively claim credit for their 
work through a shared Catholic identity. 
 
The Church’s goal is primarily to integrate migrants into the ecclesial structure, 
which will allow the Church to make stronger claims vis-a-vis other organisations 
and institutions. At the diocesan level, the Church looks to acquire and distribute 
resources (through its clergy) and respectability, and more intuitively provides 
refuge. The contention here relates to a point made by Hirschmann:  
 
By creating a parallel set of social institutions, immigrants were able 
to find avenues for social advancement, leadership, community 
service, and respect [that may not] have been possible in the broader 
community. 
   Hirschmann (2004, p. 1229) (emphasis added) 
 
The question of who is creating or shaping these institutions is important, and it 
is questionable to what extent immigrants in the Church, at a diocesan level, are 
creating or shaping the social institutions, whether as clergy or laity. There is also 
the issue of whether or not immigrants choose the institutions of the Church due 
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to a lack of alternatives in the broader community, or because of their identity. 
In other words, the Church has to open up its structures and institutions to 
immigrants because they cannot legitimately exclude those who prioritize a 
Catholic identity. The question then becomes how they view other identities, such 
as ethnicity or nationality: valorised, de-emphasized, or vilified? If the conflict in 
Stavanger is anything to go by, there is a risk of, in this case a Polish group, 
experiencing vilification (Friestad, 2015). This has the potential to spread to other 
parishes in the same way practices valorising a diversity of identities are. 
 
Concluding this section, the diocesan elements of the Church seem susceptible to 
coercive isomorphism, thereby gradually mimicking other organisations and 
institutions. Although this can be seen as a form of structural integration of an 
“immigrant Church”, the process also results in establishing a powerful core 
within the Church that privileges non-migrants, thereby replicating boundaries to 
integration. The concepts resources, refuge, and respectability are useful in 
framing priorities at the institutional level, where there is tension between 
resources and respectability. 
 
Through this top-down perspective, there is reason to doubt the Church’s skill and 
ability in manoeuvring integration processes. Its most effective resource, from a 
diocesan perspective, is the clergy, but this is governed by issues of pastoral care, 
not integration processes. Where the two overlap, there is potential for shaping 
integration processes, but it is always secondary to the pursuit of a well-
functioning parish. Where there does appear to be significant potential is in how 
the Church perceives and responds to other identities. At the diocesan level there 
is tendency towards a redintegrative discourse that celebrates a plurality of 
identities that share a Catholic identity. This is seen most clearly in news pieces 
published by the Diocese both online and in their print magazine168. 
 
There is also a significant link between the Church and Caritas, where the latter’s 
explicit focus on functional integration activities (language and employability 
                                         
168 For example, their series on “My Parish” (Katolsk.no, 2018b) or interviews with individuals that 
draws attention to diversity within the Catholic population in Norway (St. Olav, 2018) 
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training) allows the Church to portray itself as a resource-provider in integration 
processes. It is at this intersection we can see how integration-oriented activities 
can be limited by diocesan processes of clerical relocation, and the importance of 
the clergy in facilitating integration processes. This is becoming increasingly 
recognised within the Church, with it being a focus of its own day-long workshop 
in 2018, facilitated by a migration and integration scholar (Katolsk.no, 2018a).  
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6.3 – Parochial processes 
Two experiences during my fieldwork provide a quick introduction into parochial 
integration processes. Both events demonstrate what an initial encounter might 
look like. In the first, it is my own experience of moving back to Norway after six 
years abroad. An unfamiliar setting, ignorant of small details such as an old 
parishioner’s claim to a seat, an unfamiliar dialect (in a language I rarely spoke) 
that put me on my back foot in conversations, and general trepidation around the 
whole idea of conducting a year-long fieldwork resulting in a visceral sense of 
insecurity. Mass offered some familiarity, despite the different hymns and psalms, 
and the insecurity abated slightly until I went to the kirkekaffe, where 
parishioners meet in the parish hall for refreshments and socialising. The size of 
the congregation was so small that a newcomer such as myself was immediately 
obvious, and a parishioner immediately greeted me and introduced me. 
 
The latter experience was towards the end of the fieldwork. In this case, it was a 
young Philippine woman who had recently arrived in Bodø. Unlike when I arrived, 
there was no kirkekaffe that day, and the opportunity to meet other parishioners 
came down to chance. Having recently married a Bodøværing169, the husband was 
aware of a Philippine community centred around the parish and they had shown 
up hoping to meet Philippine parishioners who could help her feel at home in 
Bodø. 
 
These two cases demonstrate how a range of identities and circumstances play 
into integration processes. In order to understand the parochial, local processes 
at work, this section explores how St. Eystein has developed over time and how it 
is part of integration processes in the city of Bodø. Whereas the previous section 
discussed diocesan aspects and its reliance on the clergy, the parochial aspects 
are inextricably tied to the relationship between the clergy and parishioners. 
Importantly, parishioners exhibit a much stronger influence on the sense of 
community and integration processes and demonstrates the limitations and 
possibilities of clergy as influencers on integration processes. 
                                         
169 The demonym for someone from Bodø 
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Entering the empty church, I looked around and decided to sit down 
in the back rows (they were slightly elevated) so I could get a decent 
view of the church and its parishioners once Mass started. After ten, 
maybe fifteen, minutes, the next person showed up, an elderly 
woman. She walked up to where I was sitting and spoke to me, first 
in a Norwegian, her accent had an unmistakable Irish twang tinted 
by North Norwegian, but seeing my confused look, she switched to 
English with a clear Irish accent: you’re in my seat. Quickly, and 
with a sense of embarrassment, shifting to the next seat over, I 
apologised profusely, in English. She gave me an odd look, asked 
where I was from, to which I replied that I had just moved to Bodø 
from Glasgow. Our conversation was curtailed by the arrival of 
several other parishioners, all of whom seemed to know the old lady 
next to me. Mass began, and I took part as I normally would, 
although I did not recognise the hymns and psalms. After the mass, 
I followed several parishioners down into the cellar, where the 
church coffee was, and after hesitantly wandering about for a few 
minutes; I was grabbed hold of by a Filipino woman, Delilah, and 
invited to sit with her and her husband, Anthony. From there, I was 
introduced to most of the parishioners and the priest. 
Fieldwork notes, August 2015 
 
 
Following a Sunday mass, I stood outside speaking to Fr. Marek. 
There was no church coffee due to the parish hall being hired out 
for an event; hence, most parishioners had gone straight home after 
mass. Suddenly, Delilah came up to us, with a young Filipino woman 
in tow. “Fr. Marek! She’s new! We need to make sure she’s 
registered”. Following shortly behind was Anthony, Delilah’s 
husband, and another man, a Bodøværing, who turned out to be the 
young woman’s husband. Delilah and the young woman switched 
between English and Tagalog, and then translated to Norwegian, 
with supplementary comments being made by the husband. They 
were recently married, on the Philippines, and the young woman 
had just moved to Norway and they had sought out the parish to 
find other Filipinos to help her acclimatise. To sort out a 
registration form, we went to Fr. Marek’s house, and put on a pot 
of coffee. While Delilah, Fr. Marek, and the young woman looked at 
the form, Anthony, the husband, and I spoke. Asking the husband 
how he knew of the parish and the Filipino community there, he 
spoke of growing up in the area and was familiar with the nuns and 
parish from his childhood. Although he wasn’t Catholic, his wife 
was, and he wanted her to feel at home and figured the Church 
could help that. 
Fieldwork notes, May 2016 
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6.3.1 – ‘the price you pay for growing’ – Changes in a northern 
parish 
Several Catholic parishes in Norway have recorded histories, in which a common 
theme is perseverance. This speaks to challenges Catholics, both clergy and laity, 
faced, and continue to face, when attempting to practice their faith. Whereas 
many parishes were established by sending priests and religious sisters to the town 
or city, or by responding to an existing demand from resident Catholics, St. Eystein 
was founded by two families being convinced or ordered, depending on who you 
talk to and view episcopal authority, to move to Bodø. Prefect Wember convinced 
Harald and Dagny Sivertsen170 (who had converted to Catholicism during WWII 
(Katolsk.no, 1997)) to move from Tromsø, and the Jensen family to move from 
Lofoten, to Bodø (Tromsø Prelature, 2007).  
 
Fr. Walter Huijbregts administered to its 24 parishioners the first year (Eidsvig, 
1993) before being moved to Tromsø. Fr. Theodor Rusche, born in Germany, but 
served as a priest in Norway from 1931 until his death, with a brief absence due 
to WWII171, was sent to take over and had a 20-year residency in Bodø (1952-1972). 
This part of the parish history appears to be a stable period of consolidation, 
where numbers remained low and consistent (see Table 13), described by Thomas: 
50s, 60s, 70s, we were very few; we were four-five families. And, we stuck 
together […]. With the arrival of a congregation of Dominican nuns from the Stone 
Congregation in Staffordshire in 1953 (Tromsø Prelature, 2007; St. Eystein 
menighet, 2001), the parish was strengthened considerably, if not numerically, 
then institutionally. 
  
Year 1951 1965 1976 1986 1990 1991 1992 1993 2002 2003 2008 2010 2017 
Members 24 21 97 112 123 216 223 284 518 305 365 426 936 
Table 13 - St. Eystein 1951-2017172 (Eidsvig, 1993; Ingebrigtsen, 2001; Müller, 2001; Tande, 1993; 2008; 2010; 
2017b) 
 
                                         
170 Thomas Sivertsen, whom I interviewed, is one of their children 
171 He was arrested by the German Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) in 1942, and did not return 
to Norway until 1948 (Katolsk.no, 2006) 
172 The time blocs are uneven due to the range of sources I had to consult to find the figures. 
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From an integration perspective, the parish would be in the process of staking its 
claim to space in Bodø. Kivisto (2014, p. 158) points to claims-making as an aspect 
of multiculturalism, which is responded to by ‘dominant society and its political 
system’. The emphasis here should be on the detail that: 
 
Indeed, not all of the types of claims necessarily require state 
action, but rather can often be adequately addressed within the 
framework of civic society […]. This is certainly true of 
accommodation and inclusion. 
      Kivisto (2014, p. 163) 
 
This can be seen in Thomas recollection that Catholics in Bodø were 
simultaneously exotic, represented by the nuns, and “nothing special”, when 
regarding parishioners: 
 
I was born 1958, to Catholic parents, christened and raised in St. 
Eystein parish… and apart from 16-17 months in Oslo, I’ve spent my 
entire life here […] What characterised [the early years of the 
parish]? I think it was exotic, the nuns walking around this little 
town, with their black and white habits, there was something exotic 
about it. What should I say... what characterised it? I wouldn’t say 
anything characterised it, quite simply, we blended in and there was 
nothing special about us. 
 
Lending to this exoticism, during a public lecture, self-professed local historian 
Knut Eide recalled seeing a nun skiing and he supposedly exclaimed, “Look, a ghost 
on skis!” Thomas’ sister, Maria-Louise, notes in her chapter, in the book written 
to celebrate the parish’s 50th anniversary, on growing up as a Catholic in the 50s 
and 60s something similar: 
 
Outside it could happen that we were subjected to some mild 
mannered teasing from children of some of the city’s Protestants […] 
It was worse at school, not because of pupils, but because of one or 
the other teacher not being quite updated on what the Catholic 
Church actually stood for […] As the Sisters got to know people – they 
got a broad contact surface – the interest for and understanding of 
the Catholic Church grew. 
      Sivertsen (2001, pp. 36-37) 
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As argued above, clergy can have a significant impact on the formation of a parish. 
In as young a parish as St. Eystein, established 21st September 1951, in as small a 
community as Bodø, the priest and founding parishioners become integral in 
shaping the parish. Thomas described the priests of St. Eystein in very different 
terms: 
 
[Fr. Rusche is] the only priest I recognise as my priest […] He was a 
mix of fearsome and good-natured […] He was a good teacher […]. I 
don’t know what kind, if he had a network outside the parish, I 
mean, there was a relatively cold front between the Catholic Church 
and Norwegian Church. The priest in the Lutheran cathedral, he was 
relatively anti-Catholic […]. 
 
Fr. Hartmann was very, quite, extrovert […], but I think the big 
difference was that we, the parish became better known in the 
cityscape […]. He was well received by the rest of the clergy173 here 
in Bodø […] Fr. Hartmann wasn’t the teacher-type, he was a 
professor-type, he wasn’t a teacher-type who did catechesis, most 
of that was left to the nuns. 
 
[…] after Fr. Hartmann died, we got, for the most part, Torbjørn 
Olsen, and he was here for ten years, an eager beaver. Fantastic guy 
for building structures and organisation […] You can say different 
things about him as a person, he has his strengths and weaknesses, 
but a cracking priest at getting things to happen, and an enormous 
network as a Norwegian, so that was really a boost-period for the 
parish. […] 
 
[Fr. Marek] is no big organizer, but he is a warm and kind person 
and a great priest to have […] There are some, not many, who are 
hoping for another priest. Now, I’ve spoken to Jessica, and she says 
we’re really lucky to have Fr. Marek, and she’s met all the other 
priests in the region. 
 
In their parish history book, published in conjunction with St. Eystein’s 50th 
anniversary, Fr. Hartmann is again credited with ‘creating many new contacts 
outwards […] Not until during his tenure was the Catholic Church in Bodø, in a 
significant manner, drawn into ecumenical work’ (St. Eystein menighet, 2001, p. 
76). This presents the first, clear sign of the parish, through its Ecclesial structure, 
accumulating bridging capital: ‘[encompassing] people across diverse social 
cleavages’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Fr. Hartmann’s tenure ran from 1977-1995, 
                                         
173 Here referring to the clergy within the Church of Norway 
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during which the parish tripled in size largely due to, according to Thomas, 
migration: It was around then it started to arrive quite a few Poles […] and we 
started noticing there was a world outside our wee pond.  
 
With a further look at the nuns, we can draw on Hirschmann’s statement that was 
highlighted earlier:  
 
By creating a parallel set of social institutions, immigrants were able 
to find avenues for social advancement, leadership, community 
service, and respect [that may not] have been possible in the broader 
community. 
   Hirschmann (2004, p. 1229) (emphasis added) 
 
The question of whether there were avenues for social advancement, leadership, 
community service, and respect available to the nuns is interesting. Even if there 
was, and some of the sisters worked professionally as nurses, teachers, artists, 
etc., they nonetheless created an important set of bridging social institutions in 
Bodø. These were not created in parallel to what the broader community offered, 
but were in fact precursors to what would later be offered through the welfare 
state and funding: 
 
[…] before the municipality created nurseries, the nuns set up a 
nursery […]. They were the first to start up what we’d call youth 
work […]. There are still very many today in this city who have very 
many good memories of that. It left an impression on many of those 
who grew up in the 60s […]. […] they brought classical ballet […]. 
They had literature nights […]. [Sr. Ansgar] held art classes […]. 
     Thomas 
 
[…] these English Dominicans, who came in ’53, had very little to 
do. Because there wasn’t anything... So, they started a guest house 
for young women, like what they have at Katarinahjemmet, for 
students, but that wasn’t particularly successful. […] So, a youth 
club was built, long before there was anything from the city council 
[…]. […] Formally, it wasn’t religious […]. 
     Msgr. Olsen 
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Seen in its historical context, the successful integration of the nuns, and by 
extension St. Eystein, in Bodø, is closely linked to their ability to create, not a 
parallel institution, but an institution that filled a niche in the cityscape. They 
have been celebrated both with the Bodø Cultural Award in 1971 (House & 
Beckstrøm, 2001) and placed tenth on a list over the most significant influences 
on culture in Bodø over its 200 year history (Bodø 2016 & Bodø Nu, 2016, p. 67).  
 
Clearly, the nuns were able to acquire respectability, but is it fair to accredit 
their religion with being the bridge to integration when their activities were not 
explicitly religious? Their religious foundations and motivations seem 
unquestionable, which highlights the complexity and difficulty of separating the 
religious and secular. This is similar to what we find with Caritas, where they take 
on responsibilities one normally associates with the welfare state in Norway. 
Importantly, the nuns shaped integration processes in Bodø through their open 
and inclusive activities, which extended far beyond their Catholic base. 
 
Here we find the juxtaposition of the integration processes surrounding the Church 
as an institution, and those pertaining to the laity. Certainly, as individuals, the 
nuns took part in positive, valorising integration processes, but how did their work 
influence internal processes within the parish. As Thomas notes: 
 
[…] I don’t think we’ve had a single vocation to become a nun from 
Bodø, nor priestly vocations. In that sense, you can say [the 
monastery] has failed. But, I think it has enriched the parish in other 
ways than just vocations. 
 
While the nuns were able to create secular institutions that promoted their 
integration, their religious institution remained isolated within the Catholic field 
in the city. At best, then, it seems reasonable to suggest that the benefits to 
integration processes for the regular parishioner would be mostly due to a spill-
over effect from the nuns’ respectability and placement within local society.  
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One of the significant ways in which the parish changed, that can be associated 
with the change in demographics, is the transition from the English Dominican 
sisters from the Stone Congregation in England to the Filipino Dominican sisters of 
our Lady of Remedies in 2007. This shift, according to several informants in and 
familiar with the parish, occurred due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, due to the 
lack of new, younger nuns from England who could take over from the ageing nuns. 
Secondly, in the 80s and 90s, Filipinos came to constitute an increasingly visible 
part of the congregation, making the reorientation towards the Philippines 
natural. There are also issues related to the Catholicism of the UK and the 
Philippines that factor in, as vocational recruitment in the two countries differ, 
but this is not explored here. 
 
Sr. Cleopatra Moreno, one of first Filipino nuns, writes that in 2001 ‘the Filipinos 
make up a considerable group of 20 per cent of our parish’ (Moreno, 2001, p. 84). 
Thomas notes that ‘The Filipinos came here either to get married or were already 
married on the Philippines and then came here, with Norwegian husbands who 
were not Catholics, so [the parish] expanded, but in an alright way’. Msgr. Olsen, 
who took over after Fr. Hartmann in 1995 until 2006, also describes the Filipinos 
as a strong part of the congregation. Unlike parishes to the south, there has not 
been a strong presence of Catholic refugees from countries such as Vietnam, Chile, 
or Sri Lanka. This points to how state processes of refugee re-settlement can 
impact a parish. Similarly, it demonstrates the role of gender and reason for 
immigration, if we compare Thomas above remark to his comment on the Polish: 
we have a considerable Polish contingency, it’s mostly men though, never a good 
thing when it’s only men. This resonates with the migration context laid out in 
Chapter 4. 
 
At this point the parish begins to be seen as consisting of multiple parts, with 
country of birth playing a key role, reflecting both societal and diocesan changes 
in demographics. It is in the 90s we see the first creation of a formal sub-group 
within the parish that emphasises bonding social capital, ‘inward looking and 
[tending] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups’ (Putnam, 
2000, p. 22), The Filipino Community in Bodø (FCB).  The FCB provides all three 
219 
 
 
of Hirschmann’s targets: refuge, through its social activities, resources, through 
sharing information and networks, and respectability, through the formation of 
an organisation along Norwegian patterns of organisation with ‘detailed 
organisational statutes, lovingly printed and lovingly acted out’ (Eckstein, 1966, 
p. 26). The FCB provides an interesting case of the relationship between ethnicity 
and religiosity, as in 2011 it schismed and The Filipino Union in Bodø arose as a 
result. Speaking to a central person in FCB, she attributed part of the schism to 
the difference in opinion on the centrality of Catholicism in their activities174, 
particularly that many activities took place in the parish hall. 
 
The existence of the FCB was often cited as a reason for allowing Polish 
parishioners to organise themselves. During a discussion between a Filipino 
parishioner and her daughter, the daughter argued that the Polish wanting to 
organise their own activities was no different to what the FCB had done, whereas 
the mother maintained there was a difference. The difference being how the 
Polish activities sought to affect explicitly religious activities such as catechesis 
and provide a Polish language alternative. This indicates a distinction between 
social and religious motivations. Nor did the Polish have a formal structure, such 
as the FCB, contributing to some of the scepticism. 
 
In the case of the FCB, religion is clearly secondary to the social, but the social 
takes place in the parish hall. Msgr. Olsen recalls how: 
 
It was especially the Filipinos who stood strong back then; all the 
parish parties and whatever else there was, then there was a lot of 
Filipino food, a lot of Filipino games […] 
 
The coalescence and subsequent dominance of a distinctly Filipino community 
within the parish has influenced dynamics within the parish. While discussing 
youth work in the parish with a parishioner, she stressed that activities often come 
                                         
174 Early versions of FCBs constitution put it under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Tromsø, that 
one must be Catholic to be a member, and there is a reciprocal agreement that the president of 
FCB is automatically given a seat on the parish council (Filipino Community in Bodø, 2014). 
220 
 
 
to be dominated by the Filipino/Norwegian families and if I were to do anything 
with youth work in the parish, I would have to counteract their “dominance”.  
 
Philippine-born Catholics make up 12.2 per cent of St. Eystein, which compared 
to the national figure makes them slightly over-represented (see Table 14). Polish-
born parishioners, on the other hand, comprise 34.9 per cent of the parish. Despite 
this, there was no comparable level of Polish activity visible in the parish. Asking 
Fr. Marek about this, he pointed to different traditions and expectations 
parishioners have of the Church, such as the kirkekaffe175, a post-Mass 
socialisation, being alien to Polish Catholics. It is worth noting that in parishes 
that provide specific pastoral care, groups seem to organise themselves more 
readily. The interesting question then becomes at what point should a parish 
develop a hands-on approach to managing diversity rather than enforcing unity. 
 
Table 14 - Country of birth (as percentage of parish) in St. Eystein (Tande, 2008; 2010; 2012; Catholic Diocese 
of Oslo, 2017c) 
 
As the membership Polish-born, as share of membership between 2010 and 2017, 
more than doubles, St. Eystein is likely to experience significant changes if the 
registered Polish-born Catholics are practicing. Thomas expressed some awareness 
of this, as with a foreboding tone he remarked ‘we have a considerable Polish 
contingency, it’s mostly men though, never a good thing when it’s only men’.  
 
This brings us back to the importance of understandings of views on gender and 
primary reason for migration. Male-dominated, labour-oriented migration 
provokes a range of stereotypes, just as female-dominated, family reunification 
does. As the parish usually has one mass on a Sunday, in Norwegian, the 
                                         
175 Kirkekaffe – Church coffee – usually takes place in the parish hall after a Mass and is done with 
minor variations throughout the country, and often reflects the make-up of the parish through the 
food that is offered. 
Country of Birth 2008 2010 2012 2017 National (2017) 
Norway 44 39.9 26.4 25.4 23 
Poland 12 13.4 25.8 34.9 39 
Philippines 15 19.7 16.5 12.2 7 
Lithuania <3 <2 6.7 12 12 
Germany 4 4.2 2.5 1.3 1 
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opportunities to attend mass are constricted in ways immigrants from more 
Catholic countries are unfamiliar with. This reminds us to not take for granted 
that people practice their faith in the same way. All of these points were on 
display in Thomas’ interview: 
 
I think it’s an enormous advantage that we have a Polish priest, for 
example, because he has, as is my impression, a good dialogue with 
the Poles. We’ve started having Polish mass as well, once a month, 
not sure Bishop [Grgic] is too excited about that, but… […] Even 
though it seems segregating, I get it, the primary goal is that people 
get the spiritual refill they need. That is, primarily, what the 
Church should do […] Fr. Marek spoke of a conversation with some 
Poles and asked them why they don’t come to church on Sundays, 
and they replied “no, Father, it’s too early, because on Saturdays 
we drink, and then it is too early to make Mass at 11am” […] That’s 
why the Polish mass is in the evening. 
 
Contrary to previous decades, where the parish cultivated significant amounts of 
bridging capital through the priest’s ecumenical work, the nuns social and cultural 
work, and some parishioners acting as Apologists for the Church, the current status 
seems oriented towards generating bonding capital within the parish. The 
weakness lies in that the parish has a history and habit of the priest and nuns 
steering the ship, whereas this is no longer the case. With regards to ecumenical 
work, Jessica complained that compared to a decade ago, it is difficult to convince 
parishioners about the importance of ecumenicalism in Bodø. Similarly, the 
Filipino nuns have been unable to continue the work of the English nuns, instead 
emphasising cultivating a Filipino diaspora. While granting the Filipino 
parishioners a measure of dominance within the parish, this was tied to their 
prevalence. As it shifts to Polish-born and Lithuanian-born, the question is how 
long the Filipino can retain their social capital before the parish adapts to the 
recently registered members. 
 
Furthermore, without any overarching strategy from the bishop or diocesan 
pastoral council176, priests and parishioners are left to their own devices. 
                                         
176 The Prelature of Tromsø, unlike the Diocese of Oslo, does not have a Diocesan pastoral council, 
as Bishop Grgić never constituted one following his ordination to bishop. 
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Combined with the reality of clerical relocations, the risk of founder’s syndrome 
is substantial if activities are not embedded in long-term parishioners or 
structures. Nor are priests necessarily qualified to formulate development 
strategies for parishes, as their work is predominantly of a Liturgical or 
Missiological nature. While providing language-specific liturgical activities or 
pastoral care may subtly influence individual integration processes in terms of 
providing refuge, without an overarching plan there could be negative 
repercussions further up the line, such as the dominance of one group. Thomas 
applied an apt analogy to the growth of the parish and the challenges they face: 
That’s the price you pay for growing up. Not all your clothes fit anymore. 
Continuing that analogy, it seems St. Eystein has not quite found new clothes yet 
either. Although St. Eystein might have positively contributed to integration 
processes in the past, it seems confronted with a significant challenge in 
continuing that work today under vastly different circumstances. Despite this, the 
challenge was never perceived as a threat, only as potential for the parish to 
develop. 
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6.4 – NUK – Norwegians cooking rice and Vietnamese boiling potatoes 
The demographics presented in Chapter 5 point to the potential importance of a 
youth organisation in shaping integration processes amongst Catholics in Norway. 
As such, this section addresses the relationship between the Church and NUK, from 
the perspective of youth work. This provides a useful comparison to the final faith-
based organisation explored in this chapter, Caritas. Furthermore, NUK 
demonstrates how young Catholics negotiate multiple identities that cut across 
religious, ethnic, and national aspects. In other words, NUK offers a unique 
perspective on integration processes that is often less visible within parochial or 
diocesan processes. 
 
As a national organisation, NUK has the potential to bring together people from 
all over the country, irrespective of parish or dioceses. At its inception, in 1947, 
the goal was to create an organisation that ‘could help the young in such a way 
that they did not feel like, more or less, an insignificant minority’ (Bruce, et al., 
1997). The creation of the youth association was not a radical idea, as it fit into 
the pre-existing schema of Catholic associations, but as those associations 
disappeared, NUK has endured. It also fit into the overall organisational 
environment in Norway, as Eckstein notes the ‘ubiquitous tendency to act through 
associations’ (1966, p. 103) amongst young people in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
This can be partially attributed to its focus on local parishes, but also to the 
connection to the diocesan administration and its similarity to other youth 
organisations. NUK is an excellent example of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) 
institutional isomorphism. It has consistently worked with other religious (such as 
Caritas) and non-religious organisations (such as LNU177). Occasionally, these 
organisations and institutions have had a significant impact on NUK, such as when 
NUK applied for membership in LNU and had to alter their membership structure 
in order to obtain membership. This structural change also put NUK in line with 
governmental requirements for funding (Bruce, et al., 1997). This shift rendered 
its structure less “Catholic”. 
                                         
177 LNU – Landsrådet for Norske Ungdomsorganisasjoner – National Council of Norwegian Youth 
Associations 
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As an organisation, it is highly susceptible to changing demographics within the 
Catholic Church, thus presenting a fascinating reflection of how migration has 
altered the make-up of the Church whilst simultaneously retaining its institutional 
character and providing a means of inculcating migrants into Norwegian 
organisational life. Elisabeth, who was an active member of NUK prior to becoming 
principal of St. Eystein School, put it: […] the strength is that you learn the 
organisational life. A previous employee at NUK frequently repeated that NUKs 
strength was its skills in manoeuvring bureaucratic funding processes and 
facilitating local activities. This was also emphasised by one of the previous 
chairpersons. The chairperson drew a contrast between the formal bureaucratic 
format of groups and their internal activities, hence we find a juxtaposition of a 
“Norwegian” form and “ethnic”178 expression. This fits into the overall discourse 
of respecting multiple forms of Catholicism and lowering barriers to interaction. 
 
Keeping in mind demographic data presented in Chapter 5, particularly the size 
of the under–40 population, and NUKs privileged position as the official youth 
organisation for the Church in Norway, the current generation of members, and 
potential members, has the potential to be incredibly heterogeneous, as 
recognised by the above comments by central members. Several of NUKs 
chairpersons, and staff, repeated the sentiment that despite their low 
membership179, usually hovering between 2500-3000 (NUK, 2016), they sought to 
represent and help all young Catholics. 
 
Looking at Diocesan statistics, Catholics in NUKs targeted age range of 0-35 
constitute almost 50 per cent of all Catholics. Yet, the majority of its activities 
are geared towards those aged 8-30, which constitutes roughly 30 per cent. 
Comparing its actual membership and its potential membership, NUK only 
accounts for 3.5 per cent (0-35) or 6.6 per cent (8-30) of its target group. 
Furthermore, within a migration context, NUK deals extensively with descendants 
                                         
178 Polish, Chilean, Tamil, Vietnamese, Norwegian, French, or any form of Catholicism. 
179 Membership is based on annual subscription with three categories of membership: 0-25 years, 
26-36 years, and supporting members. 
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of immigrants, and occasionally those who migrated to Norway at a young age. 
This raises questions as to the influence NUK might have on individual integration 
processes, but as the official youth organisation it still wields a lot of power 
through its representation at diocesan and parochial levels.   
 
As parents often decide, and fund, whether a child or young adult can take part 
in activities organised under the auspices of NUK, the relationship between NUK 
and parents is crucial. This was often communicated to camp leaders as a 
relationship based on trust, where parents trust in NUK was inextricably tied to 
the experiences the child had at NUKs events. This, in addition to other factors, 
results in camp organisers consciously building teams that reflect the diversity of 
the Church both in terms of ethnicity and religiosity. My findings, based on 
ethnographic data collected over the course of multiple camps and events, suggest 
NUK draws on a redintegrative discourse that views the Church holistically and 
considers identities as equal. 
 
The cross-generational aspect makes ethnic identification processes a common 
undertone in NUK. Thomas recalled that during the 1980s, the Vietnamese had a 
reputation for sticking to themselves, a reputation it would be safe to say they no 
longer possess. Elisabeth remarked how, during her time in NUK, she came to 
appreciate that ‘[…] Vietnamese can also speak bergensk and trønder180 […] Later, 
I’ve noticed it when people say, “Oh, it is weird when they speak with a dialect”, 
and I’ve thought, “Is that so weird?”’ This reflects the complicated relationship 
between ethnicity and language described in section 2.2.2. 
 
At one of the camps, a Vietnamese leader reprimanded a participant for 
inappropriate reification of an immigrant/non-immigrant categorisation, telling 
the participant ‘what do you mean she’s an immigrant? She’s just as much an 
immigrant as you are; you’re Polish, are you not?’ The two participants, and the 
leader, were all born and raised in Norway. In conversation with a youth leader, 
                                         
180 Dialects from Bergen and Trøndelag 
226 
 
 
she described the team at a camp she had helped organise as ‘basically just 
Asians, and a token Norwegian’. 
 
References to ethnicity were commonplace, and when pressed on the issue it was 
presented as a shorthand for cultural differences and appearance. Ethnicity was 
often activated to subtly communicate extra information about either the 
individual or the situation. This echoes broader racializing discourses, but within 
the context of NUK there were few, if any, negative connotations associated with 
references to ethnic identities. Even when they could have been construed as 
such, the tone of conversation was often joking. For example, at one of the camps 
I attended, one of the Vietnamese leaders remarked ‘don’t let the Norwegian 
make the rice’, referring back to my failure at an earlier camp to use a rice 
cooker. Whereas Lynnebakke and Fangen (2011, p. 148) argue ethnic diversity ‘has 
no natural place in today’s understanding of Norwegianness’, NUK directly 
contradicts this. Parental country of birth and appearance might play a key role 
in ‘their self-definition in relation to the Norwegian’ (Lynnebakke & Fangen, 2011, 
p. 148), but the broader discourse around ethnic identification processes is 
celebratory of diversity rather than constructing it as a threat. 
 
An illustrative case for the relationship between ethnicity, nationality, and 
religion amongst members in NUK is the pilgrimage to the World Youth Days (WYD) 
in Kraków. The wealth of data related to WYD is impossible to convey in full within 
this thesis, but for the purpose of this section, I wish to examine how the diversity 
spoken of above played out. In particular, this data offers insight into the question 
of how integration processes play out in a Catholic organisation and how 
identifications move between ethnic, national, and religious, and how these 
identifications interact with categorisation processes. In Norway, these processes 
are framed by a Norwegian context, while during WYD the participants are faced 
with a different context that may challenge understandings constructed in 
Norway. 
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One of the integral parts of the pilgrimage is a component called Days in the 
Dioceses (DiD), where pilgrims stay with host families in parishes around the host 
country. In 2016, the group from NUK, tallying 172 pilgrims, were split between 
six parishes in the diocese of Tarnów. This diocese was chosen due to its 
connection to Norway: quite a few Polish priests in Norway are from the diocese 
of Tarnów. Staying with a host family in the town of Żabno, one of the first remarks 
I got from my host father was ‘you [referring to the group] don’t look like what I 
expected’. It was obvious he was referring to the ethnic makeup of the group. At 
every level of the organisation, members speak of ‘the Vietnamese’, ‘the 
Filipino’, ‘the Norwegians’, ‘the Poles’, etc., with ease. Challenging this discourse 
is commonly met by the reaction of ‘you know what I mean’, as well as recognising 
that members associated with the different groups are often born and raised in 
Norway. As above, there are narrow conceptions of ethnic identities, but they are 
rarely situated in a hierarchy rendering one desirable. In these contexts, the 
Norwegian ethnic identity is not hegemonic, a stark contrast to external contexts. 
 
As Baumann (1999) emphasises, the relationship between religion, ethnicity, and 
nationality responds to the setting and context. Excessively problematizing these 
categories leads to a hardening of boundaries, whereas the deep equality 
advocated by Beaman (2017) is indicative of soft and fluid boundaries. Under 
conditions of deep equality ‘differences disappear […] in the moment of exchange 
[…] as similarity is foregrounded’ (Beaman, 2017, p. 12). Internally in NUK, there 
is overwhelming evidence to indicate soft and porous boundaries. This is not to 
say ethnicity is a less important identifier or marker of identity, but there is a high 
degree of fluidity between alternative identities such as national, ethnic, or 
religious, highlighting how identities are contextual and situational. The openness 
around ethnic identification allows NUK to provide a degree of refuge, where 
members stand free to assert their ethnic or national identities, under the 
auspices of an overarching Catholic identity, without risking marginalisation. This 
might be indicative of what Erdal (2016b, p. 261) characterises as ‘[…] exploring 
alternatives to hegemonic approaches to integration as there is no majority within 
which minorities might integrate’.  
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Yet, the idea of there being ‘no majority’, as Erdal suggests, obfuscates systemic 
power, wherein the Norwegian is privileged as a national identity. WYD Kraków 
was a microcosm in how different situations could lead to hardening and softening 
of boundaries along ethnic, national, and religious lines. As a group, NUK strongly 
emphasised its Norwegian-ness: gifts for host families symbolised Norway, gifts 
used for trading during the days in Kraków bore symbols of Norway, and a use of 
Norwegian flags as organizing elements for the group. During the WYD Kraków, 
there were several instances of NUK attempting to ‘reproduce national belonging’ 
(Mæland, 2016, p. 94), such as performances of ‘Be for oss, Hellig Olav’181. This 
song is particularly important in the construction of a Norwegian Catholicity, 
revering St. Olav – Rex Perpetuus Norvegiae182.  
 
Whereas Mæland situates ritual reproduction amongst Catholics in Norway as 
reproducing non-Norwegian national belonging, creating a specific, national form 
of refuge, NUK emphasises a form of ritual expression it sees as particular to 
(young) Catholics in Norway and capable of expressing what being a Catholic 
means to them. Liturgies are ritual acts and fundamental to Catholicism, but can 
come to be associated with particular groups, as Mæland suggests. At central 
events in NUK, the tension between these elements lies in the performance of 
liturgies and spiritual acts: in how they are performed, choice of music, prayers, 
aesthetics, to orthopraxy183. One long-time leader at camps often advocated the 
position that ‘participants should be familiar with the diversity of worship’, 
although he freely admitted he had his preferences. Participants at events were 
also adept at identifying the nationality or ethnicity associated with a particular 
form of worship, referring to a someone as ‘being quite Filipino’ despite them 
having Vietnamese parentage. 
 
Whereas there is fluidity in identification processes internally, identities may 
harden such as when staying at a school in Kraków. NUK shared the space with a 
Portuguese group, and tensions between the groups were often attributed to 
                                         
181 ‘Pray for us, Holy Olav’ 
182 Norway’s Eternal King 
183 In the sense of interpretation of the Missal and prescribed behaviour 
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differences between the two nations. Grievances during the trip were often 
expressed in terms of ‘pushy French’ or ‘loud Italians’, or when there was a 
Eucharistic Adoration in St. Mary’s Basilica184, with the other Nordic countries, the 
groups were always identified in terms of their nationality. In other words, 
nationality trumped possible ethnic composition, and the overarching Catholic 
identity did little to mitigate this hardening.  
 
The hardening of national identities, from a governmental, zero-sum integration 
perspective, would be seen as indicative of successful integration, as a Norwegian 
identity is given a degree of primacy. The question then becomes to what extent, 
and for how long, can a monolithic conception of a Norwegian national identity 
persist. In situations, such as WYD, multiple identities are continuously and 
simultaneously activated, and the resultant hyphenation becomes inevitable185. 
The question then becomes how long it takes for this to bleed over into other 
spheres of interaction. Here, NUKs role as a youth organisation is fundamental, as 
experiences under the auspices of NUK have the potential of becoming formative, 
similar to how schools have tremendous potential in inculcating certain values and 
behaviour. 
 
WYD Kraków gives us some data of further interest: names and naming practices. 
Drawing on Khosravi (2012), names can influence integration processes through 
allowing a person to appear ‘”neutral” and without a racial or ethnic tag’ 
(Khosravi, 2012, p. 76). Names, Khosravi argues, can allow ‘[passing] (i.e. 
adopting certain aspects of identity so as to be “unmarked” […]) and covering (i.e. 
attempting to downplay one’s […] identity)’ (Khosravi, 2012, p. 78).  
 
In the run-up to the event, I spent a lot of time in NUKs volunteer office. 
Prominently displayed next to the computer was a pie-chart showing the 
distribution of Vietnamese surnames186. At camps, when registering participants, 
                                         
184 Kościół Mariacki in the main square (Rynek Główny) in Kraków 
185 One example of hyphenation is NOVIS (NOVIS, 2017), a group seeking to increase electoral 
participation amongst Norwegian-Vietnamese, or NAUY (NAUY, 2017), a career network for the 
same group. 
186 It was not specified if it pertained to Norway or in Vietnam. 
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it was not unusual to hear Vietnamese participants asked: are you a Nguyen, Vu, 
or Pham? The question was asked in the same tone of voice you would expect 
someone to ask if a Norwegian was an “Andersen”, “Hansen”, “Larsen”, or 
“Olsen”. This pertains to surnames, which is markedly different to given names. 
 
By surname, roughly two-fifths of the participants on NUKs WYD pilgrimage could 
be identified as Vietnamese, but by given names the group is varied. Ten out of 
the fifty-five (by surname) Vietnamese participants had only a 
“western/Norwegian” first name, twenty-seven had both a Vietnamese name and 
“western/Norwegian” first name, whereas eighteen had only a Vietnamese first 
name. A particular challenge, as the above information is based on what is in their 
passports, is to know which name the participants prefer to use. Those with only 
one name were presumed to only answer to that name, but it is difficult to 
ascertain if this is true in all situations (such as at family-oriented events). Those 
with both, on the other hand, have a degree of choice in what name they use, and 
it would often depend upon the person they were talking to. There is no hard and 
fast rule, and it comes down to a whole range of factors, such as how long you 
have known the person, how they introduced themselves, their personal 
preference, or how familiar they think you are with Vietnamese, i.e. how likely 
you are to be able to pronounce their name accurately, and possibly whether they 
would prefer to be seen as more Norwegian.  
 
The point I am attempting to make here is not that some Vietnamese are 
assimilating, whereas others are not, but that there is a process of change in 
response to a Norwegian context. Furthermore, there has been a gradual change 
from Thomas’ perception that the Vietnamese kept to themselves, through 
Elisabeth’s experience at camp where ‘regardless of skin colour, you can speak 
with a dialect’, up to today, where they are, arguably, essential to the continuity 
of NUK. What stands out is that what is identified as a Vietnamese presence in 
NUK is incredibly disproportionate to their share of the Catholic population as a 
whole, barely 2.5 per cent with an average age of 49 (Catholic Diocese of Oslo, 
2017c), demonstrating the limitation of the Church statistics in operating on a 
country-of-birth categorisation.  
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What it does indicate is that the generation of Vietnamese who arrived in the 
1970s and 1980s, who have had children, pushed their children to take part in 
NUK. An in-depth discussion, to answer all the questions this raises, extends 
beyond the scope of this thesis. As it stands, there is evidence pointing towards 
the emphasis and efforts made towards providing specific pastoral care for 
Vietnamese refugees through the Vietnamese Pastoral Care Centre, as well as 
providing local pastoral care through Vietnamese-speaking priests. The question 
then becomes, if the approach taken with Vietnamese Catholics has been 
successful by most measurements187, why did the Church not attempt to replicate 
it with other groups? 
 
In conclusion, NUK as an organisation bears many hallmarks of being a Norwegian 
organisation, abiding by Norwegian institutional structures and forms, but is 
notably Catholic in content. This relationship, between the Norwegian and 
Catholic, to a certain extent privileges Norwegian performances and 
understandings of Catholicism. The widening understanding of Catholicism and 
shifting demographics of NUKs target population is exemplified by the gradual 
name change of the organisation: from The Norwegian Catholic Youth Association, 
to Young Norwegian Catholic’s Association, to its current name Norway’s Catholic 
Youth.  
 
Within the central levels of the organisation, there is a distinct understanding of 
the organisation providing access to resources, through manoeuvring bureaucratic 
processes and redistributing funding to local groups. There is also an element of 
respectability in that the organisation purports to represent Catholic youth in 
Norway, this despite its relatively low membership numbers compared to its 
potential membership. Naturally, a gargantuan growth would alter the 
organisation considerably, but its consistent membership might also indicate the 
boundaries of its appeal and remit. 
 
                                         
187 Engagement with parochial and diocesan events and processes, vocational recruitment, 
respectability within the Church, and a host of other informal criteria. 
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Although there is a focus on providing access to resources, the mission statement 
emphasises community. Ideally, this should be cultivated locally and reinforced 
by central events. Hence, NUK also seeks to provide refuge. Its strength lies in 
focusing on youth, which amongst Catholics in Norway will include a large 
population of youth whose parents immigrated to Norway the last few decades.  
 
In investigating how its members behave in an international context, the World 
Youth Day, it shines a light on the relationship between their national identity, 
overwhelmingly Norwegian, ethnicity, tied to their heritage, and their religious 
identity188. In terms of how this impacts integration processes, NUK has provided, 
and continues to provide, a means of young Catholics (with or without a 
connection to migration) to shape activities that benefit from an institutional 
affiliation to a “Norwegian” hegemony. In addition to creating parallel 
associations for themselves, certain migrant groups, such as the Vietnamese, have 
become essential parts of pre-existing structures. An important element of this is 
that the organisation is a voluntary grass-roots organisation; therefore, in its 
current form it will continue to reflect the target demographic. Its efficacy, and 
continued existence, relies on remaining relevant, and if it fails in that the 
organisation will be rendered obsolete. 
  
                                         
188 For an additional discussion on the relationship between ethnicity and religious identity amongst 
young Catholics, see Trotter (2013) 
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6.5 – Caritas – ‘to not bake the same cake’ 
Caritas Norway began its life as Catholic Refugee Effort in 1951, became Catholic 
Refugee Aid in 1956, and finally turned into Caritas Norway in 1964. The initial 
work was to offer relief and aid in the post-WWII period, particularly for Catholics 
from the Czech Republic189, Poland, and Hungary (Eidsvig, 1993). When it 
constituted itself as Caritas Norway in 1964, it expanded into other projects and 
foreign aid. For many years, Caritas Norway operated as a charity organisation 
with an emphasis on foreign aid projects, whereas over the last five years they 
have strengthened their domestic work. This domestic work bears many hallmarks 
of third sector welfare organisations: a non-government, non-profit organisation 
within an area of welfare (Brown, et al., 2002). With Norway’s comprehensive, 
welfare system, this can include a multitude of activities. For Caritas Norway, the 
emphasis is mostly on employability and language training. 
 
A fundamental element of Caritas is Catholic social teaching, as laid out in The 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, hereafter simply The Social 
Doctrine. Due to its initial focus on Catholic refugees, and the structure of the 
Church in Norway at the time, priests often led the work. Such as Fr. Harald Taxt, 
who led Caritas Norway from 1964 until his death in 1981 and served as episcopal 
vicar for migrant pastoral care, a position now held by Msgr. Olsen. Fr. Taxt also 
served on the 1973 commission on immigration policy (The Danielsen-Commission) 
and was the only representative of a charitable organisation (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 1973). The distance between official Church structures and extra-
ecclesial organisations changes over time. In the case of Caritas, it was for a long 
time to an extent indistinguishable. For a deeper historical overview of Caritas 
activities, I refer to Mæland’s (2016) work. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on how different structures within 
Caritas influence integration processes today. The first observation is that there 
are three distinguishable Caritas-structures: parochial, subsidiary, and national. 
By parochial, I refer to local Caritas groups, loosely organised, and often focused 
on helping elderly, contributing to the welfare of the parish, and fundraising. By 
                                         
189 Czechoslovakia at the time 
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subsidiary, I point to the more organised groups such as Caritas Bergen, Caritas 
Stavanger, Caritas Drammen, and I choose to include NUKs Caritas Committee in 
this category although I will not be discussing them here. The subsidiary Caritas 
groups are often separate legal entities, have employees or are highly structured, 
and provide comprehensive services in language and employability training. These 
are the organisations that ‘make them an appropriate locus for the development 
of a new welfare paradigm’ (Brown, et al., 2002, p. 161), which is explored in 
their relationship to government bodies.  
 
The final element is Caritas Norway, which operates simultaneously within the 
greater Oslo region, and is responsible for national coordination. Whereas 
subsidiary Caritas groups might have contact with local and regional 
administration, Caritas Norway also has contact with governmental bodies. 
Furthermore, they often have the responsibility of representing Caritas in 
international meetings and the media. Although I have made these distinctions, I 
would add that they are not hard and fixed boundaries. As with the other Catholic 
organisations, there is a considerable amount of flow between the different levels, 
both in terms of information but also in terms of people. Due to limited resources, 
I was unfortunately not able to explore the parochial Caritas groups adequately; 
therefore, my focus is on the subsidiary and national level. One of the prevailing 
points was how they focus predominantly on the provision of resources, 
emphasising a social integrationist discourse and functional perspective on 
integration processes. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I will explore how the nature and structure of Caritas 
has changed and influences integration processes. Firstly, how the shift was made 
from parochial to subsidiary, the relationship between paid versus volunteer work, 
and the role of key persons. Secondly, how the users of their services have 
changed over time, and how they have responded to those changes. This leads to 
the third aspect, of what services they offer. Finally, this section will conclude 
with a discussion of how it all ties into integration processes. What stands out is 
the relationships the chairmen, and it is noteworthy that they were all men, and 
coordinators in the subsidiary units have with local administrations, employers, 
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and other charities. What was often emphasised was the complementarity of their 
activities, the competition around funding, and the role of personal networks. The 
subsidiary units reflect an increased professionalisation and targeted activities 
with a clear integration purpose, but the question still remains of how they 
influence the processual nature of integration, rather than the prevalent focus on 
reified and clear-cut boundaries. 
 
All the subsidiary groups transitioned from parochial groups in the space of a few 
years. Both Gunnar and Trond pointed out how their Caritas groups had gone from 
being ‘a cute, small Caritas group, like a lot of parishes have’ (Gunnar) and 
‘informal, not a registered association’ (Trond), to registered associations with 
‘two million kroner in income this year’ (Gunnar) and ‘completely unattached 
from the parish in our activities’ (Trond). Knut gave the impression that Caritas 
Stavanger was still in this process, emphasising that ‘[…] we can, in a way, try to 
build up the same as they have in Bergen’. Gunnar, who had agreed to travel to 
different Caritas groups to help them provide services with ‘a bit higher quality’, 
is indicative of this shift into a professionalisation.  
 
Interestingly, this professionalisation is occurring in parallel with the Diocesan 
professionalisation, and the dominance of white, adult, Norwegian males in this 
shift might indicate a step away from grass-roots organisation. Their services shift 
from being “offered by” the parish and local migrants to “offered for”. There is 
an awareness of this, as both Oslo and Bergen are looking to facilitate self-help 
groups. In this sense, they echo a welfare state industry model (Brown, et al., 
2002), where the emphasis on providing a service leads to vetting and training 
volunteers or utilising employees. 
 
In Stavanger, they had hired someone for a 30per cent position, in Drammen they 
had a person paid by the hour, whereas Bergen and Caritas Norway have full-time 
employees. This is in addition to those working voluntarily in a full-time capacity, 
such as Trond and Knut. Gunnar emphasised the need for paid employees because 
‘you can’t run these services with only volunteers, it’s not possible’ – a near 
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verbatim echo of a reply Brown, et al., (2002, p. 170) received in their research: 
‘We’ve had volunteers in the past but without training they simply can’t do the 
jobs like a professional would’. Key to this was expertise, and Gunnar noted that 
in order to ‘[…] hand out information about the Norwegian labour market, you 
have to know it’. The emphasis lay on being able to offer high quality instruction, 
which required a stability that precludes a dependence on volunteers. 
Furthermore, it almost automatically excludes anyone with a short residency or 
limited experience with the Norwegian labour market from contributing. Thereby 
risking constructing immigrants as passive recipients. 
 
To contrast, in Oslo, Per added that they strongly emphasise that ‘[it] is very 
important that we have people who work voluntarily who understand the 
Norwegian system and can explain it in different languages, and with a cultural 
context, and [these volunteers] make up the majority of our work in the info 
centre’. This demonstrates a clear difference between the national and subsidiary 
group, where the national centre in Oslo, unlike the subsidiary groups, has the 
opportunity and ability to recruit migrants, or individuals with the language skills, 
to provide assistance for other migrants. 
 
Common to both is a Social Integrationist understanding of integration processes, 
where they perpetuate the primacy of employment as fundamental to integration 
processes. Although they exhibit awareness of social, political, and cultural 
factors as important in constructions of inequality, it is rarely addressed. 
Naturally, here we distinguish between situations where the different approaches 
are called for: addressing social, political, and cultural factors is most suited to 
externally oriented work directed at broader society, conducted at the national 
level, whereas internally oriented work requires only awareness. 
 
The rise of these chairmen comes down to their skills, experience, and time. 
Caritas Bergen were consistently praised for their ability to secure employment 
for those who came to them. Gunnar claimed that in 2015, they managed to get 
131 people employed, though he did not specify what kinds of jobs: downplaying 
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aspects of racialised and segregated employment practices. Per also emphasised 
the expertise built in Bergen in this particular area. Gunnar admitted that ‘[…] I 
have a good friend who manages a large bus company, so we funnel them through 
there […]’ and how his previous job helped him get people employment in the taxi 
business, ‘[…] at least 20 asylum seekers [plus] five to ten users from here […]’.  
 
Similarly, Knut drew on his previous job and the network he built through that, as 
well as his engagement in local politics in order to ‘[…] promote Caritas, and to 
not least have the right people pointed out […] In that way, politics has opened 
more doors than if you did not have connections into the political’. Political 
connections was actually a weakness in Bergen and Drammen, where Gunnar 
reluctantly admitted ‘[…] it is limited’, and Trond remarked that Drammen 
municipality were ‘[…] negative all the time’, whereas the neighbouring 
municipality of Nedre Eiker were ‘[…] positive towards our work’. Thus, these 
individuals exemplify how access to resources and respectability amongst non-
migrants, may be utilised to become a conduit for resources and respectability to 
be passed on to migrants. 
 
The subsidiary groups, except NUKs group, but including Caritas Norway, have 
focused on two services: Norwegian language courses and employment. One of the 
key features focused on by several of the interviewees was the cost of the course, 
in the 800kr they charged for the ‘equivalent course at Folkeuniversitetet190 
would have cost 5000kr’ (Per, Caritas Norway), and that the main reason for 
charging anything was to increase commitment amongst the participants. All the 
interviewees emphasised that in the division of labour amongst voluntary and 
charitable organisations, in their respective cities, Caritas was the go-to 
organisation for language courses, even the Labour and Welfare Administration 
(NAV) direct people to Caritas, suggesting some downloading of responsibility: 
 
                                         
190 An organisation with the ‘aim […] to make leisure courses and further education accessible to 
all adults, regardless of social background.’ (Folkeuniversitetet, 2018) 
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We are actually at the point where many caseworkers at NAV refer 
people who come and ask for help to us […] 
     Gunnar, Caritas Bergen 
 
[NAV] were very interested that they could redirect job seekers to 
us, that here they could get Norwegian courses. 
     Knut, Caritas Stavanger 
 
[…] NAV send people to us, especially those who fall outside [the 
system]. 
     Trond, Caritas Drammen 
 
We have received funding to, also from NAV, to run our info centre, 
so it is obvious they see the need for having us. And, in many ways, 
we are the bridge-builder and communicator between the system 
and many of… yeah, the visitors. 
     Per, Caritas Norway 
 
This division of labour indicates that the different Caritas groups have been able 
to find a niche, albeit at the cost of a government agency abrogating responsibility 
for a population it should assist under the premise of a universal welfare state. 
The fact that it is oriented towards labour market integration is not only a 
response to society demanding it, but also in that, the vast majority of Catholic 
migrants over the last decade have been migrant labourers. Whereas Caritas 
historical focus was on refugees, the shift to migrant labourers reflects the shift 
in Church demographics. The focus on refugees also emphasises labour market 
integration; hence, Caritas steps in where the government bureaucracy falls short, 
as evidenced by the close collaboration with NAV. 
 
An important aspect of how voluntary organisations operate in Norway appears to 
be a division of labour, demonstrating aspects of a market model (Brown, et al., 
2002) of highly specialised organisations. It was pointed out how the voluntary and 
charitable organisations tend to play to their strengths: 
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We see no reason to, at least not for now, to develop a competing 
offer, when the structure is already there, and we can focus on what 
we have built our strength around […] it’s sort of how the division 
of labour has developed on street level here in Oslo […] we focus on 
work and Norwegian. It’s what we do best.  
      Per, Caritas Norway 
 
[…] it has sort of turned out that when people come to different 
organisations, they send people looking to learn Norwegian to us. 
      Trond, Caritas Drammen 
 
[The] other organisations in Bergen send all those looking for work 
to us […] we work with the other voluntary organisations in Bergen, 
slash Hordaland, and what we have tried is to, how should we say 
it, to not bake the same cake. We specialise a bit, so they get this 
help there, they get that here […] We draw on each other’s 
expertise, if there’s something we’re not experts in, like law, we 
go to the Robin Hood House. 
      Gunnar, Caritas Bergen 
 
It is [very important] for us, here at Caritas where we are few, to 
know where they can get more help, more help than we can provide. 
It is important for us to be clear on “what can we contribute with? 
Where can we direct them?” 
      Knut, Caritas Stavanger 
 
Despite this complementarity, it was noted how it does get competitive when 
organisations apply for funding. This raises interesting questions of whether the 
competition surrounding funding and emphasis on providing specific services 
engenders a consumerist construction of immigrants using their services, which 
points to an alternative, ‘consumer citizenship’ rather than ‘active citizenship’ 
(Brown, et al., 2002, p. 172). 
 
Of course, sometimes it feels a bit like a competition, and to a 
certain extent it is, we’re competing for the same funding, right?  
      Per, Caritas Norway 
 
Not least because there is of course competition when funds are 
handed out, and we are not the only ones doing good work. 
      Trond, Caritas Drammen 
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Competition and complementarity amongst organisations indicates a few points. 
Firstly, that integration processes are complex and require appropriate measures 
on different levels and at different times. This allows organisations to operate 
separately and complement each other. Secondly, because integration processes 
are often simplified and quantified into measurable components due to policy 
decisions and an emphasis on results, combined with scarce funding, there is a 
competition for resources.  
 
Thirdly, religious organisations working within this field often draw on different 
sub-populations for support: Caritas draws on Catholic resources, the Church City 
Mission (Kirkens Bymisjon) draws on its connections to the Church of Norway, and 
Islamic centres that offer language courses appeal to their congregations. Finally, 
non-state organisations are flexible and adapt to the situation more readily than 
state actors adapt, indicated by the state’s recognition that non-state 
organisations can complement their activities and are therefore worth funding. 
Alternatively, it may be a process of state retraction, austerity, or attempt to 
download responsibility. 
 
In both Bergen and Oslo, the arrival of asylum seekers in the winter of 2015-2016 
prompted a development of activities, where the respective Caritas groups 
initiated contact with and offered their services to asylum reception centres. 
Partly, this engagement can be traced to Per, who prior to working for Caritas 
Norway worked for a reception centre and a private company that ran asylum 
centres. In line with the political rhetoric at the time, there was a lot of focus on 
the two components Caritas has focused on, work and language, and Caritas 
Norway and Bergen were seen as capable of providing first contact in that area 
‘to start the [integration] process as quickly as possible’ (Per, Caritas Norway).  
 
Importantly, this precedes any service provided once asylum seekers are granted 
asylum and entitled to language training and official assistance. In Bergen, they 
actively sought out a couple of emergency reception centres in January 2016 and 
offered their services but emphasised that ‘our work doesn’t stop when people 
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get out of the emergency reception centre’ (Gunnar, Caritas Bergen). Max, at 
Caritas Bergen, also pointed out that their engagement with one of the reception 
centres was due to a couple of parishioners in St. Paul who work at the reception 
centre, highlighting the relevance of a Catholic network. 
 
One of Caritas’ strengths, as highlighted by the interviewees, was their connection 
to the Church and an international organisation. This manifested itself in several 
ways. Generally, they referred to material benefits, such as use of offices or 
space, but Per also emphasised the importance of networks and legitimacy in the 
immigration community deriving from the Church being perceived as an immigrant 
community191. 
 
[…] our strength lies in being a small, flexible organisation that can 
more easily adapt or react faster […] Caritas is […]considerably 
larger organisation internationally than nationally […] it is a huge 
advantage, the massive Caritas network that is out there, for a 
relatively small organisation like Caritas [Norway] […] That the 
Catholic community is so obviously an immigrant community is 
definitely a strength in our migration and integration projects […] 
      Per, Caritas Norway 
 
The classroom is partially here, and partially in ‘the crypt’ under 
St. Paul’s, we use that almost every day except for Fridays […] We 
have had quite a few volunteers, student from St. Paul Upper 
Secondary […] 
      Gunnar, Caritas Bergen 
 
We are lucky to have a priest who burns for Caritas, and he assists 
in any way he can. We are lucky there. We are fortunate enough 
that we are allowed to make use of these facilities, because renting 
space in Drammen city centre is not cheap [R: I wouldn’t imagine it 
is] No, you won’t get anything usable for less than 10-12 000kr a 
month […] In addition, we can use this place as we see fit. 
      Trond, Caritas Drammen 
 
We have an office right around the corner, the cellar under the 
parsonage […] I think, here in Stavanger, we have made contact with 
people on Sundays, who we see in church, so… they haven’t come to 
the office as strangers, but we have come to know them through 
[church] 
      Knut, Caritas Stavanger 
                                         
191 Evidenced by arguments from Hovdelien (2016) and Mæland (2016) emphasising the Church as 
a “migrant church” 
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As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the boundaries between parochial 
and subsidiary Caritas groups is fluid. Despite Trond’s initial statement that they 
were entirely detached from the parish, he later recognised the support they 
received in terms of facilities and moral support. The professionalisation of the 
subsidiary Caritas groups does not involve a complete detachment from the 
parochial structures but does involve Caritas growing into its own. Caritas Bergen 
did remark that, the relationship with their local parish was not as strong as one 
would hope: 
 
What is perhaps a disappointment, if I may say it like that, is when 
we ask for volunteers at St. Paul’s, it is difficult. If we were to limit 
ourselves to Catholics from St. Paul, I think we’d have struggled a 
bit […] No, well, the parishes, they don’t help out. It’s not just in 
Bergen, I hear this around the country, because… the connection 
between Caritas and the parishes is not as close as in the typically 
Catholic countries. So, when they have put some money in the 
collection basket, they feel… [R: job’s over?] Yes. I am being nasty 
now, but it is the truth, this is our reality. 
      Gunnar, Caritas Bergen 
 
 
A final point worth highlighting, is where the people who come to the Caritas 
groups are from, and why they visit Caritas. What stands out is the shift from 
overwhelmingly male users, to a more balanced gender distribution, and the 
emphasis on EU/EEA countries. 
 
[People] who came in the good years when it was easy to get a job, 
but unfortunately over the course of the last couple of years [due 
to falling oil prices] have become unemployed […] Before, the 
groups from the different countries were very big, and you could 
speak your native tongue, it was no problem […] [On the change 
from male users to increasing female users] During the good times, 
these petroleum engineers earned well enough for the wife to stay 
at home with children and such, but [due to the husband’s 
unemployment] they have taken a more active role [in finding work] 
      Knut, Caritas Stavanger 
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[The] first half year, we had perhaps 20 participants [in the 
language course], mainly from Eastern Europe, now we have, over 
the course of a year, perhaps a hundred, and there is still a 
prevalence of Eastern Europeans, but the weight has shifted more 
towards Southern Europe, Arabia, Africa, and South America […] It 
has shifted [from male to female] as the weight of the participants 
has moved towards the Arabic and African world […]  
      Trond, Caritas Drammen 
 
Many come from European countries, they know Caritas, which is 
well known in their home country, in France, in Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, and Poland […]. It is the last two years, especially the last 
year, where the women have started showing up. Some of these 
women are married to the men who came four years ago [but] others 
show up on their own […] it has changed a lot since we opened this 
place. 
      Gunnar, Caritas Bergen 
 
We have seen that [shift from male to female users] here as well. 
More gender balance, but there is still a prevalence of men. Another 
development is [that] it is mainly labour migrants from Catholic 
countries who… It was why the info centre was created in the first 
place, as a direct response to that. We do see another group of 
users, but they [labour migrants] are still the core group […] 
    Per, Caritas Norway (emphasis added) 
 
 
In understanding how all these elements, illustrated in the above quotes, come 
together, a useful concept is that of the entrepreneur, as put forth by Fredrik 
Barth (1963b). In particular, the concept of niche is appropriate, in which Caritas 
takes advantage of the position they occupy in relation to resources, competition, 
and clients (1963b, p. 9). The resources afforded to Caritas through its personal, 
parochial, and international connections give them a particular set of assets 
(1963b, p. 9) that allow them to occupy that niche. Though Barth (1963b) applied 
his concepts to a Northern Norwegian context, many of the elements are similar, 
allowing Caritas to assume a role as mediator and broker ‘where new links are 
being created between local communities and central or national organisations’ 
(Barth, 1963b, p. 16). In particular, we see the importance of the relationship to 
the Church, not only on the material level but also the symbolic. 
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Hirschmann (2004) echoes this in his classification of resources, refuge, and 
respectability, and Caritas operates at the national and subsidiary level as 
entrepreneurial purveyors of their assets, resources, within the integration field. 
As Caritas, generally speaking, seeks to intervene directly in integration 
processes, the question becomes whether their intervention is positive or 
negative. In terms of language courses, they appear to offer an attractive 
alternative to for-profit language schools, and their connection to the Catholic 
Church gives them access to a large population of migrants as both volunteers and 
service users. 
 
On the other hand, facilitating employment for migrants is nominally positive, but 
what are the repercussions if they are only able to facilitate employment into low 
status, low paid labour? Caritas’ assistance might provide a stepping-stone, or it 
can prove a dead end. There is a distinct risk that Caritas reifies work and ignores 
unfair structures in society that results in immigrants becoming marginalised. This 
appears to be a significant limitation of an overly Social Integrationist outlook. 
 
Caritas Bergen and Caritas Norway demonstrate an awareness that there is a value 
inherent in connecting recently arrived migrants with settled migrants through 
their nascent self-help groups. Unfortunately, these were not up and running at 
the time of my data collection. Along with drawing on volunteers with language 
skills, migrant background, or relevant qualifications, Caritas highlights the 
viability of a positive path in integration processes. Without a comprehensive 
longitudinal study of those who utilise Caritas’ services, it is not possible to firmly 
establish their impact on long-term integration processes.  
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6.6 – Conclusion 
Drawing this chapter to a close, I have attempted to explore what the role of the 
Church and Catholic organisations is in integration processes (research question 
2). In order to answer the questions pertaining to this, I have had to examine each 
organisation’s shape and nature, as well as the relationship between them 
(research question 2.a and 2.b). From diocesan decisions around migrant pastoral 
care, clerical relocation, developments of a parish, to NUKs work with young 
Catholics, and Caritas’ domestic work. One of the fundamental premises has been 
that these organisations are subject to institutional isomorphism, and that they 
gradually come to resemble similar organisations within their fields. Whether it is 
in terms of bureaucratic regulations, or in institutional norms and practices, all of 
the above organisations straddle both Norwegian and Catholic identities with 
undercurrents of a host of identities and practices (research question 2.a.i). 
 
The professionalisation of the Diocese and Caritas raises the question of 
integration processes of migrants and their descendants: whether they become 
objects, someone in need of services, or whether they are allowed to be the 
subject, someone who shapes the processes. In terms of the Diocese and aspects 
of Caritas work, the former seems more apparent, whereas NUK and parochial 
processes are more indicative of the latter. Where NUK and St. Eystein are 
concerned with continuous re-constitution, thereby facilitating a processual 
perspective on integration, Caritas and the Diocese appear outcome-oriented.  
 
Ultimately, what this chapter has demonstrated is that integration processes are 
highly complex, multi-directional, bumpy, contextual, situational, and 
inconsistent. This is not an absolution of responsibility, rather the opposite: if our 
goal is to understand and positively influence integration processes, we need a 
deep understanding of local, regional, and national contexts. How St. Eystein 
impacts integration processes in Bodø ties into how they are perceived locally, 
the resources they have available, and who they can reach. This chapter provides 
an in-depth exploration of how diversity is viewed and engaged with, and provides 
a valuable comparison to organisations in later chapters. 
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What, then, are the useful conclusions we can draw from this chapter? Firstly, 
that the organisations presented in this chapter are flexible. They have a capacity 
to respond to changing conditions rapidly. Secondly, drawing on a common 
religious identity, these organisations are able to draw on a wide range of 
resources and authority, from local to transnational. Thirdly, by being apolitical 
and faith-based, they pursue a mission, religious or secular, irrespective of 
political climate. Finally, as associational, voluntary organisations, they will 
reflect their membership; deviations from this, such as the Diocese 
professionalisation process, become obvious and can be addressed. 
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Chapter 7 – R is for… 
7.1 – Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on cases situated towards the secular end of the 
religious-secular continuum. As such, the emphasis is on research question 3, 
questioning how secular organisations and activities in Norway influence 
integration processes. As explored in the previous chapter, faith-based 
organisations can provide migrants with refuge, respectability, and resources 
(Hirschmann, 2004). This chapter, on the other hand, explores these concepts in 
non-religious settings. Hirschmann argues religious organisations become salient 
primarily when refuge, resources, and respectability are ‘denied in broader 
society’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1229), which implies these three R’s can be found 
elsewhere. This chapter demonstrates how these concepts can be applied beyond 
Hirschmann’s original examples. Furthermore, by doing so it becomes apparent 
that there is an interconnected element relatively unexplored by Hirschmann: 
Reciprocity.  
 
The two-way processes of integration necessitate an understanding of how 
resources, both material and symbolic, do not only pertain to what organisations, 
religious or secular, can offer a migrant, but also what the migrant can offer them. 
Similarly, refuge, physical or psychological, relies on relationships where 
reciprocity offers a lens by which to understand them. Ultimately, respectability 
is based on relationships of recognition of dignity, skill, or position, whether it is 
individual, internally in a group, or external in relations with “other groups” 
(organisational, ethnic, national, or interest-based).  
 
Introducing reciprocity focuses our gaze on active exchanges between individuals, 
and between groups, but also how these exchanges lead to commitments. 
Reciprocity, or the absence of it, can help us understand what impact refuge, 
respectability, and resources have on integration processes. 
 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the three R’s as they appear in my 
data, before exploring how reciprocity fills in the gaps. I refer to Chapter 2 for a 
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closer examination of Hirschmann in context of the wider literature. As will be 
demonstrated through the empirical data, reciprocity forces us to see migrants as 
active agents in integration processes, rather than passive recipients of resources, 
respectability, or refuge. The primary objective of this chapter is thus to extend 
Hirschmann’s analysis of the role of religion into the secular, and to improve his 
model by adding a fourth element that focuses the analysis on relationships. 
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7.2 – Resources – Material and symbolic 
Reorienting our gaze from what religious organisations offer to migrants, what 
they seek and offer, allows us to expand our application and bring in other 
organisations and the rest of society. Effectively, it is not the religious nature of 
the organisation that is important, but their ability to offer resources, refuge, or 
respectability. The essential aspect is that migrants find these somewhere, 
religious and/or secular.  
 
This section explores the construction and perception of resources, how migrants 
utilise or seek them out. This fact is paramount, as existing resources and 
circumstances shape how they prioritise and pursue other resources. Resources 
are not necessarily tangible, such as clothing or money, but can be intangible, 
such as language, skills, or knowledge. What this section will explore is how 
migrants utilise non-religious organisations or means in order to obtain resources, 
or in some cases, how organisations pre-empt explicit requests for resources and 
provide them in a ‘build it and [they] will come’-manner192.  
 
The latter is exemplified by the activities undertaken by the Red Cross Bodø (RCB) 
and Refugees Welcome to Bodø (RWTB) in the autumn/winter of 2015. As 
organisations, they offer two interesting contrasts: RCB, a long established and 
powerful organisation in terms of resources and respectability it can mobilise, and 
RWTB, a new, acephalous movement spurred by recent events193.  
 
Following the arrival of between 50 and 60 asylum seekers at an emergency 
reception centre in Bodø, and 150 asylum seekers at Saltstraumen (just outside 
Bodø), RCB and RWTB began providing resources in the form of clothing, toiletries, 
social activities, and toys for children. RWTB characterised itself as an acephalous 
movement, springing from locals desire to help the asylum seekers. One of their 
volunteers, at a town-hall style meeting with RCB, explicitly emphasised their 
focus on providing tangible resources in the form of clothes, shoes, prams, or toys, 
                                         
192 The original quote, from the 1989 Field of Dreams film, is ‘build it and he will come’, but is 
often misquoted as ‘[…] they will come’ 
193 See for example Selim, et al. (2018) for a discussion of encounters during the “refugee crisis”. 
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and at one point, suitcases for asylum seekers before being relocated to another 
reception centre. The provision of these resources was predominantly due to the 
state apparatus, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, being absent from 
local communities, leaving a vacuum which was subsequently filled by RCB and 
RWTB. The contrast between the government response and local responses is 
stark, where the generosity of the local response differed from the absence of 
resources and response, and hostile policy development of the government. The 
absence of a response extended down to the local government, where a common 
criticism during meetings was the invisibility of the city council refugee office. 
 
During this period of my fieldwork, what stood out was the strict division of labour 
and separation of roles the Red Cross and RWTB promoted, similar to the division 
of labour mentioned by Caritas representatives in the previous chapter. This may 
be due to the differing natures of the organisations, where RCB is a more 
traditional charity while RWTB is based on an activism model (Brown, et al., 2002).  
 
This is aptly demonstrated by RCB, which emphasises a residualist form of social 
amelioration that aims to fill ‘gaps in provision’ (Brown, et al., 2002, p. 167). 
Echoing a Social Integrationist Discourse, it results in a narrowing of perspective 
and activity where identity is de-emphasized in favour of a very narrow 
construction of inequality. Ultimately, it also includes a functionalist and 
fragmented conception of society. This was not limited to the design of the 
activities, but influenced the instructions towards volunteers, encouraging strictly 
limited involvement and engagement: 
 
The Red Cross should first and foremost give practical support and 
show compassion towards recently arrived asylum seekers. A 
volunteer meets asylum seekers with friendliness and respect. We 
are neutral and impartial, and will neither offer advice pertaining to 
their case nor take a position on the asylum case. 
[…] 
Volunteers shall not establish personal contact with nor give personal 
telephone numbers to recently arrived asylum seekers while on 
assignment from the Red Cross. 
The volunteer only gives assistance while on duty. Assistance ceases 
when the mission is terminated. 
     RCB (2015a) 
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It was reiterated in multiple emails and in person that material donations were to 
be directed at RWTB. The Red Cross, thus, saw itself as providing more intangible 
resources such as refuge and compassion (albeit limited), or social resources such 
as facilitating activities. The key point here is that the provision of resources 
through RWTB and RCB was not so much a result of demands from the recently 
arrived asylum seekers, but a mobilisation of the local population in anticipation 
of assumed needs. What the Red Cross volunteers repeatedly emphasised was 
offering their time as a resource, one they saw as more meaningful than simply 
donating a cash sum or clothing.  
 
Importantly, these resources were, rather spontaneously, provided due to the 
absence of provision from the central state or the municipal administration. As 
remarked by Siv, a RCB volunteer:  
 
we came to work one day […] read the news and turns out two 
busloads [of asylum-seekers] were arriving […] So we turned on a 
dime and got hold of two fantastic activity leaders […]. The first 
weekend it was difficult with respect to what we were responsible 
for and what we weren’t […] 
 
Thus, several of my “shifts” at the smaller of the two emergency reception centres 
involved anything from playing cards with children, talking to teenagers and young 
adults about the Norwegian educational system, to helping the asylum seekers 
expand their Norwegian vocabulary. This, combined with the 
newness/inexperience of the volunteers, highlights the general absence of 
voluntary organisations in the asylum-sector, resulting in a “make it up as you go” 
approach. 
 
This created a strong limitation on the activities, as they were effectively 
disbanded once asylum seekers were relocated, or the state asylum system 
stepped in in the spring of 2016194. Inadvertently, this residualist model of 
                                         
194 RWTB all but disappeared apart from occasional requests for clothes, toys, equipment, and such 
on their Facebook group. 
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engagement does not engage with systemic issues and reinforces the status quo 
othering of migrants. By the end of my fieldwork, Red Cross Bodø had shifted its 
focus to providing a new activity, ‘Lån en Bodøværing’ – Borrow a Bodøværing, 
where it was up to the user, migrant labourer or asylum seeker/refugee, to seek 
out the resource. The activity was located in the public library, and consisted of 
volunteers making themselves available to migrants, primarily asylum seekers and 
refugees, and the migrant would “borrow” a local in the manner one would borrow 
a book. Engendering a consumerist view, this activity emphasises the behaviour 
of the migrant rather than the wider structures of society and risks reinforcing an 
activation/passivity framing that marginalises non-participants.  
 
Through establishing this consumerist view, the onus is on where migrants find 
resources to aid in their socioeconomic mobility. Two avenues for increasing 
socioeconomic mobility are income and education (Pekkarinen, et al., 2017). Ager 
and Strang (2008) consider four “markers and means”, where employment, 
housing, education, and health are seen as indicators in gauging integration 
processes. Of equal importance, is a third, more elusive way of increasing 
socioeconomic mobility: networking, where we instead draw on aspects of social 
connection. Ager and Strang (2008) identify three forms of social connection: 
bonds, between members of a group, bridges, between groups, and links, between 
individuals and structures of the state. The next paragraphs demonstrate how 
differing social bridges and bonds open or constrain migrants in mobilisation of 
resources.  
 
A significant issue is how having immigrated influences the ability to utilize 
resources such as education195. Maximova-Mentzoni, et al. (2016) found that being 
foreign-born, or foreign-educated, was detrimental to applications for positions 
in higher education. In particular, they note that ‘Norwegian-born candidates may 
be assessed less strictly when it comes to their profile […] if the applicant is 
foreign; there is an increased risk that their competency is overlooked or 
considered irrelevant’ (Maximova-Mentzoni, et al., 2016, p. 47). This raises the 
                                         
195 There is also how resources such as income and education shape the act of immigration, but 
that is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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question of how the social bonds of one group impacts the social bridges of other 
groups. It also reminds us of the issue of categorisation, explored in Chapter 2, 
where an employer, or the state’s, application of a category, regardless of the 
accuracy of the category, may limit the opportunities available to an immigrant. 
 
The issue of deskilling migrants is particularly salient196, as both Gunnar and Per 
from Caritas remark on the non-recognition of skills, marginalisation and labour 
market segregation of immigrants, and becomes the focus of Knut’s work in 
Stavanger: 
 
[…] we point to the jobs Norwegians don’t want […] Actually, 
Norway should be glad these [migrant labourers] come and take the 
jobs us poncey Norwegians don’t want anymore […] a big problem in 
Norway is that the public sector is all but closed for migrant 
labourers […] 
     Gunnar 
 
[…] on the one hand to give a reality check, but to not take away 
their hope […] we don’t want to, to begin with, communicate that 
there is a segregated labour market, or have an opinion on whether 
there is or isn’t […] it’s back to hope and a reality check […] 
     Per 
 
[…] if they show up with papers from abroad, we […] try to find out 
what is the equivalent Norwegian education […] because many of 
those who arrive have certificates and qualifications [and] want to 
know “what does this mean in Norway”, as an electrician, plumber, 
carpenter, builder […]people can come and have their competencies 
clarified, so Norwegian employers can see clearly what sort of 
qualifications they have. 
     Knut 
 
 
This segregation is particularly salient in the service industry, as remarked by 
Vanessa, a half-Swedish, half-Greek bartender working in Bodø, ‘if it’s a 
restaurant or bar, in the service industry, it’s almost only Swedes and foreigners’.  
Here we see echoes of Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) and the desirability 
and preferential treatment of Nordic immigrants. Reminiscent of Gunnar’s remark 
above, Vanessa also noted how ‘there are many [Norwegians] who won’t work, 
                                         
196 See, for example, Siar (2013) for more on deskilling of migrants. 
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they’re a bit lazier like that, and they give their shifts away to the Swedes 
because they know the Swedes will take them’197. Within this setting, being 
Swedish was a resource that could be used in order to find work, but it remains 
an open question whether this extends to other industries.  
 
An important element in this particular workplace was that many of the 
bartenders frequently socialised, and a few of them lived in the nearby hotel, 
which had the same owner as the bar. Thus, it offered not only socioeconomic 
resources, but also refuge in the literal sense of providing a roof over their heads. 
Furthermore, the bar provided a context for developing social bonding, internally 
amongst bartenders, alongside shaping, for better or worse, social bridging 
towards as customers. Vanessa described her colleagues and friends, that she ‘met 
through Susan’, as ‘an extra family’, but simultaneously remarking that working 
in a bar took its toll:  
 
There has also been some negatives, because I’ve not been doing 
well after having had to work nights and evenings, and there have 
been incidents… where unpleasant people haven’t behaved well [...] 
sometimes there are incidents where you don’t want to be friendly, 
but you have to be. 
 
Ali, a local politician, provides a contrast to this when speaking of his and his 
family’s, work at a restaurant in Bodø: 
 
[…] I think the main reason we [the family] didn’t move southwards 
is this place we’re sitting in right now, this restaurant […] we found 
work quickly here in Bodø […] after a year or two, it became more 
and more. What happened was that we took over this restaurant […] 
and we got to know the local population because we had these jobs 
[…] 
 
 
Dmitri, a Russian-born electrical engineer, offers another contrast, where the 
aspect of bonding, as co-workers, within the workplace is markedly different, as 
                                         
197 For more on young Swedish migrant labourers in Norway, see Tolgensbakk (2015) 
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it involves simultaneously bridging as migrant/non-migrant. Additionally, there is 
less bridging involved in the work itself, compared to Vanessa and Ali’s regular 
contact with the local population through their jobs. 
 
[…] it wasn’t easy to get to know my colleagues [in Molde] […] it 
was, you could say lonely, in Molde […]. No, I can’t say there’s much 
of a difference [in Bodø]. […] I tried, in the beginning, to be with 
people, but I found out… there, unfortunately, weren’t any mutual 
interests […] If anyone comes and talks, it’s after, we have core 
hours, regular hours, between 8am-4pm, and I regularly work a bit 
later, to about 5pm, and then, when there are fewer people at 
work, it’s possible to speak to someone. 
     Dmitri 
 
Whereas Vanessa’s job increasingly became a barrier to staying in Bodø, Ali’s 
experience resulted in stronger ties to the city, and in Dmitri’s case the process 
in Molde was interrupted by lay-offs, requiring him to, basically, start over in Bodø 
but he drew on his overall experience of living in Norway. This can be seen in their 
reflections on living in Bodø: 
 
No, not live here again, I don’t think so. But to visit because I have 
made friends here, absolutely. I’ll do that, a hundred per cent I’ll 
do that. But I don’t think there would be a future for me here […] 
In the end I got fed up with the job, it was only the job I got fed up 
with, to be honest, and maybe a bit because it feels like I don’t have 
anything left to do here in Bodø. 
     Vanessa 
 
[…] we see Bodø as our home, our city, and it’s in the name, right? 
“Bo” [live] and “dø” [die], you live here, you die here. That’s sort 
of it… 
       Ali 
But now, in Bodø, I can say I’m more social […] When I came here, 
to Bodø, after two-three months I decided to adapt to the situation, 
not that I should change, but adapt to the situation […] You know, 
I’ve lived in this country for four years. I have invested a lot time, 
a lot of work, and a lot of other things […] I’m used to living in 
Norway, but it is entirely possible, later, some years from now, that 
I move to another country. It depends. 
     Dmitri 
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There are important differences between these three cases: their mode of entry. 
Vanessa’s sole reason for moving to Norway, and Bodø, was employment, whereas 
Ali, and his family, came to Norway as political refugees, whilst Dmitri was initially 
in Norway for educational reasons and later stayed for work. Thus, there are 
significant differences in their experiences that would influence their bases for 
social bonding and bridging. Nonetheless, they offer contrasts on the potential of 
workplaces in shaping social bridging and bonding.  
 
In all cases, youth also functioned as a resource, often in facilitating access to 
other resources such as language. Ali had access to primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education in Norway, which would increase his chances of socioeconomic 
mobility. In the bar, the only employees above the age of 30 were a few of the 
bouncers, the rest were in their 20s. While working in the bar, this often came up 
in conversations with the bartenders and customers, that there was ‘a type’ or 
‘mould’ for who got to work in the bar. Youthfulness, gender, and appearance 
could be used as resources, giving those who tick the right boxes access to work, 
albeit only in certain industries. This was echoed in Gunnar’s remark that:  
 
the labour market wants young, sexy people, they don’t want old 
people like me […] if you’re 55 years old, look a bit worn, come here 
and don’t speak Norwegian, then the prognosis for being able to 
help you is poor […] it’s like making a river flow uphill […] the entire 
bar and club industry is closed for that age group’ 
 
 
Dmitri, a 26-year-old, used getting a driver’s licence, more commonly done at a 
young age, as a means of practicing Norwegian:  
 
[…] I think those two months I spent [taking driving lessons], there 
were several who noticed an improvement, and… When I was almost 
done with taking the licence, I met up with a friend from 
Brøstabotn, from Demas, where I had worked, and he remarked that 
my Norwegian had improved a lot in the course of the last couple of 
months. Yeah, in the beginning we [Dmitri and the driving 
instructor] only talked about driving, “take right here, left here, 
third exit”, but then, especially on long distance driving […] there 
was a lot of time to talk. To talk about different topics, and not 
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just everyday matters, we talked about history, politics, art, film, 
and diverse topics, and, of course, I repeatedly asked, “what is this 
called in Norwegian? What is that called?”’ 
 
 
Naturally, getting your driver’s licence is an expense, and up to a point a privilege, 
that not everyone has access to. Nonetheless, Dmitri maximised the usefulness of 
the process. While in Bodø, I sat my driving test. During the driving lessons, I found 
that my driving instructor, Thor, had repeatedly been in the situation described 
by Dmitri. In particular, he mentioned one student who initially had a translator 
with her, but Thor found the presence of the translator to be a hindrance and 
instead used flash cards and images, gradually teaching the student the necessary 
vocabulary in order to pass the driving test. Although obtaining a driver’s licence 
may be the primary goal, language training becomes a bonus.  
 
In some instances, creative strategies such as the one above, can be seen as a 
result of a dearth of language training opportunities elsewhere. Dmitri initially 
came to Norway as a student, and although his course was meant to be taught in 
English, he noticed that 
 
[during an exam] I noticed that the question was formulated 
differently. I read the English version, and understood every word, 
but didn’t understand what the sentence, the question, meant, and 
then I looked at the Norwegian version and understood [what they 
were asking]. 
 
 
While he attended the University College in Narvik, he mostly taught himself 
Norwegian, as ‘there was no offer [of Norwegian language courses] in the 
beginning’. Eventually, the College ‘found some money to hire a teacher […] and 
had a course, 30 hours, an introductory course’, but that was not until March, 
almost 8 months into the academic year. Remarking on the timing of the course, 
‘a bit too late’, and the quality, ‘of course 30 hours isn’t enough’, Dmitri mused 
that  
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I can say I used her [the language instructor], in a fashion [by] 
talking to her in the break, I showed up early and spoke to her, was 
the last to leave and walked with her to the exit. 
 
 
Whereas language training, for Dmitri, required investment of resources, Ali had 
access to comprehensive language training through his primary and secondary 
education, and Vanessa had the ability to use Swedish in lieu of Norwegian. With 
language being incessantly mentioned as the “key” to integration, this was often 
constructed in a Social Integrationist perspective of facilitating employment. Yet 
the need for language skills extends beyond employment, such as Dmitri noting 
that his Norwegian was ‘good enough for my employer, but I am not happy with 
it’. This speaks to a more expansive view, more akin to a redintegrationist 
discourse that emphasises a multifactorial approach. In particular, Dmitri echoes 
the notion of identities being considered equal, and the ability to be able to define 
yourself. The overwhelming emphasis on nationality was seen as a hindrance: 
 
It is not nationality that defines me, that describes me the most. 
There are other things, but while nationality is the first point in the 
description, then I can’t say I’m integrated. 
     Dmitri 
 
 
A final aspect I wish to explore in this section is that of temporality. Not simply 
because integration processes take time, but because people utilise time 
differently. Understanding time as a resource emphasises how it is finite and can 
shape decisions on integration processes and migration. Such as Vanessa, and the 
other bartenders, who felt it was time to leave, Ali and Dmitri speak of time 
invested, and certain activities and categorisations, such as asylum-seeker, are 
constructed as temporary.  
 
There are also constraints placed on one’s time, a large portion of it is spent on 
activities that are difficult to deprioritise, such as paid labour, family and care 
work, or biological needs such as sleep. For example, the hours Vanessa had to 
work in the bar eventually had a negative impact on her well-being, whereas 
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Dmitri worked a 9-5 job and could spend his evenings in pursuit of other interests. 
In Dmitri’s case, at the time he devoted his time to improving his Norwegian, 
partially by volunteering for the Red Cross and through continued study: 
 
 
I pay for [the course] myself. It is entirely… my Norwegian is good 
enough for my employer, but I am not happy with it, and that is why 
I have to improve. Also, I want to continue studying, and take [more 
education] in Norwegian and in order to do that I have to have 
passed “Bergenstesten” […] 
 
I [volunteer] for the Red Cross first and foremost to make new 
acquaintances, to get to know people, to do something useful, and, 
again, language. It is good practice. 
     Dmitri 
 
 
 
[…] I have a dog, so I walk the dog, and then we, I have… [Anna, 
colleague from the bar], and I have gone dancing, and done other 
stuff so it’s not just work. A bit of exercise, but it’s mostly been 
work and then meeting friends, going to the cinema and stuff […] 
 
All the Swedes here know each other [R: Do you get together often, 
do stuff together?] Yeah, a lot of them like fishing, but I don’t, I 
prefer dancing or singing. I also like to spend time by myself when 
doing stuff, I like being social, but sometimes I need to be by myself 
and do what I want. Like reading, singing, and stuff [R: What sort 
of social activities are there…] To do here in Bodø? Mostly, there’s 
going out and… We play a lot of cards, it’s become a habit to come 
here [the bar] and play cards, different card games, then there’s 
bowling. We often go bowling. Go to the cinema, but not as often. 
Mostly bowling and playing cards and going for walks. [R: Activities 
where you can talk?] Yes, exactly. And going to a café every once in 
a while. Which in Swedish we call “going for fika”. 
     Vanessa 
 
 
This use of time as a resource, either in pursuit of socialisation, or in a sense 
refuge, or activities that can specifically benefit the migrant in a material sense, 
is one aspect of temporality in integration processes. Another facet is how non-
migrants see their time as a resource or involvement in integration activities as 
challenges, such as Vigdis Larsen, a deacon in the Church of Norway: 
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[…] I think part of the reason as to why it is difficult for Norwegians 
to come into contact with refugees in a city, asylum seekers or 
whatever you want to call them, is because, in a way, it feels like 
you have to get really involved, you have to go to a family, have a 
house, clothes, food [to offer], and take them on holiday and all 
this, you get too involved, so you get a bit shy and anxious […] So 
creating a meeting space where they [Norwegians and migrants] can 
get in touch, for a couple of hours, and then they can go home. 
Here, I think, the Red Cross, as they do at Bodøsjøen [the emergency 
reception centre], where they had things daily from 5pm to 7pm, 
“here it’s just a matter of showing up, you don’t need to know 
anything, pop the kettle on, talk a bit, and it’ll be fine”. I think 
that enticed a lot of people, “Hey, I can try this out”. 
 
Similarly, Michael, the activity manager for the RCB after-school homework group 
(Leksehjelpen), focused on defining and delimiting involvement: 
  
I don’t know that much, I can’t help them [pupils] with homework, 
but I have the time to organise the activity, and find people who 
have the time and knowledge to be helpers. 
 
This returns us to the start of the section, and the guidelines for RCB volunteers 
at the emergency reception centres: dispassionate and delimited, and to a certain 
extent utilitarian and pragmatic. Furthermore, it was regularly highlighted how 
volunteers are often those with more time (pensioners), or those who indirectly 
benefit, such as students, through the attitude of ‘it looks good on your CV’ 
(Astrid, RCB volunteer).  
 
Finally, adding a temporal understanding helps maintain focus on the processual 
nature of integration. Time is, in itself, a resource that is used, preserved, and 
endured in a multitude of ways. It is this expenditure of time that often forms the 
crux of problematisation of integration issues, where there is a disjuncture in what 
migrants do with their time, are expected to do with their time, and are capable 
of doing with their time. This disjunction stems from a rhetoric of fast-tracking 
and accelerating integration processes, and ties into welfare and austerity 
discourses.  
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Language-learning, job orientation, and value dissemination is accelerated, and 
migrants, especially asylum seekers, are ‘asked to make personal human contact 
at an inhuman speed’ (Hochschild, 2012[1983], p. 126) in order to “integrate 
faster/better”. Illustrated neatly by a statement from Kristin Ørmen Johnsen 
(2017), a Conservative politician: the journey from being a refugee to an 
integrated taxpayer has to be as short as possible. Here the onus is on the 
individual and incorporates elements of a Moral Underclass Discourse by suggesting 
a hierarchy (refugee<taxpayer), and implying benefits result in a welfare 
dependency.  
 
The Norwegian axiom, contribution before benefaction198, leads to a conflation of 
labour and education as the ends to, rather than means to, integration. A job, 
regardless of industry or fit with migrants’ skills and qualifications, is not the goal; 
it should be seen as a step in the integration process, invoking an attitude that 
migrants should expect to be underemployed, at least until they have “Norwegian 
qualifications”. Combined with the migration patterns explored in Chapter 2, this 
results in a marginalised and segregated labour market that is at substantial risk 
of also being racialised.  
 
Employing Hirschmann’s (2004) notion of resources has allowed us to explore 
migrant behaviour in an insightful manner, showing how they seek resources but 
also utilise resources they are in possession of in managing a day-to-day existence, 
an integral part of integration processes. The next section focuses on the second 
of Hirschmann’s Rs: Refuge. 
  
                                         
198 “Yte for å nyte” 
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7.3 – Refuge – Material and psychological 
This section will explore the role and manifestation of refuge in my fieldwork. 
Refuge can be understood in two ways, material or psychological – ‘physical safety 
as well as […] psychological comfort’, as a means of mitigating the ‘trauma of 
migration’ which not only carries an emotional or mental strain but also physical 
strain. (Hirschmann, 2004, pp. 1210, 1229). This is mirrored in Ager and Strang’s 
(2008) model of factors impacting perceptions of quality of life. The Norwegian 
state provided material refuge for asylum seekers in the form of covering the 
barest essentials of basic accommodation, and three meals a day through the 
emergency reception centre. The local municipality had, and took, no part in the 
business, while the Red Cross stepped in to provide or facilitate a social life that 
would provide ‘psychological benefits’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1212).  
 
After walking in near freezing temperatures for half an hour, in 
whipping winds, and the increasingly familiar darkness, I arrive at 
Bodøsjøen camping, one of the emergency reception centres where 
the Red Cross have organised an activity. Hastily thrown together, 
there has been little information as to what is expected of 
volunteers. The asylum seekers have been housed in wee cabins, 
grouped together either by family or age and gender. I’ve been told 
to look for a Red Cross banner, which should indicate where the 
activity will take place. I step into a cramped room with four small 
couch groups and a small table up against one wall. So far, only a 
couple of volunteers have arrived, and we introduce ourselves. I’m 
given a binder with a “contract” and instructions and told to sign. 
In one corner is a pile of instant waffle-mix, coffee, tea, sugar, and 
some drawing stuff and games. 
 
Steadily, people show up, and I find myself reacting to how lightly 
they’re dressed considering the weather. After a short while, the 
room is filled to capacity, with people chatting away, and the other 
two volunteers making conversation with some of the women. 
Strongly sweetened tea is by far more popular than coffee, and I 
find the provision of waffles oddly quaint.  
 
Roughly a third of the 40 people in the room are children, who are 
left to their own devices. I take a deck of cards and sit down with 
the children, some as young as 4 years old, and a few in their early 
teens. Some of the older children speak a bit English, but I struggled 
to think of a card game that could easily be played by many people 
without having to explain complicated rules. I settle for a simple 
approach: I deal cards to everyone around the small table and put 
down a card, point to the young boy to my left and indicate for him 
to put a card down. He puts down a higher value card. The next 
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child puts down a lower value card, and I try to explain, through 
gestures, that he needs to put down a higher value card. There 
aren’t really any clear rules, but we keep putting down cards, and 
occasionally I draw in the pile or give it to someone, so they’ll have 
more cards. After ten minutes, the game seems self-sustaining and 
I pass my cards to a nearby kid who’s only been observing so far. 
 
I move on to talking to some of the young men, who seem to be in 
their twenties, and who have a fair mastery of English. The 
conversation moves between telling them about Norway, reassuring 
them that the weather does improve (eventually), and getting to 
know them. I find it difficult to navigate the conversation, not 
knowing if, or when, I overstep and ask a sensitive question, or if 
they expect something in particular from me. I decide to ignore that 
nagging feeling (insecurity?) and do my best in listening and getting 
to know them. All the while, I find myself worrying about their 
future, how their asylum application will go, how the national 
discourse will portray them, and how my role as a researcher is 
obscured by the need to simply be a compassionate human being. 
 
Two hours have passed; they leave, and the volunteers write up a 
wee report, detailing how many were there, gender, age, if 
anything in particular happened, and tidy up. 
Notes after first shift at the emergency reception centre, 
November 2015 
 
The excerpt offers some insight into the provision of refuge, but circumstances 
made it nigh impossible to maintain contact and follow this group over time. Due 
to access (limited by internal RCB rules), relocation (to other reception centres), 
or deportation, or loss of contact once they entered the regular asylum reception 
system, I was unable to extend the research further once RCBs activity was 
terminated in February 2016. Nonetheless, the short period during which this 
activity ran, draws attention to the emphasis RCB, and many locals, put on 
friendliness and socialising, key aspects of Ager and Strang’s (2008) quality of life 
model. 
 
Space is also an important element of Refuge, whether physical or mental space, 
such as the communal room where the Red Cross sought to facilitate activities and 
provide what was often referred to as ‘psychosocial first aid’. The intensity and 
frequency by which the Red Cross initiated activities in emergency reception 
centres, not just in Bodø but also around the country, can be seen as a way of 
providing an ‘anchor as immigrants must adapt’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1211). This 
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first impression, or anchor, can be significant (Ager & Strang, 2008). For example, 
one of the children, a 14-year-old, from the emergency reception centre held a 
17th May199 speech, as a part of the official 17th May program, and highlighted how 
the Red Cross and the activities they organised the first few months were 
important to him and gave him a positive impression: Bodø is pleasant with nice 
people.  
 
Refuge involves seeking or creating a community (or sense of) and necessitates a 
development of familiarity. This inculcation of familiarity, as a core element of 
refuge, covers both material and psychological aspects. Hirschmann (2004) draws 
on imagery such as ‘drawn to’ (p. 1208) or ‘gravitate’ (p. 1210) when speaking of 
familiarity and refuge. This language offers some insight, as it allows us to 
distinguish the migrant, who is actively moving towards (drawn to) the familiar, 
perhaps in the form of an organisation or informal group, and the group, whose 
characteristics have the potential to influence the migrant (gravitate). Yet, the 
language also implies underlying, unconscious processes: in the absence of formal 
groups or organisations, they might arise because of a coalescence of interests. 
Such as, the Filipino Society in Bodø, which was the result of Filipinos gradually 
coming together under the auspices of St. Eystein but establishing itself as 
separate from the parish. 
 
Drawing further on the idea of gravity, it importantly focuses our attention on 
aspects of quantity, size, and space. For example, for Dmitri it was different being 
Russian in Narvik and Bodø, where ‘people are used to Russians’ (Narvik) and ‘I 
found, on Facebook, a Norwegian-Russian association’ (Bodø), as opposed to 
Molde, where ‘I tried to get in touch with locals, but they were very suspicious 
[of me], a bit sceptical’. Simultaneously, Dmitri ‘tried to get into typically 
Norwegian activities, like hiking’, but the understanding of it as “typically 
Norwegian” emphasises its unfamiliarity as an activity: resulting in the discovery 
that ‘it was boring to hike, all the time, by yourself’.  
 
                                         
199 Norway’s national holiday, commemorating the signing of the constitution in 1814. 
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Contrasted with Vanessa, who immediately found some familiarity and comfort in 
the ubiquity of Swedes within the bar-industry: All the Swedes know each other 
here. Additionally, the bar itself offered a familiar, shared space where they could 
meet. Similarly, when Ali came to Norway, ‘we were five-six big families from 
Kurdistan, who came at the same time and ended up in Narvik’. Again, being given 
access to a space, the steakhouse, gave them an anchor to Bodø: […] I think the 
main reason we didn’t move southwards is this space you and I are sitting in right 
now, this restaurant. To a certain extent, this attraction to familiarity was also 
apparent in the emergency reception centre, where there were cliques structured 
around whether they came from Egypt, Afghanistan, or Syria. 
 
On the opposite end, dissimilarity or unfamiliarity can increase the mental strain 
or ‘trauma of migration’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1210). If one, initially, has a sense 
of excitement about the migration: 
 
I’d never been so far north […] and I figured… Well, see something 
new and get to know new people 
Vanessa 
  
When I arrived [in Molde] … The first few days I just walked about 
and looked, and sort of “ok, lots of flowers, very green, beautiful 
city and nature”. Yeah, but some days later I realised I didn’t know 
anyone, at all. 
     Dmitri 
 
The excitement is often accompanied by a shock of dissimilarity: 
 
And, I panicked, and started crying, and called my parents […] but 
after a week I enjoyed myself. 
     Vanessa 
 
In Molde, you know, in Molde there was a bit of… I was in shock for 
a long time. I moved there, and… it wasn’t “one month and I’m 
fine”. No, it took time. The first weeks or months […] I wore 
“Russian glasses” […] and I was quite passive. 
     Dmitri 
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A key element in both Vanessa and Dmitri’s experience is that both migrated as 
adults, alone, and for different reasons: education (Dmitri) or work (Vanessa), but 
the reasons for remaining changed. Dmitri went on to obtain work, whereas 
Vanessa extended her stay in part due to social reasons.  
 
Ali came to Bodø, and Norway, as a young, political refugee, with family, and 
represents yet another variation of how refuge manifests. While several of the 
Kurdish families that arrived at the same time moved southwards, Ali’s family 
stayed and ‘we went to school here, got friends here, got to know the locals […] 
That made it more difficult for us to leave Bodø’. They were given refuge in both 
a bureaucratic sense of being granted asylum, which entitled them to certain 
material support, but also found it through involvement with the local community, 
activities directly related to socializing, and activities not directly related to 
socializing (Ager & Strang, 2008).  
 
Refuge is often imbued with a sense of acuteness, particularly when linked to the 
asylum system and the crisis rhetoric of 2015/2016. This prompts a discussion of 
whether there is a hierarchy in Hirschmann’s three Rs. Even if there is a hierarchy, 
the ranking will shift based on context. Once Refuge has been found, Resources 
can be obtained, and perhaps that results in finding Respectability. Perhaps 
Respectability facilitates easy access to Resources, which in turn leads to Refuge. 
Or, as Ager and Strang (2008, p. 186) put it: ‘[how] progress with respect to one 
domain supports progress with respect to another [is] poorly understood’. 
 
Adding context, and by extension a temporal aspect, we can note how priorities 
shift. Vanessa, for example, experienced an acute need for Refuge upon arrival, 
but had already obtained Resources and Respectability through her position at the 
bar, which drastically reduced the time and effort she had to expend to find 
refuge. The similarities between Sweden and Norway, linguistically and culturally, 
rendered Bodø familiar, whilst working with peers provided an additional layer of 
familiarity. Due to the relative stability of her stay, and understanding of it as 
temporary, her priorities rarely shifted. Ultimately, a desire for more of all three 
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Rs led her to move back to Sweden: she was offered a job as a teacher, giving her 
the opportunity to obtain more respectability than working in the bar, and 
resources through a more stable and predictable job, but returning to the familiar 
refuge of her home country. 
 
Contrasted with Dmitri’s experiences, we can see how there is not only a 
hierarchy, but also how they overlap. Ager and Strang’s (2008) emphasis on the 
role of housing demonstrates how refuge and respectability can be linked. While 
at the University College in Narvik, Dmitri was offered accommodation in an 
apartment building run by the Best Western Hotel. Despite offering Refuge, the 
accommodation ‘compared to the worst student accommodation, it was worse in 
the Best Western’. Though it was a blow to his Respectability, it was seen as 
temporary and therefore not necessarily worth the extra effort or strain involved 
in finding alternative accommodation in a new, unfamiliar city. Similarly, when 
persistently encountering challenges in attempting to socialise with colleagues, 
there is a lack of Refuge to be found:  
 
It wasn’t easy to get to know the colleagues [in Molde] […] There 
was an attempt to organise “lønningspils”200, but we lost that one. 
Only three people signed up […] It was, you could say, lonely in 
Molde […] I can’t say there’s that big of a difference [in Bodø]. Lunch 
breaks… I tried, in the beginning, to be with people and… but I found 
out that, unfortunately, there weren’t any shared interests […] If I 
didn’t say keywords, buzzwords like fishing, mountain, or cabin, it 
became uninteresting for them [the colleagues] […] I get the 
impression that when you get in touch with people, they’re nice, 
really nice, but you’re kept at a distance. Consistently, and firmly. 
Which is why I was very surprised when you asked if I wanted to go 
for a pint, I was so surprised I couldn’t turn down, say “no”, because 
it doesn’t happen often […] There were these colleagues who go 
fishing or cycling every week, I suggested going for a pint once and 
they went “yeah, of course, we should”, and we never have […] Most 
Norwegians are difficult to get to know, you can say “hi”, and 
people are friendly and helpful, but when it comes to, if we’re 
talking friendship, I can say I don’t have any Norwegian friends. 
None. 
 
                                         
200 Directly translated, “salary pint” – going for a pint on payday 
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This lack of Refuge granted by locals, in Narvik, Molde, and Bodø, results in a 
damning indictment from Dmitri: I can say that Mission Integration is completely 
lost. Which in turn offers some explanation for why he sought out the Norwegian-
Russian association. This is reminiscent of Ager and Strang's (2008) distinction 
between ‘involvement with the ethnic community’ and ‘involvement with the 
local community’, and its relationship to perceived quality of life. 
 
The lack of Refuge found in Molde, prompted Dmitri to consider relocating to 
somewhere he had friends, and when the redundancies were announced, forcing 
Dmitri to focus on finding Resources, relocation was all but guaranteed. Yet, the 
desire for Refuge was not the determining factor when relocating, a job was, 
hence the move to Bodø. We see the interplay between Resources, Refuge, and 
Respectability in Dmitri’s everyday encounters, and also how they are weighted 
differently.  
 
Having explored both Resources and Refuge, it remains to examine the final 
component of Hirschmann’s model: Respectability. Having already touched on it 
in the latter part of the current section, the next section will break it down further 
and lead us into the development of a new R, Reciprocity.  
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7.4 – Respectability – Internal and external 
Respectability, the final R in Hirschmann’s framework, is perhaps the most 
intangible of the three Rs. In short, Hirschmann (2004, p. 1229) sees respectability 
as ‘[…] opportunities for status recognition and social mobility’. Earlier in the 
article, he notes that: 
 
[Immigrants] experienced upwards mobility and joined the 
“respectable” middle class (most of their early immigrant ancestors 
were probably not respectable in their countries of origin and 
probably not in the early years after arrival […]). 
     Hirschmann 2004, p. 1215 
 
Respectability, therefore, is inextricably tied to issues of class, migration, and 
status. Yet, it is also contingent upon recognition and acceptance. Respectability 
is also negatively linked with the prevalence of intolerance and prejudice 
(Hirschmann, 2004). By definition, Respectability is to be in possession of 
something worth respecting, of worth, merit, and importance. Critically, it 
involves a relationship between what you possess and what others recognise. 
 
Now, we can begin to distinguish between two facets of Respectability, an internal 
or external respectability, both of which are strongly linked to individual 
identification processes. The internal form is tied to Refuge, where familiarity, 
and similarity, facilitates recognition and Respectability within an in-group. As 
Hirschmann (2004, p. 1210) points out, this leads to ‘employment in ethnic 
enclave firms and social pursuits in the company [of those] with similar 
backgrounds.’ The external form is the respect and dignity an individual expects 
from society, or from an out-group. A lack of the external form can drive a need 
for the internal form and result in ‘sheltered [communities] where immigrants and 
their families [do] not have to endure the daily insults’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 
1222), tying it to discussions of ghettos and silos201. This relationship can be seen 
in Ali’s recounting of his family history and migration: 
 
                                         
201 See for example OECD (1998) 
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[…] another thing is how we were received by people in Bodø, who 
have, without a doubt, contributed to us staying here. If we hadn’t 
been well received here, by the people of Bodø, we would not have 
thrived here. And, if we hadn’t thrived here over a long period of 
time, no doubt, we would have moved away […] the population of 
Bodø are, generally, fantastic, very hospitable and open, right? […] 
Northerners, they’re spontaneous, open, and very inclusive […] you 
have to be accepted by society, that you are different […] I didn’t 
move to Norway because everything was so much better than in 
Kurdistan, I think what made my father and mother move to 
Norway, it wasn’t welfare, I’m sure of that, because we had food, 
we had water, we had the essentials in Kurdistan as well. What we 
didn’t have there, which is what every human needs and has a right 
to, is dignity, freedom, and belonging to a bigger environment, 
country, society, and people. We didn’t have that […] Our language, 
our identity, our dignity was trampled, day by day. 
 
 
Yet, recognition and acceptance do not only manifest in as drastic situations as 
those experienced by Ali, but also occur in mundane encounters. What Ali’s 
experience highlights is the importance of a base level of respectability, the 
inherent worth of an individual and, in this case, the Kurdish. This underlies every 
encounter, and can appear in everyday conversations, again echoing Ager and 
Strang (2008).  
 
For example, Dmitri spoke of how people spoke Norwegian to him as an indicator 
of their estimation of him: 
 
[…] in Molde, there were some colleagues who didn’t speak 
Norwegian to me, at all [R: Do you know why?] Because they thought 
that I, as a Russian, was too dumb to speak Norwegian, to 
understand the Molde-dialect […] I’d reply in Norwegian and he’d 
continue in English […] a couple of years ago, I was met with toddler-
language […] I’m not a toddler, I have the same responsibilities as 
Norwegians […] but now I feel that people talk to me as they would 
normally speak. 
 
Language, in the above example, forms a part of Respectability, where Dmitri’s 
colleague’s refusal to acknowledge Dmitri’s efforts was experienced as 
disrespectful and insulting. Indicating a link between two factors Ager and Strang 
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(2008) characterise as having distinct distances from each other in impact on 
perceived quality of life: language and friendliness of local people. Here, language 
and dialect becomes tied to friendliness and experiences of respectability, in 
terms of the non-native speaker’s mastery but also the native speaker’s 
perception of and response to those language skills. 
 
As recognition is a fundamental part of Respectability, communication becomes 
integral, which strengthens the importance of language. This even applies when 
one is a native speaker of a language, as dialects carry meaning. While working in 
the bar, I occasionally received hostile reactions to my Oslo-dialect, but once it 
was established as an Eastern-Oslo (traditionally working class) dialect and not 
the Western-Oslo (upper class) dialect, there was less hostility. Nonetheless, as a 
native speaker, I was automatically afforded more respect than, as Vanessa put it 
‘[…] Poles get to work, either in the kitchen, or with something else because they 
can’t communicate in the same way’. 
 
Despite language featuring prominently in external Respectability, it also features 
in the internal form, in the same way it is related to Refuge: ‘[….] needs, which 
are most meaningful when packaged in a familiar linguistic and cultural context’ 
(Hirschmann, 2004, pp. 1207-1208) (emphasis added). Thus, when there are 
languages which are closely related, such as Norwegian and Swedish, ‘it’s almost 
the same language’ (Vanessa), there is less of a gap: external Respectability and 
Refuge is more accessible. Although language is generally portrayed as a Resource, 
and emphasised as essential for integration, because of its function as a Resource, 
it is equally relevant for Respectability.  
 
Language also features in other situations, such as recognition or translation of 
skills, qualifications, and education. This was encountered in the previous 
chapter, where an essential aspect of Caritas’ work was aiding in this translation 
process, in addition to their language classes. 
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As with Resources and Refuge, age is also a factor in Respectability. Hirschmann 
(2004, p. 1209) argues that migrants can obtain Respectability by ‘joining one of 
the already existing subcultures’, which can be seen in Vanessa’s reflections on 
working in the pub-industry. Vanessa saw the job as appropriate for her age, but 
that it was temporary: I like working here and all that, but it’s not exactly what 
I want to do. I’m 25 now. Short-term, the job provided a certain Respectability, 
but due to the negative aspects of the job, it was untenable. Whereas Vanessa 
could easily fit into a youth subculture in the nightlife-industry, Dmitri had few 
opportunities for obtaining the same respectability in his workplace where he was 
often younger: […] most of them are at least ten years older. 
 
Dmitri also noted the association between immigrant and refugee/asylum seeker, 
and emphasised that the persistent focus on the integration of refugees and 
asylum seekers risked rendering other immigrants invisible: 
 
One night, I was with a friend, he’s Ukrainian, and we were standing 
in Glasshuset202, it was around 1am, we’d bought burgers and were 
eating them, and up comes a young man, he was a bit drunk, he 
asked a question and [when we answered] he heard our foreign 
pronunciation, and “you’re not from Norway? No, I’m from Russia. 
Are you an asylum seeker? No, I’m an engineer”. So, there is this 
foreigner=asylum seeker. Foreigner=asylum seeker. There are some 
integration programs in Norway, but they’re mostly focused on 
refugees, but I can tell you, workers, foreign workers, also need 
help with integration and integrating. 
 
Thus, the nature and labelling of migrants also impacts on Respectability, cutting 
several ways. The recognised status of refugee affords the migrant certain rights 
and benefits, but simultaneously situates them as dependent upon the state and 
society, increasing the risk of removing their agency. Similarly, being a migrant 
labourer affords the respectability of contributing to society, but with a labour 
market segregation that disadvantages migrants, the respectability is limited. This 
process sits on the intersection of racialisation, migrant identification and 
labelling processes, and respectability. 
                                         
202 A shopping arcade in the centre of Bodø 
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At this point, it is necessary to move the discussion onto “the new R”, reciprocity.  
Where Resources, Refuge, and Respectability are useful in exploring integration 
processes, Reciprocity ties them all together and provides a holistic view on 
integration processes by focusing on relationships and interactions.  
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7.5 – Reciprocity – Giving and receiving 
One of the key contributions of this thesis lies in the inclusion of reciprocity to 
Hirschmann’s framework. While he does not explicitly identify the nature of 
reciprocity when exploring the role of religion in integration processes, it 
underlies parts of his argument. For example, Hirschmann notes that ‘members in 
many religious bodies, similar to members of a family, do not expect immediate 
reciprocity […]’ (p. 1207)(emphasis added). Later, he argues that ‘religious 
commitments are stronger if a faith expects conformity to principles and enforces 
obligations by creating a strong sense of community’ (p. 1228). These quotes point 
to the importance of relationships in understanding the behaviour of migrants and 
religious organisations but can easily be adapted to other scenarios.  
 
For example, in Bloch and McKay’s (2015, p. 40) research on employment within 
ethnic enclaves and businesses: ‘Co-ethnic workers are thought to possess 
desirable characteristics of which solidarity and trust assumed by shared ethnicity 
features highly’. Familiarity, one of the elements of Refuge facilitates a 
relationship. This is not to suggest that these relationships are perfectly 
reciprocal, as Bloch and McKay (2015, pp. 40-41) note that ‘the enclave can trap 
workers and prevent the development of social networks seen as crucial for 
progression’.  
 
The role of Reciprocity is easily identified in Hirschmann’s (2004) latter discussion 
of the role of ‘immigrant/ethnic churches’ by positing the question: who is 
providing the Resources, Respectability and Refuge to new immigrants? The 
nature of the relationship is essential. We can begin by examining the cause of 
the relationship. Thus, it follows logically that there will be different 
manifestations of reciprocity due to differing modes of entry. Or, as Ali said, ‘I 
think [maintaining an identity] is more important for those who migrate, to 
Norway, due to political reasons than if someone thinks “I’ll move to Norway for 
a year or two and see how it turns out”, and then stay for three-four-five years’.   
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Susan, the bar manager, felt her professional relationship to her immigrant 
colleagues was burdensome due to turnover, requiring a continuous investment of 
resources in not only training new employees but developing relationships with 
them. The Swedish bartenders, on the other hand, saw the professional 
relationship as temporary, thus their investment of in the relationship does not 
necessarily match expectations from the manager and other long-term employees. 
The owner of the bar ‘equated [“good” workers] with workers from the same 
ethnic group’ (Bloch & McKay, 2015, p. 45), but the relationship between the 
workers “on the factory floor” is based on reciprocity: covering shifts for each 
other, helping out, and providing social refuge.  
 
As a contrast, Dmitri initially moved to Narvik for educational reasons but stayed 
in Norway in order to work. In Norway, one in three migrants who arrive for 
educational reasons emigrate from Norway after a year, compared to one in five 
for labour migrants (Pettersen, 2013, p. 70). As with Vanessa, and the other 
Swedish bartenders, this would lead you to believe that Dmitri is likely to migrate 
onwards. Yet, once we include other factors, such as his Russian citizenship and 
time spent in Norway, the relationship to Norway is more than simply that of a 
professional, work-based relationship: 
 
You know, I’ve lived in this country for four years. I’ve invested a 
lot of time, a lot of work, and other stuff. So, for example, a year 
ago, when I could have left Norway, I though “Yeah, sure, I can move 
back to Russia, no problem”, but yes, there would be problems […] 
things were more uncertain in Russia than in Norway… I’m used to 
living in Norway, but it is entirely possible that, in a few years, I’ll 
move to another country, but it depends. If I receive, for example, 
a job offer. But again, there are bureaucratic problems […] So that 
uncertainty, it is annoying. Which is why think, if I would, for 
example, move to another European country, or another country 
than Russia, I first have to get Norwegian citizenship, then it’ll be 
easier, bureaucratically, mostly bureaucratically […] Life [in 
Norway] is much more relaxing, for example when you’re driving, in 
traffic, when you’re at work, there are almost no places where 
there is a dress code. Communication is very informal […] with 
management and colleagues, and teachers at university. 
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The differences in the relationships Vanessa and Dmitri have to Norway are shaped 
by very different experiences. Contrast the quote from Dmitri above with 
Vanessa’s experience: 
 
In the beginning, it was really, really cool. But it has been tiring 
because it’s a lot of weekends, or almost every weekend and 
evening. And there’s been a lot of… There have been quite a few 
incidents, with bothersome, drunk people who’ve said horrible 
things […] you see a lot of alcoholism, you see it more easily in small 
towns because you recognise people. In big cities, there are so many 
people you don’t recognise anyone, but here you know who’s who, 
who’s a drug addict, who’s an alcoholic, and these things, and it 
leaves an impression, you feel sad because you know who they are 
[…] I don’t think this is a long term job, you can’t take it […] At 
first, I thought I was only going to stay here half a year, but that 
didn’t happen. Yeah, I thought I’d go back [to Sweden], I’d already 
planned on going back. 
 
 
The assumption that migrants are the main beneficiaries of migration, such as in 
the Brochmann-II commission (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2017) discussed in 
Chapter 4, obscures the two-way relationship. It obscures migrant contributions 
to society and the costs borne by the migrant, as Vanessa demonstrates above. 
Expanding our perspective to include refuge and respectability encourages us to 
explore other ways relationships are reciprocally maintained and developed. 
 
What the migrant receives from society, in the form of Resources, Refuge, and 
Respectability, sets expectations for what the migrant reciprocates, or should 
reciprocate. There are several sources of these expectations, they might arise 
internally, from the migrant him/herself, migrant group, or an external actor, 
such as a state, can formulate them. One need only think of voting, whether it is 
perceived as a right and privilege, or duty and obligation. Vaguely issued 
expectations, whether communicated by state, media, or organisations, are akin 
to Hirschmann’s (2004) notion that commitment is strengthened through an 
expectation of conformity to principles. Yet, this does not prevent migrants from 
extracting something of value to them from the implicit arrangement, such as 
Dmitri’s reasoning for volunteering for the Red Cross: 
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I am not a member of the Red Cross, but [a volunteer] primarily to 
make acquaintances, to get to know people, to be of use, and, again, 
language. It’s good practice. Because, when it comes to, for 
example, mathematics, which I know well in Russian or English, I 
realised I don’t know it in Norwegian, especially the terminology, 
[but] I teach myself, I learn new words […] I think it’s useful for me 
and those who come, who get help. It might be a bit selfish, but 
since they’re getting help and it’s useful for them it’s not 
completely selfish. 
 
This is echoed by Hirschmann when he notes that the religious foundation only 
removes the need for ‘immediate reciprocity’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1207). Again, 
we note the importance of temporality. Short-term transactionalism versus long-
term reciprocity.  
 
The nature of Vanessa’s migration story is rendered invisible, perhaps even 
inconsequential, due to its transience, but also in part due to the expectation of 
its invisibility: Nordic migrants are regularly omitted from migration statistics or 
migration rules. Recalling the discussions on identification and categorisation 
processes in Chapter 2, it points to how categorisation processes can stunt or limit 
integration processes. 
 
In a similar vein, we can revisit Dmitri’s observation that ‘foreigner=asylum 
seeker’. Migrant labour is ‘left to fend for itself’ (Dmitri), and we can situate this 
as a disparity in the reciprocal relationship between the migrant and society: 
migrant labourers are expected to integrate, or simply operate invisibly, and make 
the effort, but there is little assistance or recognition from society. As Ali 
remarked: 
 
Unfortunately, both immigrants and Norwegians are not very good 
at including each other, and that is a challenge. [There] needs to be 
an understanding that… “yes, we’ve moved here, this is where we 
are going to be and, somehow, at some point, we have to become a 
part of this country, this society”. That is it, everything else will 
fail and lead to suffering for the individual, but it will also be a 
challenge for all of society. And to make it work, we need to think 
“yes, both, both minorities and majority have to make the effort”. 
The majority cannot run away from its responsibility […] 
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Citizenship, discussed in depth in Chapter 2, is strongly related to the discussion 
of reciprocity. Damsholt and Aagedal (2012, p. 10) emphasise that the 
introduction of citizenship ceremonies in Norway was an explicit move to ‘not only 
make [citizenship] a formality and a legal contract, but to imbue it with moral 
and emotional content’. Here we should keep in mind Jurado’s (2008) questioning 
of the causal relationship between integration processes and citizenship. 
Particularly in Norway, where naturalisation necessitates relinquishing previous 
citizenships, it engenders a reified and exclusive conception of identity. It 
constructs citizenship, and linked identities, as a zero-sum game, as opposed to a 
dual-citizenship system which has the ability to valorise a diversity of identities 
and see them in a non—zero-sum perspective. The former is demonstrated by Ali, 
reflecting on receiving his Norwegian citizenship: 
 
It kicked off quite a few thoughts and reflections: What does this 
mean? This Norwegian citizenship, am I now done with everything 
to do with Kurdistan? Have I suddenly become Norwegian? Who am 
I? 
 
Bearing in mind Marshall’s third aspect of citizenship, the social, it is not only 
about the ‘right to a modicum of economic welfare and security’ that comes up, 
but also the duty to contribute to that welfare and, in Ali’s case, security. We see 
an explicit reflection on reciprocity and the relationship between him and the 
imagined community of Norway. His citizenship came hand in hand with another 
letter: 
 
It didn’t take long before another letter arrived, and I was called in 
for National Service203 [laughter] and it was “Congratulations, you 
have been drafted to…” It was… I started thinking, a lot, when I got 
this letter and was called in for National Service, and “what now?” 
I’m originally from Northern Iraq and have seen how Saddam 
Hussein’s police and regime acted towards the public, and they 
weren’t the nicest guys in the world. I remember a lot, have 
experienced a lot, and this led me to question my views on the 
military, weapons, and National Service. So, I thought about it a lot, 
and I reached the conclusion that “Yes… When Norway has given us 
so much […] the least I can do is to give back to this new country”. 
                                         
203 Norway operates with Universal Conscription into what it refers to as Initial Military Service 
(Førstegangstjeneste), what in the UK was referred to as National Service 
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His reflections also echo Hochschild’s (2012[1983], p. 74) observation that 
‘gratitude lays the foundation for loyalty’. Admittedly, this is provoked by Ali 
receiving citizenship while in the age group that gets drafted, something which 
does not necessarily happen to all naturalised citizens. Norway only introduced 
Universal Conscription in 2015 (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2016), with citizens aged 
19-44 being eligible for conscription. Ali’s experience is highly gendered, as even 
today only 14 per cent of those serving their Initial Military Service are women. 
Additionally, it is most likely to apply to a small subsection of naturalised citizens, 
predominantly those who naturalised either under-18 or shortly after turning 18. 
Even then, there were 71 000 eligible to serve their National Service but only up 
to 8000 were enrolled in 2015 (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2015). 
 
Though it might only apply to a small population, Ali’s trajectory lends some 
credence to Hirschmann’s axiom that higher expectations and stronger obligations 
will strengthen conformity. After all, Ali went on to serve two contracts with 
Forsvarets Innsatsstyrker (a branch of the Norwegian Territorial Army), and later 
was called into local politics. The use of “called” in the preceding sentence is 
deliberate, as Ali spoke of his nascent political career in terms of surprise: 
 
[I] was sort of a placeholder 204[…] I think I was forty-something, 
almost at the bottom of the list. But, after the elections, I got a 
call and was congratulated on a permanent position on the City 
Council. Then I thought “Ok, that was probably not what was 
supposed to…” But, when you’ve chosen to be on the list, you have 
to accept that you might get in, that’s it. But, that one would get 
in, from being completely new to politics, and it was the first time 
I ran […] 
 
This involvement with the political aspect of citizenship (Marshall, 1950) adds an 
element of a duty to exercise political power. It also draws attention to how 
political citizenship is more than simply voting. Bergh and Bjørklund (2010) 
attempt to infer the status of integration processes through electoral participation 
                                         
204 In Norwegian, Ali used the term “listefyll”, which is difficult to translate, but carries 
connotations of “simply making up the numbers” 
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(in local elections) in Norway, but they do not address citizenship or offer any 
analysis of the relationship between citizenship and political actions such as 
voting. In Norway, citizenship is a prerequisite for voting in a general election, 
demonstrating that in some cases citizenship has to precede actions that are seen 
as significant in integration processes. Simultaneously, Ali, in the quote below, 
demonstrates how the exercise of political power can feed back into the 
integration processes, encouraging him to get deeper involved, and strengthen 
the emotive aspect of citizenship. In other words, echoing Jurado’s (2008, p. 16) 
encouragement that governments should put ‘citizenship at the heart of their 
integration strategies’.  
 
When I was on the list [the first time], it was sort of, and I have to 
be allowed to say this, I hadn’t looked into it […] I knew a bit about 
SV, but I didn’t take that round with myself, as I should have, about 
“who says what” and “who stands for what” […] So I joined the 
Labour party  [and they] asked if I wanted to be on the list […] And 
I was put in the 43rd spot […] I got in from the 43rd place and ended 
up on the 7th […] And I think, when I have been given that trust, I 
have to respond, and the answer has to be that I will sit on the City 
Council again, wholeheartedly and I have to take this, my role as an 
elected official, seriously, because that is what they have told me I 
should do. 
 
As with the citizenship and National Service, there is a trade between trust, 
confidence, and service. Echoing sentiments of being “called upon” to serve, the 
impression from the interview was that of a soldier doing his duty.  
 
The reciprocal relationship is influential, as it not only shapes Ali and his loyalties, 
but the image of the City Council shifts, with the inclusion of a Kurdish-born, 
naturalised citizen. Or, as Ali put it: when I moved to Norway, there weren’t any 
adults with minority background in politics or other visible places.  Thus, serving 
on the City Council is not merely repayment for granted trust, education, work, 
or respectability, it is also contributing towards the future: 
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What I hope and believe is that, if, what I have done in politics, or 
if the time I have been a part of politics, if it has contributed or can 
contribute to it becoming easier for those who come after us, then 
I think it will have been very good and positive. And I think “Ok, 
then you’ve done something that’s ok”. And I hope and believe, of 
course one should be humble, but I hope and believe it can 
contribute to something positive, both for those who are sceptical 
to immigrants but also to immigrants… That you… Also immigrants, 
children with a minority background can see with their own eyes 
that “yes, you don’t have to be 185cm, blond, and be from Lofoten 
to do well or to get involved with politics”. It is possible to get 
involved in politics even if you come from, have a background from, 
another country. So, I hope this can contribute to opening the way 
for others. 
      Ali 
 
Importantly, Ali emphasised strongly that a politician with a minority, or 
immigrant, background should not only focus on minority or immigrant issues: 
 
Us with minority background have to take responsibility for the 
politics that impact us as minorities, but also take responsibility for 
the politics that concerns the community. When I’m in politics I am 
as concerned with property tax, I am as concerned with keeping the 
Armed Forces in Bodø, as I am with integration politics. One 
shouldn’t become a minority-politician. 
 
 
Rounding off this section, I have sought to demonstrate how integration processes 
are dependent upon reciprocal relationships. It involves clarifying expectations 
and demands, whether this clarification is formulated internally by self-reflection 
or externally through rights and obligations. Reciprocity cements the 
understanding of integration processes as bi-directional, although only one party, 
the individual, is perpetually defined. The other party can be the state, 
government, the imagined community, the local community, or organisation. 
Either party can feel mistreated, disrespected, or unreciprocated, which I would 
argue lies at the base of negative integration processes. If a state imposes 
unrealistic expectations on migrants, an employer exploits labourers, migrant 
communities exist in parallel to other communities, and locals feel privileges 
bestowed upon migrants are unfair and hasty, all these situations, and many 
others, are a result of poorly reciprocated relationships.  
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7.6 – Conclusion 
The final sentence of the preceding section might perhaps paint me as a 
doomsayer, where a well-integrated society is only a distant utopian future; where 
balanced, equal, and fair relationships govern all interactions. That would be a 
false conclusion to draw from the chapter. Whereas Hirschmann emphasised 
Resources, Refuge and Respectability, these three notions do not adequately and 
by themselves rely on a relational perspective. Hirschmann constructs all three as 
objects that can be received, given, or traded, but without emphasising the 
relationship that governs or influences the space within they are received, given, 
or traded. Adding Reciprocity to the framework forces us to emphasise the 
relationship, and to explore the nature of both parties. If integration processes 
are genuinely processual, they are 
relational, multidirectional, and 
contextual, which means we have to ask 
not simply what is transferred, but 
between whom and how. 
 
As has been argued several times 
throughout this thesis, there is always the 
question of integration into what? 
Ultimately, there are always a minimum of 
two parties: the individual and an 
amorphous, imagined, whole. Whether 
that whole is a group, local, regional, 
national, or transnational imagined whole. 
In the entropic space between these, 
there can be any number of other actors 
and agents. Akin to a Heath Robinson contraption (see Image 1), or Rube Goldberg 
machine, what we are attempting to do is to understand how we can achieve a 
result, integration, by creating a system that will deliver that result. Employment, 
language, education, affiliation, etc. are building blocks that can be put together 
in any number of configurations (Ager & Strang, 2008), but Hirschmann provides 
us with three principles that allow us to understand how these bricks come 
together.  
Image 1 - A Heath Robinson machine (Robinson, 1973) 
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What I have suggested, by introducing Reciprocity, is simply taking a step back 
and seeing the whole picture. If integration, returning to Image 1, is fitting square 
pegs into round holes through a bizarre contraption, this does not suggest an 
impossible task, rather I would emphasise the presence of the pots and pans which 
have pegs fitted (lower left-hand corner). The process by which the peg is fitted 
is made possible through an elaborate contraption, and the task might seem 
hopeless or impossible. Rather than seeing the individual components, the 
presence of a round hole, the square peg, the gears and pulleys, and what one 
must assume, engineers, akin to how we look for Resources, Refuge and 
Respectability, we should rather take a step back and see how all these elements 
relate to each other. One might add that there is also the demand for fitting 
square pegs into round holes.  
 
Thus, we also need to consider the demands of those with round-holed pots and 
pans and the supply of a solution. Exploring Reciprocity is seeing the whole 
picture. If integration is fitting square pegs into round holes, what we are actually 
looking for is redintegration: the restoration of a whole. Similarly, emphasising 
Hirschmann’s three Rs and Reciprocity encourages a discourse which is 
Redintegrative, rather than a Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass Discourse. 
 
Concisely providing an answer to the research question framing this chapter, we 
see from the analysis that a narrow, Social Integrationist understanding of 
integration processes does not accurately reflect the understandings of the 
informants. Rather, the chapter points to the value of a redintegrative discourse, 
formulated through the notion of reciprocity, that reflects on the multiple causes 
of inequality and allows for valorisation of multiple identities, and considers 
cultural, social, political, and economic factors in inequalities and integration 
processes.
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Chapter 8 – Complementary approaches 
8.1 – Introduction 
Pursuant to the research question exploring the influence of secular organisations 
and activities, this chapter discusses the relationship between activity organisers, 
volunteers, and public administrators with regards to integration-oriented 
activities. As a shorthand, I will refer to this group as facilitators, in the sense 
that they often understood their behaviour as enabling migrants to integrate. As 
Cantle (2016, p. 142) emphasises ‘[the] prospect for cohesion and peace [depend] 
upon the development and facilitation of interaction and contact’ (emphasis 
added).  
 
This chapter stands in contrast to the previous. Chapter 7 demonstrated how 
reciprocity is a key to integration, which is matched by facilitators in this chapter 
albeit without the emphasis on identities. As with Caritas in Chapter 6, the 
emphasis is often on language, employability, and employment and echoes 
priorities set by the nation-state. In other words, we see a distinct presence of 
SID and emphasis on a fragmented but functional understanding of society. As 
such, there are elements of complementarity and competition, as we saw with 
Caritas. While competition is fairly absent, informants reacted to the lack of 
complementarity, emphasising the potential for cooperation and improvement of 
the “dugnadsånd”205 they saw as a prerequisite for positively influencing 
integration processes. 
 
The relevant interviews for this chapter are with Kirsten Hasvoll, project manager 
for Tilflyttingsprosjektet (the Immigration Project), at Nordland Fylkeskommune 
(Nordland County Municipality, henceforth NFK), Vigdis Larsen, deacon at Rønvik 
church, and Siv, one of the activity organisers at RCB. These are meso-
organisations and institutions that link and mediate between migrants (and 
                                         
205 “Dugnadsånd”, loosely translated as dugnad-spirit, draws on the idea of coming together for 
the good of the community. A dugnad is an activity that aims to improve conditions for a group, 
be it a football team, marching band, or even society as a whole. Bake-sales, fund raising, and 
contributing to maintenance (cleaning public areas or washing uniforms/equipment) are common 
dugnads, while certain events such as TV-aksjonen (a national charity drive, such as the Pudsy 
Appeal or Red Nose Day in the UK) are also considered dugnads. Fladberg (2017) provides an 
example of the concept being exploited by an employer to trick his Polish joiners to do work for 
free. See also Engebrigtsen, et al. (2017). 
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migrant groups) with parts of the state and the “host” society. Hasvoll’s relevance 
is quite apparent, whereas both Larsen and Siv were individuals I encountered in 
the course of my fieldwork who were, within their respective organisations, 
important in the establishment or continuation of integration-oriented activities.  
 
Larsen, along with another deacon from the Church of Norway, established a bi-
weekly dinner that is held at Bodø Voksenopplæring, the Adult Education centre 
that is responsible for delivering Introduksjonsprogrammet, the Introductory 
Program for migrants. Siv was one of the individuals working with the Red Cross 
to establish activities and to recruit other volunteers, but in order to respect her 
wish for anonymity I am unable to offer more specific details about her and the 
activities she was involved in. 
 
The core argument of this chapter is that despite echoing state perspectives on 
integration, emphasising utilitarian aspects such as employment, language, and 
accommodation, facilitators shift to value- and contact-oriented perspectives 
following their involvement with integration-oriented activities. This is 
reminiscent of one of the underlying arguments of Interculturalism. 
Interculturalism, Zapato-Barrero (2017, p. 13) argues, ‘can be seen as a policy of 
rebellion of cities against the state domination of policy’ based on proximity and 
pragmatism.   
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8.2 – Facilitator perspectives on integration processes 
This section will compare and contrast perspectives on integration process as 
formulated by the state, explored in Chapter 4, and as understood and iterated 
by facilitators in a small sample of organisations in Bodø. Following a brief 
repetition of relevant points concerning state perspectives on integration 
processes, I will explore how these perspectives are echoed and/or challenged by 
the facilitators.  
 
Lynnebakk and Fangen (2011, p. 148) argue that ethnic diversity ‘does not have a 
natural place in today’s popular understanding of Norwegianness’. 
“Norwegianness”, they argue, has three components: origin, practice, and 
citizenship. This effectively sets up ethnicity, culture, and nationality as 
determiners of “Norwegianness”. This echoed by Brochmann and Hagelund 
(2012b, pp. 155-156) ‘the concept of multicultural Norway is shaky for the 
majority’. Thus, a homogeneous, exclusive construction of “Norwegianness” is 
juxtaposed with a multicultural challenge, rendering a multicultural, multi-
ethnic, or even multi-national206, conception of “Norwegianness” a challenge or 
threat (Eide, 2012). 
 
This points to, as Brochmann and Hagelund (2012a) argue, the concept of 
inequality becoming linked to two new dimensions: ethnicity and immigrant 
background. Thus, processes of integration become tied to not only immigration 
and integration policies, but also to the overarching welfare policies. This results, 
as argued by Bendixsen (2018), in a differentiation of rights, legitimised by the 
conception of humanitarian exceptionalism as a part of “Norwegianness”. 
Ultimately, this constitutes society as fragmented, with a strong functionalist 
undertone, whereby anything that does not fit is externalised and necessitates an 
exceptional response. As will be shown below, this is strengthened by the crisis-
rhetoric. As such, systemic issues and societal inequalities are obscured, and 
identities are rendered inferior to the vague, humanitarian, identity-neutral 
response. 
                                         
206 Bearing in mind the discussion around dual-citizenship, which the government argued for based 
on security-issues rather than widening the understanding of “Norwegianness”. 
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Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, p. 152) distinguish between two aspects of 
integration processes: ‘the general integration project of the welfare state’ and 
‘integration of new immigrants’. This is akin to Joppke’s (2012, p. 135) argument 
that ‘labour market structures or the education system are vastly more important 
for helping or hindering “integration” than any, by nature paltry, “integration 
policy”’. This serves to reduce integration to a structural and functional form, 
which confines the discussion to systems and limits the acceptable discourses to 
those characterised as Social Integrationist or Moral Underclass. Identification 
processes are seen as secondary to categorisation. Thus, what becomes 
problematised is not the construction of “Norwegianness”, but migrants’ 
(in)ability to conform to it. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the development of state policy in depth, but it was succinctly 
characterised by participants at a meeting of the reference group in NFKs 
Immigration project: laissez-faire. This was followed by the remark that it was 
ironic that the Minister for Integration, Sylvi Listhaug, did not have a clear policy 
about integration. One of the purposes of the reference group was to inform local 
county approaches to integration processes, highlighting the absence of an 
acceptable policy at a national, central level, and the need to tailor approaches 
to a local context. 
 
Over the course of the last decades, and particularly recent years, there has 
developed a distinct hierarchisation within immigration and integration policy and 
related discussions. This socially constructed, functionalist, reifying 
hierarchisation is demonstrated by Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, pp. 205-206): 
(1) Nordic citizens, (2) Refugees, (3) EEA citizens with employment, (4) Third 
country (non-Nordic, non-EEA) nationals with employment, (5) Asylum-seekers, 
and (6) Irregular migrants207. This is reflected in wider society, as demonstrated 
by Guðjónsdóttir and Loftsdóttir (2017) and Friberg and Midtbøen (2018), where 
                                         
207 ‘[Irregular migrants] refers to all those who cross borders without prior authorization, regardless 
of their reason, and encompasses asylum seekers as well as undocumented labour migrants’ (James 
& McNevin, 2013, pp. 89-90) 
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notions of a hierarchy are reflected in hiring practices and individual identification 
processes. In these cases, rather than the citizenship-oriented hierarchisation of 
Brochmann and Hagelund, the hierarchies are constructed according to ethnic 
categorisation and identification. Problematically, neither article problematise or 
challenge the social construction of these hierarchisations, thereby contributing 
to the perception of them as natural rather than constructed categories. 
 
Here we can recall the experiences of Vanessa (Nordic), Ali (refugee), and Dmitri 
(third country national), explored in Chapter 7. These hierarchies echo James and 
McNevin’s (2013, pp. 88-89) distinction between capital-relation immigrants 
(tourists, students, migrant labour) and ‘those who bring risk or unspecifiable 
outcomes […] asylum-seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons and the more 
generic category of irregular migrants’, a distinction McDowell (2009, p. 34) 
referred to as ‘venomous’. 
 
These hierarchisations are echoed in Hasvoll’s remarks around NFK’s immigration 
project, albeit situating an additional group at the top of the hierarchy, the 
internal migrant: 
 
[…] For many, many years, we have, and still do, tried these “come 
home”-projects, tempting students to move back, travelled to 
graduate fairs in Oslo and tried to get students there to move to 
Nordland, recruiting people from Sweden. They have, in short, not 
had a lot of luck […] Not only do we need people, we have to have 
people. So, we think it is best to go for an inflow from abroad […] 
unfortunately, it is still the case that when you talk about 
immigration everyone thinks we’re talking about refugees. 
 
Hasvoll’s remark reflects the socially constructed hierarchisation, where refugees 
are often viewed as lower on the hierarchy of desirable immigrants, as they are 
implicitly deskilled and seen as benefactors rather than contributors, whereas 
Swedes are nearly equivalent to internal migrants. The above quote, as well as 
other conversations with Hasvoll, suggest an awareness of a Moral Underclass 
Discourse, as well as a desire to counteract it. As later emphasised by Brochmann 
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and Hagelund (2012b, p. 218), immigrants are seen ‘through the prism of “weak 
group”’ – reminiscent of Bauböck’s (1996b, p. 21) observation that immigration 
has become a ‘meta-issue’ used to explain social and economic problems. This 
points to a latent Moral Underclass Discourse that, while homogenising the 
“native” population, seeing migrants as either resources (labour migrants) or a 
drain on resources (refugees), or as Hasvoll phrased it ‘refugees have an enormous 
apparatus around them’, ignores identification processes, reifies and naturalises 
identities and categories, and presents unwanted characteristics as distinct from 
the “majority”. This, as argued by Bendixsen (2018), is accompanied, and 
legitimised, by a notion of humanitarian exceptionalism that, effectively, lets 
“natives” off the hook in a moral sense.  
 
This view is demonstrated by the Brochmann-II commission on the long-term 
effects of continued high immigration, explored in Chapter 4, where refugees are 
seen as burdens on the welfare system:  
 
Refugees are a particular category amongst immigrants. They are 
given residency irrespective of whether or not they want to 
contribute to economic growth and development 
    NOU (2017, p. 24) (emphasis added) 
 
 
This also plays out in the Introductory Act (Introduksjonsloven), governing the 
rights and responsibilities of recently arrived migrants, where most rights and 
obligations are afforded those seen as the weakest or most disadvantaged. This 
demonstrates how SID and MUD can overlap. 
 
One of the main areas where SID and MUD interconnect is around language. This 
singular focus is echoed by a wide range of actors and facilitators, but the 
concomitant emphasis on work results in it being framed within a Social 
Integrationist Discourse. We see how the state, Caritas (see Chapter 6), and 
facilitators align in their perspectives on language and work: 
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[…] Norwegian language training should become more tailored, and 
it should to a greater extent be tied to work. 
    NOU (2017, p. 22) 
 
The answer at present is an active integration policy for new arrivals, 
with particular emphasis on participation in the labour market 
    Brochmann and Hagelund (2012b, p. 150) 
 
[…] we think Norwegian language training is priority number one, 
whether you’re a refugee, child, adult […] it is probably the area 
where we’ve spent the most time and money. 
    Hasvoll 
 
[…] In the aftermath of [the arrival of asylum-seekers in 2015-2016], 
language training has appeared […] I think language is the alpha and 
omega of being integrated. To getting a job, to making friends. 
    Siv 
 
Unsurprisingly, Hasvoll echoed the state and emphasised language and labour, but 
she also reflected that their priorities changed as the project went on. While not 
an explicit formulation of Interculturalism, it nonetheless demonstrates how 
policy priorities can change in relation to proximity and pragmatism to local 
realities. It also demonstrates an awareness of the need to address multiple forms 
of social exclusion, addressing more than just economic factors: 
 
Then we have the important one: free time, volunteering, and 
democracy. It started out as a… volunteering, integration-bit 
because we figured that to get people to stay it’s important they 
come along and get to join football teams, learn to swim, those 
things. Now we have gradually changed perspective, now our 
perspective is that in order to get them to stay we need to actively 
include them in processes of democracy, municipal administrations, 
organisations, to include them as regular members, not just 
someone to be integrated […] they are so many now that we can’t 
go on without them being represented in different bodies. 
 
 
The notion of “self-organisation” echoes a long-held policy position of ‘help to 
self-help’ (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b, p. 178), which also came up during a 
debate on Bodø as an international city: one attendee loudly suggested migrants 
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should self-organise and that the municipality should stop funding ‘silly 
projects’208. In practice, this results in a partial abdication of responsibility by the 
state, where responsibility is passed on to local government, municipal 
administrations, and individuals (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012b), laying the 
groundwork for bottom-up Intercultural approaches to develop. The notion of 
“self-help” also cultivates an attitude of limited responsibility amongst 
facilitators: 
 
I’ve always thought that this group [asylum-seekers] is the one we 
should focus on, of course we should focus on work and integration, 
but I think they’ll go their own community [for that] […] They should 
have a huge mosque with plenty of room, so they could have cultural 
[events], it’s a meeting place for them, but [what they have now is] 
a small place […] 
      Larsen 
 
Now they’re going into regular asylum centres. Now they have a 
different apparatus around, then when they were in the emergency 
reception centres, then they had nothing. Now they have 
consultants, community workers, they have some money, they’re 
going into adult education […] So now our activities are the ones we 
normally offer. 
       Siv 
 
Whereas the state prefers a policy of self-help, the informants consistently 
referred to the apparatus of the state, resulting in a situation where both the 
state and facilitators put the onus on the migrant. Emphasising the importance of 
“empowering” the asylum-seekers allows for both RED and MUD, where the 
dividing line falls on the emphasis on passivity (MUD) versus inequality (RED) as 
the cause of exclusion. These tensions come out in Siv and Larsen’s remarks, 
where the former echoes MUD and the latter is more indicative of RED: 
 
                                         
208 Alas, he did not offer concrete examples of what constituted “silly projects” and was not 
challenged by anyone on that characterisation. 
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We’re working with empowering those living in asylum centres, that 
they have to get to the activities […] I think you’ll get so much more 
out of it if you do something yourself, if you take responsibility […] 
I think passivity is the root of… I was about to say “evil”, but that’s 
a bit over the top, but I think it leads to more passivity, more 
twiddling thumbs, less initiative, poor health […] 
      Siv 
 
[Our activity] has been running for a year, shall we say, so maybe 
now we’ll get some funding, perhaps we can employ someone, a 
refugee or something, to take care of it. 
      Larsen 
 
Here, Siv places the responsibility on the migrant and his/her “passivity”, whereas 
Larsen points to the need for funding in order to employ ‘a refugee or something’ 
to take over. The issue, according to Larsen, is not the passivity of migrants, but 
the lack of funding, clearly demonstrating a redintegrationist understanding. 
 
A final note on this, is the use of a ‘reference group’ during NFKs Immigration 
Project. Consisting of eight migrants, they served as an advisory group for the 
Immigration Project (NFK, 2018). Hailing from Poland, Pakistan, Serbia, Russia, 
Somalia, India, China, and the Philippines (NFK, 2015), their explicit function was 
to give insight into the lived experiences of immigrants in Norway: ‘We have 
experience of being immigrants in Norway, and we know what has been important 
for us’ (Jelena Budeša in NFK, 2018: 5). Echoing an argument by Carens and 
Williams (1996, p. 177): ‘marginalized groups possess a distinctive political 
“voice”, a distinctive perspective […] that arises out of the fact that their social 
and political experience is markedly different from that of relatively dominant 
groups’. Hasvoll, who managed the project, referred to the group as ‘some of the 
funniest [on the project]’, repeatedly highlighting the work done both internally 
in the group, as well as public lectures and conferences led by members of the 
group. In particular, Hasvoll demonstrated a clear redintegrationist approach in 
that despite the group’s work ‘not being particularly measurable’ it became more 
of a focus ‘than when we started’. 
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Hasvoll’s redintegrationist perspective was reinforced by her perception of 
society, equality of identities, and recognition that integration is a process which 
necessitates a multifactorial approach: 
 
We have to get them active in democratic processes in local 
councils, organisations, as regular members, not just as someone to 
be integrated […] we can’t go on much longer without their 
representation in different bodies […] there’s still very little 
knowledge in society [about migrants and] I am exasperated at how 
little people know. […] We have six pillars [in the project] […] 
Norwegian language training is priority number one […] point 
number two is education […] number three is housing […] four is 
targeted recruitment from abroad […] then there’s the important 
one: leisure, volunteering, and democracy […] last pillar is 
information […]. 
 
 
Concluding this section, we see how the three discursive models interact. It is 
possible for facilitators to simultaneously echo state emphases on language and 
work, characteristic of SID, as well as toeing a fine line between RED and MUD 
when emphasising empowering migrants. On the one side, empowerment derives 
from addressing multiple causes of inequality, on the other empowerment is seen 
as a remedy to “passivity”. Ambiguities in facilitator understandings is reflected 
in the ambiguity of state approaches, where it was seen as inadequate (and 
requiring a local remedy) or, as will be shown in the next section, entirely lacking.  
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8.3 – Facilitating migrants 
The socially constructed hierarchies mentioned above has a significant impact on 
facilitator activities. This section will explore how mode of arrival and the 
responsibility of the welfare state shape both activities and understandings of 
responsibility in integration processes. According to Dragolov, et al. (2016, p. 11), 
social cohesion is contingent upon people dealing ‘appropriately with diversity’. 
As such, exploring facilitator perspectives offers insight into this process of 
“dealing with diversity”. As we saw in section 6.5 on Caritas, there is a high degree 
of specialisation amongst voluntary organisations. What this section demonstrates 
is how, as Bauböck argues, specialisation contributes to a blindness towards 
complexity. Effectively, this should predispose facilitators towards SID, but does 
not preclude elements of RED or MUD in their understandings. 
 
In a differentiated society, institutions are highly specialized. Their 
rules correspond to certain roles attributed to individuals. 
Specialized institutions are blind to the total complexity of 
individuals; they perceive them only as agents of those roles fitting 
into the pattern of their rules. Institutions thus produce their own 
internal descriptions of what individuals are for them. 
    Bauböck (1996a, p. 77) (emphasis added) 
 
Within NFK, Hasvoll emphasised that their focus is relatively indiscriminate with 
regards to who immigrates to Nordland. Their emphasis is merely that they are 
able to retain immigrants and keep them employed and contributing to the local 
and regional economy. Despite this, Hasvoll did remark that they are aware of a 
differentiated system where certain groups are provided for by other institutions: 
 
Our perspective isn’t to help people […] we need people to fill many 
roles […] We’re not very concerned with, we’re not at all concerned 
with why they’re here. But we do see that refugees have an 
enormous apparatus around them, so we’re probably directing our 
efforts at the two other groups you mentioned, the labour migrants 
and not least the family reunification migrants whom no one is 
concerned about or registers. 
      Hasvoll 
 
295 
 
 
Hasvoll disregards NFKs part in providing safety, a stark contrast to Siv’s 
perspective on the role of RCB: 
 
We were there to make them [the asylum-seekers] feel safe, that 
was our goal […] We have had to establish some boundaries, because 
it has been important to us that this, those who are in on this do it 
according to Red Cross guidelines […] I think without volunteerism, 
who knows what these refugees who came to Bodøsjøen and 
Saltstraumen would have had? […] They had nothing, no money, 
nothing. And, it was volunteerism that made sure they got anything 
outside, what was it, four meals a day? […] But, now, they’re going 
into ordinary reception centres. So now, they have an entirely 
different apparatus around them […] 
      Siv 
 
Both Hasvoll and Siv demonstrate a fragmented understanding, as would be 
expected under SID. Both de-emphasise identity in favour of categorisations that 
enable them to obscure multiple aspects of inequality in exchange for a focus on 
a specific task. 
 
Larsen clearly identified multiple approaches to influencing integration processes, 
as well as recognising the role of identities, hinting at a redintegrationist 
understanding. She also points to a scepticism towards religious actors, and the 
perception of religious identities, which can indicate MUD being related to 
secularisation processes and views on the role of religion in society. Nonetheless, 
she reinforces the notion of specialisation. 
 
It’s a big field, should you work politically, maybe the [Norwegian] 
Church could do that, could you provide food, should it be a 
sponsor/mentorship-system, the Red Cross was involved too […] We 
considered [having the activity] in Rønvik church, but we were a bit 
naive and thought they’d probably not want to come here because 
it’s a church and they’re Muslims, most of them, that turned out to 
be baseless, really, but we didn’t know that then […]  
 
[asylum-seekers] are the group most suitable for us to work with 
[…] of course we should think about work and integration, but I 
reckon they’ll go to their own milieu… All depending what church 
or [religious] society they belong to […]  
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[…] I noticed that Refugees [Welcome to Bodø], they were a bit 
sceptical that the Church, they thought, were a bit like 
“yeah…no…yeah…” Can’t remember what it was, but it was a feeling 
I got. That we shouldn’t offend the Muslims, that [RWTB] were a 
bit… There’s a shyness, a sort of scepticism from the others in 
[volunteerism], who aren’t ecclesial, about what the [Norwegian] 
Church does […] The Red Cross are supposed to be neutral, so the 
[Norwegian Church] should work more politically, I think. That’d be 
great. 
     Larsen 
 
What the above quotes demonstrate is how SID is clearly visible in their 
understandings, but simultaneously how their remarks also reflect other 
discourses.  
 
What became apparent in the early winter of 2015 was how opaque state systems 
and expectations of the state were, as many participants remarked, driving 
factors in the mobilisation of the local population in Bodø. 70 per cent of reception 
centres are run by commercial actors, with the remaining 30 per cent split evenly 
between municipal actors and non-profit organisations (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger, 2017, p. 46). Thus, in many cases, one of the most significant actors, 
asylum reception centres, operate distinctly different from either state actors or 
the civil society organisations in the sense that reception centres are run as 
businesses. Under SID, society is viewed as fragmented but functional, whereas 
the situation was quickly seen as dysfunctional, hence the “crisis”-rhetoric. This 
opens the door for MUD, as was commonly seen in the local newspaper. “Blame” 
was often attributed either the state, the asylum seekers, or “asylum barons” who 
were seen to be profiteering off the situation. Elements of this is noticeable in 
Siv’s recollections: 
 
We came to work one day, can’t remember which, just a random 
day, and then we read the news and it turns out there were two or 
more busses [of asylum-seekers] coming, don’t recall exactly, it was 
intense, we weren’t sure about the numbers. No one knew anything! 
We got in touch with Bodøsjøen Camping, because they’d been told 
they were going to open an emergency reception centre, without 
them knowing anything at all […] The first weekend there were some 
issues concerning what you were responsible for, what you weren’t 
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responsible for […]. [There’s] been poor cooperation with regards 
to communication, in terms of what information we’ve received, 
especially from UDI. […] I was struck by how little information we 
received. I mean, you would think this was something you had a 
contingency plan for, that “if this happens, we do this, and we push 
these buttons”, but there was nothing. 
 
 
Later, new issues arose when UDI decided to relocate asylum-seekers from the 
emergency reception centre in Bodø and Saltstraumen northwards, to Storskog, 
close to the Russian border. This provoked intense reactions from people, 
culminating in a protest march that objected to the “deportation” of asylum-
seekers. Attending the protest, I was struck by how the situation created a 
juxtaposition between RED and MUD, as speaker after speaker emphasised 
equality of identities, valorised diversity, and challenged hierarchical 
categorisations imposed by the state. Larsen provides some reflections around the 
event that neatly captures notions of responsibility, societal trust, and cohesion, 
but also questions the motivations of the state’s decision to curtail local 
integration processes: 
 
I recall that I didn’t attend the march, that’s also something you’re 
taught: I believe I live in a democracy, I’m used to trusting the 
authorities, I think “they’re doing their best and examining things”. 
I want to be there, where I can say, “yes, the authorities will take 
care of this and they’ve probably considered everything, and this is 
why they’re doing it” […]. At the same time, from our perspective, 
it is incredibly stupid that those who’d been at Bodøsjøen for three 
months should travel up to Kirkenes and live in worse conditions 
than now, now that we, the Red Cross had gotten started, kids were 
starting school, and us in the parish were helping out, so this was 
horrible […]. I think it’s ridiculous, they [the authorities] could have 
come here to do the asylum interviews… But then I think maybe 
they, the authorities, did it so we wouldn’t create so much of a riot 
if they were to be sent directly from Bodø out of the country, then 
there would have been a bigger insurrection. I don’t know, I think 
it just seems idiotic […] There’s no understanding it, plain and 
simple, because now they’re back, at Tverlandet reception centre 
[…] Such an awkward way of doing it, and to not have been given a 
decent explanation for why […] I think it’s difficult when the 
authorities don’t explain anything to us. There’s so little 
information […] 
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The notion of “having gotten started” and subsequent disruption ties into central 
premises of Interculturalism. Cities and local environments are fundamental to 
‘developing a climate of trust and maintaining social cohesion’ (Hepburn & 
Zapata-Barrero, 2014, p. 5) and cities can be the space of rebellion against the 
state (Zapata-Barrero, 2017). What Larsen’s reflection draws attention to is how 
trust and distrust of authorities can be observed in moments of rebellion and 
conflict. This highlights how Interculturalism, as an approach to integration 
processes, is fragile in the absence of state commitment (Kymlicka, 2016). The 
deportation protest demonstrates an instance of deep equality, which resonates 
with Larsen’s emphasis on mundane, everyday activities: 
 
a process enacted and owned by so-called ordinary people in 
everyday life [...]. It recognizes equality as an achievement of day-
to-day interaction […]. It circulates through micro-processes of 
individual action and inaction and through group demonstrations of 
caring […]. Paradoxically, deep equality is fragile. 
     Beaman (2017, p. 16) 
 
The absence of state commitment or involvement was also noted in an evaluation 
meeting late November 2015, highlighting the absence of state involvement limits 
local initiatives: 
 
It is apparent that asylum seekers, the reception centres, 
municipalities, and volunteers are operating in a vacuum created by 
UDI. All good endeavours are doing their best without any 
overarching control or guidance. This creates frustration and 
insecurity, which renders difficult an effective and good operation 
for those who want to contribute to the common good. 
     Red Cross Bodø (2015c, p. 3) 
 
Hasvoll drew attention to another aspect of insecurity, which prevents the 
development of contact and a sense of belonging to local communities: 
casualisation of labour and precarity: 
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This growth in agencies, particularly geared towards health care and 
the municipality, we think that’s unfortunate. Not because it 
matters that they are agency workers, but because the local 
community doesn’t get to take part in the development […] we need 
to get labour migrants, and not least their spouses, into 
volunteering. They are needed there, and that is the best way to 
become a permanent resident. 
     Hasvoll 
 
Larsen and Siv also reflected insecurity and precarity in their remarks, noting that 
the result induces a form of paralysis amongst asylum-seekers209. They emphasise, 
as James and McNevin (2013, p. 89), a liminal state, ‘suspended in time and 
space’: 
 
I get the impression this group, those without residency, are a group 
that… they don’t have a lot of energy, because they’re so stuck in 
this situation that they can’t make themselves do anything. They 
don’t know if they’re going to be allowed to remain, should they 
learn Norwegian today, maybe they have to learn Russian tomorrow, 
are they going to Germany, and you’re left with the impression that 
they’ve got enough on their plate as it is. There’s so much 
insecurity! I thought they might be bored to death, and some 
probably are and would prefer to get to work, but I think most of 
them are paralyzed, in a way. 
     Larsen 
 
The kind of inactivity there is at a reception centre, it’s only meant 
as a temporary solution. Originally, they were only supposed to live 
there for a maximum of six months, for God knows how many years 
ago, and now they live in the same conditions but could be living 
there for ten years! So that “brakkesyke”, as we call it, it can be 
hard to fight […] 
If I were in that situation, I would try to make the best of it. I get 
that it is extremely difficult, sort of, when society doesn’t facilitate 
it: you’re in a reception centre for five, ten years and, in a way, 
you’re not allowed to work, you’re not allowed… you’re not earning 
money, the kids don’t have rights… you don’t have the right to 
anything. 
     Siv 
 
The awareness of precarity, insecurity, and lack of resources, becomes an 
important aspect of how facilitators operate. It leads to facilitators drawing on 
                                         
209 For a detailed report on life in Norwegian reception centres, see Andrews, Anvik & Solstad 
(2014) 
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their personal and organisational resources and networks. This provides us with 
insight into how the structure, and agents therein, of Norway as a host society can 
influence integration processes (Bauböck, 1996a). Facilitators can serve to 
‘mediate between individuals and [institutions] in a dual sense: by connecting 
them and coming between them’ (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 85). Hasvoll demonstrates 
a highly functional, albeit fragmented, perspective on society, but this underpins 
her understanding of a need for a multifactorial approach that includes a range of 
actors: 
 
[The] most important ones are the municipalities […] then there’s 
NAV, who I would say is the most important single actor […] just to 
mention some, it’s the individual municipality and business that’s 
the foundation, right? […] there aren’t many employers that take 
[language teaching] seriously […]. It’s mostly from hand to mouth 
[…] we haven’t been able to get LO210 along […] NHO211 were 
positive, but don’t participate, don’t do anything, so… In a way, we 
can’t… We have to include industry, if we were to do anything, we’d 
have to include industry more, and that is one of the main 
challenges. 
      Hasvoll 
 
What Siv, on the other hand, demonstrates is how some of these resources and 
networks are only accessible in specific circumstances, such as when events are 
discursively constructed as crises – drawing on the idea of humanitarian 
exceptionalism. Siv describes volunteer involvement and engagement as ‘very 
generous’ against the implied reference point of the state and national212: 
 
[…] it’s peaks and troughs, I think it’s quite easy to forget the 
ongoing crisis when it’s not as acute and not present in your 
everyday. So, I think you forget very quickly. I think so. But I will 
say, the way I felt it, where I was, amongst volunteers and in an 
organisation, I experienced Bodø as a very generous society and 
generous city. 
[…] 
                                         
210 Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions 
211 Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
212 The notion of generosity is problematic, as it creates a power relationship. For a discussion of 
this from a migrant perspective in Norway, see Carli (2006) 
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I made some calls and got 2000kr from Rema 1000 to buy food for. 
That was it. I spoke to a pharmacy that was willing to donate some 
stuff to us […] I spoke to Norengros213 who were very “yeah, of 
course we’ll help”, so… It wasn’t as much as I thought we would get. 
I spoke to Bama214and they had nothing to offer despite the fact 
they cooperate closely with the Red Cross […] I think, if you look at 
the list of Red Cross’ partners, it’s a long, long, long list, and I think 
one’s aware of that centrally […] The more decentralised things 
are… I’m trying to make connections, to make them aware that […] 
they are a cooperating partner […] I think school and nurseries are 
important for understanding the Norwegian way of doing things. […] 
These organisations work alongside each other, not with each other. 
      Siv 
 
Larsen also draws on this notion of generosity, but similarly echoes Hasvoll’s 
fragmented conception of society, which Siv characterised as working alongside, 
not with each other. Where all three differ is in their perception of time and 
events: Hasvoll demonstrated a processual, continuous perspective, Siv 
emphasised an acute, crisis perspective, and Larsen referred to a cyclical, “wave” 
perspective. 
 
So we asked the bishop, or diocese, for money, and this was at the 
end of the year last year, so there were some leftovers from unused 
positions, and we got 5000kr, and we had a collection here at an 
ecumenical service right after new year, there we got 4000kr, and 
we applied for some more […] and we’ve gotten free food from Kiwi, 
but now they’ve stopped that… […]  
 
When they started this “Refugees Welcome to Norway”-group in 
Bodø [on Facebook] they started on Facebook and got 4000 
members, and they called a meeting here in Bodø, at Havet [a 
hotel], they got to borrow a venue. I tagged along, I thought “we 
have to come together”, and we don’t have to do everything but it’s 
important we know what each other are doing. So it was… Those 
who came to the meeting, there were 4000 “likes”, but there were 
60 people at the meeting, and it’s the same people who’ve been 
volunteering all along. It was Norwegian People’s Aid, they were at 
the reception centres, the Red Cross was there, the [Norwegian] 
Church was there. It was an interesting meeting, but I think these 
in Refugees [Welcome to Bodø], they had a different impression of 
this, I thought there’d be lots of people, but that probably sits a bit 
deeper than a “like”. At the same time, I think it was a good feeling, 
that they were many and had support, especially when it came to 
                                         
213 A wholesaler 
214 A wholesaler for fruit and vegetables 
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clothes, because people went through their houses and brought lots. 
And at the time, it was needed, but it must have been 
overwhelming, they got so much, too much. But, people are quick 
to… “finally, something useful I can do, and I can bring the old 
clothes”, so it turned out… you can’t refuse people, but you would 
rather they brought themselves, and spoke to… not just dropping 
off clothes and boxes, and then leave. To get involved… […] 
 
Now we’ve been through this, I think… I think if they [asylum-
seekers] come now, if we’re going to settle [them]… or if there is 
another wave [of asylum-seekers], or the EU or Schengen decide how 
to do things, it’ll happen again, then I think we’re more prepared, 
now we know, it’ll be easier to jump to it […] Now we’ve been tried 
out, so now we’re ready for the next round. Yeah… I think it’s going 
to go well, I don’t have any… But it was intense, for those who did 
the most. In a way, it was a service that it kept up for a while. 
       Larsen 
 
The above quotes demonstrate how they attempt to draw on a wide range of 
institutions and bodies in order to achieve their goals. The above quotes exemplify 
one of the core values embedded in the concept of inclusion: working together 
(Babacan & Babacan, 2013, p. 160). This notion of working together is also an 
important part of developing social capital that strengthens networks (Putnam, 
2000). Hasvoll is critical of the absence of certain groups and actors, suggesting 
that networks between specialised institutions are highly limited. Adding to that, 
Siv described a case of working alongside each other and the absence of 
coordination and bridging efforts, while Larsen points to the normality of the 
division of labour amongst voluntary organisations by remarking on the surprise of 
the newest group, RWTB, at the nature of volunteerism in Bodø. 
 
Larsen’s statement above also draws attention to the contrast between those who 
“like” a page on Facebook, those who donate material resources, and those who 
devote their time. An important factor here is the size of the community (Putnam, 
2000), with Bodø demonstrating cross-cutting connections that more easily occur 
in smaller communities: ‘[Bodø] isn’t that big a city, that makes it easier’ 
(Larsen). This contradicts earlier remarks pertaining to the lack of coordination 
and networks. Yet, here the distinction is again drawn concerning systematic and 
continuous networks versus spontaneous initiatives.  
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In conclusion, this section has emphasised that there is a high degree of 
specialisation in Bodø. The facilitators presented display expectations from the 
state and focus their efforts where the state falls short. In the case of the county 
administration, NFK, they emphasise migrant labour and family reunification 
migrants, in line with their emphasis on growing Nordland’s economy. Acting 
independently of the state, and expressing criticism towards governmental 
attitudes towards immigration, NFK sought to directly involve migrants in 
optimising the project. Despite an initial emphasis on material conditions, NFK 
gradually paid more attention to ensuring migrants’ equal participation in civil 
society, voluntary organisations, and democratic processes through funding 
initiatives and projects. 
 
This contrasts with Larsen and Siv, representing facilitators in civil society, who 
directed their efforts primarily at the asylum-seekers, who are often placed 
towards the bottom in the socially constructed migrant hierarchy. Drawing on 
networks and social capital, they attempt to facilitate activities that contribute 
positively to integration processes, through the provision of safe, social spaces, or 
with material goods. Keeping in mind that this was during the winter, hence the 
donations of winter attire would allow the asylum seekers a higher degree of 
freedom of movement thereby reducing the risk of the sense of isolation.  
 
What the next section seeks to explore, in detail, is how facilitator understandings 
and behaviour manifest in terms of action. Not simply in terms of how they include 
migrants, but in how they manage volunteers and partners.  
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8.4 – Managing “the majority” 
While Chapter 7 focused on migrants’ experiences, this section focuses on the 
majority-oriented part of voluntary organisations and institutions. Particularly in 
terms of how the facilitators understand and respond to perceived attitudes and 
beliefs in the non-migrant population. This forms a central premise of 
Interculturalism and is the basis of one of the criticisms of it. With Interculturalism 
emphasising cross-cultural dialogue and contact (Meer, et al., 2016), attempting 
to break down boundaries (Cantle, 2016), there is nonetheless the risk of contact 
and dialogue reinforcing barriers and differences (Pettigrew, et al. in Meer, et al., 
2016; Loobucyk, 2016). The emphasis on contact and dialogue does not address 
the context and circumstances of it. 
 
By utilising the discursive framework, we can critically analyse the basis and 
orientation of dialogue directed at non-migrants. Based on that, we can identify 
differences and similarities with discourses directed at migrants, and thereby 
establish a better picture of circumstances and contexts of integration processes. 
 
This section echoes previous research on understandings of Norwegianness, such 
as Erdal, et al. (2017), Erdal and Strømsø (2016), Lynnebakke and Fangen (2011), 
where the expansion and negotiation of Norwegianness involves cultural, ethnic, 
and legal markers, and widening the range of identities considered equal and 
opening up for a redintegrationist discourse. With Interculturalism’s emphasis on 
culture, it is useful to highlight ethnicity as a complicit factor. As Jenkins (1997, 
p. 13) remarks: ‘ethnicity is centrally concerned with culture’. If the positive 
effects of contact, according to Interculturalism, is premised on ‘equal status 
between groups’ (Loobuyck, 2016, p. 230); this presupposes a redintegrationist 
approach. While that may be how contact towards migrants is promoted, 
facilitators similarly have to move their volunteers in the same direction. 
 
Rather than focusing on the “inferior” parties, the migrants, this section addresses 
how facilitators respond to fears and concerns from the “dominant”, non-migrant, 
population. Contrary to what one would expect from the title of “dominant”, or 
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similar term (majority, native, etc.), the facilitators refer to notions of 
unpredictability, insecurity, powerlessness, and ignorance amongst the wider 
population. 
 
The initial move in facilitating contact between migrants and non-migrants is to 
find or create spaces where contact can occur. In the case of Siv and Larsen, we 
can identify them as primary facilitators, where both take a hands-on approach 
to finding or creating these spaces. This contrasts with Hasvoll’s project, which 
targeted businesses and organisations rather than individuals, although they relied 
on individual migrants to inform their policies, priorities, and approach, the 
contact was envisioned as happening out there. 
 
Siv and Larsen simplified their tasks by setting activities to venues where migrants 
were guaranteed to be, such as the emergency reception centres and adult 
education centre, thereby assuming the desire for contact amongst migrants. 
Furthermore, this proactivity gave Siv and Larsen the power to define the nature 
of the activity and contact. This demonstrates two assumptions: firstly, that 
contact is likely to have a positive outcome; secondly, that contact is primarily 
about counteracting migrant passivity, caused by either lack of will or lack of 
resources, as described in the above section. By inserting themselves into a venue, 
or situation, Siv and Larsen define the initial premise, and boundaries, of the 
contact. 
 
This is most visible in the case of activities at the emergency reception centre. 
RCB defined a daily two-hour slot as the appropriate time for contact. In guidelines 
issued to the volunteers at the emergency reception centre, the first rule was 
‘Volunteers shall not establish personal contact with or give personal telephone 
numbers to recently arrived asylum seekers while on assignment from the Red 
Cross’ (Red Cross Bodø, 2015a). A second document was circulated to volunteers 
with routines and recommendations and sought to encourage hospitality by 
euphemistically referring to the asylum seekers as “guests” and the volunteers as 
“hosts”. The document attempted to demonstrate cultural awareness, indicating 
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the risk of stereotypes or cultural expectations. The rule of wearing the RC vest, 
effectively a uniform, cements the interaction as one between an active provider 
and passive recipient. 
 
• Be early – our guests are often there before 18.00 — and it’s 
great if things are ready by then; 
• Wear the Red Cross vests lying to the left of the entrance; 
• Greet each person, with a look, smile, or greeting. Be mindful 
that not all shake hands the Norwegian way; 
• Be a host, divide your attention, and use time on small and 
big conversations with those present.  
RCB (2015b) 
 
Although RCB sought to facilitate contact between recently arrived asylum seekers 
and locals, the instructions point to a relationship which is far from a meeting of 
groups with equal status, it is between provider and provided. These points were 
echoed in Siv’s reflections. She notes how the interaction is premised on rules and 
a defined remit, making the contact inherently unequal as the volunteer and RCB 
assert the power to define every aspect of the contact in a narrow, social 
integrationist, specialised manner. The RCB is envisioned as addressing a single 
factor, and then only in a limited capacity. 
 
So, that fell into place fairly quickly, our volunteering-policy, what 
we should do and shouldn't do, and from that point onwards it 
worked quite well. […] We were there to make them feel safe, that 
was our objective. […] We’ve had to… set some limits because it is 
important to us that this, those involved do it according to Red Cross 
guidelines. […] And it’s pretty difficult to know, I thought so, when 
I started out as a volunteer, I thought it was difficult to know how 
far my mandate as a volunteer extended. I thought “now I can go 
out and save the world, I’m going to do something good”, and I was 
told “you should not translate papers”, “you should not help them 
contact lawyers”, “that is not your responsibility”, “you are 
supposed to be a social provider, you are meant to be a relief, that 
is what you provide”, “you should not be someone who, sort of, 
helps with these things, someone else will do that”. So… I… It’s a 
difficult balancing act. 
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Larsen, who was familiar with RCBs activities at the emergency reception centre 
made similar remarks but demonstrated uncertainty as to how to label and 
categorise the people they sought to help. This could point to uncertainty and 
insecurity related to a lack of awareness of migrant identification processes, as 
well as discourses around the legitimacy of claims, labelling and categorisations. 
The result, as Larsen points to, seems to be limiting and defining contact in a way 
which privileges the volunteer and provider in the power relationship established 
through the activity. Particularly in the case of the emergency reception centre, 
although practical, it drew attention to the mobility/immobility of the volunteers 
and asylum seekers: volunteers had freedom of movement, while the asylum 
seekers were, for a variety of reasons, confined to the centre215. 
 
[…] I think part of the reason why it is difficult for Norwegians to 
get in touch with refugees in a city, asylum seekers or whatever you 
want to call them, is that in a way it feels like you have to get very 
involved, you have to, in a way, go into a family, you have to have 
a house, clothes, food, and bring them on holiday, you get too 
involved, and you get a bit shy or anxious […] we have to take that 
seriously. So, to make a meeting place where they can make 
contact, for two hours, but then they can go home. […] I think that 
drew out very many. […] we have to take it seriously that people 
are afraid and sceptical and don’t understand what’s happening, 
and that there’s no one “out to get them”, and we just have to act 
accordingly. 
      Larsen 
 
Furthermore, this tied into the distinctly gendered component in the 
refugee/asylum seeker-oriented activities. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
explore how this is related to gendering of other aspects of Norwegian society, 
but it would certainly be an avenue for further research.  
 
[…] we’re lacking men to be volunteers […] Why it is the case that 
men don’t get engaged… I think it has to do with… a certain shyness 
[…] I don’t think it’s reluctance, in a way, but… it’s about finding 
good ways to get together […] 
      Larsen 
 
                                         
215 Availability of means of transport, knowledge of local geography, climate, and uncertainty of 
rules are all factors in the mobility/immobility aspect. 
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We’ve got a tonne of female volunteers, it’s women who sign up… 
There are of course also men, but not to the same extent as women. 
There is definitely a gender-disparity […] There are clearly defined 
tasks, not that I know when they were defined as such, but… the 
women do this, and the men do that. So… I’ve come to understand, 
not that I’ve experienced it, that it’s easier for men if they have a 
defined task […]. I was at a meeting with some of the reception 
centres yesterday, and they wondered if one could start a fishing 
group, and I thought “Yeah, this is something we can go out and 
recruit men for”, because it’s very tangible. “Here we need men, or 
volunteers, who can fish, know what to do with it once it’s caught, 
how to kill it, gut it, what you keep, what you throw”. I think that’s 
a great way to get men to volunteer, because simply being a 
volunteer in the Red Cross is very diffuse […] 
      Siv 
 
This gendered division was also apparent in the social and multicultural216 
activities and trainings organised by RCB. Out of 22 participants at a meeting on 
multicultural work held late January 2016, six were male. A workshop held three 
weeks later, had between 25-30 participants, and, again, there were only half a 
dozen men in attendance. Out of 80 recipients of emails organising activities at 
the emergency reception centre, only a quarter were male. This is reflected in 
the volunteers’ attendance, where out of 8 weeks, and 81 shifts, a man covered 
only 10 of those shifts. Further to that, three separate individuals covered those 
10 shifts. This strengthens the idea that the activities centred on, relatively, 
unstructured socialisation are a highly gendered activity. 
 
Despite the Interculturalist ideal of intercultural contact between groups of equal 
status, the reality is often far from it. The gender disparity between the 
volunteers and the asylum seekers and refugees leads to a complex discourse, 
where intersectionality becomes key to understanding and analysing the 
situations. Notions of gender, age, and culture are brought to the fore in Larsen’s 
remark: 
 
There are grown men in their 40s, and [my daughter who’s 27] is a 
young woman who’s unmarried, and that’s what they ask about 
“why aren’t you married?” 
                                         
216 Certain activities were grouped as “flerkulturell”, which translates to multicultural 
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Naturally, intercultural contact requires these encounters in order to begin the 
bridging process between cultures. The principle of equal status thus becomes an 
idealised starting point, an implied premise for contact, rather than describing 
the contact itself. As Meer, et al., points out: ‘differences in status and power 
relations more broadly mean that dialogue(s) do not proceed on an equal footing’ 
(Meer, et al., 2016, pp. 12-13). Importantly, the contact serves to diversify non-
migrants understanding of migrants particularly concerning how labels such as 
refugee or asylum seeker erase other identities. Contact can facilitate a move to 
externalising the refugee/asylum seeker label away from the individual, and 
seeing the label as a result of circumstances (Block, et al., 2013), thereby opening 
up for a diversity of past and future trajectories (Polzer, 2008; Gifford, 2013). 
 
This was neatly exemplified by a conversation I had with a 21-year old Afghani 
man, Aron, at the emergency reception centre: he disliked that people often 
assumed they, the residents at the emergency reception centre, were Syrians, but 
in fact, there were Egyptians, Afghani and Syrians. He spoke of his journey, but 
he spoke more of what he wanted from his future. He also remarked that he 
appreciated speaking to a young man, someone his own age.  
 
This encounter demonstrates the need for a gender balance, where certain 
differences are minimised and allow focus to be put on other differences and 
similarities. The Red Cross recognise this, as one of their activities, refugee-
guides217, emphasises that the refugee/non-refugee pair should be the same 
gender, and that they needed male refugee-guides.  
 
RCB also had an International Women’s Group and were in the process of creating 
a parallel International Men’s Group. Simultaneously, one participant at a meeting 
                                         
217 “Flyktningguide” – Refugee-guide, seeks to couple a refugee with a volunteer, who is expected 
to be someone who can introduce the refugee to Norwegian society (although there are no explicit 
criteria formulated). Again, the activity is confined and limited to regular contact at set intervals 
for up to a year, after which it is presumed the need has dissipated. The activity had been dormant 
in Bodø during my fieldwork, and only started up towards the end of my fieldwork, making it 
unfeasible to include in my research. 
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raised the gender segregation of activities as a potential bjørnetjeneste, 
something that might seem like a good idea at the time but ultimately is a 
disservice. The implication was that in order to convey Norway’s form of gender 
equality, there should be activities that include both genders. In particular, this 
drew on the idea that asylum-seekers were predominantly male, whereas RCB 
volunteers were women.   
 
The notion of acute versus chronic contributes to what labels we apply and how 
we understand them. Aron poignantly remarked that the assumption that the 
refugees arriving were Syrian was unfair considering Afghanistan has suffered a 
war much longer. This echoes the argument promoted by Hayden (2006), that the 
discrepancy in the understanding of the refugee label is a result of a series of 
relationships (inter-state relationships, origin-state to citizen, receiving-state to 
citizen, receiving-state to non-citizens, and the state’s relationship to itself). 
Finally, the encounter between Aron and myself was impeded by the rules of 
engagement dictated by the Red Cross. I certainly felt that the Red Cross’ “arms-
length” approach, by strongly advising against forming close ties, encouraged a 
passivity, in myself, during the encounters. Underpinning the RC’s approach seems 
to be a form of professionalism and construction of asylum seekers and refugees 
as vulnerable, in line with their charity-oriented model and emphasis on providing 
social amelioration (Brown, et al., 2002). 
 
These points relate back to a discussion at one of the organising meetings between 
voluntary organisations in Bodø, where RCB representatives strongly emphasised 
the distinction between volunteerism and activism: a volunteer fulfils a formal 
role; the activist fulfils a personal, often political, desire.  The notion of being 
both was not even considered. This is reminiscent of Bauböck’s quote in section 
8.3: specialised institutions are blind to the total complexity of individuals. 
Amongst organisations explored in this chapter, this appears to be the case, as 
they conform strictly to their remit, and, as Siv noted, ‘work alongside each other, 
not with’.  
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This raises the question of the nature and quality of the intercultural encounters 
in their activities, if relationships are to be strictly defined and predetermined to 
exist only in a two-hour slot, as well as identities being consistently de-
emphasised. Leaping ahead, to May 17th 2016, one of the public speeches218 was 
held, in Norwegian, by a 14-year-old boy, one of the minors who arrived in 
November 2015. His honorary mention of RCB’s activities at the emergency 
reception centre echoes Ager and Strang’s (2008) findings that friendliness from 
the settled community is important. What is missing from Ager and Strang is the 
question of temporality: what does short-term friendliness do for long-term 
processes? Recalling Siv’s comments on generosity in the previous section, the 
expression of gratitude entails a recognition of a power relationship. 
 
While the Red Cross does not discourage long-term relationships, it does seek to 
limit it within their activities. The issue then becomes seeing intercultural contact 
as discrete points of contact, as the RC encourages, or as a process. This does not 
preclude us from identifying certain points of contact as more significant. Such as 
the speech from the 14-year-old schoolchild who has lived in Norway for six 
months or the speech from his counterpart, a teenage girl who came to Norway 
as a refugee in 2009, who called upon the legacy of national icon Henrik 
Wergeland: [He] would have fought for refugees219.  
 
Alternatively, is Siv’s description of how volunteerism and attitudes towards crises 
fluctuating in peaks and troughs more accurate, where the majority of time is 
spent in a level of indifference? In the absence of first-hand contact, what shapes 
perceptions amongst the rest of the population? If the media is a significant actor, 
then Eide and Simonsen’s evidence pointing to how the Norwegian press functions 
as an ‘ethnic gatekeeper’ (Eide & Simonsen, 2007, p. 17) is significant220.  
 
                                         
218 For more on the nature of 17th May speeches, see Buxrud and Fangen (2017), of particular 
salience is the idea that  ‘this day forges an arena for intercultural encounters and national identity 
management’ (p. 773). 
219 Wergeland was a vocal critic of the Norwegian Constitution’s §2, which barred Jews, Jesuits, 
and monks from entering Norway. 
220 See Wiggen (2012) on Anti-Immigration rhetoric in Norway post-22 July, and Andersson (2012) 
on debates around Multiculturalism post-22 July  
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In conclusion, the discussion of how facilitators understand and relate to non-
migrants offers additional insight into how we can understand integration 
processes. In the short term, their understanding is influenced by the public 
discourse and engagement, allowing them to facilitate a range of activities, 
whereas the long-term goal is to maintain and improve upon their activities. This 
is demonstrated, for example, by the awareness of the lack of male volunteers 
and the desire to remedy that deficiency. Understanding both “sides” is essential 
to furthering the understanding of how integration processes take place and 
inform activities. 
 
What becomes apparent is that the highly specialised nature of the different 
organisations, combined with the division of labour amongst them, is incapable of 
engendering contact with a respect for the equality, multiplicity, and 
complexities of identities. Additionally, they are drawn to hierarchical 
understandings of identity which are often underpinned by racialised stereotypes. 
 
Whereas the previous chapter emphasised the role of reciprocity, the data 
presented here encourages a power-relationship between the service-
provider/volunteer and the recipient. 
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8.5 – Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to draw attention to how individuals involved in 
facilitating activities that bring together migrants and non-migrants understand 
their activities. A key theme for the beginning of the chapter was whether the 
facilitators presented sought to compliment or compete with state understandings 
of integration processes and activities, as emphasised in research question 3. 
 
There is a strong sense of complementarity in facilitator emphases and what the 
state desires, a focus on language and employment. Yet, facilitators are informed 
by an awareness of where the state is insufficiently involved, such as Hasvoll’s 
emphasis on migrant labourers or family reunification. Although complementary 
to state efforts, it is understood as “making up for” a lack of concern or efforts 
from the state. The notion of an all-encompassing welfare state should, according 
to these facilitators, include adequately addressing the needs of asylum seekers, 
migrant labourers, and family reunification migrants. 
 
In the case of reference group in the NFK migration project, they additionally 
criticised the lack of adequate state policy on integration, something we saw in 
Dmitri’s comments in the previous chapter. The securitisation and conflict-
oriented approach became apparent during the late winter of 2016, when 
relocating asylum seekers to another reception centre was framed as 
“deportation” and is apparent in policy changes such as the proposed changes to 
dual citizenship.  
 
These perspectives and understandings come together to inform how facilitators 
approach their jobs, responsibilities, and obligations. In the absence of clear 
control by the state, they draw on their networks and resources, personal and 
organisational, in order to mitigate circumstances which are framed as acute or, 
for lack of a better term, a crisis. 
 
The final section of this chapter also demonstrated how there is an awareness of 
how activities are gendered. Without necessarily reflecting on how they came to 
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be gendered, facilitators such as Siv and Larsen incorporate that understanding 
into how they attempt to recruit or structure activities, such as by attempting to 
find “male-oriented” activities. Although not framed in the sense of pursuing 
contact between groups of equal status, their pursuits carry the second meaning 
of the Norwegian word for Equality (likhet)221 – birds of a feather flock together. 
 
Overall, we find that the division of labour between voluntary organisations, 
spoken often of by those in Caritas in Chapter 6, results in highly specialised 
institutions that do not reflect on their or other’s identities. Instead, processes of 
categorisation dominate, and activities are developed with an orientation towards 
providing a service. Combined with a rhetoric of crisis, the emphasis is then 
shifted towards material and resource-oriented solutions, contributing to the 
reification of identities and categories, while simultaneously establishing power-
relationships that can contribute to the hierarchisation of identities. The only one 
who demonstrated consistent elements of a redintegrationist discourse was 
Hasvoll, who was also the one who had been working most consistently with 
integration processes for years and had involved migrants on an equal footing in 
the development of the project.  
  
                                         
221 See section 4.4 for the discussion of likhet as a gatekeeper concept that can imply both equality 
and similarity. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions 
9.1 – Summary 
This thesis has analysed how religious and secular organisations can influence 
integration proceses. As integration processes need to be seen from a holistic 
perspective, I explored several tiers, ranging from the local to national contexts. 
A key aspect of emphasising the role of religious organisations is that it 
necessitates examining the religious-secular relationship. This led to the 
formulation of three overarching research questions, with supplementary sub-
questions: 
1. To what extent, and in what ways, do religious and secular identities and 
identifications influence integration processes? 
2. What is the role of the Catholic Church (in Norway) and related institutions 
in integration processes? 
a. How does the nature of the Catholic Church affect its response to 
and perception of integration processes? 
i. How do the responses and perceptions of integration 
processes mirror or diverge from other organisations or 
institutions, such as the state? 
b. How does the relationship between different Catholic organisations 
influence integration processes? 
3. How do secular organisations and activities in Norway impact integration 
processes? 
a. How do secular organisations and institutions, and their members, 
mirror or diverge from each other, and the state, in their 
understanding of integration processes? 
 
The structure of the thesis was designed to answer these questions in sequence, 
and by moving from the theoretical to the empirical. Chapter 2 provided the 
theoretical framework and conceptual clarification, and Chapter 3 explored what 
methods I used to gather the empirical material. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
subsequently established the contours that allowed me to situate the findings. 
Finally, Chapters 6-8 analysed the data and explored the research questions in 
depth. 
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The cornerstone of integration processes is identities. My analyses begin with 
understanding, first and foremost, that identities are multiple, contextual, and 
relational. Identities have to be distinguished from categories, which are always 
externally applied to individuals. Hence, it was necessary to examine the 
relationship between processes of identification and processes of categorisation. 
Despite the near infinite permutations of identities and categories, I focused on 
three I evaluated as the most pertinent for this thesis. As the case study focuses 
on Catholicism and Norway, I judged that religion, ethnicity, and nationality 
offered the greatest possibilities of answering the research questions. Due to 
constraints inherent to a PhD thesis (time, space, resources), this necessitated de-
emphasising certain identities and categories, such as gender, diaspora, 
transnationalism, or sexuality. 
 
Key to integration processes are the roles of migrant identities and 
categorisations. Shaped by processes of leaving, journeying, and arriving, a range 
of categories are generated and, occasionally, internalised to become, if only 
temporarily, identities. This ranges from asylum seeker to tourist, with each 
category and identity implying a different process of categorisation and 
identification, shaped by different contexts and relationships. This gives rise to a 
myriad of concepts attempting to describe integration processes. As a result of 
the fieldwork and extensive literature review, I adapted Levitas’ (2005) discursive 
framework to explore migration and integration processes. This allowed me to 
step beyond the polysemic and contested meanings and understandings of a range 
of concepts. Instead, it allows for situating participants understandings of 
integration processes within their appropriate contexts and in relation to specific 
situations. Rather than imposing an academic definition on the concept of 
integration, the discursive framework focuses on the understanding and usage of 
it. 
 
Subsequently, the research questions necessitated exploring theoretical premises 
for religion’s potential influence on integration processes. This had to be seen in 
relation to secularisation processes. Each of the discursive categories has a 
reciprocal relationship with religious-secular relationships. If the religious-secular 
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relationship is conducive to one discursive context, we may see religion 
influencing integration processes in one way. Whereas a different discursive 
context may shape religion’s influence another way. The discursive framework 
can also be applied to internal processes within religious organisations, for 
example by exploring the role of the papacy, the bishops’ conferences, individual 
bishops, or priests. Exploring multiple levels allowed us to see the nuance in 
understandings of integration processes and how integration processes are 
influenced. Here Hirschmann’s (2004) three Rs (Resources, Refuge, and 
Respectability) provided some refinement to the discursive framework, and by 
adding a fourth R, Reciprocity, the thesis established a theoretical basis for 
understanding integration processes and the role of religion. 
 
With the theoretical framework laid out, in Chapter 3 I explored the methods 
employed during the fieldwork. Ethnography was the overarching method, 
characterised by participant observation, interviews, and documentary analysis. 
Taking place over the course of 14 months, the data collection consisted of an 
immersive and holistic approach. Exploring both religious and secular 
organisations, I moved to Bodø, in Northern Norway, and took part in activities in 
the Catholic parish, St. Eystein, Red Cross Bodø (RCB), and found work at a local 
bar. In addition to this, I conducted part of the ethnography across multiple 
locations, such as with Caritas and the Catholic Youth of Norway (NUK). 
 
Having laid out the theoretical and methodological framework, Chapter 4 
presented a range of statistical and documentary material in order to establish a 
context that allows us to analyse the data more fully. As integration processes are 
inherently about people, demographics play a key part in setting the context. 
Firstly, I explored how the migrant population grew from the 1970s onwards, with 
substantial increases in net migration. This occurs alongside an increasing 
urbanisation, which should not be ignored. Internal factors may have an equal, if 
not greater, impact on integration processes than immigration. Secondly, I 
demonstrated the relationship between demographic changes and policy changes, 
starting in the 1970s. The policy environment has encouraged certain forms of 
migration: supportive of Nordic migration, willingness to accept refugees, and the 
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necessity of accepting EU migration as a result of EEA membership. From the 1970s 
up until the 2000s, the diversification of the migrant population was inextricably 
linked to asylum seekers, refugees, and the concomitant family reunification. 
From the mid-2000s, labour migration has had a much larger impact on the 
composition of the migrant population. The exploration of demographic factors 
also demonstrated how there are significant differences due to gender, where 
women dominate immigration categorised as being for “family reunification” and 
“education”, whereas men have dominated the categories of “work” and 
“refuge”. 
 
Shifting the perspective down to a local level, I explored demographic details 
pertaining to Bodø and Nordland. Contrasting it to the national data showed some 
variation, most significantly with regards to duration of residency. Unable to 
distinguish whether it was due to emigration, internal migration, or immigration 
to Nordland occuring at a slower rate, immigrants in Nordland had a significantly 
shorter duration of residency when compared to the national level. Despite some 
awareness of the diversification of the immigrant population at a local and county 
level, there is an absence of clearly formulated policy, and issues seem to be 
resolved on an ad-hoc basis. 
 
While Chapter 4 explored the secular context, Chapter 5 examined the religious 
context in Norway. Firstly by looking at overarching issues of affiliation, 
disaffiliation, and secularisation, and how elements of the religious landscape 
have shifted. Utilising the recent membership scandal as an example, I 
demonstrated how the Catholic-secular relationship in Norway has been 
highlighted and shifted in recent times. The membership scandal was also an 
example of how migration flows can alter the internal composition of religious 
organisations, and the result this change can have on funding policies and 
understandings of different religions. 
 
The remainder of Chapter 5 was an in-depth look at the Catholic Church in Norway. 
This was a key element, as this thesis deviates strongly from previous writing on 
the Catholic Church in Norway that characterises it as an “immigrant church”. 
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Rather, I made the argument that the Church has gradually been shaped to a 
Norwegian context, giving rise to a hegemonic “Norwegian” Catholicity. What the 
increase in immigration has brought to the fore is the heterogeneity of the 
Catholic Church, challenging the hegemonic form. The growth of membership, 
officially registered or un-registered but practicing, has necessitated acquiring 
more priests to serve the parishioners. It has also necessitated expanding the 
provision of pastoral care in multiple languages. This discussion fundamentally 
shaped the arguments for how the Church can influence integration processes. It 
emphasises the basis on which decisions are made concerning how the Church 
manages this diversity and how it changes.   
 
Chapter 6 furthered this analysis by exploring the fieldwork data. Returning to 
Hirschmann’s three Rs and the discursive framework presented in Chapter 2, I 
analysed how the Church is capable of influencing integration processes at the 
diocesan level and the parochial level. At the Diocesan level, we saw how the 
acquisition and allocation of clergy allows the Church to react to demographic 
changes. Simultaneously, at the Diocesan level we saw how the relationship with 
Caritas allowed the Church to emphasise its religious character, which has become 
more diverse, while claiming credit for work done by Caritas through their shared 
Catholic identity.  
 
Drawing on extensive participant observation and interviews, I then explored how 
integration processes are influenced at the parochial level. Here, I demonstrated 
the impact of clerical allocation on local processes, and how the changes explored 
at the Diocesan level are experienced locally. In particular, the growth of the 
parish, and its diversification, has highlighted multiple, overlapping identities that 
influence the parish. This altered the parish from a small, close-knit community, 
to a larger body comprised of multiple parts, mirroring the developments at the 
Diocesan level, albeit at a slower pace. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 examined the role of faith-based organisations such as NUK and 
Caritas. As a youth organisation, NUK has significant potential in reaching 
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descendants of immigrants, and can influence integration processes in a cross-
generational aspect. As with the Diocese, there was a strong awareness of 
diversity, and a similarly strong emphasis on a shared, albeit heterogeneous, 
Catholic identity. Caritas, on the other hand, exhibited a considerably more 
functionalist outlook. Unlike the Diocese and NUK, the interviewees from Caritas 
echoed state understandings of integration processes. This derives, in part, from 
their reliance on state resources and cooperation/competition with other 
charitable organisations. Chapter 6 demonstrated the complex religious-secular 
relationship, and how the different organisations positionality in that relationship 
contributed to the discursive tendencies. 
 
Chapter 7 continued the analysis of Hirschmann’s three Rs, but applied it to non-
religious cases. Exploring integration processes from local organisational and 
migrant perspectives, the chapter demonstrated how adding a fourth R, 
reciprocity, enhances our understanding. Where Red Cross Bodø and Refugees 
Welcome To Bodø mirrored a Social Integrationist perspective in their emphasis 
on the provision of resources and limited responsibility for refuge and 
respectability, the interviewees emphasised the importance refuge and 
respectability. Additionally, interviewees’ remarks drew attention to how the 
provision of resources, refuge, and respectability, leads to reciprocity. This draws 
attention to the discussions of Rights versus Duties in debates around citizenship 
explored in Chapter 2. Importantly, the addition of reciprocity emphasises a 
relational perspective more suited to exploring integration processes and is 
capable of shifting the discourse away from a pure Social Integrationist Discourse. 
 
In Chapter 8, I explored integration processes from the perspectives of non-
migrants who are in positions that allow them a greater level of influence on 
integration-oriented activities. Here, we saw how the absence of clear 
instructions from a state level is mirrored at the local level, and responses at the 
local level were seen as mitigating the lack of state efforts. The emphasis on SID 
was nuanced by aspects of RED and MUD in the sense that the overwhelming 
emphasis was still on language and work, but there was some variation in whether 
the onus was on migrant passivity (MUD) or lack of resources (RED). There was a 
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consistent de-emphasis of identities, with exceptions deriving from prolonged 
cooperation with migrants in a context where they participated as equals as 
opposed to as customers/clients.  
 
The final substantive chapter added an analysis of how facilitators and their 
organisations related to their volunteers. What this highlighted was how organized 
activities limited and restricted contact between volunteers and migrants. The 
specialisation of organisations points to a division of labour that allows for a de-
emphasis of identities and engenders a transactional approach. This, in turn, 
furthers hierarchical perspectives where categories are ranked according to 
perceptions of vulnerability, and reinforce racialised stereotypes. The crisis-
rhetoric of 2015-2016 further exacerbated the resource-oriented focus, and the 
broader societal discourse significantly shaped the activities set up in this time 
period. 
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9.2 – Key contributions 
This thesis has made four significant contributions to our understanding of 
integration processes and the role of religious organisations. Firstly, the promotion 
of exploring integration through a discursive framework. Secondly, demonstrating 
how understandings of identities can influence integration processes. Thirdly, the 
expansion of Hirschmann’s framework to include a fourth R; reciprocity. Finally, 
addressing the role of non-migrants and the influences they may have on 
integration processes.  
 
9.2.1 – Contribution 1 – Integration processes in a discursive 
framework 
The first contribution of this thesis is the appropriation of Levitas’ (2005) 
discursive framework, developed for analyses of social exclusion, to 
understandings of integration processes. Components of this contribution are a) it 
allows us to categorise and understand a multitude of concepts pertaining to 
integration processes; b) it allows for, and clarifies, competing understandings of 
a concept; c) it reflects broader contexts and situates data in a processual 
understanding; d) it can be applied to theoretical discussions, political debates, 
and everyday conversations. The framework forces us to explore the underlying 
premises of the terminology. It allows us to explore why participants may choose 
one term over another, as contested keywords have context-specific 
connotations. 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the integration and migration field is replete with 
competing concepts and terminology. In turn, some of these concepts make their 
way into the vernacular and take on a life of their own, integration being the most 
obvious example. Many concepts derive from specific contexts and have different 
connotations (see in particular Table 4 and appendix A). For example, assimilation 
has different histories in the US and Europe, as does multiculturalism. 
Assimilation ranges from ‘benign neglect’ (Brazal, 2015c, p. 74) to ‘a one-sided 
process of adaptation’ (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 247). Assimilation has also been 
developed to include the concept of Segmented Assimilation (Portes & Zhou, 
1993; Wessendorf, 2013; Zhou & Bankston III, 2016), which seeks to nuance the 
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understanding of assimilation. Multiculturalism can be both ‘cultural enrichment’ 
(Ben-Rafael, 1996, p. 141), a normalisation of diversity (Kymlicka, 2012), and 
‘political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group’ (Meer, et al., 
2016).  
 
This creates a particular kind of conundrum: which concept does a researcher 
choose that is accurate for the context it is applied to, but simultaneously is 
interpreted the same way by the wider community of researchers? This was also 
echoed in the fieldwork, where finer nuances were lost by the fixation on a 
singular concept. Whereas integration (rather, the Norwegian “integrering”) was 
a firmly established concept, often contrasted with inclusion (Eriksen, 2010), the 
crisis-rhetoric of 2015-2016 gave rise to everyday-integration 
(“hverdagsintegrering”) as an alternative term. Additionally, as Rytter (2018) 
argues, we need to be highly critical of the uses of integration.  
 
Applying a discursive framework represents an innovative, holistic approach that 
enables a critical perspective on the uses and meanings of integration. The 
discursive framework allows for the application of the same analytical rigour to 
all aspects of the methodology and the diversity of data. It can be applied equally 
to government reports and interviews, and irrespective of religious-secular 
distinctions, as evidenced by the context and data chapters of this thesis. The 
discursive framework and approach also highlights the processual nature of 
integration processes, as each discourse points to patterns of understanding and 
behaviour. 
 
9.2.2 – Contribution 2 – Situating identities at the core of religious 
organisational aims and integration processes 
The second key contribution of this thesis is that it develops a more robust analysis 
of how Catholic religious organisations influence integration processes in Norway. 
As much of the discussion on integration processes in Norway has been focused on 
Islam (Eriksen, 2012; Bangstad, 2014; 2013), Catholicism and Catholic 
organisations provide different experiences of integration processes. Exploring the 
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relationship between migration, integration, and the Church in Norway is 
relatively new, thus many of the studies so far have significantly limited scopes or 
omissions. Mæland (2016) overwhelmingly focuses on internal constructions of the 
Church, and does not explicitly address the notion of multiple and wider contexts 
for integration processes. Erdal (2016b), with an emphasis on Polish migrants (in 
major cities), highlights how the complexity of integration processes in the Church 
in Norway derives, in part, from the lack of a ‘majority within which minorities 
might integrate’, but fails to adequately address the institutional, historical power 
and legitimacy of a Norwegian Catholicity. Research by Halvorsen and Aschim 
(2016), and Giskeødegård and Aschim (2016) similarly limited its focus to Polish 
migrants, albeit in a peripheral Catholic parish on the west coast of Norway; failing 
to situate the local processes in the greater context, both politically and in 
relation to central Church aspects. Hovdelien (2016), on the other hand, 
overwhelmingly focuses on understandings within the core of the Church, omitting 
local and peripheral aspects. 
 
This thesis, therefore, adds a significant contribution through its exploration of 
central and peripheral aspects, situating Catholic processes within overarching 
Norwegian societal integration processes, and providing a comparison to secular 
organisations. Through detailed analysis of several Catholic organisations, I 
demonstrated how, despite the organisations sharing a Catholic label, there were 
distinct differences in how they understand and influence integration processes. 
For the Church itself, at both diocesan and parochial levels, and NUK, the 
emphasis is on providing pastoral care, a mixture refuge, respectability and 
resources. Strengthening a Catholic identity and community shapes outlooks on 
alternative identities, similar to what Garces-Foley (2008) found in her comparison 
of Catholic and Evangelical integration efforts in the US. As a heterogeneous 
group, it has several options with regards to managing or responding to multiple 
identities: de-emphasise, hierarchise, or valorise. 
 
De-emphasis implies an promoting a Catholic identity in favour of competing 
identities, as Erdal (2016b, p. 284) puts it ‘faith is the common denominator’. 
Historically, this might have been a sustainable approach, as the hegemony of a 
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Norwegian — albeit pre-Vatican II — form of Catholicism was uncontested. But, as 
migration has altered the demographics of the Church membership, different 
Catholicities — legitimised post-Vatican II — have become associated with national 
and ethnic identities. Where previous analyses fall short is in the almost 
sensationalist emphasis on Polish migrants. As St. Eystein demonstrated, despite 
the Polish-born population within the parish nearly tripling over a decade, changes 
to the parish were rarely attributed to the Polish-born. Rather, it was the overall 
growth of the parish that was emphasised, where Filipino-born were seen as an 
enduring significant influence on the parish and its activities. 
 
The influence of religious organisations is not confined to how they manage 
diversity, or ‘unity within complex diversity’ (Erdal, 2016b, p. 264), as much of 
the previous research emphasises, but includes how the management of diversity 
is perceived and fits into other, intersecting, overlapping integration processes. 
NUK provides a particularly salient demonstration of this in how it operates both 
within and outwith parishes and the diocese/prelatures. Where the Church is 
Catholic in form and content, continuously situating itself in a Norwegian context, 
NUK is Catholic in content, but the form is identical to other youth organisations 
in Norway. When the Church membership scandal broke, NUK was scrutinised 
because it was Catholic despite being a separate legal entity (Fordelingsutvalget, 
2016). When NUK travels to the World Youth Days, it is a Norwegian group; the 
ethnic makeup of the group might result in it being considered a diverse group, 
but it is nonetheless categorised, and identifies, as a Norwegian group. The 
reciprocal relationship between NUKs local and central activities can have a 
significant impact on a parish, as seen in St. Eystein. 
 
What the Church and NUK share is how they attempt to manage identities. De-
emphasis is not viable, hence there is an attempt to negotiate valorisation and 
hierarchisation. They are not mutually exclusive, and cut across local and regional 
processes (parish and diocese), as well as a web of relationships between different 
identities (ethnic and national). As Garces-Foley (2008, p. 21) argues: ‘Catholic 
integration efforts start and end with the assumption that new immigrants must 
be allowed to retain their religiocultural traditions […]’. Effectively, this results 
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in a predisposition to valorisation of a diversity of ethnic and national identities. 
This does not suggest hierarchisation does not occur, it clearly does. What my 
analysis suggests is that hierarchisation is, in the Church centrally and NUK, 
considered problematic and detrimental. 
 
This is where Caritas deviates, as their goal is not to manage identities, but to 
provide a service. Other than an association with the Church and a Catholic 
identity, Caritas is not structured, nor does it operate, distinctly from other 
voluntary organisations. While the relationship to the Church offers some 
strengths, their approach to, and influence on, integration processes appears to 
have more in common with other charities and voluntary organisations than with 
the Church and NUK. Their domestic work oriented towards integration processes 
is distinctly Social Integrationist, as opposed to the Church and NUK’s inclination 
to redintegrationist discourses. Their activities rely on de-emphasising identities, 
and emphasising the role of language and work. Identities are only relevant insofar 
as it relates to where they are situated in hierarchical constructions of identities, 
as seen in how the activity coordinators seek to “adjust expecations” of what a 
migrant can expect to obtain in terms of work. Whereas NUK and the Church have 
the open-ended goal of growth and absence of conflict, Caritas echoes 
governmental outlooks on integration processes and emphasise language and work 
as goals, rather than as means to a goal of an equal society. 
 
9.2.3 – Contribution 3 – Adding Reciprocity to Hirchmann’s 
framework  
The third key contribution is the highlighting of reciprocity in integration 
processes, expanding Hirschmann’s (Hirschmann, 2004) framework from three to 
four Rs. Reciprocity emphasises the relational and contextual nature of 
integration processes. Adding reciprocity to our understanding of factors in 
integration processes also contributes to the citizenship discussion in Chapter 2 
(in particular Jurado (2008)); demonstrating how we benefit from seeing the 
relationship as rights and duties, rather than rights versus duties. The interviews 
with Dmitri, Vanessa, and Ali demonstrate the complexity of this relationship.  
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They demonstrate how relationships to workplaces, local communities, as well as 
to an imagined nation, can shape integration processes. Specifically, how the 
reciprocal nature of these relationships can have positive or negative influences. 
All three demonstrated the benefit of a redintegrationist approach to integration 
processes. An approach that addresses multiple factors that contribute to 
inequalities, and defies the hierarchisation of identities. Recognising reciprocity 
enables a discourse that empowers migrants as providers of refuge, resources, and 
respectability in their own right, and can run counter to Moral Underclass 
discourses of welfare chauvinism that suggest migrants have ‘a tendency to erode 
the normative consensus on which generous welfare systems depend’ (Brochmann 
& Hagelund, 2012a). 
 
9.2.4 – Contribution 4 – Influencing integration processes for non-
migrants and from non-migrant perspectives 
The fourth contribution is the insight into how individuals in formal positions 
within non-Catholic organisations understand and attempt to influence integration 
processes at a local level. The discursive framework allows us to distinguish where 
and how local efforts deviate from national policy and rhetoric. For example in 
Hasvoll and Larsen’s rebuke of governmental approaches that were seen as 
indicating a Moral Underclass Discourse or simply insufficient. The crisis-rhetoric 
exacerbated MUD tendencies by implying a failure or dysfunction of the asylum 
system, at both national and European levels. It also questioned the sustainability 
of the welfare state, and villified migrants as harming its sustainability, risking 
strengthening notions of welfare chauvinism (e.g. the Brochmann-II commission) 
(Freeman, 2009). 
 
What is remarkable is how the disconnect between local and central is apparent 
twenty years after the issue was identified in the Moen-Commission (Norges 
Offentlige Utredninger, 1995). Local initiatives started up and developed in the 
perceived absence of a coherent government response, thereby becoming 
‘exceptional services that are legitimised and presented as humanitarian services’ 
(Bendixsen, 2018, p. 168). What Siv and Larsen drew attention to in their 
interviews was how the circumstances and governmental behaviour in 2015-2016 
complicated the trust relationship between citizen and state, which can drive 
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anxiety in society (Papademetriou & Kober, 2012). Hasvoll also referred to 
anxieties in the non-migrant population and the need to mitigate them. 
 
Thus, an important aspect of their work entailed addressing potential anxiety 
amongst their volunteers and locals. One outcome is a construction of the local 
community as “generous”, engendering an unequal relationship between migrant 
and non-migrant that contributes to the hierarchisation of identities that 
privileges Norwegians. This ties into how activities by the Norwegian Church and 
Red Cross are often organised in ways that favour or privilege the volunteers; by 
controlling the context and circumstances of their activities. This may be the 
reason why, even in 1995, the Moen-commission (section 4.4, in particular Table 
6) noted how efforts to influence integration processes never quite achieve Full 
Pluralism (their term) or redintegration. 
 
These findings provide a contribution to the Multiculturalism-Interculturalism 
debate, which was touched on in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. An aspect of 
Interculturalism, according to Kymlicka (2016, p. 173), is that it attempts to avoid 
‘triggering anxieties’. What the interviews with Hasvoll, Larsen, and Siv 
demonstrate are differences in how those anxieties are addressed. On the one 
hand, they are addressed through controlling and defining parameters of 
interaction. What the interview with Hasvoll demonstrates, on the other hand, is 
how, through work with the Reference group, there are multiple causes for those 
anxieties. Efforts to influence integration processes, therefore, should address 
multiple factors, rather than simply focusing on language and work, as the 
organisations emphasising a Social Integrationist Discourse tend to. 
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9.3 – Implications and recommendations 
The above section alludes to multiple potential avenues of further research. These 
are a few suggestions for where this research can go, all of which suggest further 
application of the discursive framework. Firstly, more can be done to explore the 
differences between national, regional, and local discourses of integration 
processes. This is already touched upon by some scholars, but the research can 
benefit from a more expansive approach that includes participant observation, 
interviews, and documentary analysis. Secondly, further research comparing 
different religions can add considerable depth to the analysis. Thirdly, a more 
comprehensive look at voluntary organisations, faith-based or not, would be 
fruitful, as this thesis was limited to a local branch. There are already multiple, 
recent, publications based on the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) 
“NATION” project, which explores constructions of the nation-state and 
norwegianness from the perspective of school students222. 
 
Finally, a significant implication for further research is the emphasis on engaging 
critically with a range of material. This thesis has drawn on a multitude of 
resources and methods, and has highlighted the need to contextualise the 
analysis. Engaging critically with both reports and statistics draws attention to 
how processes have developed on one level, while engaging with historical 
material and contemporary data extends our analysis beyond ahistorical analyses 
based on a preconceived notion of recency. 
 
I am hesitant to offer definitive recommendations for specific action for the 
organisations in this thesis, as well as wider policy implications. As integration 
processes, and discourses, are intricate, multivariate, complicated, and 
overlapping, I have only pointed to a relationship between the two. Suggesting 
correlation or causation is, for now, simply beyond the ability of this thesis. It is 
impossible to ascertain what impact a recommendation would have on integration 
processes. What I would suggest, on the other hand, is a series of questions that 
may inform decision-making processes or integration discourses. 
                                         
222 See for example Erdal and Strømsø (2018a; 2018b) or Strømsø (Strømsø, 2018).  
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1. What does this (action, event, statement, policy, etc.) say about our 
understandings of identities? 
I argued in Chapter 2 that identities are at the core of integration processes. The 
discursive framework points to three, broadly speaking, approaches to identities: 
valorisation of a diversity of identities (Redintegrative), de-emphasis (Social 
integrationist), and hierarchisation (Moral Underclass). These operate on a 
continuum, and may have their time and place, but an organisation or group 
seeking to influence integration processes should be aware of the possible 
implications of choosing one over the other. De-emphasis does not, as argued 
above, preclude valorisation or hierarchisation, and the latter two may occur in 
spite of de-emphasis. Similarly, hierarchisation or valorisation may provoke each 
other, as we saw in the contrast between governmental and local responses to the 
arrival of refugees in 2015-2016. This leads to the second question. 
 
2. What factor in integration processes does this (action, event, statement, 
policy, etc.) seek to address? 
There is no silver bullet for integration processes. This does not imply that actions 
geared towards addressing one factor are inadequate, but recognising the 
limitations of the action may help clarify expectations. This is particularly useful 
from a Social Integrationist perspective, as it allows organisations to focus their 
activities on one source of inequality, while also recognising that there are 
multiple forms of inequality. This is compatible with how the voluntary sector 
already operates in Norway, with a significant division of labour. Additionally, this 
may skew the Social Integrationist approach towards a Redintegrationist 
understanding rather than MUD.  
 
Essential to drawing the greatest benefit from this requires an awareness of the 
broader spectrum of influences on integration processes. As Gunnar (Caritas 
Bergen) remarked in Chapter 6: ‘what we have tried to do, is to not bake the 
same cake’. In order for this to be the case, one needs to know who’s baking what. 
In other words, there needs to be a level of coordination. This opens up one 
specific recommendation, albeit hardly original as it is already implemented in 
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some towns and cities: a local government volunteer coordinator that can keep 
track of and support voluntary organisations and their activities. The absence of 
this was repeatedly noted in Bodø during the fieldwork, and would in all likelihood 
contribute positively to integration processes. 
 
3. Are there moral components to this action (event, policy, statement, etc.)? 
Perhaps one of the more significant questions, the purpose is to clarify that there 
are no neutral decisions or actions. We see this in how even a Social Integrationist 
Discourse can incorporate elements of a Moral Underclass Discourse. Recognising 
that morality plays a role in integration processes allows us to more clearly 
recognise which part of the continuum discourse one cuts across. This is also 
related to the first question pertaining to identities: valorisation and 
hierarchisation communicate moral positions.  
 
4. How do we understand integration processes? Are they continuous and 
open-ended, or are they limited and finite? 
These questions go to the heart of the subject matter: the constitution and 
imagination of society. Any attempt to influence integration processes should 
begin with scrutinising what they are and how they are understood. This underpins 
the entire discursive framework. If integration processes are seen as limited and 
finite, the discourses, and resultant action, are confined to Social Integrationist 
or Moral Underclass Discourses. Society is seen from a functionalist and relatively 
static perspective, where integration can be measured and considered complete. 
This underpins the close relationship between SID and MUD, as both rely on 
functional conceptions of society. The distinction lies in whether one concerns 
itself with “failures” (MUD) or whether it chooses to ignore/de-emphasise it (SID). 
 
The alternative, open-ended and continuous, allows for a Redintegrationist 
discourse and understanding. It implies a more holistic understanding of society 
that opens up for a multifactorial approach. Alongside a Social Integrationist 
Discourse, it allows an emphasis on a factor while recognising that integration 
processes are complex. It also encourages a negotiation of where the integration 
processes lead, and what one seeks to achieve by influencing it.  
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Appendix A - Discursive framework – relevant references 
Redistributive Discourse of Exclusion (RED) 
• Multiculturalism 
o ‘[Immigrants] should be able to participate as equal in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their 
own culture, religion and language, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values’ (Castles 
& Miller, 2009, pp. 247-248);  
o ‘[Can] include the whole society through its national identity’ (Vasta, 2009, p. 30);  
o Normalisation of diversity (Kymlicka, 2012);  
o ‘[Represents] cultural enrichment’ (Ben-Rafael, 1996, p. 141);  
o ‘[Criticized] because, in concentrating on cultural identity, it has neglected the fundamental problem of the economic 
and political marginalisation and exploitation’ (Turner, 2010, p. 73);  
o ‘[Arises] in the context of liberal or social democratic egalitarianism and citizenship [and] is different from integration 
because it recognizes groups, not just individuals’ (Modood, 2013, pp. 6, 46);  
o ‘[A] picture of multiculturalism which is predicated on a stance towards difference as non-intrusive’ (Valluvan, 2016, 
p. 211);  
o ‘[Refers] to the policy of peaceful co-existence of different cultural communities in one nation-state, with neither 
intention nor vision of interaction to create a larger community of bonding’ (Brazal, 2015b, pp. 47-48);  
o ‘[The] inclusion of immigrants into the mainstream by respecting their differences and recognising their distinctive 
cultural practices, religions and languages […] [Multiculturalism is] rights-based’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2017, pp. 3, 13);  
o ‘[Is] about ensuring there is a genuine dialogue and that the minority is allowed to express its point of view’ (Modood, 
2017, p. 6);  
o ‘“the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost 
by reference to race or ethnicity, and, additionally, but more controversially, by reference to other group-defining 
characteristics such as nationality, aboriginality, or religion […]”’ (Moodod and Meer in Meer, Modood, & Zapata-
Barrero, 2016, p. 4);  
o ‘[Highlights] the problem in the state-sponsored privileging of nationhood, and [the] exclusions this has entailed’ 
(Kymlicka, 2016, pp. 172-173);  
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o ‘[Focuses] on equal rights, recognition and justice [and] can be thought of as a vertical, top-down policy between the 
state and minority groups’ (Loobuyck, 2016, pp. 226, 232);  
o ‘An “orientation” to immigration that embraces difference and diversity […] a particular way of identifying how 
immigrants integrate in the destination country, and how they are expected to integrate’ (Bartram, et al., 2014, pp. 
102-103);  
o ‘[A] particular type of normative response [that] means that the state recognises and protects cultural minorities as 
distinct groups’ (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a, p. 10) 
 
• Integration 
o ‘[Relates] to their social, political and economic participation in the receiving society […] [Only] participation in civic 
associations and in general cultural discourse can provide proof that integration has been [achieved]’ (Bauböck, 1996a, 
pp. 114, 116);  
o ‘[Participation] in societies common institutions, combined with maintenance of group identities and cultural 
uniqueness’ (Eriksen & Sørheim, 1994, p. 92);  
o ‘[Equal] opportunities to compete for the same economic outcomes and can participate in civic and political life on the 
same basis as their native counterparts’ (Papademetriou & Kober, 2012, p. 21);  
o ‘For integration to occur, a mutual accommodation is required, involving the acceptance by both dominant and 
nondominant groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different people who interact within the same society’ 
(Phinney, et al., 2006, p. 71);  
o ‘[Is] a two-way process – it requires the mainstream society to adapt itself to immigrants, just as immigrants must adapt 
to the mainstream’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 96);  
o ‘[Is] the generic over-arching term of which multiculturalism is a species an so the two terms are on different levels 
rather than being alternatives’ (Modood, 2013, p. 146);  
o ‘[Has] been conceptualised as a two-way process which also involves social and cultural transformations in the majority 
society’ (Wessendorf, 2013, pp. 6-7);  
o ‘[Entails] rooting out prejudice and discrimination [and] is a long-term intergenerational process’ (Brazal, 2015c, p. 
79);  
o ‘[Predicates] a degree of mutual adaptation and acceptance’ (Halvorsen & Aschim, 2016, p. 103);  
o ‘[Process] by which immigrants gain social membership and develop the ability to participate in key institutions in the 
destination country’ (Bartram, et al., 2014) 
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• Accommodation 
o ‘[Involves] the adaptation of the inserted group to existing conditions, as well as a change in the structure of the larger 
society and a redefinition of its criteria of cohesion […] characteristics of inserted groups become accepted as 
distinctions within common social positions and membership groups’ (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114);  
o ‘[Does not] necessarily require state action [but can be] addressed within the framework of civic society’ (Kivisto, 2014, 
p. 163) 
• Inclusion 
o ‘[Arises] from five values: social justice, diversity, choice and opportunity, entitlement to rights and services and 
working together’ (Babacan & Babacan, 2013, p. 160);  
o ‘Acquisition of citizenship is linked to social inclusion’ (Pittaway, 2013, p. 179);  
o ‘[Does not] necessarily require state action [but can be] addressed within the framework of civic society’ (Kivisto, 2014, 
p. 163) 
• Interculturalism 
o ‘[…] not only respects difference but creates a space for the interaction of diverse cultural groups within a society’ 
(Brazal, 2015b, pp. 47-48);  
o ‘[…] contact opportunities between the local population and the minority [group diminishes] tension and prejudice 
against that group’ (Garcia-Muñoz & Neuman, 2012, p. 14);  
o ‘[Places] more emphasis on a contact-based policy approach […] it also needs to be supplemented by a positive narrative 
at the societal level to support and sustain the beneficial impact (political, leaders’ narratives, the media, schools, 
etc.)’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2017, pp. 2, 9);  
o ‘[Focuses] on interaction, social cohesion and shared participation on the basis of belonging together […] must involve 
equal status between groups, norms, supportive of equality, and co-operative rather than competitive intergroup 
interaction’ (Loobuyck, 2016, pp. 226, 230) 
• Selective acculturation 
o ‘[Takes] place when the learning process of both generations is embedded in a co-ethnic community of sufficient size 
and institutional diversity to slow down the cultural shift and promote partial retention of the parents’ home language 
and norms’ (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, p. 54);  
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o ‘[Occurs] when parents and children learn the language and culture of the host society and, at the same time, retain 
significant elements of their “original” culture or remain part of their ethnic communities’ (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 
10) 
• Deep equality 
o ‘[Is] a vision of equality that transcends law, politics, and social policy, and that relocates equality as a process rather 
than a definition, and as liver rather than prescribed. It recognises equality as an achievement of day-to-day interaction 
and is traceable through agonistic respect, recognition of similarity, and a concomitant acceptance of difference, 
creation of community, and neighbourliness’ (Beaman, 2017, p. 16) 
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Social Integrationist Discourse (SID) 
• Enclaves  
o ‘with its pool of low paid and available workers traps these workers in a co-ethnic and mono-linguistic environment, 
limiting their access to social networks outside of the immediate ethnic community and preventing structural 
embeddedness into the wider society’ (Bloch & McKay, 2015, p. 41);  
o ‘self-employment and employment in ethnic ownership economies are understood to result from disadvantages in the 
dominant labour market and in resources’ (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 59) 
• Segregation 
o ‘preserves the existing social structure by confining inserted individuals or groups within clearly-marked segments […] 
provides an externalisation of difference’ (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114) 
• Segmented Assimilation 
o ‘[In Europe] the idea of segmented assimilation has thus been conceptualized in terms of the differentiation and 
divergence between structural, political, social and cultural integration’ (Wessendorf, 2013, p. 7);  
o ‘raises the question of what makes some immigrant groups become susceptible to the downward route and what 
resources allow others to avoid this course […] the extent to which this strategy is possible also depends on the history 
of each group and its specific profile of vulnerabilities and resources’ (Portes & Zhou, 1993, pp. 82, 96);  
o ‘is built on the central idea that contexts shape assimilation’ (Zhou & Bankston III, 2016, p. 73) 
• Dissonant acculturation 
o ‘takes place when children’s learning of the [local] language and [way of life] and simultaneous loss of the immigrant 
culture outstrip their parents’ (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 53-54);  
o ‘occurs when children reject the values and culture of their parents for those of the host society’ (Bartram, et al., 
2014, p. 10) 
• Consonant acculturation 
o ‘where the learning process and gradual abandonment of the home language and culture occur at roughly the same 
pace across generations’ (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, p. 54);  
o ‘occurs when parents and children simultaneously learn the language and become accommodated to the customs and 
culture of the host society’ (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 10) 
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• Incorporation 
o ‘the process of becoming incorporated into the new setting requires a sifting and choosing of which aspects of one’s 
cultural background to preserve and which social ties to maintain’ (Kivisto, 2014, p. 38) 
• Denizens 
o ‘people who have become members of and have rights in their adopted countries to a substantial extent – in other 
words they have gained a degree of citizenship – but they are not citizens in a formal status sense’ (Bartram, et al., 
2014, p. 41) 
• Integration 
o ‘is usually identified as a matter of concern by politicians, and academic research in this area often seems to echo their 
concerns; some of this research is funded by governments and then predictably emphasizes issues that can be addressed 
by governments’ (Bartram, et al., 2014, p. 87);  
o ‘integration policy: a development of the means at the disposal of the welfare state to prevent social and economic 
marginalisation of what, at least initially, have been new, weak groups in society […] measures concerning legally 
established immigrants that support them during the process of integration into the society and contribute to improving 
preconditions to enable realisation of their rights’ (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a, pp. 10, 14) 
o ‘dominance of SID in government policy’ (Levitas, 2005, p. x);  
o ‘in politics the themes for integration have the following order: labour, education, housing, and finally, values’ (Døving, 
2009, p. 83);  
o ‘European governments in general have also neglected to develop integration policies and programmes for the highly 
skilled, assuming that highly educated and skilled migrants would adjust to a new society without them’ (Bartram, et 
al., 2014, p. 131) 
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Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD) 
• Racism – ‘the process whereby social groups categorize other groups as different or inferior on the basis of phenotypical or 
cultural markers. This process involves the use of economic, social or political power, and generally has the purpose of 
legitimating exploitation or exclusion of the group so defined […] Minorities may have poor employment situations, low incomes 
and high rates of impoverishment. This in turn leads to concentration in low-income neighbourhoods and growing residential 
segregation. The existence of separate and marginal communities is then taken as evidence of failure to integrate, and this 
in turn is perceived as a threat to the host society.’ (Castles & Miller, 2009, pp. 37, 275); ‘migrants and refugees have been 
represented metaphorically as natural catastrophes (flow, flood, invasion), against which “we” are presupposed to need to 
protect ourselves’ (Eide & Simonsen, 2009, p. 230); ‘Perceived discrimination is positively correlated with [separation] and 
marginalisation’ (Phinney, et al., 2006, p. 113); ‘Racism and xenophobia […] provide ideologies that deepen this divide 
between national and migrant[s] [and] prevent them from uniting’ (Brazal, 2015a, p. 10) 
• Assimilation – ‘immigrants were to be incorporated into society through a one-sided process of adaption’ (Castles & Miller, 
2009, p. 247); ‘coercive inclusion in a dominant culture’ (Bauböck, 1996b, p. 9); ‘leads to gradual abolition of difference […] 
cultural difference is then redefined as a hierarchy of civilisations […] Failed assimilation therefore prepares the ground for a 
racist interpretation of cultural distinctions […]’ (Bauböck, 1996a, p. 114); ‘based on the assumption that difference is harmful 
and should be abandoned’ (Turner, 2010, p. 76); ‘An attitude of laissez-faire, or benign neglect vis-à-vis the cultures on the 
part of the country of immigration, tantamounts to a policy of assimilation’ (Brazal, 2015c, p. 74); ‘conveys a factual prediction 
about the final outcome of the encounters between foreign minorities and the native majority and, simultaneously, an 
assertion of a socially desirable goal […] [forceful assimilationism] delegitimize the culture and the language of [migrants] […] 
Assimilationism sustains a vision of an integrated society composed of well-behaved citizens who share key values and 
normative commitments’ (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 44-45, 273, 276); ‘[however] defined, is typically a multigenerational 
process’ (Hirschmann, 2004, p. 1211); ‘the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences’ 
(Alba & Nee, 2003, p. 11) 
• Group Threat Theory – ‘predicts that an increase in the size of the minority generates hostile attitudes by the dominant native 
group toward the minority, either because of competition over scarce resources, or because of the perception that the 
minority is a symbolic threat to the cultural integrity’ (Garcia-Muñoz & Neuman, 2012, pp. 14-15) 
• Reactive ethnicity – ‘forging a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, and exclusion is not uncommon 
[…] Groups subjected to extreme discrimination and derogation of their national origins are likely to embrace them even more 
fiercely […] is the product of confrontation with an adverse native mainstream’ (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 148, 187, 284) 
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• Welfare Chauvinism – ‘[claims] and policies to reserve welfare benefits for the “native” population; 2) an ethno-nationalist 
and racializing political agenda’ (Keskinen, et al., 2016, p. 321); ‘the welfare state does not operate according to fiscal logic 
alone – it also reinforces (or is intended to reinforce) solidarity. That point raises the question: solidarity among whom?’ 
(Bartram, et al., 2014, pp. 43-44); ‘immigration has a tendency to erode the normative consensus on which generous welfare 
systems depend’ (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012a, pp. 2-3); ‘Accumulating evidence suggests there are significant negative 
relationships between both ethnic diversity and the rate and scale of migration and support for welfare state programs, either 
as measured by public opinion or by public sector spending on welfare programs’ (Freeman, 2009, p. 11) 
• Passing – ‘[adopting certain aspects of identity so as to be “unmarked”] and covering (i.e. attempting to downplay one’s 
[identities]) are two common ways of coping with [stigma]’ (Khosravi, 2012, p. 78) 
• Integration – ‘“Integration” does not have a universally agreed meaning; indeed it is often used without being defined and is 
sometimes used (by different people) in ways that can fairly be described as mutually incompatible’ (Bartram, et al., 2014, 
p. 84); ‘has become an emic concept used in the media and by the general public and politicians to address specific minorities 
and their more or less unsatisfactory ways of being and belonging in particular nation-states […] the concept of integration 
implies a specific kind of “problematisation” […] talk of and demands for integration in public and political discourse rest on, 
produce and reproduce specific ideas of the society, the state, the nation and the relationship between majorities and 
minorities’ (Rytter, 2018, p. 2) 
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Appendix B – Interview participant list 
NAME223 GENDER ROLE/OCCUPATION/ASSOCIATION NATIONALITY 
Mgr. 
Torbjørn 
Olsen 
Male Episcopal Secretary for Pastoral Care 
for Migrants in the Catholic Diocese of 
Oslo, previously priest in St. Eystein 
Bodø 
Norwegian 
Vigdis 
Larsen 
Female Deacon in the Norwegian Church Norwegian 
Siv Female Red Cross Norwegian 
Kirsten 
Hasvoll 
Female Adviser at Nordland County 
administration 
Norwegian 
Thomas 
Sivertsen 
Male Parishioner Norwegian 
Vanessa Female Bartender at Borealis Swedish/Cypriot 
Dmitri Male Red Cross Russian 
Gunnar 
Solheimnes 
Male Activity coordinator - Caritas Bergen Norwegian 
Per 
Wenneberg 
Male Leader for the Domestic section of 
Caritas Norway 
Norwegian 
Trond 
Aaring 
Male Activity coordinator - Caritas Drammen Norwegian 
Knut 
Maubach 
Male Activity coordinator - Caritas Stavanger Norwegian 
Ali Horori Male Local politician Norwegian 
Elisabeth 
Thielemann 
Female Principal at St. Eystein school Norwegian 
 
                                         
223 Italicised names are pseudonyms 
